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VOLUME III

PRATAPADITYA PAL

THE FIFTY-ONE ŚĀKTA PĪṬHAS

dehasthāḥ sarvavidyāśca dehasthāḥ sarvadevatāḥ/
dehasthāḥ sarvatīrthāni guruvākyena labhyate//
All knowledge resides in the body;
All deities reside in the body;
All pilgrimages are located in the body;
And none can be achieved without the guru's instructions.

PROLOGUE

That the traditional number of Śākta pīṭhas (seat, altar, shrine, pilgrimage center) is fifty-one is well-known and has been mentioned by all scholars who have written on the subject [1]. However, none of these scholars seems to have given any thought as to why the number came to be fixed at fifty-one. The number fifty-one or fifty (as in the *Jñānārṇava-*

* Almost half a century ago Professor Giuseppe Tucci discussed the pīṭha concept in the Buddhist context (see below note 20) and suggested that it was evolved to establish the homology between a yogin's body and the idea of the divine. While some scholars have reiterated the idea, most appear to have been unaware of Tucci's early and cogent observations. As an expression of my profound admiration for Tucci's monumental contribution to Indic and Tibetan studies, I propose to reinterpret here the Śākta concept of fifty-one pīṭhas in the light of Tucci's revelations.

[1] M. Eliade, 1958. *Yoga* (New York), pp. 346–348; D. C. Sircar, 1973. *The Śākta Pīṭhas* (Delhi, Varanasi and Patna). A. Bharati, 1975. *The Tantric Tradition* (New York), pp. 85 ff.; S. Chattopadhyay, 1978. *Reflections on the Tantras* (Delhi, Varanasi and Patna). Bharati (*ibid.*, p. 90) suggests that Eliade was the first scholar to formulate the relationship between centers of pilgrimage and the mystical body of the tāntric. This is not altogether true for Tucci had already discussed both the homology and the hypostasis doctrines as related to the pīṭha concept over forty years ago (see below, note 20). It is surprising, however, that neither Sircar nor Chattopadhyay were aware of the discussions about the homology between the pīṭhas and the adept's body by the three western authors.

tantra) is mentioned, among other texts, in the *Devībhāgavatapurāṇa*, the *Śivacarita*, the *Tantrasāra*, *Pīṭhanirṇaya* and the *Prāṇatoshiṇī tantra* [2].

Among the tāntric texts we can be reasonably certain of the date of the *Tantrasāra* of Krishnānanda Āgamavagiś who probably lived in the second half of the sixteenth century [3]. Since he quotes the *Jñānārṇava* list of fifty pīṭhas, we can further assume that by fifteenth century the concept of fifty pīṭhas had become current [4]. The *Devībhāgavata* (V, 29–30), which was certainly compiled at about this time or earlier, connects the fifty–one pīṭhas with the body of Satī, Śiva's first wife, who died or killed herself unable to bear the insults hurled against her husband by her father, Daksha. This story is mentioned invariably by all those who have written on the subject, and the most elaborate discussion is to be found in Sircar's book. However, neither he nor anyone else has sought to explain why the number is fifty–one and not sixty–four, eighty–four or one hundred and eight, which are all sacred numbers in Indian religious symbology. Moreover, if the idea of pīṭha was conceived simply to legitimatize shrines and temples dedicated to the various tribal, aboriginal, rural and non–Aryan goddesses, then it seems strange that the number of pieces into which Satī's body was chopped up was limited to fifty–one, when clearly the shrines are literally legion. Furthermore, the practice of legitimatizing or Sanskritizing such shrines had already begun as early as the *Mahābhārata*, and the purāṇas contain lengthy and monotonous chapters incorporating innumerable shrines not only of the Goddess but also of all other deities. Therefore, why should tāntric theologians suddenly reveal their predilection for the number fifty–one (or fifty) around the sixteenth century or a little earlier? In this paper we will attempt to answer this question and will begin by briefly reviewing the relevant material in the *Tantrasāra* which appears to be the first tāntric text in Bengal to mention the number fifty–one.

[2] See Sircar 1973 where all the textual references are cited.

[3] Although some scholars would like to make him a contemporary of Caitanya, and thereby place him in the first half of the sixteenth century, Sircar (*ibid.*, pp. 74–80) argues for a seventeenth century date. In my *Hindu Religion and Iconology according to the Tantrasāra* (Los Angeles, 1982), I have demonstrated that Krishnānanda very likely lived during the second half of the sixteenth century.

[4] The dates of tāntric texts are difficult to establish. However, since the *Jñānārṇava* is quoted authoritatively by Krishnānanda, it must have been well known by the sixteenth century. Moreover, the *Jñānārṇava* is also mentioned by the *Muṇḍamālinī*, a text quoted extensively in the *Tantrasāra*. Thus, at a conservative estimate, the *Jñānārṇava* was an established work by the fifteenth and is probably a much earlier text.

I.

The *Tantrasāra* is an encyclopaedic digest of Tāntric religious ideas and traditions that was compliled by Krishnānanda Āgamavāgiś, an eminent Bengali brahmin who lived in the town of Navadvip in West Bengal. Among the various rites and rituals described in this text, one of the most important is that known as *nyāsa*, which is basic to the tāntric mode of worship. There are various kinds of *nyāsas*, such as *shoḍānyāsa*, *mātṛikānyāsa*, etc., included in the text, but we will concentrate in this paper on *pīṭhanyāsa* only. The word *pīṭha* literally means a seat or altar, but we will have more to say about this presently. Let us first begin by defining *nyāsa*, which is the term used to describe the rite.

Mircea Eliade[5] defines the word *nyāsa* as follows:

> In connection with tāntric iconography, mention must be made of *nyāsa*, the 'ritual projection' of divinities into various parts of the body, a practice of considerable antiquity but one that tāntrism revalorized and enriched. The disciple 'projects' the divinities, at the same time touching various areas of his body; in other words, he homologizes his body with the tāntric pantheon, in order to awaken the sacred forces asleep in the flesh itself. Several kinds of *nyāsas* are distinguished according to their degree of interiorization, for in some cases the divinities and their symbols are 'put' into the various organs of the body by a pure act of meditation.

Aghehananda Bharati[6] gives us two definitions of the term *nyāsa*:

> 1) Literally, *nyāsa* is the process of charging a part of the body, with a specified power through touch...
> 2) *Nyāsa* (lit. placing down, depositing) is the process of placing one meditational entity into another, and applies both to actual, physical, and to imagined entities...

According to the *Kulārṇava tantra*, "nyāsa is so called because therein riches that are acquired in a righteous way are deposited or placed with persons whereby all-round protection is got"[7]. S. Shankaranarayana[8] further elaborates upon this when he writes:

> *nyāsa* means a pledge or a deposit that is entrusted to one's care. One must begin to identify oneself with the Mantra one worships and this is done by completely surrendering the individuality, the sense of 'I' ness

[5] Eliade 1958, pp. 210–211.

[6] Bharati 1975, pp. 91 and 273.

[7] P. V. Kane, 1977. *History of Dharmaśāstra*, V, 2 (Poona), p. 1123. The entire Chapter XXVII is devoted to the various kinds of *nyāsa*.

[8] *The Glory of the Divine Mother*, (Madras, 1973), p. 113.

and ' my ' ness in all parts of one's being and entrusting it to the Mantra which is the sound–body of the Deity.

Notwithstanding the different styles of verbalization by the various scholars, it is evident that the term *nyāsa* generally means the process whereby the adept homologizes his body with the divinities, and, once this is done, he not only holds his body in trust, so to speak, for the Divine, but the body itself is transformed into a sacred area, devoid of all profanity. This, of course, is an important point to bear in mind for the true *sādhaka* thereafter is one with the Divinity, and all his subsequent ritual acts must not be interpreted by ordinary standards of morality. In any event, we must remember this meaning of *nyāsa* in order to understand not only the pīṭha concept but also the number fifty–one which seems to have been generally misunderstood by modern scholars.

II.

The *Tantrasāra* mentions the word pīṭha in several different places but always in the context of *nyāsa*. In connection with the worship of Bhūvaneśvarī, we are told that one should invoke the goddesses Jayā, Vijayā, Ajitā, Aparājitā, Nityā, Vilāsinī, Doghdhrī, Aghorā and Maṅgalā who are the nine *pīṭhaśaktis* [9]. In this instance, the number of pīṭhas is nine, although no geographical places are named. The association of the *nyāsa* rite and four geographical pīṭhas is made in the *pīṭhatattvanyāsa* related to the goddess Śrīvidyā or Mahātripurasundarī and is quoted from the *Navaratneśvara* [10]. The four pīṭhas are Kāmagiri, Jālandhara, Pūrṇagiri and Uḍḍīyāna. The details of this *nyāsa* are tabulated in Table 1. There can be little doubt that here we are witnessing the homologization of the yogin's body, the pīṭhas, different deities and letters of the alphabet Rather curious are the facts that Uḍḍīśanātha is not the Bhairava of Uḍḍīyāna, and both Bhagamālinī and Mahātripurasundarī are characterized as Brahmātmāśakti. The *Tantrasāra* also quotes several verses from the *Kulāmṛita* to further explain the meaning of this *nyāsa*.

In the worship of Tārā a more elaborate *nyāsa* is quoted from the

[9] All references are to the Basumatī edition entitled *Bṛihat–Tantrasāraḥ* (Calcutta, n. d. 10th ed.) edited by Upandranath Mukhopadhyay and Satishchandra Mukhopadhyay. *tathā ca nibandhe – tataḥ saṃpūjayet pīṭhaṃ navaśaktisamanvitam/ jayākhyā vijayā paścāt ajitā cāparājitā/ nityā vilāsini doghdhri taghorā maṅgalā'pi ca/*

[10] *Bṛihat–Tantrasāraḥ*, p. 270.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 339.

TABLE 1

Pīṭha	*Cakra*	*Bhairava*	*Bhairavī*	*Part of the Body*	*Letters*
1) Kāmagiri	Agni	Mitrīśanātha	Kāmeśvarī = Rudrātmaśakti	*mūlādhāra* (base of the spinal column)	ka, e, ī, la, and hrī
2) Jālandhara	Sūrya	Shashṭhīnātha	Vajreśvarī = Vishṇvātmaśakti	*hṛidaya* (heart)	sa, ha, ka, ha, la, hrī
3) Pūrṇagiri	Soma	Uḍḍīśanātha	Bhagamālinīdevī = Brahmātmāśakti	*lalāṭa* (forehead)	sa, ka, la, hrī
4) Uḍḍīyāna	Paraṃbrahma	Śrīcaryānātha	Mahātripurasundarī = Brahmatmāśakti	*brahmarandhra* (cranium)	ka, e, ī, la, hrī, sa, ha, ka, ha, la, hrīṃ, sa, ka, la, hrī

Rudrayāmala [11]. The *nyāsa* is to be performed on ten different parts of the body and is tabulated in Table 2.

TABLE 2

Pīṭha	*Part of the Body*	*Letters*
Kāmarūpa	*mūlādhāra*	hrī, strī, hū, aṃ, āṃ, kaṃ
Jālandhara	*hṛidaya*	iṃ, īṃ, caṃ
Pūrṇagiri	*lalāṭa*	uṃ, ūṃ, ṭaṃ
Uḍḍīyāna	*brahmarandhra*	riṃ,ririṃ, taṃ
Vārāṇasī	*bhruvormadhye* (between the eyebrows)	liṃ, liliṃ, paṃ
Jvalantī	*locantraye* (in the three eyes)	eṃ, aiṃ, yaṃ, raṃ, laṃ
Māyāvatī	*mukhāvṛitte* (face)	oṃ, auṃ, śaṃ, shaṃ, sam, ham
Madhupurī	*kaṇṭhe* (neck)	aṃ, aḥ, laṃ, kshaṃ
Ayodhyā	*nābhideśe* (navel)	none
Kāñcī	*kaṭya* (hip)	none

That there was some consistency in such lists is evident from the fac that the four most important pīṭhas are homologized with the same four parts of the body in both. The number of letters however varies from one pīṭha to another, and two of them, viz. Ayodhyā and Kāñcī, do not appear to be associated with any letters at all. This is strange since all the letters of the alphabet have not been used in this *nyāsa.* It is also interesting that these ten pīṭhas are regarded as the most important (*daśaitāni pradhānāni pīṭhāni ...*).

There is yet a third *pīṭhanyāsa* [12] quoted in the text which involves fifty-one different parts of the body and is associated with fifty-one letters of the alphabet and fifty-one goddesses known as Mātṛikā (Table 3).

[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 275–276.

TABLE 3

Names of Mothers With Corresponding Pīṭhas, Letters and Limbs of the Body

Letter	*Pīṭha*	*Mother*	*Limb*
a	Kāmarūpa	Tripurā	Head
ā	Vārāṇasī	Mālinī	Face
1	Nepāla	Madanā	Right eye
ī	Pauṇḍravardhana	Unmādinī	Left eye
u	Kāśmīra	Drāviṇī	Right ear
ū	Kānyakubja	Khecarī	Left ear
ṛ	Purasthita	Jhaṭikā	Right nostril
ṛṛ	Carasthita	Kalāvatī	Left nostril
ḷ	Purṇaśaila	Kledinı	Right neck
ḷḷ	Arbuda	Śivadūtī	Left neck
e	Āmratakeśvara	Subhagā	Upper lip
ai	Ekāmra	Bhagavahā	Lower lip
o	Trisrotaḥ	Vidyeśvarī	Upper teeth
ou	Kāmakoṭṭa	Mahālakshmī	Lower teeth
ṃ	Kailāsa	Koulinī	Throat
ḥ	Bhṛgu	Kāleśvarī	Mouth
ka	Kedāra	Kulamālinī	Right armpit
kha	Candrapura	Vyāpinī	Right elbow
ga	Śrīpīṭha	Bhagā	Right wrist
gha	Oṃkāra	Vāgīśvarī	Right finger base
ṅg	Jālandhara	Kālikā	Right finger tip
ca	Mānava	Piṅgalā	Right finger
cha	Kūpāntaka	Bhagasarpinī	Right finger
ja	Devikoṭṭa	Sundarī	Right finger
jha	Gokarṇa	Nīlapatākā	Right thumb
ñ	Māruteśvara	Siddheśvarī	Left armpit
ṭa	Aṭṭahāsa	Mahāsiddheśvarī	Base of right foot
ṭha	Vijaya	Aghorā	Right knee
ḍa	Rājagṛha	Ratnamālā	Right heel
ḍha	Kolvagiri	Maṅgalā	Base of right toe
ṇa	Elāpura	Bhagamālinī	Hip of right toe
ta	Kāmeśvara	Raudrī	Base of left foot
tha	Jayantī	Yogeśvarī	Left knee
da	Ujjayinī	Ambikā	Left heel
dha	Kshīrikā	Aṭṭahāsā	Base of left toe
na	Hastināpura	Vyomarūpiṇī	Tip of left toe
pa	Uḍḍīśa	Vajreśvarī	Right side
pha	Prayāga	Ksobhiṇī	Left side
ba	Vindhya	Śākambharī	Back
bha	Māyāpura	Anaṅga	Navel
ma	Jaleśvara	Lokeśvarī	Stomach
ya	Malaya	Raktā	Heart
ra	Śrīśaila	Susthā	Right shoulder
la	Meru	Śukrā	Hump on the back
va	Giri	Aparājitā	Left shoulder

Letter	*Pītha*	*Mother*	*Limb*
śa	Mahendra	Saṃvartā	Right hand
sa	Vāmana	Vimalā	Left hand
sha	Hiraṇyapura	Aghorā	Right foot
ha	Mahālakshmīpura	Bhairavī	Left foot
la	Uḍḍiyāna	Amoghā	Belly
ksha	Chāyāchatrapura	Sarvākarshiṇī	Mouth

It may be pointed out that the word *mātṛikā* also denotes the letter of the alphabet. The names of the pīṭhas given in this list are the same as those which occur in the *Jñānārṇava* [13]. However, while the *Jñānārṇava*'s list is of fifty letters, the *Tantrasāra* has fifty–one. Table 3 correlates the names of the pīṭhas with different parts of the body, the letters of the alphabet and the various goddesses.

III.

We thus see that the *Tantrasāra* itself knows of at least three different traditions regarding the number of pīṭhas: 4, 10 and 51. Although it seems that there was a tradition of three pīṭhas, as enumerated in the *Matasāra* [14], generally the early tāntric tradition knows of a group of four. The Buddhist tantras are quite consistent about the pīthas being four and the earliest text to mention them is the *Hevajratantra* [15]. The *Sādhanamālā* was compiled at least as early as the eleventh century, and there too only four pīṭhas are mentioned. The Buddhists also composed a text called *Catushpīṭhatantra* [16], the earliest manuscript of which is dated in 1145 A. D.

According to the *Catushpīṭhatantra* the four pīṭhas are *ātmapīṭha*, *parapīṭha*, *yogapīṭha* and *gūyapīṭha* or in other words pīṭha of the self, supreme pīṭha, pīṭha of yoga and the secret pīṭha. Thus, there is nothing geographical about the four pīṭhas in this text. In the earlier *Hevajra* too the pīṭhas do not appear to have any topographical significance as is clear

[13] Sircar 1973, pp. 20–21.

[14] Chattopadhyay 1978, p. 3. The concept of only three pīṭhas is also known to the *Tantrasāra* and the *Ānandārṇava*, where they are associated with the *cakra* of the lowest level. See Sircar 1973, p. 17 and Chattopadhyay 1978, p. 33.

[15] D. Snellgrove, 1959. *The Hevajra Tantra*, 2 parts. London, I, p. 70. Snellgrove has shown that the tantra must have existed in its present form by the eighth century (p. 14).

[16] Sircar 1973, p. 11.

from the commentaries [17]. In answer to Vajragarbha's question, "What o Lord, are these places of meetings", the Lord enumerates twelve different places which are called pīṭha, upapīṭha, kshetra, upakshetra, etc. He then clearly states that "these correspond with the twelve stages of a Bodhisattva [18]". These twelve stages are obviously the twelve *bhūmis*, as the commentators tell us. Vajragarbha then continues to ask: "What are these *pīṭhas* and the rest?" In reply, the Lord enumerates several places including the four principal pīṭhas: Jālandhara, Oḍḍīyāna, Paurṇagiri and Kāmarūpa.

As Snellgrove [19] has discussed, there is considerable confusion among the commentators regarding the exact number of places and the number of veins and limbs in the body. However, there is no ambiguity about the meaning of these pīṭhas, upapīṭhas, etc. According to Naro-pa's commentary, "the places, Jālandhara and so on, are mentioned for the benefit of simple fools who wander about the country". Snellgrove adds: "They are therefore interpreted as symbols for the places within the body, that is to say, they are the external equivalent of that which exists within". The confusion of the commentators was resolved by Tucci [20], who appears to be a pioneer in discussing the correspondence between the pīṭhas, in the Buddhist context, and the yogin's body.

Of the four principal pīṭhas named by the *Hevajratantra*, there is no doubt regarding the identification of Kāmarūpa and Jālandhara. By common consensus Uḍḍīyāna is identified with the Swat Valley in Pakistan, although some have questioned this identification [21]. There is also some uncertainty about the identification of Pūrṇagiri. It may be pointed out that while Jālandhara is consistently characterized as a great center for the worship of the Goddess, it is not especially associated with Buddhism. Kāmarūpa too was not as important as Bengal, Orissa or Nepal for the history of Buddhism, although the temple of Kāmākhyā may once have been associated with the faith [22]. Only the Swat Valley has had im-

[17] Snellgrove 1959, I, pp. 69–70, n. 2.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 68.

[19] See note 17.

[20] G. Tucci, 1936. *Indo-Tibetica*, III, 2, pp. 38–45, also cited by Snellgrove *ibid.*

[21] One of the more recent scholars to revive the identification of Uḍḍīyāna with Oḍra or Orissa is Professor Bijan Bihari De of Gauhati University who has discussed the subject in a thesis for the Calcutta University. I have not had the opportunity to examine this thesis however. That there was some confusion between Oḍra and Uḍḍīyāna is also evident from the *Kālikāpurāṇa*. In a recent article Lokesh Chandra («Oḍḍīyāna: a new interpretation» in M. Aris and A. S. Suu Kyi, eds. *Tibetan Studies in Honour of Hugh Richardson*, Warminster, 1980, pp. 73–78). has proposed the identification of Uḍḍīyāna with Kanchipuram in South India.

[22] Apparently there are many Buddhist sculptures scattered around the hill on

portant connections with Buddhism which in fact is an argument for its identification with Uḍḍīyāna. If the four pīṭhas were originally intended to be four external places of pilgrimage, it is rather curious that the Buddhists did not choose four better known centers of tāntric Buddhism. On the other hand, it is possible that these four places were simply important for the tāntric tradition in general, and were incorporated in both Buddhist and Hindu religious literature. Swat today bears no traces of Hindu tantra, or of the Śākta tradition, while its neighbour Kashmir has been an important center of tāntrism from early times. Kalhaṇa makes no particular mention of the Swat Valley or Uḍḍīyāna as important pīṭha, but does allude to the shrine of Śāradā in Kashmir. Indeed, the temple of Śāradā was so important that it became associated with the hagiography of Śaṃkarācārya, while Abul Fazal substituted it for Uḍḍīyāna in his discussion about the pīṭhas [23].

We may never know why these four particular places were chosen by the Buddhist tantras. Certainly, when the early Buddhists first selected the eight places of pilgrimage, at least four were directly associated with the principal events in the life of the Buddha – Lumbinī, Gayā, Sārnāth and Kasia. The selection of the other four, as is well–known, may have been dictated by geo–political considerations. Eliade has suggested that "since each pīṭha represented the actual presence of the Great Goddess, the quarternary symbolism expresses the victory of the cult of Śakti in all India" [24]. While this interpretation may be applicable to the Śākta pīṭhas, it is doubtful if the Buddhists had selected the number four for the same reason. It is difficult to connect the four pīṭhas with the four cardinal directions, as has already been pointed out by Bharati. However, the number four may reflect quarternary symbolism in an abstract manner, and this would explain why the number of great miracles of the Buddha's life too was settled at eight, perhaps to symbolize the eight directions, although they are not actually situated in these directions. The number of pīṭhas too was increased to eight, as we encounter in the *Jñānārṇava*, as well as to ten in the *Rudrayāmala*. Elsewhere in the *Tantrasāra* the number of *dikpālas* is increased from eight to ten with the addition of

which this temple is situated. Professor Bijan De has also informed me that the Tibetans and Bhutanese come down to the temple annualy by the hundreds to worship the goddess on the birthday (*vaiśākhī pūrṇimā*) of the Buddha.

[23] For Śaṃkarācārya's association with Śāradā, see Mādhava–Vidyāraṇya, *Śaṅkara–Dig–Vijaya*, 1978, tr. by Swami Tapasyananda (Madras), pp. 198 ff. Abul Fazal was the court historian of the Mughal emperor Akbar (1556–1605). See Sircar 1973, p. 14.

[24] Eliade 1958, p. 346.

Brahmā and Ananta to the conventional eight [25]. Thus four, eight and ten may all symbolize the universe with four, eight or ten directions (including the zenith and the nadir), and in the *nyāsa* ceremony, by either the four or the ten pīṭhas, the adept's body or the microcosm is homologized with the macrocosm. In my opinion, therefore, it is fruitless to try and identify the pīṭhas with exact geographical locations for these pīṭhas exist only in the mind and the body of the tāntric.

IV.

This is also clearly evident from the choice of the number fifty-one though here we do not have a directional symbolism. However, there are other numbers of pīṭhas such as fifteen (*Brahmayāmala*), eighteen (*Kulārṇava* and *Ashṭādaśapīṭha*) and forty-two (*Kubjikātantra*), but these are not necessarily associated with the *nyāsa* rites. Nevertheless, all these numbers do have symbolic significance. Eighteen of course is a very important number in Indian numerology, while forty-two is closely associated with alphabet mysticism, as for example, the *Bhūta-lipi* which consists of forty-two letters and plays an important role in astrological calculations [26]. Similarly, it seems unnecessary to discuss the grouping of 108 pīṭhas for it obviously follows the standard Indian practice of enumerating 108 names of deities. Moreover, in tāntric *sādhana*, the *mūlamantra* is to be recited 108 times [27].

It is significant to note that the first part of the *Lalitāsahasranāma*, traditionally ascribed to Śaṃkarācārya (8th c. or earlier), consists of fifty-one verses obviously corresponding to the fifty-one letters of the alphabet [28]. If indeed the *Sahasranāma* was composed by the philosopher-saint, then this would be one of the earliest applications, though indirect, of the *var-*

[25] *Bṛihat-Tantrasāraḥ*, p. 387. (*indrādidaśadevatāḥ saṃpūjya*).

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 43.

pañcahrasvāḥ sandhivarṇā vyomerāgnijalandharāḥ/
antyamādyaṃ// dvitīyañca caturthaṃ madhyamaṃ// kramāt//
pañcavargāksharāṇi syurvāntaśvetendubhiḥ saha/
eshā bhūtalipiḥ proktā dvicatvāriṃśadaksharaiḥ//

[27] Similarly, the number of *āsanas* in tantra is eighty-four as is stated in the *Kulārṇava* (*padmādi caturaśītinānāsana vicakshaṇaḥ*/ 13, 89a). The *Gheraṇḍasaṃhitā* (2, 1) tells us that the number of *āsanas* are innumerable, but eighty-four are the most important. In the *Skandapurāṇa* the *liṅgas* of Śiva are described in eighty-four chapters, and perhaps these are some of the reasons why the number of *mahāsiddhas* was also settled for eighty-four.

[28] R. Ananthakrishna Sastry, 1951. *Lalitā-Sahasranāman* (Madras) p. 6.

ṇasādhana or *akshara–vāda*, consisting of the 51 letters of the alphabet. Among the other texts, which we have mentioned above, the earliest is the *Jñānarṇava* which names fifty pīṭhas. By splitting one of these fifty names, Krishnānanda Āgamavāgiś, arrived at the number fifty–one which was accepted by his followers. Unable to understand the significance of this number, Sircar has written [29]:

> Curiously enough the *Tantrasāra*, in spite of its clear recognition of the number of Pīṭhas to be fifty only in accordance with the *Jñānarṇava Tantra*, actually makes fifty–one Pīṭhas out of the fifty enumerated above. This has been done *strangely* (italic ours) by splitting the name of one of the fifty Pīṭhas, viz. Merugiri (No. 44) into two names, viz. Meru Pīṭha and Giri Pīṭha, in the formal *nyāsa* associating certain limbs with the Pīṭhas. The *anomaly* (italic ours) was probably the result of a modification of the text of the *Tantrasāra* by later hands. What is, however, more interesting is that the *Pīṭhanirṇaya* or *Mahāpīṭhanirūpaṇa*, which has been quoted in the *Prāṇatoṣaṇī Tantra* by Rāmatosaṇa Vidyālaṅkāra ... adheres exactly to this modified number of the Pīṭhas, viz. fifty–one, although the list itself is independent of the earlier lists of Pīṭhas.

It is obvious from the above statement that Sircar has not appreciated the significance of the number fifty–one which is basic to the enumeration of the pīṭhas. He has laid much too much emphasis on the interpretation of the pīṭhas as pilgrimage centers that have a " geographical " reality. This is understandable in a scholar who is a leading authority on ancient Indian geography. The same emphasis on the pīṭha as a verifiable and identifiable geographical site is also evident in Chattopadhyay's discussion of Śākta pīṭhas [30]. He begins his essay disagreeing with Sircar's theory about the origin of the pīṭhas – that they " are nothing but the transformation of the early *yoni–kuṇḍas* ", – and plunges immediately into a discussion of certain names that occur in the Tīrtha–yātrā section of the *Mahābhārata*. Obviously, he too identifies the words pīṭha and *tīrtha* and seeks a topographical resolution of the pīṭha concept. Based on the geographical locations of some of the pīṭhas, he even discovers that " the *pīṭhas* developed in India at the initial stage under foreign influence " [31].

V.

The *Tantrasāra* quotes the entire *pīṭhanyāsa* from the *Jñānārṇava* in connection with the worship of Mahātripurasundarī. It is therefore a

[29] Sircar 1973, p. 19.
[30] Chattopadhyay 1978, p. 30 ff.
[31] *Ibid.*, p. 34.

further elaboration of the simpler *pīṭhanyāsa* with four pīṭhas we have already discussed. Instead of using four groups of letters however, in the more elaborate *nyāsa*, one letter is associated with one pīṭha, and then homologized with a limb in the body of the *sādhaka*. Thus, the basis of this *nyāsa* appears to be the entire alphabet of the Sanskrit language which consists of fifty or fifty-one letters from *a* to *ksha*. A glance at Table 3 clearly demonstrates how the pīṭhas, the letters and different parts of the body are homologized. Indeed, that the letters are the key to this symbology is evident not only from the fact that many of the names of the pīṭhas such as Meru pīṭha and Giri pīṭha are contrived but also from the nomenclature of the different parts of the body, some of which had to be repeated to conform to the number of letters. The number of letters is considered to be fifty or fifty-one according to whether or not one counts the letter *ksha*.

The importance of the concept of letters, which constitute *śabda* (word) and *dhvani* (sound), in tāntric tradition has been discussed by Woodroffe [32]. However, there is much more to be said about the subject. The *Sanatkumārīyatantra*, as quoted in the *Tantrasāra*, as well as other tantras, explicity states that the fifty letters from *a* to *ha* constitute the garland of letters and *ksha* is their Meru, presumably the cosmic axis (*kramotkramāgatairmālā matṛikārṇaiḥ kshamerukaiḥ/*). We are further told that it is forbidden to cross the Meru during *japa* or recitation (*caramaranam merurūpaṃ langhanaṃ naiva kārayet/*). According to the *Mālinīvijayatantra* the thread of the garland of letters is the sleeping Kuṇḍalinī power [33]. The tantras therefore advocate two theories, one of fifty and the other of fifty-one letters, which constitute what is known as *varṇa-sādhana*.

The profound significance of the number fifty-one, symbolizing all the letters of the alphabet and hence all words and sounds, is also evident from other iconographic information given in the *Tantrasāra*. Among other deities, Gaṇeśa, Kāma, Śiva and Vishṇu, each have fifty-one forms and fifty-one Śaktis [34]. The text divides the names of Śiva and Vishṇu, along with their Śaktis, into two groups: sixteen vowel images (*svaravarṇamūrti*) and thirty-five consonant images (*vyāñjanavarṇamūrti* or *halamūrti*). What is also curious is that in the cases of both Gaṇeśa and Kāma the names have been repeated in order to reach the required number, just

[32] John Woodroffe, 1979. *The Garland of Letters* 7th ed. (Madras).

[33] *Bṛihat-Tantrasāraḥ*, p. 28.

antarvidrumabhāsamāna-bhujagīṃ suptotthavarṇojjvalām /
āroha-pratirohataḥśatmayīṃ vargāshṭashṭottarām //

[34] See P. Pal, 1970. *Vaiṣṇava Iconology in Nepal* (Calcutta), Appendix F. See also Pal 1982 (note 3).

as the fifty-one pīṭhas include both real and imaginary names of "pilgrimage" centers. The *akshamālā* or the rosary, also known as *japamālā*, plays an important role in the tāntric tradition and here too the number of beads, we are told, should be fifty-one. The central bead should be larger than the others for it represents the letter *ksha* or Meru, which is the *axis mundi*. It is interesting to note that the rosary or garland is called *aksha* because it is made up of the fifty-one letters from *a* to *ksha* (= *aksha*).

It is clear from the above discussion that the number fifty-one was not an arbitrary or a *strange* choice as Sircar thinks but was deliberate and reflects the primary importance of both *śabdasādhana* and *ātmasādhana* in the tāntric mode of worship. The doctrine of Śabdabrahman is expounded at length in his *Śaradātilaka* by Lakshmaṇa Deśikendra (10th c.). "Śabdabrahman is the Consciousness in all beings" (*caitanyaṃ sarvabhūtānāṃ śabda-brahmeti me natiḥ*). As Woodroffe has commented, "This is the Śabdabrahman or the Brahman as the cause of manifested Śabda and Artha and therefore Mantra" [35]. And *mantra* of course is constituted with letters which are used to form words and sentences. The relation between *mantras*, the adept's body, and Śabdabrahman has been very lucidly explained by Woodroffe:

> All Mantras are in the body as forms of consciousness (Vijñānarūpa). When the Mantra is fully practiced, it enlivens the Samskāra and the Artha appears in the mind. Mantras are thus a form of the Samskāras of Jīvas – the Artha of which appears to the consciousness which is pure. The essence of all this is – concentrate and vitalise thought and will power. But for such a purpose a method is necessary, namely, languages and determined varieties of practice according to the end sought ... Mantravidyā is the science of thought and of its expression in language as evolved from the Logos or Śabda-brahman Itself. It is in this sense that the universe is said to be composed of the Letters [36].

The concept of Śabdabrahman and the symbolic significance of the letters of the alphabet play an important role in Pāñcarātra theology. Among others, the *Ahirbudhnya Saṃhitā* devotes several chapters to the subject, although there is no specific mention of the fifty or fifty-one letters [37]. We are told, however, that from *nāda* develops *bindu* and from the latter proceeds two kinds of sounds: vowels and consonants. The

[35] Woodroffe 1979, p. 43.

[36] *Ibid.*, pp. 224–225.

[37] F. O. Schrader. 1916. *Introduction to the Pāñcarātra and the Ahirbudhnya Samhitā* (Madras), pp. 118–120. Chapters 16 and 17 of the *Ahirbudhnya* are devoted entirely to an exposition of Śabdabrahma and the doctrine of the letters. Similar discussions also occur in the other principal Pāñcarātra saṃhitās.

vowels are then integrated with Śakti or specifically Kuṇḍalinī Śakti, and the consonants with Vishṇu who is the Kuṭastha Purusha. These ideas are developed further in the later *Lakshmī tantra* [38] where also several chapters are devoted to the origin of letters and their symbolic role in Pāñcarātra theology. In keeping with the central idea of the Supremacy of the Goddess, Lakshmī declares: " I then automatically evolve out of the great God into Śabdabrahman " [39]. An entire chapter is dedicated to the description of the Goddess as Mātṛikā, which of course means both the Mother and the letters of the alphabet [40]. She is called the mother of *mantras* and her body, constituted with the letters, is said to be Śabda-brahman. Indeed, this hypostasization of the letters finally results in the creation of a goddess called Varṇeśvarī or the Mistress of letters in the *Tantrasāra*.

The importance and antiquity of alphabet mysticism is evident in the doctrine of sound or *sphoṭa* in the Yoga tradition [41]. The Sphoṭa theory of Patañjali's *Mahābhāshya* is concerned with words and their significance. Naturally the letters (*varṇa*), and their sounds (*dhvani*) and the modifications of sounds known as *nāda* are important elements in the doctrine. The Yoga view holds that all letters have infinite potentialities of manifesting endless meanings, and the *Haṭha-Yoga-Pradipikā* (IV, 101–102) tells us that " whatever is heard in the form of sound is Śakti ". In Kuṇḍalinī-yoga, Mahā-kuṇḍalinī, of endless potentialities like the letters, remains coiled normally, but when aroused, according to the *Śaktisaṅgama tantra*, she manifests herself into fifty-one forms obviously corresponding to the total number of letters of the alphabet [42]. She creates the universe and all it contains in the form of the letters and then returns to rest in the *mulādhāra* of all living creatures. As the *Śiva-saṃhitā* (V, 58) says, Kuṇḍalinī is self-luminous and is the goddess of Speech (*vāgdevī*). We are repeatedly told in tāntric texts that the body of the deity is constituted with *mantras* which are composed of letters, and hence, they are of such paramount importance [43].

[38] S. Gupta, 1972, *Lakṣmī tantra* (Leiden), pp. 104–126; Chapters XIX-XXIII.

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 109.

[40] *Ibid.*, p. 125.

[41] S. N. Dasgupta, 1978. *Yoga as Philosophy and Religion* (Delhi, Varanasi, Patna), pp. 179–187.

[42] Woodroffe 1979, p. 225. It is also interesting that the number of heads that form the garland of the goddess Kālī is fifty-one.

[43] In passing it may be pointed out that the two categories of *bhāva*, as given in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, are eight and fifty, which seems a very abrupt jump from the first number. The number eight here is consistent with the eight-fold subtle body, eight forms of supra-animal existence, eight manifestations of *buddhi*, eight *yogāṅgas* and eight

VI.

To return to the subject of our discussion, the fifty-one letters of the alphabet are equated with fifty-one pīṭhas not because these pīṭhas are places of pilgrimage recommended to the devotee but because they represent the universe. That is why it would make no sense to try and find historical truth in these pīṭhas as to their exact geographical location or to discuss whether or not they existed at all. Collectively, they symbolize the macrocosm which is not only homologized with the microcosm of the adept's body through the *pīṭhanyāsa*, but is also interiorized, as has been suggested by Tucci and others. The process of interiorization is basic to both Yoga and tantra, as is clearly stated in the following verse from the *Kulārṇavatantra*:

liṅgatrayaviśeshajñaḥ shaḍādhāravibhedakaḥ/
pīṭhasthānāni cāgatya mahāpadmavanaṃ vrajet// (5, 106)

The *sādhaka* who knows the three *liṅgas* and can distinguish between the six *cakras* wakes Kuṇḍalinī and with her travels through the pīṭhas and reaches the greater lotus forest which is located in the cranium. Indeed, it is well known that each of the six *cakras*, which are within the adept's body, is considered to be a pīṭha.

The fundamental importance of the process of interiorization was recognized by the tāntrics long before the theory of fifty-one pīṭhas was thought of. It is interesting that one of the *stotras* composed by Abhinavagupta is called *Dehasthadevatācakrastotra*[44]. In it Abhinavagupta has homologized the eight Mātṛikās with the eight *cakras* of the body and in the tāntric tradition the Mātṛikās are always eight in number. It may be pointed out that generally the letters of the alphabet are divided into eight groups in tāntric philosophy which may explain the importance of the group of eight Mātṛikās rather than the traditional seven. Furthermore, Abhinavagupta addresses the Mothers as seated on eight petals of

Śaktis, as enumerated in the early Pāñcarātra texts (Schrader 1916, pp. 55, 62, 70, 72, 122, 124, 171). Scholars have rightly been puzzled by the abrupt increase of these numbers to fifty. While Keith considered the passages as later interpolations, Frauwallner was of the opinion that the doctrine of fifty *bhāvas* is in fact older. G. Larson (*Classical Sāmkhya*, Varanasi, Delhi, Patna, 1979, pp. 191–194) agrees with Keith although he does give an alternate explanation. Can we suggest that the number fifty reflects the influence of alphabet mysticism and that the verses indeed are an interpolation in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*?

[44] L. Silburn, 1970. *Hymns de Abhinavagupta* (Paris), pp. 85–86. Compare also the Kuṭastha Purusha of the early Pāñcarātra saṃhitās.

the lotus within the body; thus here the body is also seen as a *maṇḍala*, which, as we know, is a microcosmic symbol of the universe. At the center of the universe or the *maṇḍala* is Śiva and on the eight petals are the eight Mothers symbolizing the energy radiating from that center. As Silburn has commented:

> Ou encore *śakticakra* désigne l'ensemble des energies, ces rayons qui permettent au *sādhaka* de pénétrer dans la lumière de la Conscience, libre et sans dualité ... " [45]

VII.

Neither the idea of the *dehasthadevatā* of Abhinavagupta nor that of *nyāsa* originated with the tantras, but as Eliade [46], with his characteristic erudition and insight has shown, both are of considerable antiquity which " tāntrism revalorized and enriched ". The seminal idea of *nyāsa* is reflected in the *Rigvidhāna* and the process of interiorization can also be traced back to the homology between Vedic sacrifice and *ātmayajña*, as was brilliantly demonstrated in an essay by Coomaraswamy many years ago [47]. I can only remind the reader of the following verses from the *Kaṭha Upanishad* which is the most lucid and eloquent statement of yogic (or tāntric?) interiorization that I have come across:

> A hundred and one are the channels of the heart;
> One of them leads to the crown of the head.
> By this channel, proceeding upward, one goes to immortality.
> The rest serve for movement in various directions.
> The Person of a thumb's size, the *ātman* within,
> ever dwells in the heart of beings.
> One should draw him out of one's body with care –
> just as an inner stem is drawn from its sheath.
> Him you should know, the Pure, the Immortal;
> Him you should know, the Pure, the Immortal [48].

In this connection it is worthwhile to discuss Chapter 104 of the *Vāyupurāṇa* which contains interesting material both about the symbology of interiorization and the pīṭhas [49]. Apart from closely associating Pa-

[45] *Ibid.*, p. 90.

[46] Eliade 1958, pp. 210–211.

[47] A. K. Coomaraswamy, " *Ātmayajña* " in *Coomaraswamy* (2), 1977, ed. R. Lipsey (Princeton), pp. 107 ff.

[48] R. Panikkar, 1977. *The Vedic Experience* (Berkeley and Los Angeles), p. 568.

[49] Sircar (1973, p. 128) has alluded to this chapter but has not fully discussed its import.

rabrahma and Śakti, we are told that Kṛishṇa is none other than Brahma [50]. Neither in the nigamas nor in the āgamas is anything said to be beyond him. And yet Vedavyāsa is puzzled by the fact that according to the nigama he is beyond the letters, while in the śruti he is said to be *paratastvaksharāt* [51]. Thus mystified, Vyāsa goes to Mount Meru and begins to meditate upon the four Vedas who appear before him as personified beings. Interestingly, their bodies are constituted of the letters of the alphabet in the following manner: faces with the vowels and their middle with *praṇava* or *om*; arms and hands with the letters beginning with *ka* and *ca*; right leg with *ta–varga*; left with *ca–varga*; etc., etc. It then continues to homologize the four Vedas with various pilgrimage centers, rivers, the sacrifices, fires, religions and *mantras*. The short list of pilgrimage centers begins with Mathura and significantly the word *pīṭha* is used to characterize Nepāla, Purṇagiri, Māthuri, Kāñci, Jālandhara and Bhṛigu [52]. Uḍḍīyāna is conspicuously omitted from this list. In any event, Vyāsa then reveals his doubt before the four Vedas who commend him for his many faceted qualities and declare that he is none other than Vishṇu (*sādhu sādhu mahā prājña vishṇurātmā śarīriṇām*). However, they are unable to dispel his doubt about existence of a being or principle beyond the Supreme Being and tell him that *akshara* is *parama brahma*. Further, just as the flower has beauty and fragrance, so also *ātmā* has its own essence which is a great mystery unknown even to the Vedas [53].

Thus, the homology between the pīṭhas and the yogin's body is without question an ancient concept which receives new and added emphasis in the tantras, whether Buddhist, Hindu or Jaina. We have already discussed the evidence of the *Hevajratantra*; and the *Catushpīṭhatantra* categorically mentions *ātmapīṭha*. Fascinating information about pīṭhas and alphabet mysticism is contained in the *Ḍākārṇava tantra* which seems to have been

[50] *rādhāvilāsarasikaṃ kṛishṇākhyaṃ purushaṃ param* / 104, 52a.

[51] *nātaḥ parataraṃ kiñcinnigamāgamayorapi* /
tathāpi nigamo vakti hyaksharāt parataḥ paraḥ //
golokavāsī bhagavānaksharāt para ucyate /
tasmādapi paraḥ ko'sau gīyate śrutibhiḥ sadā
uddishṭairvaidavacanairviśesho jñāyate katham /
śrutervārtho'nyathā bodhyaḥ paratastvaksharāditi // (53–56).

[52] 104, 71–85.

[53] *aksharaṃ brahma paramaṃ sarvakāraṇakāraṇam* //
tasyātmano'pyātmabhāvatayā pushpasya gandhavat /
rasavadvā sthitaṃ rūpamavehi paramaṃ hi tat //
anubhūtaṃ tadasmābhirjāte prākritike laye /
aksharātparatastasmādyatparaṃ kevalo rasaḥ /
na ca tatra vayaṃ śaktāḥ śabdātīte tadātmakāḥ // (108–110)

altogether ignored by most scholars interested in the pīṭha concept [54]. There we have a division of four *cakras* within the body located at the navel, heart, throat and the head, and these are equated with the letters of the alphabet. This may also explain why the Buddhist tradition generally recognizes a group of four pīṭhas only. However, the number is increased to twenty-four in the Buddhist tantras corresponding to twenty-four places in the body, as has been thoroughly discussed by Tucci [55].

The Hindu tantras repeatedly emphasize that the human body itself is the seat of Brahma. According to the *Śivasaṃhitā* [56]:

> This temple of suffering and enjoyment (human body), made up of flesh, bones, marrow, blood, and intersected with blood vessels, etc., is only for tbe sake of suffering or sorrow.
> This body, the abode of Brahma, and composed of five elements and known as Brahmāṇḍa (the egg of Brahma or microcosm) has been made for the enjoyment of pleasure or suffering of pain.

The *Kulārṇava* asserts that Brahma is the ultimate bliss and resides in the body (*ānandaṃ brahmaṇo rūpaṃ tacca dehe vyāvasthitam/* 5, 80a). In the *Jñānasankalinī* we are told that all knowledge, deities and pilgrimages exist in the body [57]. Quoting from the *Tantrāntara*, the *Tantrasāra* informs us that if one bathes in the pure Pushkara *tīrtha* located in the heart one is never reborn. This body is the *tīrtha* of Śiva through which flows the two rivers of gnosis known as Iḍā and Sushumnā. If one bathes constantly in these waters of gnosis, then why should one bathe in *tīrthas*? [58]

The idea that the pīṭhas – whether seats, altars or pilgrimage centers – lie within the body of the *sādhaka* has also been repeatedly emphasized by the *mahāsiddhas* in their *sahaja sādhana*. In the *Kālacakratantra* the Buddha himself explains how everything in the universe with all objects and localities and how time with all its divisions and subdivisions are contained within the body [59]. At the same time, however, they have charac-

[54] H. P. Sastri, 1917. *A Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Government Collection*, I (Calcutta), pp. 92–100. A detailed discussion of this material must be postponed for another occasion.

[55] See note 20.

[56] S. C. Basu (ed. and tr.), 1979. *The Siva Samhitā* (New Delhi), p. 14.

[57] S. Chattaraj (ed. and tr.), 1980. *Jñānasaṅkalinī-tantram* (Calcutta), p. 2. The verse is quoted as the epigraph to this article.

[58] *snāyācca vimale tīrthe pushkare hṛidayāśrite /*
viṅdutīrthe'thavā snātvā punarjanma na vidyate //
iḍāsushumne śivatīrthake'smin jñānāmbupūrṇe vahataḥ śarīre /
brahmāmbubhiḥ snāti tayoḥ sadā yaḥ kintasya gāṅgairapi pushkarairvā //.
Bṛihat-Tantrasāraḥ, p. 640.

[59] S. B. Dasgupta, 1962. *Obscure Religious Cults*, (2nd ed. Calcutta), p. 25.

teristically questioned the efficacy of all external rituals. In his *Dohākosha*, Saraha-pāda unambiguously states: [60]

> What will one do with lamps, offerings, Mantras and services – what is the good of going to holy places or to the hermitages? – can liberation be attained only by bathing in holy waters?

Even a more trenchant criticism of pilgrimage is offered by the Jaina Muni Rāma Siṃha (c. 1000 A. D.) in his *Pahudā-dohā*: [61]

> Prevent this elephant of the mind from going to the mountain of Vindhya, for it will trample under feet the forest of Śīla (i.e., good conduct discipline) ... Of no avail is travelling from one sacred place to another; for the body may be cleansed, but what of the mind?

The *Kumārītantra* (7, 14–19) tells us that one can visit the various pīṭhas such as Kāmarūpa, Purṇaśaila, Vindhyaparvata, Uḍḍīyāna, Vārāṇasī, Louhitya, Karatoyā, Āryāvarta, Prayāga or Brahmāvarta, but better than a pīṭha is the burning ground. And as Ramprosad Sen sings in a hymn to Kālī "because you love the burning ground, mother, I have converted my heart into one".

Epilogue

To sum up, although the majority of the names of the pīṭhas in tāntric literature are those of real pilgrimage centers, the act of pilgrimage or *tīrthayātrā* had nothing to do with the pīṭha concept. Rarely does a tāntric text recommend a visit to a pīṭha to be as effective spiritually as the purāṇas do with the *tīrthas*. Rather, the pīṭhas are repeatedly said to be located within the *sādhaka*'s body and in general they symbolize the entire universe. The earliest number of pīṭhas found in Buddhist texts is restricted to four generally, which may symbolize the four directions and hence the universe. The number four may also have been inspired by the earlier Buddhist tradition of four primary pilgrimage spots associated with the life of the Buddha. Although the four places are not actually located in the four cardinal directions, one cannot overlook their directional symbolism. It is equally possible that the four pīṭhas symbolize the four *cakras* in the adept's body as stated by Buddhist tantras, or represent the four kinds of *śūnya* enumerated in *Haṭhayoga-pradīpikā*: *śūnya*, *ati-śūnya*, *mahā-śūnya* and *sahaja-* or *sarva-śūnya*. We may also recall

[60] *Ibid.*, p. 56.
[61] *Ibid.*, p. 59.

that there are four types of Yoga: *mantra, laya, haṭha and rāja,* and Yoga is fundamental to tantra. Similarly, the three pīṭhas of *Matasāra* and other texts may symbolize the three aims (*trilakshya*) concept of the Yoga tradition. That the pīṭhas are internal rather than external in the Hindu tāntric tradition is evident from Abhinavagupta's *stotra* discussed above where the internal *cakras* are homologized with the eight directions, and hence with the universe. Finally, because there are fifty-one letters in the alphabet, Satī's body was divided into fifty-one limbs and the homology established among the limbs of the deity, the *sādhaka* and the letters, as is clear from the *Pīṭhanirṇaya.*

It is quite clear from the above discussion that neither the doctrine of Śabdabrahman nor that of alphabet mysticism is as late as one might think because of the generally prevailing views that tāntric literature is not very old. Apart from the fact that some of these ideas are clearly discussed and delineated in the Upanishadic texts and the concept of *nyāsa* may be traced back to the *Rigvidhāna,* the early Pāñcarātra texts where alphabet mysticism plays an important role are generally believed to have been compiled by the Gupta period (300–600 A. D.). Most scholars are also agreed that the *Vāyupurāṇa* is one of the earliest purāṇas and in its present form was compiled probably before the seventh century [62].

En passant, one may introduce here the doctrine of alphabet mysticism that is an essential element of both Manichaeism (4th c. A. D.) and Mazdakism (6th c.). In discussing the alphabet mysticism of Mazdak, Altheim and Stiel traced the origin of the doctrine to Greek influence, but as Müller has shown Mazdak very likely borrowed the idea from Manichaeism [63]. According to Mazdak " the king of the upper world rules by means of the letters of the alphabet whose sum yields the highest name " [64]. As Müller has suggested, the idea must derive from Mani's ABC classification in his *The Great Gospel from Aleph to Tau.* It is not our purpose to discuss the relationship between Mani's and Mazdak's ideas and the doctrines of alphabet mysticism in India. However, is it a pure coincidence that alphabet mysticism should play a significant role both in Iran and in the Pāñcarātra system in India at about the same time?

In any event, certainly between the fifth and the eleventh century (Abhinavagupta, Lakshmaṇa Deśikendra as well as the *Rudrayāmala*), the

[62] Chapter 104 does not occur in all the manuscripts but is included in the Vaṅgavāsī edition. It is very likely that the chapter is an interpolation, especially as it mentions Rādhā and includes Nepal as a pīṭha.

[63] W. Müller, 1963. " Mazdak and the Alphabet Mysticism of the East ", in *HR* 3, 1, pp. 72–82.

[64] *Ibid.,* p. 77.

homology between the universe (symbolized by 4, 8 or ten pīṭhas or directions), the yogin's body and the letters of the alphabet became a familiar concept. The homology was ritualistically enacted through the rite known as *nyāsa*. Sometime during the eleventh and the sixteenth century, there developed a *nyāsa* called *pīṭhanyāsa* involving the entire alphabet. Depending on the number of letters (fifty or fifty–one) the concept of fifty–one pīṭhas was evolved. The Buddhists do not appear to have accepted the idea of the fifty–one pīṭhas, but certainly the Hindus did. The mythological justification of the number was contrived by chopping up Satī's body into fifty–one. It should be remembered that the Dakshayajña story is *not* the origin of the pīṭha concept, as Sircar and his followers seem to imply. The function of the myth was rather to legitimatize a new concept and establish a " linkage " with an ancient creation myth. While attending Daksha's sacrifice, Satī in a sense sacrifices herself (*ātmayajña* or self–sacrifice), and since each of us has pīṭhas within us, she may be said to be the cosmic creator like the Purusha who creates through primal sacrifice. By interiorizing and homologizing the pīṭhas and the letters with his body in the *nyāsa* rite, the yogin is essentially transmuted into the divine and ceases to be a mortal.

Thus, these fifty–one pīṭhas have nothing to do with the geographical reality of pilgrimage centers that an adept must visit,

Rather, they should be mentally visited by the yogin for they exist within his own body. Finally the Sahajyās even rejected this homologization when Muni Rāma Siṃha said:

> What can one do with the letters which will shortly die with the times? That is, O Fool, called Mokṣa by which a man becomes changeless (*anakkharān*) [65].

[65] See note 61.

LUCIANO PETECH

THE SUCCESSION TO THE TIBETAN THRONE IN 704–705

There is no end of problems raised by the interpretation of the historical material supplied by the old Tibetan chronicle known by the name of *Annals of Tun–huang*. One of them, concerning a case of conflict between the Tibetan and Chinese sources, gives me the occasion for offering these few pages as a tribute of gratitude to my *guru* Giuseppe Tucci, who half–a–century ago initiated me to the fascinating study of Tibetan history and culture.

I.

In 703/4 the Tibetan *btsan–po* (king) K'ri–'du–sroṅ–brtsan went to wage war in a frontier region, where he subsequently died at the end of 704 or early in 705. A serious disagreement arises concerning the region which was the theatre of the king's last campaign and of his death. According to the Tun–huang *Annals* (9th century?) [1], in the year of the Hare (703) " in winter the *btsan–po*, having gone to the country of 'Jaṅ, conquered 'Jaṅ " (l. 92) In the year of the Dragon (704) " in winter the *btsan–po*, having gone on a military expedition (*c'ab srid la*) [2] to Myva, died [there] " (l. 95) [3].

[1] The Tun–huang *Annals* (Pelliot Tib. 1288) and *Chronicle* (Pelliot Tib. 1286 and 1287) are quoted here directly from the facsimiles published by A. Spanien and Y. Imaeda, *Choix de documents tibétains conservés à la Bibliothèque Nationale*, II, Paris, 1979.

[2] On the meaning of the term *c'ab srid* in the *Annals* and in the *Chronicle*, but not necessarily in other ancient documents, see A. Macdonald, « Une lecture des P. T. 1286, 1287, 1038, 1047 et 1290 », *Etudes tibétaines dédiées à la mémoire de Marcelle Lalou*, Paris, 1971, p. 280.

[3] Most of the later historical texts contain the same information. Thus the royal genealogies by Grags–pa–rgyal–mts'an (1147–1216) and by 'P'ags–pa (1235–1280) ap. G. Tucci, *Deb t'er dmar po gsar ma*, Rome, 1971, p. 130 and 134; the *rGyal rabs* (c. 1368), ed. by B. I. Kuznetsov, *rGyal rabs gsal ba'i me long*, Leiden, 1966, p. 161; the *rGya Bod*

The Tun–huang *Chronicle* (Pelliot Tib. 1286–1287) conveys the same information in slightly different words. " After this, [king K'ri–'du–sroṅ–brtsan] made an expedition (*c'ab srid*) against 'Jaṅ and levied tribute from White Myva. He reduced to subjection Black Myva and [obtained] other [successes]. His helmet (*dbu rmog*; magic power) [4] being mighty, no other member of the dynasty carried military expeditions farther than he " (ll. 334–335).

The geographical setting is not open to doubt. As it has been known for a long time, 'Jaṅ is the Mo–so country. i.e. the region of Li–chiang on the Yangtze–kiang. White Myva and Black Myva (白蠻 Pai Man and 烏蠻 Wu Man for the Chinese) were the two districts in which 'Jaṅ was divided. A few years later (c. 720) 'Jaṅ was to become the northernmost section of the new kingdom of Nan Chao in the Chinese province of Yünnan.

The Chinese sources, i.e. the two dynastic histories of the T'ang, seem to point in a quite different direction. "At this moment (c. 703) the kingdoms tributary to the Tibetans situated on the southern border, viz. 泥婆羅門 Ni–p'o–lo–mên etc., all of them rebelled. The king in person went to fight them, but died in camp; his sons disputed the succession among themselves " [5]. Thus far the chapter on T'u–fan (Tibet); the biography of general Kuo Yüan–chen in the same work employs similar terms: " Now, is the Tibetans neither invade nor molest us, this is not because they are troubled by the fact of not receiving friendly messages from our government, but simply because in their kingdom the various chieftains and the principalities subject to them, such as Ni–p'o–lo–mên etc., have grown hostile to each other. Because of this, the *btsan–po* has gone in person to lead a military expedition to the South. He himself has died in an enemy court and his kingdom has suffered severe internal upheavals ". And farther on in the same context: " Several Man (= Myva? barbarians in general?) inside the kingdom, as well as principalities such as P'o–lo–mên and others, are at present in revolt " [6].

yig ts'aṅ (1434), Thimphu ed., I, 126*b*; all of them state that K'ri–'du–sroṅ–brtsan died in 'Jaṅ.

[4] On the significance of the helmet (*dbu–rmog*) sde G. Tucci, « The sacral character of the kings of Ancient Tibet », *EW*, 6, 1955/6, 200 (= *Opera Minora*, Rome, 1971, p. 375).

[5] *Chiu T'ang–shu* (Po–na ed.), 196–A, 5b; translation by P. Pelliot, *Histoire ancienne du Tibet*, Paris, 1961, p. 12. The parallel passage in the *T'ang–shu* (Po–na ed.), 216–A, 7a (transl. P. Pelliot, *Op. cit.*, p. 95) omits the name of the rebel populations and mentions only " all the tents subject to Tibet ", which seems to allude to nomad tribes.

[6] *Chiu T'ang–shu*, 97.5a–b; translation by E. Chavannes, *Documents sur les Tou–*

Ni–p'o–lo–mên is usually considered as a contraction of Ni–p'o–lo P'o–lo–mên, translated as " the Brahmans of Nepal ", or " Nepal and the Brahmans (i.e. India) " [7]. According to a Japanese scholar the last syllable *mên* refers to Mon[-yul], the Himalayan tract to the West of Bhutan [8]. Or else *mên* is simply dropped and the name is taken to refer to Nepal only [9].

The contradiction between the Tibetan and the Chinese evidence is flagrant; as far as I am aware, no attempt at a conciliation has been made upto now. *Prima facie*, it would seem necessary to operate a clear –cut choice, accepting one of the two traditions and discarding the other as erroneous; the perfect coincidence of the dates and of the facts excludes any possibility that we are confronted with two different events.

Nevertheless I believe it possible to formulate at least an hypothesis, based on a critical examination of the available elements. For this purpose it seems advisable to start from the Tibetan evidence, which appears more certain and more circumstantiated than the Chinese. Since 700 the *btsan–po* had been permanently absent from Central Tibet, directing operations against China on the north–eastern frontier, while his mother K'ri–ma–lod carried on the government in his name. Her exalted position is underscored in the *Annals* by the regular mention of her places of residence every year after 700; this was done for no other Tibetan queen. We know from the Chinese texts that as the result of a prolonged but not always successful campaign the Tibetans in 702 concluded peace with China [10]. At the end of the same year the ministers were able to proceed to the administrative organization (*mk'os c'en po*) [11] of the Sum–ru (l. 86), the Sum–pa country to the Northeast, which was formed into an additional " horn " of the kingdom [12]. In the summer of 703 the

kiue (Turcs) Occidentaux, Paris, 1941, pp. 185–186 and 187. In the parallel biography in *T'ang–shu*, 122.15b–16a, Ni–p'o–lo–men has been corrected into Ni–p'o–lo; a clear instance of *lectio facilior.*

[7] S. Lévi, *Le Népal*, II, Paris, 1905, p. 174.

[8] H. Sato, Japanese translation of the Tibet chapters of *Chiu T'ang–shu* and *T'ang–shu*, in *Kiba minzoku shi 3* (Three studies on the horsemen peoples), Tokyo, 1973, pp. 121–122.

[9] Z. Yamaguchi, *Toban seiritsu shi kenkyū* (A study on the establishment of the T'u–fan kingdom), Tokyo, 1982, p. 747.

[10] *Chiu T'ang–shu*, 196–A. 5b; *T'ang–shu*, 216–A. 7a; P. Pelliot, *op. cit.*, p. 12 e 94–95.

[11] On this term see L. Petech, « Glosse agli Annali di Tun–huang », *RSO*, 42, 1967, 249n.

[12] On the suddivision of the kingdom in *ru* " horns " see G. Uray, « The four horns of Tibet according to the Royal Annals », *AOH*, 10, 1960, pp. 31–57. For a different interpretation of Sum–ru see Z. Yamaguchi, « Su–p'i and Sun–po: a geographical

king stayed at 'Ol–byag in Gliṅ (l. 90) on the upper reaches of the 'Bri–c'u (Yangtze–kiang)[13]; it was probably from there that he left in the following winter for his expedition to 'Jaṅ. After a quick deplacement in the summer of 704 to Yo–ti C'u–bzaṅs in rMa–sgrom (ll. 93–94) on the great bend of the rMa–c'u (Huang–ho)[14], in the following winter the king returned South for his campaign in Myva, were he met his death. This picture seems to reveal a fairly rational political design which, having ended the war with China, aimed at consolidating and extending the power of the *btsan–po* in Amdo and in the southern part of K'ams.

Now, our main problem is how to insert the Chinese evidence in this frame. First of all it should be emphasized that Ni–p'o–lo–mên occurs in two independent passages of the *Chiu T'ang–shu*, which considerably lessens the possibility of a textual corruption; we have to accept the word as it is. However, I shall proceed on a path diverging from the one followed usually, and I shall leave aside for the moment the first syllable *ni*. The principal element of the name is P'o–lo–mên (anc. *b'uâ lâ muən*), which normally transcribes Brahmana and designates the Indians, particularly under the religious–cultural aspect. Now, this name of a people or region occurs twice in connection with Nan Chao, the state which came into being in the early 8th century in what is now the province of Yünnan[15].

Its first occurrence is found in the 蠻書 *Man–shu*, a geographical and historical monograph of Nan Chao composed about 862[16]. We read that the 彌諾 Mi–no river (almost certainly the Chindwin, the main tributary of the Irrawaddy) originates in the country of the 小婆羅門 Hsiao P'o–lo–mên ("Little Brahmans") in the Northwest (ch. 2, p. 53). Another passage informs us that, going northward from the city of 安西

study on the relation between rTsaṅ yul and yan lag gsum paḥi ru », *Acta Asiatica*, 19, 1970, pp. 97–133, and now *Toban seiritsu shi kenkyū*, 863–871. Yamaguchi separates Sumru from the Sum–pa tribe, understands it as [g]Sum–pa'i–ru "third horn" and locates it in the North of Central Tibet.

13 R. A. Stein, *Recherches sur l'épopée et le barde au Tibet*, Paris, 1959, pp. 128–129.

14 R. A. Stein, *Les tribus anciennes des marches sino–tibétaines*, Paris, 1959, p. 30.

15 The more recent Western studies on Nan Chao are M. Blackmore, « The rise of Nan Chao in Yünnan », *Journal of South–East Asian History*, 1, 1960, pp. 47–61; W. Stott, « The expansion of the Nan Chao kingdom between the years AD 750–860 », *TP*, 50, 1963, pp. 190–220; Ch. Backus, *The Nan–chao kingdom and T'ang China's Southwestern frontier*, Cambridge U. P. 1981.

16 I have used the critical edition by 向達 Hsiang Ta, 蠻書校注 *Man–shu chiao–chu*, Peking, 1962.

An–hsi (on which see below), one arrives in the kingdom of the Hsiao P'o–lo–mên (ch. 6, p. 167). A third piece of information says that Hsiao P'o–lo–mên borders with 驃 P'iao (the Pyu kingdom in Central Burma) and with 彌臣 Mi–ch'en on the sea (possibly at the mouth of the Irrawaddy) and is situated at a distance of 74 days to the north of 永昌 Yung–ch'ang (in Western Yünnan, between the Salween and the Irrawaddy) (ch. 10, p. 242). This last passage is apparently corrupt, as its geographical elements are mutually incompatible.

The geography and hydrography of the *Man–shu*, fairly clear so long as Nan Chao itself is concerned, are much less so for the outside countries. In any case, Hsiao P'o–lo–mên should be sought for in the Hukawng valley in the source basin of the Chindwin. As to the ethnographical elements supplied by the text, they are limited to the statement that this population eats no beef and is able to predict the things to come (ch. 10, p. 242). In our opinion we should not attribute too much importance to this information: it is a cliché known also from other sources and applied to the Brahmans, or to the Hindus in general.

A similar geographical term occurs in the well–known itinerary of 賈耽 Chia Tan, partly preserved in the dynastic history of T'ang and studied by P. Pelliot eighty years ago [17]. Without entering into the details of the discussion by Pelliot and later scholars, we limit ourselves to presenting the text with the most acceptable identifications of the geographical names it contains. "From 諸葛亮 Chu–ko Liang (near modern T'ai–p'ing–p'u) one goes westward for 200 *li* to the city of 騰充 T'eng–ch'ung (today T'eng–yüeh, formerly called also Momein); from there we go westward for 100 *li* to the city of 彌 Mi; from here we go westward for 200 *li* through the mountains to the city of 麗水 Li shui (probably near Waingmaw on the east bank of the Irrawaddy); from here we go westward, crossing the Li–shui (Irrawaddy) and the 龍泉 Lung–ch'üan rivers, for 200 *li* to the city of An–hsi (in the neighbourhood of Mogaung); then going westward one crosses the Mi–no river (Chindwin) and hence after 1000 *li* one arrives at the kingdom of 大秦婆羅門 Ta–ch'in P'o–lo–mên; from here westward, crossing a great mountain range, after 300 *li* one reaches the kingdom of 箇沒盧 Ko–mo–lu (Kāmarūpa, Assam), which is the northern frontier of Eastern India" (*T'ang–shu*, 43–B, 18a) [18].

[17] P. Pelliot, « Deux itinéraires de Chine en Inde à la fin du VIIIe siècle », *BEFEO*, 4, 1904, chiefly pp. 178–180.

[18] The identification of the geographical names is based on A. Christie, « Ta–ch'in P'o–lo–men », in *BSOAS*, 20, 1957, pp. 159–166.

A cryptic passage of the *Man-shu* informs us that Ta-ch'in P'o-lo-mên is contiguous to the North of Yung-ch'ang, and that to the West of the river in the kingdom of Mi-no going straight eastward one arrives at An-hsi; from there still going eastward after a journey of forty days one arrives at the city of 陽苴咩 Yang-chü-mieh (modern Ta-li, then the capital of Nan Chao) (ch. 10, p. 242). The text is certainly corrupt, and its first portion originally referred perhaps to Hsiao P'o-lo-mên and not to Ta-ch'in P'o-lo-mên.

It is rather unexpected to see Ta-ch'in, the well-known Chinese term indicating the Roman Orient, turning up in this context. We may suppose that this is partly due to a reminiscence of a hint in the *Wei-lüeh* (3rd century), concerning a water route from Ta-ch'in by sea and then continuing to I-chou and to Yung-ch'ang [19]. In any case, this is one of those transferts of geographical names from Western India and neighbouring countries to the Indo-Chinese peninsula, of which several instances are known, such as Gandhārarāja (Burman pron. Gandhālayīt) for Nan Chao [20]. These transferts are connected with the Indian influence penetrating to those inland regions by the trade routes [21]. The localization of Ta-ch'in P'o-lo-mên is uncertain. According to Pelliot it should be situated in the valley of Manipur, according to Christie somewhere in Upper Assam [22].

Anyhow, this particular problem is immaterial for our purpose. We wish merely to point out that in the regions to the Northwest or West of Nan Chao there were at least two regions and/or populations known to the Chinese by the name P'o-lo-mên. It is also irrelevant whether the names applied to countries of Hindu religion and civilization, or they covered local toponyms phonetically resembling the word Brahman.

On this basis I propose, merely as a working hypothesis, to add our Ni P'o-lo-mên to the other two P'o-lo-mên and look for it in some tract between Yünnan and Southeast Tibet; not, however, in Assam, a country which was never subjected to Tibetan suzerainty and therefore could not rebel against Tibet. This seems to me the only practicable way for bringing to a tollerable agreement the Chinese and Tibetan evidence concerning the events of 704–705. Of course I am aware of the serious difficulty re-

[19] *Wei-lüeh* ap. *San-kuo-chih*, Wei-shu 30.33b; translation by F. Hirth, *China and the Roman Orient*, Leipzig, 1885, pp. 74–75.

[20] See P. Pelliot, « Deux itinéraires » etc., pp. 157–159. See also the perceptive remarks by R. A. Stein, *Recherches sur l'épopée et le barde au Tibet*, p. 308.

[21] On the Indian influence in Nan Chao see E. Rosner and K. Wille, « Indische Elemente in der Gründungsgeschichte des Königreiches Nanchao », *ZDMG*, 1981, pp. 374–383, and the bibliography there quoted.

[22] P. Pelliot, « Deux itinéraires » etc., pp. 179–180; A. Christie, *Op. cit.*, p. 165.

presented by the position of Ni P'o–lo–mên, which both Chinese sources place to the South of Central Tibet. We should suppose a mistake by the compiler who, being confronted with a similar name, was naturally led to think of India. Another unsolved problem is the syllable Ni, for which I have no solution to offer.

If, in view of these difficulties, my hypothesis should prove to be untenable, and since it is unthinkable that the Chinese and Tibetan sources could refer to two separate events (the death of the *btsan–po* is their common element), the only way out of the dilemma would be to admit that the Chinese texts have supplied us with a completely wrong item of information; which is possible, but very unlikely.

II.

As to the person of the king who died in 704/5 in 'Jaṅ, no doubt can be entertained; he was K'ri–'du–sroṅ–brtsan Maṅ–po–rje. Still, some element of uncertainly clings to the succession to the Tibetan throne after his demise.

The following two passages from the Tun–huang *Annals* are relevant for our purpose:

... | *btsan po sras rgyal gtsug ru daṅ* | *p'yi k'ri ma lod dron na bžugs* | (l. 150)

... | *poṅ lag raṅ du btsan po gcen lha bal p'o rgyal sa nas p'ab* | (l. 152)

Several years ago I pointed out that, taking into account the grammatical usage of the *Annals*, these passages can be correctly translated only in the following way: " [In the year of the Snake 705] the king son rGyal–gtsug–ru and the grandmother K'ri–ma–lod resided at Dron ... At Poṅ Lag–raṅ the king elder brother Lha Bal–p'o was deposed from the throne " [23]. A translation " the king elder brother Lha was deposed from the throne of Nepal ", as adopted by the original editors of the *Annals* and accepted by Mr. H. Richardson [34], is philologically less correct. It has also been suggested that the Tibetans may have given to the king of Nepal the title " elder brother of the *btsan–po* " in the same way as nearly fifty years later they gave to the king of Nan Chao the title of " *btsan–po*

[23] L. Petech, « Glosse agli Annali di Tunhuang », pp. 255–256.

[24] J. Bacot et al., *Documents de Touen–houang rélatifs à l'histoire du Tibet*, Paris, 1940/46, 40–41; H. Richardson, « Names and titles in early Tibetan records », *Bulletin of Tibetology*, 4/1, 1967, p. 10; Id., « Bal–po and Lho–Bal », in *BSOAS*, 46, 1983, p. 137.

younger brother" (*btsan–po gcuṅ*). This would be highly anomalous; a title "younger brother" for a tributary ruler can only imply that the elder brother was the *btsan–po* himself. Moreover, it is by now generally agreed that Bal–po of the *Annals* is not Nepal, but a Tibetan district to the south of the gTsaṅ–po, where the *btsan–po* betook himself to pass the summer and which was near the terminus of the official itinerary followed by the Chinese envoys, from the Hsi–ning region to the camp of the Tibetan ruler (*T'ang–shu*, 40.8b) [25].

The text concerning Lha Bal–p'o can be understood to mean that he was the elder son of the deceased K'ri–'du–sroṅ–brtsan and that he ascended the throne as a rival of the heir–apparent, the child rGyal–gtsug–ru, who at the moment of the demise of his father was less than one year old [26]. And indeed the chapter on Tibet in the *Chiu T'ang–shu* clearly state that after the death of the king in 704/5 "his sons disputed the succession among themselves; after a long time, the people placed on the throne Ch'i–nu–hsi–lung's (K'ri–'du–sroṅ–brtsan's) son Ch'i–li–so–tsan (K'ri lde–btsug–brtsan)" [27]. The biography of Kuo Yüan–chen is even more precise: "The son of the first queen and the sons of the other wives fought for the throne; the generals and the councillors contended for the supreme authority" [28].

One may object that no other Tibetan text, whether ancient or modern, mentions Lha Bal–p'o. First of all, this would not be the first case of the sort. We know that Sroṅ–btsan–sgam–po fought against his younger brother brTsan–sroṅ; and in this instance too the *Annals* (l. 8–9) supply the

[25] Cf. P. Demiéville, *Le concile de Lhasa*, Paris, 1952, pp. 200–202; Id., *TP*, 46, 1957, p. 407. H. Sato, « The route from Kokonor to Lhasa during the T'ang period », in *Acta Asiatica*, 29, 1975, p. 16, identifies this Bal–po with the plain on the sKyid–c'u near Lhasa; but the context does not support this identification, and we would not expect the king to remain near Lhasa during the summer.

[26] The Tun–huang *Annals* are decisive on this point: "In the year of the Dragon (704) in the spring, rGyal gtsug ru was born at K'o braṅ tsal" (l. 90).

[27] *Chiu T'ang–shu*, 196–A, 5b; translation by P. Pelliot, *Histoire* etc., p. 12. The text continues with the statement that "he (i.e. the new king) was 7 years old at that time. In 705 the Tibetans sent an envoy to announce the death [of their ruler]". The later Chinese works, such as the *T'ang–hui–yao*, the *T'ang–shu* etc., abridged these items of information in such a way as to convey the impression that the boy *btsan–po* was seven years old in 705, and thus was born in 698 or 699. This date was accepted by several scholars, such as P. Demiéville, *Le concile de Lhasa*, 3n, and (most emphatically) by E. Haarh, *The Yar–luṅ dynasty*, Copenaghen, 1969, 68. It is, however, clear that the text is partly anticipating the following development and that the new *btsan–po* was seven years old "at that time", meaning at the end of the "long period" of civil strife (in 711/2); the boy was born in 704 as shown by the evidence of the *Annals*.

[28] *Chiu T'ang–shu*, 96.5a–b.

only extant evidence of the fact [29]. Secondly, we can find at least a trace of Lha Bal–p'o in the Chinese sources. The *T'ung–tien* of Tu Yu, completed in 801 and representing the earliest Chinese source of Tibet, contains a confused item of information, according to which Sroṅ–btsan–sgam–po died in 650 and was succeded by his grandson 乞梨拔布 Ch'i–li–pa–pu; several lines after we read that Ch'i–li–pa–pu died in 705 and as succeeded by 乞梨弩悉籠 Ch'i–li–nu–hsi–lung [30]. It is self–evident that in the first passage Ch'i–li–pa–pu indicates Maṅ–sroṅ–maṅ–brtsan (d. 676), without however transcribing his name, and that Ch'i–li–nu–hsi–lung is a faithful transcription of K'ri–'du–sroṅ [–brtsan]. It is equally evident that the second passage, after skipping over a whole generation, inverts the order of K'ri–'du–sroṅ–btsan and Ch'i–li–pa–pu, but correctly dates to 705 the death of the one and the accession of the other.

Whatever the cause of this glaring mistake, there remains the fact that the mysterious name Ch'i–li–pa–pu (anc. *k'iei ljie b'uât puo*) is a correct transcription of K'ri Bal–po, i.e. our Lha Bal–p'o with the substitution of the royal prefix K'ri for the princely title Lha [31]. We may infer that in the documents at his disposal and utilized by him in a confuse way, Tu Yu found the mention of an ephemeral ruler K'ri Bal–po, who tried to seize the throne in 705. Or course he made a mess of the chronological frame; but the name remains and is quite easily connected with the information about a civil war between the sons of the deceased king.

In conclusion, we suggest the following reconstruction of the sequence of events. After the death of king K'ri–'du–sroṅ–brtsan the old lady K'ri–ma–lod, who was in firm control of the central government with the support of the ministers and of the central and regional assemblies (*'dun–ma*), carried on as the regent for the child rGyal–gtsug–ru; the title of regent is expressly given her by the *T'ung–tien*. In the following year Lha Bal–p'o was deposed. This may have been merely a formal declaration by the Lhasa authorities, and probably Lha Bal–po prolonged his resistance for " a long time ", as shown by the *Chiu T'ang–shu*.

[29] This passage, omitted in the *editio princeps* by J. Bacot et al., was first made known by H. Richardson, « A fragment from Tun–huang », in *Bulletin of Tibetology*, 2, 3, 1965, pp. 33–38. For its interpretation see L. Petech, « Glosse agli Annali di Tun–huang », pp. 254–255.

[30] *T'ung–tien* (Shih–t'ung edition, Shanghai 1936), ch. 190, pp. 1023a and 1024b. The same passage has found its way in the *T'ai–p'ing huan–yu–chi* (c. 980), 185.8b, and in later works such as the *T'ung–chih* and Ma Tuan–lin's *Wen–hsien t'ung–k'ao*.

[31] Compare the title of the prince lJaṅ–ts'a Lha–dbon, who died in 739. The problem was already adumbrated in H. Richardson, « Tibetan inscription at Žva–ḥi Lha Khaṅ », *JRAS*, 1952, 143. Cf. E. Haarh, *Op. cit.*, p. 66.

This explains why the solemn coronation of prince rGyal–gtsug–ru with the royal name K'ri–lde–gtsug–brtsan took place as late as 712 (*Annals*, 11, pp. 134–135). For once, the Tibetan and Chinese sources are in agreement.

Addenda

After my manuscript was sent to the press in June 1983, I became acquainted with the article of C. I. Beckwith, " The revolt of 755 in Tibet ", in *Contributions on Tibetan language, history and culture*, Vienna, 1983, I, pp. 1–16, where on pp. 4–5 and 8–10 he deals with the same problems treated in the second part of the present study. He too notices the garbled account in the *T'ung–tien* and connects it with Lha Bal–p'o of the *Annals*. As can be seen, I mostly agree with his findings, except for some details.

RAMON PRATS

" THE ASPIRATION-PRAYER OF THE GROUND, PATH, AND GOAL ". AN INSPIRED PIECE ON RDZOGS-CHEN BY 'JIGS-MED-GLIṄ-PA

The brief text at issue [1], styled as a *smon-lam* [2], " condenses " – as put in its colophon – " the vast and profound universe that is the pith of unbiased mind " [3]. It is, in fact, a very valuable synthesis of the philosophical and psychological approach of Rdzogs-chen Atiyoga, the most essential teaching and the climax of the nine graded ways (*theg-pa rim-dgu*) into which Rñiṅ-ma-pa adepts classify the entire doctrinal corpus of Buddhism [4].

[1] The following abbreviations will be used in this paper: *Alchemy* = Vajranātha (John Reynolds), Dudjom Rinpoche's *The Alchemy of Realization*, Baudha (Nepal), 1978; *Contributo* = Ramon Prats, *Contributo allo studio biografico dei primi* gter-ston, Napoli, 1982; *Hevajra* = D. L. Snellgrove, *The Hevajra Tantra*, Part I, London, 1959; *KBEU-I-II-III* = Herbert V. Guenther, Longchenpa's *Kindly Bent to Ease Us*, " Part One: Mind ", " Part Two: Meditation ", " Part Three: Wonderment ", Emeryville (Calif.), 1975–1976; *Religions* = Giuseppe Tucci, *The Religions of Tibet*, London, 1980; *TBWP* = H. V. Guenther, *Tibetan Buddhism in Western Perspective* [" The Concept of Mind in Buddhist Tantrism ", pp. 36–59; " The Levels of Understanding in Buddhism ", pp. 60–82; " The Philosophical Background in Buddhist Tantrism ", pp. 83–109; " Indian Thought in Tibetan Perspective: Infinite Transcendence Versus Finiteness ", pp. 110–138; " Some Aspects of Tibetan Religious Thought ", pp. 139–161; " Mentalism and Beyond in Buddhist Philosophy ", pp. 162–177; " The Spiritual Teacher in Tibet ", pp. 178–195; " Tantra and Revelation ", pp. 196–224], Emeryville (Calif.), 1977.

[2] *Smon-lam*, that renders Sanskrit *praṇidhāna*, ' prayer, vow, fervent wish ', is a kind of invocation recited for the purpose of motivating and conforming one's mind to a high spiritual aim by adressing all thoughts towards fulfilment of the expressed wish.

[3] See n. 21, below.

[4] Several expressions are used in Tibetan literature to describe this highly pragmatical system of mystical realization: Great Completion (*rdzogs-pa chen-po*), Great Self

Rdzogs–chen teachings, that focus upon the *Khregs–chod* and *Thod–rgal* techniques of realization [5], belong as a whole to the Tantric *upadeśa* precepts par excellence, and are classified into three orders: Outer Mental Class (*phyi sems–sde*), Inner Relativistic Class (*naṅ kloṅ–sde*), and Secret Arcane Class (*gsaṅ man–ṅag–gi–sde*).

Rdzogs–chen dispenses with the Developing and Completion Stages (*bskyed–rim* and *rdzogs–rim*) [6] of meditational procedure. It is concerned with direct and immediate recognition, and subsequent ultimate realization, of the immanent nature of absolute mind (*sems–ñid*; *cittatā*), the

(*bdag–ñid chen–po*), Great Spontaneous Accomplishment (*lhun–grub chen–po*), Great Contemplative Meditation (*bsam–gtan chen–po*), Great Light–seed (*thig–le chen–po*), etc.

[5] By means of *Khregs–chod* the yogi recognizes the actual nature of his primordial mind as self–existent intrinsic awareness (*raṅ–byuṅ rig–pa*), thereby the supreme realization of Buddhahood is fulfilled. Abiding in this condition of decisive awareness all delusive phenomena are radically transformed into Absolute Reality (*chos–ñid*; *dharmatā*), and enlightened cognition of the ultimate aspect of the Buddha–existentiality (*chos–sku*; *dharmakāya*) is definitively established.

That of *Thod–rgal* is a photo–organic process intended to accomplish the attributes of both the metaphysical and the manifested aspects of the Buddha–existentiality (*loṅs–sku*; *saṃbhogakāya* and *sprul–sku*; *nirmāṇakāya*). The relevant process comes about through four stages of photic visionary experience (*snaṅ–bži*), basically hinged on the contemplative focalization of the light–seeds (*thig–le*) and the web (*drwa–ba*) that are linked to the basic structure of natural light. After the visionary experience of Absolute Reality (*chos–ñid mṅon–sum*), its intensification (*ñams–snaṅ goṅ–'phel*), and ripening (*rig–pa tshad–'phebs*), the fourth stage, that of final consummation (*chos–ñid zad–pa*), is reached. Hence, when the time for the adept's physical death is come, the atomic particles (*rdul–phran*) which make up the psychosomatic constituents of human individuality are desintegrated (*deṅs–pa*), and a sublimation of those elements into pure iridescent energy (photons) – the most subtle form of energy, the essence of light being scientifically recognized as a universal constant – takes place. This photolytic phenomenon is metaphorically known as the ' transfer into the rainbow body ' (*'ja'–lus 'pho–ba*), i.e. a transmutation into the spectrum of light. A concise reference to this process is found, e.g., in f. 24a of *Sras* 'Phags–mchog–rdo–rje's *Gnas lugs rdzogs pa chen po'i khrid yig yaṅ zab yid bžin nor bu* (to be shortly published by the Dzongsar Chhentse Labrang, Gangtok), where it occurs in the description of Kloṅ–chen *Rab–'byams–pa*'s realization: " Lhun grub thod rgal gyi snaṅ ba'i rtsal chen rdzogs pas phyi naṅ snod bcud rnams daṅ/ sku lus sogs rdul phran du deṅs nas 'ja' lus 'pho chen gyi sku bžeṅs su ñe ba'i ṅaṅ du gśegs pa... " A brief text with a few illustrations of the photic pattern–visions corresponding to the four phases in the practice of *Thod–rgal* is included among the *Gter gsar* of Mchog–gyur–gliṅ–pa: See *Mchog gter kun bzaṅ thug tig las/ thod rgal snaṅ bži'i char tshul gyi dpe'u ris mthoṅ bas don gsal* by *Mknan–po* Karma–ratna, in Volume 30 (*E*) (fols. 4; pp. 507–514) of *The Collected Rediscovered Teachings* (*Gter ma*) *of Gter–chen Mchog–gyur–gliṅ–pa*, reproduced in New Delhi, 1977. See also n. 32, below, and cf. *Contributo*, pp. 46–47 n. 7.

[6] *Utpattikrama* and *saṃpannakrama*, respectively. They constitute the general procedure of the Tantric approach to Buddhahood. See *TBWP*, p. 78; *Hevajra*, pp. 139–140.

" primordial self–existent intrinsic awareness of the absolute reality of Being " (*rig–pa*) [7] which is unconditioned and stainless from its beginning-less origin (*ka–dag*).

The emphasis lies upon stressing the pristine, enlightened nature of all phenomena; that Buddha–essence intrinsic to all beings, as plainly expressed in the following verses of the omniscient (*kun–mkhyen*) Kloṅ-chen–pa:

" I and the infinite sentient beings
Are enlightened from the very beginning.
In the recognition of this reality
I pledge my mind to supreme Realization " [8].

Like other compositions of the same or similar genre, the *smon–lam* in question may be also considered a mnemonic piece suited to provide a comprehensive view of Rdzogs–chen mysticism, for it conveys its fundamental concepts as well as a wealth of the technical terms peculiar to its nomenclature.

This tract, no commentary of which seems to exist, is structured into three sets of three stanzas, each set dealing with the concept of Ground (*gži*; *hetu*), Path (*lam*; *mārga*), and Goal (*'bras–bu*; *phala*), respectively; a triad that constitutes the doctrinal underpinning of Rñiṅ–ma–pa ontology.

In fact, they are three distinct, but integral and indissoluble aspects of Being's quiddity. The point of departure (*gži*), the point of arrival (*'bras–bu*), and the process of treading the intervening distance (*lam*), are, basically, a unitary and perfect ontological situation – the Great Completion – spontaneously accomplished (*lhun–grub*). Yet, they appear broken into a trinity through temporal and spatial factors produced by finite mind (*sems*; *citta*).

Such a notion is illustrated as follows in the " Aspiration–prayer of Kun–tu–bzaṅ–po ", pertaining to *Dgoṅs pa zaṅ thal*, a rediscovered ' Tantra ' of Rdzogs–chen:

" Phenomenal and ephemeral existence, Saṃsāra and Nirvāṇa,
All has one Ground, (but is split into) two Paths, and two Results,

[7] *Rig–pa* is a central concept in Rñiṅ–ma–pa thought. Apart from corresponding to the intrinsic awareness of Being, its absolute cognitive capacity, *rig–pa* likewise indicates the state of noetic existentiality at its optimal level. Cf. *Alchemy*, p. 32 n. 14.

[8] " Bdag daṅ mtha' yas sems can rnams/ ye nas saṅs rgyas yin pa la/ yin par śes pa'i bdag ñid du/ byaṅ chub mchog tu sems bskyed do/ ". In fol. 3a of *Gsaṅ ba bla na med pa'i chos spyod lam khyer gyi rim pa*, reproduced as No. IX (fols. 55; pp. 463–571) in Vol. II of *Miscellaneous Writings* (*Gsuṅ thor bu*) *of Kun–mkhyen Kloṅ–chen–pa Dri–med–'od–zer*, Delhi 1973.

The apparition of either intrinsic or deluded awareness ".

. . . .

" The universal foundation (of Being) is unconditioned;
A self-existent infinite expanse, beyond utterance,
Where neither so-called Saṃsāra nor Nirvāṇa exist.
The awareness of this reality in itself is Enlightenment " [9].

The intitutive apprehension of this very fact is the primary cause (*rgyu*) [10] for the realization of the Goal. Buddhahood is not to be attained outside the primal nature of Being, since it is already present therein. It is the intrinsic awareness of this Buddha-essence (*byaṅ-chub sñiṅ-po*) that must be unfolded and fully brought *in esse*. Yet, inasmuch as one fails to realize this truth, the stream of intrinsic awareness that flows naturally from the spontaneous resolution of all dualities, displaying the five archetypal models of enlightened cognition (*ye-śes lṅa*), is obstructed, and deluded knowledge (*ma-rig-pa*) gets the upper hand. Consequently, enlightened wisdom turns into spiritual poisons (*dug*; *viṣa*) which evolve into the mental and physical aggregates of personality (*phuṅ-po*; *skandha*) that ineluctably give birth, in the end, to Samsaric existence [11].

It is the course (*lam*) of re-integration, the recovery of the original condition of Being's plenitude, that constitutes the experience of realization as such (*'bras-bu*). A path presupposes two extremes, hence a distance to cover; but this qualitative gap is abolished as soon as the recognition of the fundamental identity underlying the existential play of Being becomes actual. Therefore, it is the Path, with its prescribed tecniques of realization, that must be regarded as the core of the whole situation [12].

To return to the present *smon-lam*, its author, the accomplished

[9] " Snaṅ srid 'khor 'das thams cad kun: gži gcig lam gñis 'bras bu gñis: rig daṅ ma rig cho 'phrul te: ... kun gyi gži ni 'dus ma byas: raṅ byuṅ kloṅ yaṅs brjod du med: 'khor 'das gñis ka'i miṅ med do: de ñid rig na saṅs rgyas te: ... " (fol. 180b). I quote these lines from *Kun bzaṅ smon lam* (fols. 180b–184a; pp. 360–367), as edited and reproduced in *Thub bstan rdo rje brag e waṃ lcog sgar ba'i 'dus sde rnams kyi chos spyod rab gsal*, " The standard rituals used in the liturgy followed by Rdo-rje-brag and its affiliates ", Gangtok (Sikkim), 1979.

[10] *Gži* and *rgyu*, ' ground ' and ' primary cause ', both are translations of Skr. *hetu*, ' cause, motive, impulse, reason ', an indication of the common source of these two concepts in Rñiṅ-ma-pa philosophy.

[11] For an elucidation of the Ground's splitting into two opposite results see *TBWP*, pp. 115–130. It consists of an annotated translation of the *Rdzogs pa chen po kun tu bzaṅ po ye śes kloṅ gi rgyud* text.

[12] The correspondence between the three aspects of Being's quiddity and their relative coefficients, can be thus schematized:

sage (*rig–'dzin*) 'Jigs–med–gliṅ–pa (6/2/1730–12/10/1798)[13] alias Raṅ–byuṅ–rdo–rje and Padma–mkhyen–brtse'i–'od–zer among other names, highly reputed as a great scholar and a realized yogi, is one of the most prominent figures in the Rñiṅ–ma–pa and Rdzogs–chen traditions[14].

In the period when he was intensely devoted to his practices of meditation in the Gsaṅ–chen–me–tog cave in Bsam–yas, Mchims–phu area, he had numerous visionary experiences (*dag–snaṅ*)[15], and especially three apparitions of the enlightened wisdom of the hypostasis (*ye–śes kyi sku*) of Kloṅ–chen *Rab–'byams–pa* Dri–med–'od–zer (1308–1364), revered as the foremost exegete and systematizer of the Rñiṅ–ma–pa doctrine. Kloṅ–chen–pa vouchsafed to 'Jigs–med–gliṅ–pa insight into the spiritual treasure (*thugs–gter*)[16] of the *upadeśa* precepts (*man–ṅag*) of the *Sñiṅ thig* series[17]. Thereupon, 'Jigs–med–gliṅ–pa committed to writing the *Rdzogs pa chen*

gži	*lam*	*'bras–bu*
	lta–ba + *sgom–pa* + *spyod–pa*	
ṅo–bo		*chos–sku*
raṅ–bžin		*loṅs–sku*
thugs–rje		*sprul–sku*
(transcendental structure of Being's foundation)	(facets of the realization process)	(threefold plane of the Buddha–existentiality)

For a gloss of these terms see nn. 30, 38, below.

[13] A brief account of the life of 'Jigs–med–gliṅ–pa is found, *inter alia*, in *Gter ston brgya rtsa'i rnam thar*, fols. 219a–223a (Mtshur–phu redaction of *Rin chen gter mdzod chen mo*, Vol. *Ka*), by Koṅ–sprul Blo–gros–mtha'–yas (1813–1899). 'Jigs–med–gliṅ–pa's birth took place in 'Phyoṅ–rgyas, Central Tibet, in the 12th (*rgyal*) lunar month of the Earth–Bird year of the 12th Sexagenary Cycle, on the anniversary day of Kloṅ–chen *Rab–'byams–pa*'s demise (*sku–mchod*), viz. the 18th day (*op. cit.*, fol. 69a). His passing away occurred on the 3rd day of the 9th (*dbyug–pa*) lunar month of the Earth–Horse year. For the conversion of Tibetan calendrical dates into Western ones consult Dieter Schuh, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der tibetischen Kalenderrechnung*, Wiesbaden, 1973.

[14] For a short analysis of 'Jigs–med–gliṅ–pa's interpretation of Rñiṅ–ma–pa thought see *TBWP*, pp. 133–138.

[15] *Dag–pa'i gzigs–snaṅ*, ' mystic or pure visions ', one of the three systems of passing on the teachings characteristic of the Rñiṅ–ma–pa tradition. See *Contributo*, pp. 38 n. 19, 80–81.

[16] *Thugs–gter* is an equivalent of *dgoṅs–gter*, one of the two main classes of *gter–ma* recoveries. See *Contributo*, 38 n. 19, 77–78.

[17] The two doctrinal streams that make up the *Sñiṅ thig* series sprang separately from Padmasambhava and Vimalamitra, and were eventually united in the person of Kloṅ–chen–pa. Cf. R. Prats, " Tshe–dbaṅ–nor–bu's Chronological Notes on the Early Transmission of the *Bi ma Sñiṅ thig* ", *Tibetan and Buddhist Studies commemorating the 200th anniversary of the birth of Alexander Csoma de Körös*, Volume 2. Edited by Louis Ligeti, Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1984, pp. 197–209.

po Kloṅ chen Sñiṅ thig cycle [18] – to which this *smon-lam* belongs [19] – and also authored a number of treatises, among which mention must be made of *Yon tan rin po che'i mdzod* cum commentary, i.e. *Śiṅ rta rnam gñis* [20], which fill the first two of his nine-volume collected writings (*gsuṅ-'bum*). In this way, 'Jigs-med-gliṅ-pa came to be the principal vessel and propagator of the whole *Sñiṅ thig* series, and his *Kloṅ chen Sñiṅ thig* became the most widespread cycle of texts on Rdzogs-chen practice.

The colophon of this aspiration-prayer [21] tells us that it was set down by 'Jigs-med-gliṅ-pa at the behest of Rāhula [22], who manifested to him under the semblance of a Buddhist monk. Subsequently, the secrecy relative to this mystical composition was removed, and 'Jigs-med-gliṅ-pa entrusted it to a certain ' secret *vidyādhara* ', the Madman of Koṅ-po [23], who had been blessed with the empowering grace of Nam-mkha'i-sñiṅ-po [24].

The tibetan text

GŽI LAM 'BRAS BU'I SMON LAM

Dpal kun tu bzaṅ po la phyag 'tshal lo:
(I,1) *gdod ma'i gnas lugs raṅ bžin spros daṅ bral:*
yod pa ma yin rgyal bas 'di ma gzigs:
med pa ma yin 'khor 'das kun gyi gži:

[18] *Kloṅ chen Sñiṅ thig* is a creation inspired by the *Sñiṅ thig Ya bži* cycle which consists of five groups of complementary texts partially elaborated, and arranged by Kloṅ-chen-pa. *Kloṅ chen Sñiṅ thig* is considered the essence of Rñiṅ-ma-pa philosophy and psychology. Cf. Jamyang Namgyal [E. Gene Smith], " *Vie et chants de 'Brug-pa Kun-legs le yogin*, a Review ", *Kailash*, I, 1, 1973, [pp. 91–99] pp. 96–97; and *KBEU-I*, xiv–xv. According to Prof. Namkhai Norbu, *Kloṅ chen Sñiṅ thig* also synthesizes the essentials of the *Rñiṅ ma rgyud bcu bdun* collection, namely the Seventeen Tantras of the Arcane or *Upadeśa* Class of Rdzogs-chen Atiyoga.

[19] It is section *Ne* (fols. 2; pp. 445–447) in Vol. *Āḥ* (II) of the *Kloṅ chen Sñiṅ thig* cycle, reproduced from a xylography of A-'dzom 'Brug-pa 'Gro-'dul-dpa'-bo-rdo-rje's religious community (A-'dzom *chos-sgar dpar-ma*) in Sde-dge, New Delhi, 1973.

[20] *Yon tan rin po che'i mdzod*, a gradual approach (*lam-rim*) to Rdzogs-chen, was composed on the pattern of Kloṅ-chen-pa's *Sems ñid ṅal gso*. See *KBEU-I*, xxv.

[21] Fol. 2a: " ... thugs bcud kloṅ chen zab rgya yi: mtha' sdud smon lam zab mo 'di: bka' sruṅ draṅ sroṅ rā hu la: bande'i tshul gyis bskul nas bkod: zab don spel ba don yod ciṅ: rten 'brel smon lam mthar phyin phyir: nam mkha'i sñiṅ pos byin rlabs pa'i: koṅ smyon sbas pa'i rig 'dzin la: zab rgya bkrol te gtad rgya byas: 'tho don nam mkha' mñam par śog: ".

[22] Rāhula, Guardian of the Pronouncements (*bka'-sruṅ*) and Seer (*draṅ-sroṅ*; *ṛśi*), is the chief of the planetary deities (*gza'*).

[23] This personage is not included among the closest disciples of 'Jigs-med-gliṅ-pa, as listed in Koṅ-sprul's *op. cit.*, fol. 222ab.

[24] In all likelihood, the *dge-sloṅ* (*bhikṣu*) who was one of the twenty-five yogis, disciples of Padmasambhava (8th century).

'gal 'du ma yin brjod bya'i yul las 'das:
rdzogs chen gži yi gnas lugs rtogs par śog:
(I,2) *ṅo bo stoṅ pas rtag pa'i mtha' las grol:*
raṅ bžin gsal bas chad pa'i mu daṅ bral:
thugs rje 'gag med sna tshogs sprul pa'i gži:
gsum du dbye yaṅ don la tha mi dad:
rdzogs chen gži yi gnas lugs rtogs par śog:
(I,3) *bsam gyis mi khyab sgro 'dogs kun daṅ bral:*
yod daṅ med pa'i phyogs 'dzin rnam par žig:
'di don brjod la rgyal ba'i ljags kyaṅ rdugs:
thog mtha' bar med gtiṅ gsal chen po'i dbyiṅs:
rdzogs chen gži yi gnas lugs rtogs par śog:
(II,1) *raṅ ṅo rnam dag skye med ka dag la:*
lhun grub 'dus ma byas pa'i gdaṅs śar ba:
gud du ma bzuṅ rig stoṅ zuṅ 'jug cher:
rtogs pas gži yi dgoṅs pa tshad du phyin:
lam gyi gnad la gol 'phyugs med par śog:
(II,2) *ye nas dag pas lta ba'i miṅ yaṅ med:*
raṅ ṅo rig pas sgom rgyu'i śubs nas don:
gza' gtad med pas spyod pa'i sgrog daṅ bral:
raṅ bžin lhums žugs spros bral rjen pa'i ṅaṅ:
lam gyi gnad la gol 'phyugs med par śog:
(II,3) *bzaṅ ṅan rnam rtog phyogs su ma lhuṅ žiṅ:*
btaṅ sñoms luṅ ma bstan du ma 'byams par:
śar grol ris med rgya yan lhun 'byams kloṅ:
spaṅ blaṅ ye zad raṅ bžin yoṅs śes ṅaṅ:
lam gyi gnad la gol 'phyugs med par śog:
(III,1) *thog ma'i spyi gži nam mkha' lta bu'i ṅaṅ:*
gži snaṅ rig pa mkha' la sprin deṅs bžin:
phyi gsal śes pa naṅ du ldog pa las:
khyad chos drug ldan gžon nu bum sku'i sbubs:
'bras bu'i rgyal po btsan sa zin par śog:
(III,2) *ye nas raṅ rig kun tu bzaṅ po la:*
thob bya'i že 'dod mtha' dag dbyiṅs su yal:
bya rtsol blo 'das rdzogs pa chen po'i gśis:
dbyiṅs rig kun tu bzaṅ mo'i mkha' kloṅ sbubs:
'bras bu'i rgyal po btsan sa zin par śog:
(III,3) *rab tu mi gnas dbu ma chen po'i don:*
khyab gdal lhun 'byams phyag rgya chen po'i ṅaṅ:
mtha' grol kloṅ yaṅs rdzogs pa chen po'i gnad:
sa lam yon tan gžir rdzogs lhun grub sbubs:
'bras bu'i rgyal po btsan sa zin par śog:

Translation

The Aspiration–Prayer of the Ground, Path, and Goal

Homage to the Glorious Kun–tu–bzaṅ–po![25]

Ground:

(I,1) The actual nature of the primordial state (of Being) is beyond determination[26].
It is neither existent, for (even) a Victorious Buddha cannot see it,
Nor is it non–existent, being the common foundation[27] of both

[25] For the anagogical meaning of this salutation formula see *KBEU–II*, pp. 98–99 n. 6. Identification between the Ādibuddha Kun–tu–bzaṅ–po, Skr. Samantabhadra, and the Bodhisattva bearing the same name must be avoided. In Rñiṅ–ma, the Primordial Buddha Kun–tu–bzaṅ–po is the embodiment of the Dharmakāya's quiddity, the sublime aspect of perfect Buddhahood. This Ādibuddha is the very symbol for the existential state of self–existent intrinsic awareness (see n. 7), thus conveying the ontological sense of " absolute (*kun–tu*) positiveness (*bzaṅ–po*) of Being ". Two differentiated but complementary and inseparable aspects of Absolute Reality are represented by the syzygy of Kun–tu–bzaṅ–po and Kun–tu–bzaṅ–mo (Samantabhadra and Samantabhadrī), from which coalescence emerge the five prototypal enlightened wisdoms (*ye–śes lṅa*), regarded as the characteristic values of the five Tathāgata Buddhas, or basic manifestations of the Ādibuddha. As coefficients of ultimate realization, this dyad also embodies its factual and cognitive qualities (*thabs*; *upāya* and *śes–rab*; *prajñā*), respectively, which are correlative on another level to the subjective and objective planes of the quintessential dimension (*naṅ–dbyiṅs* and *phyi–dbyiṅs*) of the existentiality of Being, where the latter is the energetic expression of the former (cf. n. 32). On the Primordial Buddha Samantabhadra, and relevant polarity, see *TBWP*, p. 131, 142 n. 7, 151–152, 223; *KBEU–I*, pp. 300 n. 12.

[26] *Spros–bral* (*niṣprapañca*), an ineffable condition eluding any formulation or conceptualization whatsoever. Analogous to 'vacuity' (*śūnyatā*), it connotes a fundamental model free from all the relative and definite propositions of the Eight Limits (*mtha'–brgyad spros–pa kun–bral*), as enuntiated in the first stanza of the *Prajñā–nāma–mulamadhyamakakārikā*, the main Śāstra of Nāgārjuna. It is stated there that whatever has an interdependent origination (*rten–'brel*; *nidāna*) is unimpeded (*'gag–med*; *anirodha*), unproduced (*skye–med*; *anutpāda*), incessant (*chad–med*; *anuccheda*), impermanent (*rtag–med*; *aśāśvata*), not having many distinct meanings (*tha–dad don min*; *anānārtha*), not having only one meaning (*don gcig min*; *anekārtha*), not coming (*'oṅ–med*; *anāgama*), and not going (*'gro–med*; *anirgama*). *Spros–bral* is but one of the several derivatives of *spros–pa* (*prapañca*), a concept of wide application in Rñiṅ–ma–pa mysticism, where the following compounds, in relation to different degrees of empowering initiations (*dbaṅ*), are propounded: *spros–bcas*, *spros–med*, *śin–tu spros–med*, and *rab–tu spros–med*.

[27] *Kun–gži* (*ālaya*), an alternative, cognate term to *gži*, is the universal foundation underlying all entities; the unpatterned store whence myriad beguiling phenomena of both the sorrow of the transmigratory cycle and the bliss of spiritual realization arise differentiated because of our delusive perception of Absolute Reality. In Rdzogs–chen

Saṃsāra and Nirvāṇa [28].
This is not a contradiction, but (a reality which) cannot be object of any utterance.
May the state of the Ground of the Great Completion be intuitively perceived [29]!

(I,2) Since the inmost essence (of the Ground) is vacuity, it is free from the limit of permanence.
Since its actual nature is clarity, it is beyond the bounds of interruption.
Since its responsive function is incessancy, it is the Ground of manifold manifestations [30].
Although it can be split into three (aspects), they are identical in meaning [31].

practice, *kun-gži* is susceptible to identification with the infinitesimal gap or ground-state between thoughts. According to Rñiṅ-ma-pa philosophy, *kun-gži* must be strictly distinguished from the more general notion of *kun-gži rnam-śes* (*ālayavijñāna*), peculiar to the Yogācāra school of Mahāyāna Buddhism, where it is conceived as the universal unconscious or basic level of pan-consciousness possessing the potential capacity of knowledge. On *kun-gži* see *TBWP*, pp. 116–117, 134, 143 n. 9; *KBEU-I*, pp. 49–51, 264–265 nn. 1–2.

28 These last two verses are identical – with the only exception of *'di* for *kyaṅ* – with those in the eleventh stanza of *Phyag rgya chen po'i smon lam* by the 3rd Karma-pa, Raṅ-byuṅ-rdo-rje (1284–1339). Himself was a repository of the *Sñiṅ thig* precepts, that he received from *Rig-'dzin* Kumārāja (the chief guru of Kloṅ-chen-pa), and *Gter-ston* Rin-chen-tshul-rdor alias Padma-las-'bral-rtsal (Kloṅ-chen-pa's previous embodiment). For a translation of the *Phyag chen smon lam* see Garma C. C. Chang, *Teachings of Tibetan Yoga*, New York 1963, pp. 31–36. Cf. n. 54, below.

29 *Rtogs-pa* (*adhigama*), direct understanding of Absolute Reality through intuitive perception. It flows on the cessation of *rnam-rtog* (see n. 40).

30 The Three Pristine Cognitions (*ye-śes gsum-ldan*): *ṅo-bo* (*vastu*), *raṅ-bžin* (*svabhāva*), and *thugs-rje* (? *karuṇā*), constitute the transcendental coexistent and indivisible structure of the Ground (*gži*) of Being's noetic state of intrinsic awareness (*rig-pa*). That is, the essential, actual, and factual facets of Being, respectively, each one of them possessing a distinctive quality, as outlined in the text. Thus, the immanent attribute of *ṅo-bo* is 'void' (*stoṅ-pa*; *śūnya*), not a nihilistic view of 'vacuity' but an absolute absence of any concretization and determination. *Raṅ-bžin* is defined as 'clarity' (*gsal-ba*; *bhāsana*), a lucid condition of cognitive insight radiating from the actual nature of *rig-pa*, like a light shining from its source (cf. n. 33). Finally, *thugs-rje* is qualified by the 'continuity' (*'gag-med*; *anirodha*) of its operation of universal compassion (*thugs/sñiṅ-rje*; *karuṇā*). On this triad see *TBWP*, pp. 155–156, 176, 212; *KBEU-III*, pp. 5–7. And for a diagram of their interrelations, attributes, and other values, see *KBEU-I*, p. 224; *KBEU-II*, p. 31.

31 Part of these first stanzas were quoted, in English translation, by Prof. G. Tucci in *Religions*, pp. 82–83, though no bibliographic reference is therein given as to their provenance.

May the state of the Ground of the Great Completion be intuitively perceived!

(I,3) (The primordial state) is inconceivable, transcending all conjecture.
Positions on existence or non-existence are entirely abolished (in it).
The meaning of this (reality) cannot be expressed even by a Victorious Buddha.
Without beginning, middle, or end, it is the quintessential dimension[32] of great inner clarity[33].
May the state of the Ground of the Great Completion be intuitively perceived!

Path:

(II,1) The self-existent essence (of Being) is perfectly pure, unproduced, and peerless by nature,
Displaying its unconditioned immanent energy, spontaneously accomplished[34].
In the great coalescence[35] of intrinsic awareness and vacuity[36], from which nothing is excluded,
Once the concept of the Ground has been grasped by intuitive perception,

[32] *Dbyiṅs* (*dhātu*) is a most difficult key term to translate satisfactorily. It is the dynamic field of the naturally inherent continuum of Being. In Rdzogs-chen a distinction is established between *naṅ-dbyiṅs*, the individual's inner sphere of existentiality, and *phyi-dbyiṅs*, its outer projection upon absolute space, where the photic visions – that are like the focalization of *rig-pa's* intrinsic radiance on an ethereal multi-dimensional screen – occur, specifically during the practices of *Thod-rgal* (see n. 5). On *dbyiṅs* cf. n. 25, above.

[33] *Gtiṅ-gsal* is the visible manifestation of the deep inner luminosity of the enlightened nature of *rig-pa* (cf. n. 30), from which the spectrum of five primordial lights symbolizing the fundamental models of pristine cognition (*ye-śes*; *jñāna*) shines forth (cf. *Religions*, pp. 64, 84; *TBWP*, p. 99). In mediation practices, *gtiṅ-gsal* is that bluish radiance emanating from *Hūṃ*, the visualized seed-syllable (*sa-bon*; *bīja*) that represents the state of ultimate realization.

[34] *Rnam-dag* (*viśuddhi*), *skye-med* (*anutpāda*), *ka-dag*, *lhun-grub* (*anābhoga*), *'dus ma-byas-pa* (*asaṃskṛta*), and *gdaṅs* are qualifications related to *raṅ-rig* (see n. 48). Among these, *ka-dag*, ' pure *ab initio*, from the beginningless origin ', and *gdaṅs*, ' the immanent energy of Being's intrinsic awareness ', are characteristic of Rñiṅ-ma.

[35] *Zuṅ-'jug* (from *zuṅ-drwa 'jug-pa*; *yuganaddha*) is the indissoluble unity of two complementary principles, a basic notion in Tantric Buddhism, where it is iconographically represented by the hierogamic embrace of the male-female partners (*yab-yum*). See *Hevajra*, pp. 22-25.

[36] *Rig-stoṅ*, the sublime coalescence evinced from the realization of the Great Completion. It comprehends *bde-stoṅ*, 'bliss and vacuity ', and *gsal-stoṅ*, ' clarity and vacuity ' that describe the mystical accomplishment to which the Anuyoga and the Mahāyoga classes of Inner Tantras lead, respectively.

May the gist of the Path be (realized) without straying!

(II,2) (The Path) being pure from the very beginning, does not even have a so-called view.

As its self-existent essence is intrinsic awareness, it emerges from the cover of causal meditation.

Since it has no definite design [37], it is rid of the bind of formal action [38].

Entering the womb of its actual nature [39] (constitutes) the bare intrinsic condition beyond determination.

May the gist of the Path be (realized) without straying!

(II,3) Not falling into the categories of dichotomic thought [40], (such as) good or bad,

Nor vanishing into a nondescript (blank state [41] of) indifference,

[37] *Gza'/Bza'-gtad med-pa* is a very old term already found, as Prof. Namkhai Norbu kindly pointed out to me, in *Bsam gtan mig sgron* (fols, 158a–160a of the MS. reproduced in the Smanrtsis Shesrig Spendzod Series, Vol. 74, Leh 1974) by Gnubs-chen Saṅs-rgyas-ye-śes (b. 772). According to Gnubs-chen's glosses and quotations, this special term refers to that mental attitude devoid of any definite position and determination, free of whatever aim or purpose; namely, effortless and spontaneous (*rtsol-ba'i dbaṅ-pos stoṅ*). Quoting a text entitled *Nam mkha' che* (most certainly the same *Rdzogs pa chen po nam mkha' che* written by Gnubs-chen himself - cf. Samten Gyaltsen Karmay, « An Open Letter by Pho-brang Zhi-ba-'od to the Buddhists in Tibet », *The Tibet Journal*, V, 3 (1980), [pp. 3–28] 15), with regard to the Path (*lam*) it says as follows: « The path (that stresses the attainment) of a higher and higher purity is not in accord with the law of freedom from objective action. Proceeding in such a way, the space-like (state of Being) will not be attained" (fol. 160a: "goṅ nas goṅ du tshaṅs pa'i lam/ bya bral chos daṅ mthun pa min/ ci ste lam gyi bgrod gyur na/ nam mkha'i mtha' bžin thug pa med/"). Another quotation warns that "for the natural (fulfilment of) *bodhicitta* itself, no specifically oriented meditation is to be exercised" (ibid.: "ma bcos byaṅ chub sems ñid la/ gza' gtad bcas nas bsgom du med pa.../").

[38] *Lta-ba* (*dṛṣṭi*), *sgom-pa* (*bhāvana*), and *spyod-pa* (*caryā*) are the three facets of the process (*lam*) aimed at the accomplishment of ultimate realization. 'View' or 'consideration' is both the theoretical support upon which spiritual experience is founded, and the mindfulness of the essentially void (*stoṅ-pa*) nature of all phenomena. For 'deep meditation', meditative and contemplative practices as a whole are meant, implying the direct experience of the intrinsic, unimpeded (*zaṅ-thal*) state of mind beyond discursiveness. The natural (*ma-bcos-pa*) attitude of mind towards every single event in one's life, and its resolution into spontaneous (*rtsol-med*) action, free of expectation, constitutes proper 'behaviour'. In other words, the fact of bringing the first two facets into everyday life. See *TBPW*, pp. 81, 179–180, 200–201 n. 9.

[39] That is to say, having fully realized the profound meaning of the course of bringing into actual existence the intrinsic nature of Being.

[40] *Rnam-rtog* (*vikalpa*), the discursive and interpretative mental activity that elaborates the dichotomies of the dualistic, relative, karmic mind. It is opposed to *rtogs-pa* (cf. n. 29).

[41] *Btaṅ-sñoms luṅ-ma-bstan*, a torpid state of mind sunk into passive indifference, hence devoid of awareness. Cf. *TBWP*, p. 152; *Alchemy*, p. 36 n. 64.

The absolute expanse[42] (of Being's nature), spontaneously pervasive[43], overspreading and unbiased, rises and liberates.
Rejection and attachment are extinguished, from the outset, in the intrinsic condition of complete cognition of (Being's) actual nature.
May the gist of the Path be (realized) without straying!

Goal:

(III,1) The primordial general ground[44] is an intrinsic condition (unchanging) like space.
The intrinsic awareness (of Being realizes that the actual nature) of the Ground's appearance[45] is like clouds dissolving into sky.
Once the cognition of outward clarity is turned inwards,
Entering the existential dimension[46] having a sixfold quality[47],
May the victorious stronghold of the Goal be fulfilled!

[42] *Kloṅ* (*ūrmi*) is commonly rendered as 'space' (more properly *nam-mkha'*). It refers specifically to the mental dimensional continuum of Being, and the open medium of its natural expanse, the basis of the quintessential dimension of *rig-pa*.

[43] *Lhun-'byams.* This term occurs again in III,3–2.

[44] *Thog-ma'i spyi-gži*, equivalent to *kun-gži.* Cf. *KBEU-III*, p. 8.

[45] *Gži-snaṅ*, the outward projection of the Ground's intrinsic quality, has a pure (Nirvanic) or impure (Samsaric) appearance depending on whether it is filtered through untained or defiled awareness (*rig-pa* or *ma-rig-pa*). Pure visions (*dag-snaṅ*) are exemplified by the manifestations of the enlightened wisdom of the Tathāgata Buddhas, while the impure (*ma-dag-pa'i snaṅ*) or defiled ones (*'khrul-snaṅ*) are those constitutional of the sentient beings wandering in the six prototypal realms of cyclic existence (*sems-can rigs-drug*).

[46] *Gžon-nu bum-pa'i sku*, literally 'the existential pattern of the youthful vessel', is a metaphor coined to indicate the quintessential dimension of ultimate Buddha-existentiality. This state, formulated as a potential receptacle of all phenomena (*chos-can*), is consequent to the full accomplishment of the realization practices of *Khregs-chod* and *Thod-rgal* (see n. 5). The radiance of clear luminosity attributive of this state is the revelation of Being's pristine cognition of Absolute Reality. See *KBEU-III*, pp. 115–116 n. 17; *Alchemy*, p. 38 n. 88.

[47] I have found no explicit mention of these six salient features (*khyad-chos drug-ldan*) in the texts available to me for consultation, e. g. *Rnam mkhyen śiṅ rta* (viz. the 2nd part of the detailed commentary of *Yon tan rin po che'i mdzod*) by 'Jigs-med-gliṅ-pa, or *Grub mtha' mdzod* by Kloṅ-chen-pa. In Sog-po Bstan-dar's interspersed glosses of *Yon tan mdzod* (i.e. *Yon tan rin po che'i mdzod kyi dka' gnad rdo rje'i rgya mdud 'gro la byed legs bśad gser gyi thur ma*, reproduced in the Ngagyur Nyingma Series, Paro, 1978, fols. 250b–251a) is found an enumeration of the "eight modes in which the spontaneously accomplished nature (of Being) waveringly arises" (*raṅ-bžin lhun-grub g.yo-ba 'char-tshul brgyad*), referred to as the "state of the jewel-case" (*rin-chen ga'u'i gnas-lugs*). Professor Namkhai Norbu has indicated to me that that enumeration may be considered as corresponding, in its first six items, to the specific features of the *gžon-nu bum-sku.* They are: 1) *Lhun-grub*: the state of great (spontaneous) unproduced ac-

(III,2) In (the state of) pristine self-existent awareness [48], (known as) Kun-tu-bzaṅ-po,
Every longing for gain vanishes into the quintessential dimension (of Being),
(As) the ultimate nature [49] of the Great Completion transcends mental striving.
Entering the sphere of Kun-tu-bzaṅ-mo, (the coalescence of) the quintessential dimension (of Being) and its intrinsic awareness [50],
May the victorious stronghold of the Goal be fulfilled!

(III,3) The significance of the Great Middle Way [51] is unexcelled [52];
The intrinsic condition of the Great Symbol [53] is all-encompassing spontaneous pervasiveness;

complishment (" ma grub pa'i grub pa chen por gnas pas lhun grub ltar du 'char "). 2) *Thugs-rje*: the continuous operation of responsive function (of universal compassion), for the sake of sentient beings (" thugs rje 'char ba'i go ma 'gags pas sems can gyi don byuṅ "). 3) *Ye-śes*: the incessant empathetic communication of enlightened cognition, manifesting the inner glow of its five pristine wisdoms (" ye śes ltar 'char ba'i loṅs spyod ma 'gags pas ye śes lṅa'i raṅ 'od du snaṅ "). 4) *Sku*: the unextinguishable essence of the Buddha-existentiality, that realizes the absolute dimension of intrinsic awareness (" sku ltar 'char ba'i ṅo bo ma 'gags pas rig pa sku ru smin "). 5) *Gñis-med*: the indeterminate view of non-duality, free from both the position on singleness and plurality (" gñis med ltar 'char ba'i lta ba ma ṅes pa sa gcig daṅ du ma las grol "). 6) *Mtha'-grol*: incessant positive action, free from all limits (of existence, non-existence, both existence and non-existence, neither existence nor non-existence), no longer abiding in the natural stream of delusive appearances (" mtha' grol ltar 'char ba'i thabs ma 'gags pas 'khrul snaṅ raṅ rgyud bar mi gnas ").

[48] *Raṅ-rig* does not stand here for *raṅ-gi rig-pa* (*svasaṃvedya*), ' self-awareness, non-referential awareness ', but is a shorthand term for *raṅ-byuṅ gi rig-pa* (*svayambhū-vidyā*), *raṅ-byuṅ* being occasionally glossed as " devoid of primary and contributory causes " (*rgyu-rkyen bral-ba*), namely ' self-existent ', ' autogenous ', etc.

[49] *Gśis* is analogous to *ṅo-bo*. Therefore, it can be interpreted as ' essential nature ' or ' transcendent reality '. See *TBWP*, pp. 58, 67, 144 n. 11.

[50] *Dbyiṅs* (*daṅ*) *rig*(*-pa*). On *dbyiṅs* see n. 32, above. Cf. Herbert V. Guenther, Long-chen-pa's « The Natural Freedom of Mind », *Crystal Mirror*, IV, 1975, [pp. 113-146] p. 145 n. 5.

[51] *Dbu-ma Chen-po*, the Mādhyamika school of Mahāyāna philosophy founded by Nāgārjuna, and based on the Prajñāpāramitā doctrine. It is styled ' middle ' after its fundamental theory emphasizing a central epistemological position far from all extreme judgment.

[52] *Rab-tu mi-gnas*, equivalent to *bla-na med-pa* (*anuttara*), ' unsurpassed, supreme, preeminent '.

[53] *Phyag-rgya Chen-po* or Mahāmudrā denotes the ultimate state of utter co-integration of every dichotomic expedient and experience into a transcendent unity. This system, proper to the Bka'-brgyud-pa spiritual lineages, is very near to Rdzogs-chen, although certain significant differences exist bewteen these two approaches.

The gist of the Great Completion is limitless (like the) infinite universe [54].
Entering, in perfect spontaneous accomplishment, the Ground of spiritual levels and paths [55], and values [56],
May the victorious stronghold of the Goal be fulfilled!

[54] These last three verses again remind us of those composed by the 3rd Karma-pa in his *Phyag chen smon lam*, referred to in n. 28, above. In the present case, wordings are different but the spirit is the same. Karma-pa's verses, that form the nineteenth stanza of his aspiration-prayer, run as follows: "Yid byed bral ba 'di ni phyag rgya che/ mtha' daṅ bral ba dbu ma chen po yin/ 'di ni kun 'dus rdzogs chen žes kyaṅ bya/".

[55] *Yon-tan* (*guṇa*), also 'qualities, capabilities'.

[56] *Sa-lam*, that is *sa-bcu* (*daśabhūmi*) and *lam-lṅa* (*pañcamārga*): the Ten Levels, corresponding to the ten Pāramitā excellences in the spiritual career of a Bodhisattva; and the Five Paths, the phases in the spiritual development of the individual.

Postil. Only after completing the present paper, on the occasion of my last visit to Bhutan, a reprint copy of a commentary of this *smon-lam* came into my hands. It is the *Kloṅ chen sñiṅ gi thig le las/ gži lam 'bras bu'i smon lam gyi don gsal bar byed* (*bśad* in the colophon) *pa kun tu bzaṅ po'i žal luṅ* (ff. 65) authored by Kaḥ-thog Dge-rtse *Paṇḍi-ta* 'Gyur-med-tshe-dbaṅ-mchog-grub alias Dbon-po Tshe-dbaṅ-mchog-grub (b. 1764?), the celebrated rebirth of *Rig-'dzin* Tshe-dbaṅ-nor-bu (1698–1755). I purpose writing a second article on this very same subject, on the base of that *smon-lam*'s commentary (*smon-'grel*).

IGOR DE RACHEWILTZ

THE THIRD CHAPTER OF CHOS–KYI 'OD–ZER'S TRANSLATION OF THE *BODHICARYĀVATĀRA*: A TENTATIVE RECONSTRUCTION

Introduction

The publication in 1954 of the Turfan fragment of the 1312 Daidu (Peking) edition of the Mongolian version of Śāntideva's *Bodhicaryāvatāra* by Chos–kyi 'od–zer [1] – without any doubt a major event in Mongolian studies – has raised a fundamental question: to what extent do the later recensions of Chos–kyi 'od–zer's translation that have come down to us faithfully represent his original work?

This problem has been discussed by various scholars, notably F. Weller, F. W. Cleaves, L. Ligeti and, more recently, W. Heissig, to whom we owe also the restoration and publication of the important Olon Süme fragments of the *Bca.* in Mongolian [2].

I shall not go into this complex question myself, as the contributions of the above–mentioned scholars are well known and easily available. One point, however, should be stressed. In order to reconstruct the lost original on the basis of the extant versions it is not only necessary to study and compare the internal evidence provided by these versions in the light of the Olon Süme fragments and other Buddhist and literary Mongolian Preclassical texts, but it is also essential to carefully examine and compare both the Tibetan version of the *Bca.* and the Sanskrit original for each line of the poem. As is known, Chos–kyi 'od–zer's translation was done from the Tibetan. In this respect, the Tibetan edition prepared by Weller

[1] Haenisch, 1954 and Cleaves, 1954. (For these and the other references in the notes, see the list of Abbreviations).

[2] See, in particular, Cleaves, 1954, pp. 5–13; Weller, 1955; Ligeti, 1966, pp. 3–8; Ligeti, 1970, pp. 251–282; Heissig, 1968; Heissig, 1976, pp. 236–249. Cf. also J. W. de Jong in *IIJ* 20 (1978), pp. 131–132. The section devoted to the Olon Süme fragments of the *Bca.* in Heissig, 1976, occupies pages 15–263.

is an indispensable work; and his textual criticism of the *Bca.*, a product of careful scholarship, must also be used as a constant guide.

In the present paper I have endeavoured to reconstruct Chapter III of Chos-kyi 'od-zer's original version of the *Bca.* I have chosen this particular chapter chiefly because of its manageable length. My reconstruction is, of course, tentative as all reconstructions of this kind are; nevertheless, it may provide the basis for further efforts in that direction.

For the purpose of reconstruction I have used the language material in all the Preclassical Mongolian sources available to me at present. Since most of the preclassical texts have been published by Ligeti in his *Monumenta Linguae Mongolicae Collecta* [3], in my critical apparatus and in the notes I have simply given page references to the handy *Indices* [4] of the *Monumenta.*

In the critical apparatus under the reconstructed text I have justified most of the Mongol readings that I have adopted by referring, in order of importance, to the extant versions, the Turfan fragment, the Olon Süme fragments, the Buddhist texts and fragments of the 13th–15th centuries (in particular those from Turfan), and other literary sources in Preclassical and Middle Mongolian.

In the Notes to the Translation I have discussed the philological problems posed by the reconstruction of the text in relation to doubtful forms, comparison with the Tibetan text, etc. These notes could, of course, be extended indefinitely; however, in view of the limitation of space, I have restricted them to the essential.

This paper is offered with affection and deep gratitude to Professor Giuseppe Tucci who has done so much for Buddhist, Sanskrit and Tibetan studies during his long and productive career as teacher and scholar. At the same time, it is also a modest contribution to the memory of Chos-kyi 'od-zer, that great scholar and superb traslator of Buddhist works into Mongolian [5].

In conclusion, I wish to express my hearfelt thanks to my friend and colleague Dr. T. Rajapatirana of Canberra, without whose generous help with the Tibetan and Sanskrit texts of the *Bca.* this paper could have never been written.

[3] Budapest, 1971– (nine volumes published so far).

[4] *Indices Verborum Linguae Mongolicae Monumentis Traditorum,* Budapest, 1970– (five volumes published so far).

[5] On Chos-kyi 'od-zer see Cleaves, 1954, pp. 13–27, and D. Cerensodnom, *XIV zuuny üeiin yaruu naïragč Čoïži-Odser* (*The XIV Century Poet Čoïži-Odser*), Ulan-Bator, 1969; Aalto, 1973, pp. 3–4; Ruegg, 1974, p. 247.

ABBREVIATIONS

1. *Texts and Versions of the Bodhicaryāvatāra*

B = The lost original text of Chos-kyi 'od-zer's translation of the *Bca.* (? 1305) on which the later recensions (OS and MB) ultimately derive.

K = *Bōdhi-satu-a ca-ri-ā a-va-tā-ra orosiba*, Kowalewski Ms. ed. in Vladimircov 1929.

L = *Bodisung narun yabudal-dur oroqui neretü šastir*, Delhi Ms. L6 ed. in Chandra 1976.

M = *Bodisung čari-a avatar-a-yin teyin böged nomlaqui tayilburi. bodi sedkil-i geyigülün üiledügči saran-u gerel kemegdekü*, Copenhagen Ms. M480 after Heissig 1976, pp. 157–160.

T = *Bōdhi-satuva-nar-un yabudal-dur oroqui*, Tanjur ed. after Ligeti 1966 and Heissig 1976, pp. 157–160.

BT = Chos-kyi 'od-zer's *Bodistv-a čari-a avatar-un tayilbur* of 1312, Turfan fragment ed. in Haenisch 1954 and Cleaves 1954.

MB = The later (17th–18th c.) recensions of B, i.e. the K, L, M and T versions.

OS = The Olon Süme fragments of a 16th c. recension of B, and other preclassical texts ed. in Heissig 1976.

SB = The Sanskrit text of the *Bca.* ed. in Bhattacharia 1960.

TB = The Tibetan text of the *Bca.* ed. in Weller 1950, Anhang.

TB1 = The same ed. in Bhattacharia 1960.

2. *Primary and Secondary Sources*

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Aalto 1973 = P. Aalto, « Sanskrit and Mongol Language and Literature », in Ratnam, II, pp. 1–13.

AOHung = *Acta Orientalia Acad. Scient. Hungaricae.*

Bat. = S. Batchelor, tr., *A Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life*, Dharamsala, 1979.

Bca. = Śāntideva's *Bodhicaryāvatāra.*

Bhattacharia 1960 = V. Bhattacharya, ed., *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, Bibl. Indica 280, Calcutta, 1960.

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CAJ = *Central Asiatic Journal*

Cev. = Ya. Cevel, *Mongol xelnii tovč tailbar tol'*, Ulan-Bator, 1966.

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Cleaves 1950 = F. W. Cleaves, « The Sino-Mongolian Inscription of 1335 in Memory of Chang Ying-jui », *HJAS* 13, 1950, pp. 1–131, Pl. I–XXXV.

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Das = S. C. Das, *Tibetan-English Dictionary*, Calcutta, 1902; rep. Kyoto, 1969.

DO = A. Mostaert, *Dictionnaire ordos*, I–III, Pékin, 1941–44.
DTS = V. M. Nadelyaev a.o., *Drevnetyurkskiĭ slovar'*, Leningrad, 1969.
Edg. = F. Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit*, Vol. II. *Dictionary*, New Haven, 1953.
Fin. = L. Finot, tr., *La Marche à la Lumière. Bodhicaryavatara. Poème sanscrit de Çantideva*, Paris, 1920.
Gershevitch 1961 = I. Gershevitch, *A Grammar of Manichean Sogdian*, Oxford, 1961.
Gram. = N. Poppe, *Grammar of Written Mongolian*, Wiesbaden, 1954.
Haenisch 1954 = E. Haenisch, *Mongolica der Berliner Turfan–Sammlung. I. Ein buddhistisches Druckfragment vom Jahre 1312*, Abh. d. Deut. Ak. d. Wiss. zu Berlin, Berlin, 1954.
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Heissig 1976 = W. Heissig, *Die mongolischen Handschriften–Reste aus Olon süme Innere Mongolei* (*16–17. Jhdt.*), Asiat. Forschungen 46, Wiesbaden, 1976.
HIIY = *Hua–i i–yü* of 1389. See *Mat.*
HJAS = *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies.*
IbnM. = Ibn al–Muḥanna's Mongolian Glossary in *Muk.* pp. 432–451.
IIJ = *Indo–Iranian Journal.*
Ind. = L. Ligeti, *Indices Verborum Linguae Mongolicae Monumentis Traditorum* (Budapest): I (1970); II (1972); III (1973); IV (1973); V (1974).
Index = I. de Rachewiltz, *Index to the Secret History of the Mongols*, Uralic and Altaic Series 121, Bloomington, 1972.
Ist. = L. Ligeti, « Un vocabulaire mongol d'Istanboul », *AOHung.* 14, 1962, pp. 3–99.
Jä. = H. A. Jäschke, *A Tibetan–English Dictionary*, London, 1881; rep. Delhi, 1980.
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Ligeti 1971 = L. Ligeti, «Fragments mongols de Berlin», *AOHung.* 24, 1971, pp. 139–164.
Macdon. = A. A. Macdonell, *A Sanskrit–English Dictionary*, London, 1893.
Mat. = A. Mostaert, *Le matériel mongol du Houa i i iu de Houng–ou* (*1389*), I, éd. par I. de Rachewiltz, Mél. chin. et bouddhiques XVIII, Bruxelles, 1977.
MEPD = M. Haltod a.o., *Mongol–English Practical Dictionary*, The Evangelical Alliance Mission, 1949–1953.
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Muk. = N. Poppe, *Mongol'skiĭ slovar' Mukaddimat al–Adab*, I–III, Moscow–Leningrad, 1938–39; Gregg Int'l rep., 1971.
M–W. = Sir M. Monier–Williams, *A Sanskrit–English Dictionary*, Oxford, 1899; rep. 1974.
N1431 = W. Heissig, « Zwei mutmasslich mongolische Yüan–Übersetzungen und ihr Nachdruck von 1431 », *ZAS* 10, 1976, pp. 7–115.
Pas. = A. Mostaert, *Sur quelques passages de l'Histoire secrète des Mongols*, Cambridge, Mass., 1953. (Reprint of articles in *HJAS* 13, 14 and 15).

Pelliot 1949 = P. Pelliot, *Notes sur l'histoire de la Horde d'Or*, Paris, 1949.

Poppe 1962 = N. Poppe, « Antworten aus Professor Fr. Wellers Frages », *CAJ* 7, 1962, pp. 42–49.

PTSD = T. W. Rhys Davids and W. Stede, eds., *The Pali Text Society's Pali–English Dictionary*, London, 1921–25; rep. 1966.

Ratnam = P. Ratnam, ed., *Studies in Indo–Asian Art and Culture, Commemoration Volume on the 69th Birthday of Acharya Raghu Vira*. Vol. I, New Delhi, 1972; Vol. II, New Delhi, 1973; Vol. III, New Delhi, 1974. Śata-piṭaka Series 95, 96, 209.

SH = *The Secret History of the Mongols*. See *Index* and *Wört*. (The number following *SH* refers to the paragraph of the text in *Index*, Part One).

Ruegg 1974 = D. Seyfort Ruegg, « On Translating the Buddhist Canon », in Ratnam, III, pp. 243–261.

Sum. = Sumatiratna, *Bod-hor-kyi-brda-yig-min-chig-don-gsum gsal-bar-byed-pa-mun-sel-skron-me*, I–II, Corpus Script. Mong. VI and VII, Ulan–Bator, 1959.

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TSD = L. Chandra, *Tibetan–Sanskrit Dictionary*, I–II, New Delhi, 1959; rep. Kyoto, 1971.

VaP. = L. de la Vallée Poussin, tr., *Bodhicaryāvatāra. Introduction à la pratique des futurs Bouddhas. Poème de Çāntideva*, Paris, 1907.

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Weller 1955 = F. Weller, *Zum Blockdruckfragmente des mongolischen Bodhicaryāvatāra der Berliner Turfansammlung. Mongolica der Berliner Turfan–Sammlung*, hgb. von E. Haenisch, la, Abh. d. Deut. Ak. d. Wiss. zu Berlin, Berlin, 1955.

Weller 1957/8 = F. Weller, « Anfragen eines Nichtmongolisten an den Mongolisten », *CAJ* 3, 1957/8, pp. 23–61.

Wört. = E. Haenisch, *Wörterbuch zu Manghol un Niuca Tobca'an* (*Yüan–ch'ao pi–shi*). *Geheime Geschichte der Mongolen*, Leipzig, 1939.

ZAS = *Zentralasiatische Studien.*

3. *Other Abbreviations*

chin. = Chinese
co–oper. = co–operative (verb.)
et p. = et passim
lat. = Latin
mmo. = Middle Mongolian
mo. = Written Mongolian
pa. = Pali
'ph. = 'Phags–pa
pl. = plural
pmo. = Preclassical Mongolian
skr. = Sanskrit
sogd. = Sogdian
tib. = Tibetan
tu. = Turkic (Uighur)

NOTE. In the Transcription, the vowels in bold type were, in the original text (B), most probably as I have transcribed them; however, there is some uncertainty regarding their quality (**o** = *o*~*a*; **e** = *e*~*ö*). Words or suffixes within angle brackets 〈 〉 are doubtful. Their greater or lesser likelihood to have been present in B is discussed in the Notes to the Translation.

Transcription

III

1 a *qamuγ amitan–u γurban maγui ǰaγaγan–u*:
b *ǰobolang–i amu⟨rli⟩γuluγči buyan–nuγud kiged*:
c *ǰobolang–tan amuγulang–a aqun–dur*:
d *daγan bayasun nököčemü bi*::

1a qamuγ amitan–u: cf. BT 163b9, 165a2. γurban maγui ǰaγaγan–u [lb] ǰobolang–i: cf. BT 161a13. **1b** ǰobolang: cf. BT 160b12 et p. (but ǰobalang BT 164a1!). amurliγuluγči L: cf. OS 578b; amuγuluγči M, T, K. buyan: cf. BT 156a10 et p. –nuγud: cf. BT 157a1 et p. kiged: cf. BT 157a6 et p. **1c** –tan: cf. BT 156a2, 4. amuγulang–a L, K: cf. BT 156b3; amuγulang-dur M, T. **1d** daγan: cf. *Ind.*I, 138; *Ind.*II, 29; etc. bayasun: cf. OS 580a. nököčemü L,M,K: cf. sögödümü BT 165b4, 6; nököčemüi T; for nököče–, cf. *Ind.*II, 200. Cf. also Ligeti 1970, 276.

2 a *qutuγ–un šiltaγan bolqu buyan quriyaγsad*:
b *tegün–dür daγan bayasun nököčemü bi*:
c *amitan–u sansar–un ǰobolang–ača*:
d *maγad toniluγsad–ta bayasun nököčemü bi*::

2a qutuγ–un L, T: cf. BT 164b8; bodi q.–un M, K. siltaγan bolqu L; s.–a b. T; ündüsün bolǰu M; ü. bolqui K; for šiltaγan, cf. šiltaγabar BT 165b9. bolqu: cf. BT 159a3 et p. buyan quriyaγsad L: cf. b. üiledkü BT 156a12; b. quriyaγčid M; b.–i quriyaγsad T; b.–i quriyaγčid K; for quriya–, cf. BT 164a6. **2b** tegün–dür L, T; teden–dür M, K. bayasun nököčemü bi L, T; b. n. K; bayasulčamu M. **2c** amitan–u sansar–un M: cf. BT 165a2; a. s.–un L, T; a.–i s.–un K; for sansar, cf. BT 164a13 et p. **2d** maγad: cf. *Ind.*II, 195; OS 591b. for tonil–, cf. BT 156b7 et p.

3 a *qamuγ ibeged–ün qutuγ kiged*:
b *bodistv–nar–un γaǰad–tur ber bayasulčamu bi*:
c *qamuγ amitan–i amuγulsuγai kemen egüskegsen*:
d *sedkil–ün dalai metü buyan kiged*:
e *amitan–u tus–a üiledküi–dür*:
f *daγan bayasun nököčesügei*::

3a qamuγ ibeged–ün L, M, K: cf. bodistv–nar–un 3b; q. ibegel–ün T; for ibeged, cf. ibegen BT 165b5. **3b** bodistv–nar–un L, M: cf. BT 162a8; bodisatu–a–nar–un K; bodhisatuva–yin T; cf. Ligeti 1970, 274. γaǰad–tur: cf. *HIIY* (*Mat.* 87). bayasulčamu L, M; bayasulčamui T, K; for bayasulča–, cf. OS 580a. **3c** amuγulsuγai: for amuγul–, cf. *Ind.*II, 75–76. egüskegsen: for egüske–, cf. BT 165b9, 167a7. **3d** sedkil–ün L, M, K: cf. BT 161b9; s.–iyen T. for dalai cf. *Ind.*II, 174; etc. **3e** tusa L, T: cf. BT 163b9–10; amitan–a t. M, K. üiledküi: cf. BT 156b8. **3f** nököčesügei L, M, K, üǰügülsügei T!

4 a *bükü ǰug–ün ⟨ile⟩ burqan–nuγud–ta*:
b *alaγaban qamtudqaǰu öčikü minu*:

c *ǰobolang-a tengčiregsed amitan-a*:
d *nom-un ǰula⟨-yi⟩ šitaγan soyurq-a*::

4a bükü M, T, K: cf. BT 161a11; büküi L. ǰụg (pro ǰüg): cf. BT 157a10 et p.; N1431,83. burqan M; ile b. L, T, K; b.-nuγud: cf. BT 161a2; -nuγud-ta L, M, T; -n.-a K. **4b** alaγaban: cf. BT 157a12; Ligeti 1970, 276. for qamtudqa-, cf. OS 596a. öčikü minu T; öčig minu L, M; öčimü bi K; cf. γarqu minu BT 162b13; Ligeti 1970, 279; for öči-, cf. BT 159b10. **4c** ǰobolang, as above 1b. tengčiregsed T; tenčirdegsed L; tenčirdegsen M, K; see below, n. 22. **4d** ǰula⟨-yi⟩ šitaγan: cf. ǰula šita·aqu (šitāqu) *Ind.*III, 57; ǰula-yi sitaγan L, M, T, K. soyurq-a: cf. OS 599b.

5 a *nirvan bolqu-yi küsegčid ilaγuγsad-ta*:
b *alaγaban qamtudqaǰu öčikü minu*:
c *ede amitan-i ülü tögörigülkü-yin tulada*:
d *toγ-a ügei kalb-ud-tur saγuqui-a öčimü bi*::

5a nirvan: cf. BT 165a5. bolqu-yi T, K: cf. *Ind.*II, 80–81; bolqui-yi L, M. küsegčid: cf. BT 159a1. ilaγuγsad: cf. N1431, 82. **5b** öčikü minu, as above 4b **5c** tögörigülkü-yin: for tögöri-, cf. *SH* to'ori- (*Wört.* 151). tulada: cf. BT 156b10 et p. **5d** toγ-a ügei L, T, K; t. tomsi ügei M; for toγ-a, cf. *Ind.*II, 259. kalb-ud-tur: cf. *Ind.*III, 65; galab-ud-tur L, M, T, K. saγuqui-a T; saγulun L; saγul-un M; saγulγan K; for saγu-, cf. BT 157b2. öčimü bi: cf. mörgömü bi BT 165b11.

6 a *tere metü edeger bügüde-yi üiledčü*:
b *quriyaγsan minu ali tere buyan*:
c *tegüber qamuγ amitan-u*:
d *ǰobolang-ud bügüde arilqu boltuγai*::

6a tere metü: cf. BT 158b2, 162b5. edeger: cf. *Ind.*II, 178; OS 585a. bügüde-yi: for bügüde, cf. BT 156a1 et p. **6b** ali tere: cf. BT 161b8. **6c** tegüber: cf. BT 163a8; tegün-iyer L, M, T, K. **6d** ǰobolang, as above 1b. arilqu: for aril-, cf. BT 158a11 et p.

7 a *ebečiten amitan keǰiy-e-de*:
b *ebečin anaγ-a inaγši-da*:
c *otači em kiged ebečiten-ü*:
d *ǰaruqu kümün inu bolsuγai bi*::

7a ebečiten amitan L, T, K; ebedčiten-ü a. M; for ebečin, cf. BT 165a3. keǰiy-e-de: cf. *Ind.*III, 66; IV, 173; for keǰiy-e, cf. BT 163a2 et p. **7b** ebečin: cf. BT 165a3. anaγa inaγši-da: cf. oluγa inaγši-da BT 163a11–12; inaγšida L, M, T, K. **7c** otači: cf. *Muk.* 489a. em: cf. BT 164b12, 165a4. **7d** ǰaruqu: for ǰaru-, cf. BT 159a3, 160a7. kümün: cf. BT 160b4 et p. bolsuγai bi L, T, K; boltuγai bi M.

8 a *idegen umdaγan-u qur-a oroγulǰu*:
b *ölösküleng umdaγasqulang adas-i tarqaγasuγai*:
c *ǰutaγsan dumdadu kalb-un čaγ-tur*:
d *idekü uγuqu anu bolsuγai bi*::

8a idegen: cf. BT 160a9 et p. umdaγan: cf. OS 603a; idegen u.-u K; i.u. L; i. umdan M; i.-ü nom-tan [= umdan] T. qur-a oroγulǰu: cf. BT 158a1. **8b** adas-i L,

M; idesi T; ǰobalang-i K. adas: cf. *Ind.*II, 160; OS 577a. tarqaγasuγai L, K; tarqasuγai T; tarqauγai M; for tarqaγa–, cf. BT 156b1 et p. **8c** ǰutaγsan K; ǰudtaγsan L, T; ǰüdegsen M. dumdadu: cf. BT 159b9. kalb–un, as above 5a. čaγ–tur: cf. BT 157b14′ et p. **8d** idekü: for ide–, cf. BT 163b1. uγuqu M, K; uuqu L, T; for uγu–, cf. OS 603a; *SH* u'u– (*Wört.* 167).

9 a *ügegü dutaγu amitan–a*:
b *barasi ügei sang inu bi bolǰu*:
c *kereg–iyer eldeb ed ele*:
d *emün–e anu bütükü⟨i⟩ boltuγai*::

9a ügegü: cf. BT 158a12, 161a9. dutaγu: cf. *SH* duta'u (*Wört.* 39–40). **9b** barasi ügei: cf. BT 156b11. sang: cf. BT 156a1, 156b10. **9c** kereg–iyer L, T, K: cf. BT 156b11; kereglekü̈i M. eldeb ed ele L, T, K; yisün ǰüil–tü eldeb ed anu M; for eldeb, cf. BT 156b14; for ed, cf. BT 161a10; for ele, cf. BT 156b2 et p. **9d** emün–e anu L, T, K; e. inu M; for emün–e, cf. *Ind.*I, 133; etc. bütükü⟨i⟩ boltuγai: cf. 158a4 et p.; butükü b. L, T, M, K.

10 a *beye ber tegünčilen ed tabar ber*:
b *γurban čaγ–un buyan–iyan ber*:
c *qamuγ amitan–u tus–a–yin tulada*:
d *qayiralal ügegüi–e ögsügei*::

10a beye: cf. BT 156a5 et p.; Ligeti 1970,274; bey–e L, M, T, K. tegünčilen: cf. BT 159a5 et p. ed tabar: cf. BT 156a2, 165a13; ed tavar L, M, T, K. **10b** γurban čaγ: cf. *Ind.* II, 181. **10c** qamuγ amitan–u tus–a–yin: cf. BT 163b9–10, and above 3e; q. a.–a tusa–yin T; q. a.–a tusa bütügekü–yin L, K. **10d** qayiralal: for qayirala–, cf. *Ind.* II, 111. ügegüi–e: cf. BT 156a3, 163a5. ögsügei: for ög–, cf. BT 165b13.

11 a *bügüde–yi tebčibesü amuγu*:
b *minu ber sedkil amuγulang–i kü küsemü*:
c *qamuγ–i mün ele tebčiküi–dür*:
d *amitan–a ögbesü deger–e ülegü bui*::

11a tebčibesü: for tebči–, cf. *Ind.*II, 208; *SH* (*Wört.* 147). amuγu: for amu–, cf. *Ind.* II, 162; *SH* (*Wört.* 7). **11b** minu ber sedkil: cf. m. b. yabudal BT 164a11–12. amuγulang–i L, T, K; a.–yi M. küsemü L, M, K; küsemüi T; for küse–, cf. BT 157b4 et p. **11c** mün ele: cf. *SH* 149 (*Index* 67/4417; *Wört.* 112). tebčiküi–dür T: cf. irügeküi–dür BT 158b8; tebčiküi–dür L, M; tebči–dür K. **11d** deger–e: cf. BT 160b1. ülegü: cf. BT 160b14 (but ülegüi 161b1!); *Ind.*II, 148; etc.

12 a *qamuγ amitan–a taγalaqui–bar*:
b *ene beyeben ögbe bi*:
c *nasu ürgülǰi alabasu doromǰilabasu ber*:
d *ašqiqu⟨i⟩ terigüten–i taγalaγsaγar üiledtügei*::

12a taγalaqui–bar: cf. nomlaqui–bar BT 157a10; for taγala–, cf. BT 161a10. **12b** beyeben: cf. *Ind.*II, 79; bey–e-ben L, M, T, K. **12c** nasu L, M, K: cf. BT 159b4, 167a4; nasun T. ürgülǰi: cf. *Ind.*II, 218; SH (*Wört.* 166); etc. alabasu: for ala–, cf. *Ind.*II, 161;

etc. doromǰilabasu: for doromǰila-, cf. BT 158a7. **12d** ašqiqu⟨i⟩: askiqui M, T, K; aškiqu L; for ašqi-, cf. *SH* ašigi- (*Wört.* 9). terigüten-i L, T, K; terigüten M; for terigüten, cf. BT 156b8 et p. taγalaγsaγar: cf. küsegseger BT 157b4 and sedkigseger BT 162a9; taγalaγsabar T; taγalaγsan-bar L, M; taγalaγsan-iyer K. üiledtügei L, K; üiledsügei T; üileddeküi M.

13 a *minu beye-dür naγadbasu ba*:
b *sonǰin inegedün-ü šiltaγan bolbasu ber*:
c *ene beyeben öggün baralaγai*:
d *egün-i soyin asaraǰu yaγun kereg*::

13a minu beye-dür L, T, K; m. b.-ber-dür M. naγadbasu L; naγulbasu M, K; naγadqu T; see Weller, 1949, 18; for naγadbasu ba, cf. küsebesü ba BT 163a2-3. **13b** sonǰin: for sonǰi-, cf. *HIIY* (*Mat.* 95). inegedün-ü L; for inege-, cf. *SH* (*Wört.* 82), *HIIY* (*Mat.* 63); inigedün-ü M, T, K. šiltaγan, see above 2a; siltaγan L, M, T, K. **13c** beyeben, as above 12b. öggün: cf. *Ind.*II, 125. baralaγai L; cf. bülegei BT 165b10; etc.; baraluγai M, T, K. **13d** egün-i L, T, K; egünü M. asaraǰu: for asara-, cf. *Ind.*II, 77. yaγun kereg: cf. BT 156b11 (Cleaves) 1954, 44 ǰaγun [sic] kereg).

14 a *teden-e qoor ada ülü bolqu metü*:
b *ali ber üiles-i üiledteküi*:
c *namayi ǰoriǰu keǰiy-e ber bögesü*:
d *nigeken ber qabiy-a ügei buu boltuγai*::

14a qoor ada: cf. *Ind.*II, 112. ülü bolqu metü: cf. ü. bisqariqu m. *Ind.*II, 149, and ada tüligen ülü boluyu *ibid.*, 82. **14b** ali ber üiles: cf. *Ind.*III, 12. **14c** ǰoriǰu: for ǰori-, cf. BT 166a2. **14d** nigeken ber: cf. BT 158a6, 7-8. qabiy-a: cf. *Ind.*I, 102 (see Cleaves, 1950, 126-127, n. 255). For lines 14b-d, cf. also OS 26-27, 79 where, however, γabiya is an error for qabiy-a.

15 a *ked ber namayi ǰoriǰu bürün*:
b *urin ba taqi süs-üg törögülbesü*:
c *tere böged teden-e nasuda*:
d *qotal-a üiles bütükü-yin šiltaγan boltuγai*::

15a ked ber: cf. *SH* (*Wört.* 98); *HIIY* (*Mat.* 71); *Ind.*IV, 172. bürün L: cf. BT 159a9 et p.; Ligeti, 1970, 274; bür-ün M, T, K. **15b** taqi: cf. *Ind.*II, 133; *SH* (*Wört.* 144); *HIIY* (*Mat.* 98). süs-üg: cf. BT 156b8; süsüg L, M, T, K. törögülbesü: for törögül-, cf. BT 164b13 et p. **15c** böged: cf. BT 156a8, 163a4. nasuda: cf. BT 156b3 et p. (but nasu-da 158b13! see Ligeti, 1970, 273, 274). **15d** qotal-a: cf. BT 167a10; qotala M, T, K; qotola L. bütükü-yin T, K; bütüküyin L; bütügeküi-yin M; cf. bütügekü-yin BT 163b10, 164a9. šiltaγan, see above 2a; siltaγan L, M, T, K.

16 a *ked be namayi daγaribasu ber*:
b *busud nadur qoor kürgebesü ber*:
c *tegünčilen qoblaqun bolbasu ber*:
d *bügüde qutuγ-tur kürküi qubitan boltuγai*::

16a ked be T, K, (?M); kedbe L; cf. ked be *Ind.*V, 268–269. namayi L, M: cf. *Ind.*I, 86, 135; II, 235, 305, 332; OS 593a namai~namayi; namai-yi T; namai K. daγaribasu: for daγari-, cf. *SH* da'ari- (*Wört.* 30). **16b** busud: cf. BT 156b12 et p. nadur qoor L, T, K; qoor M; for nadur, cf. BT 164a2, 164b4. **16c** qoblaqun: see below, n. 69; qubiyaqun L, M, T, K.

17 a *bi itegel ügegün–ü itegel anu*:
b *mör–tür oroγsad–un uduriγulsun anu*:
c *getülsügei kemekün–ü ongγoča anu*:
d *kegürge kiged sal anu ber bi bolsuγai*::

17a itegel: cf. BT 162a3, 10. ügegün: cf. *SH* üge'ün (*Wört.* 159). anu L, K, OS 79; inu T. **17b** mör: cf. BT 161b9 et p. oroγsad: cf. BT 157a6, 158b7. uduriγulsun: cf. OS 603a; *Ind.*V, 455. **17c** kemekün-ü L, K; kemekün T. ongγoča: cf. *Ind.*III, 79 (but ongγačačin *Ind.*II, 321, and ongqača *Mat.* 81!). **17d** kegürge: cf. *Ind.*II, 248; *SH* ke'ürge (*Wört.* 100); *HIIY* ke'ürge (*Mat.* 71); IbnM. 440a ke'ürge; *Muk.* 231a kü'ürge; kögörge L, T; kögerge OS 80 (?), K. sal: cf. *SH* (*Wört.* 131); OS 598a. bolsuγai L, K; boltuγai T.

18 a *qoi küsekün–ü qoi anu*:
b *ǰula küsekün–ü ǰula anu*:
c *oron küsegčin–ü oron anu*:
d *amitan boγol ǰalaγu küsebesü*:
e *qamuγ–un boγol ǰalaγu bi bolsuγai*::

18a qoi: cf. *Ind.*IV, 162 (Bosson, 1969, pp. 307-308, n. 23). **18c** oron: cf. BT 160a3 et p. küsegčin-ü T, K; erigčin-ü L, M. **18d** amitan boγol L, T, K; a.-u b. M; for boγol, cf. *Ind.*II, 80; etc. ǰalaγu: cf. *Ind.*II, 183. bi bolsuγai L, T, K; bolsuγai bi M.

19 a *čindamani erdini sayin qumqan*:
b *bütügegsen tarni yeke em*:
c *sedkigsen–i bütügegči kalbavarags modun*:
d *amitan–u kamidini anu bolsuγai bi*::

19a čindamani: cf. N1431, 79. erdini: cf. BT 157a13; erdeni L, M, T, K. qumqan L, M, T: see below, n. 78; qumqa K. **19b** bütügegsen L, T, K; bütügsen M; for bütüge-, cf. BT 157ab et p. tarni: cf. BT 158a4. **19c** kalbavarags: cf. BT 157a7; galbaravars T; galbaravrča K; galbavars M; galbaras L; cf. Ligeti, 1970, p. 274; for k. modud, cf. BT 157a7-8. **19d** amitan-u M, T, K; amitan-i L. kamidini anu bolsuγai bi M; k. inu b. bi K, b. bi amitan-i kamidi-ni anu L; b. bi amitan-u kamidini metü inu T (metü has no counterpart in SB and TB).

20 a *γaǰar terigüten dörben maq–a–bud*:
b *oγtorγui metü nasu turqaru*:
c *čaγ⟨laši⟩ ügei olan amitan–u*:
d *olan ǰüil aγali–yin šitügen inu boltuγai*::

20a maq-a-bud: cf. maq-a-gali *Ind.* II, 196; maqabud L, M, T, K. **20b** oγtorγui: cf. BT 156a1 et p.; Ligeti, 1970, p. 275; oγtarγui L, M, T, K. nasu turqaru: cf. BT 159b4. **20c** čaγ⟨laši⟩ ügei: cf. čaγlaši (~čaγlasi) ügei BT 156b2, 161a2; N1431, 78; OS 583a; etc.; čaγ ügei L, M, T, K. olan amitan-u L, T, K; amitan-u M. **20d** aγali-yin K; aγali M, T; anaγal-i L; cf. aγali-yin šiltaγan 21d; for aγali, cf. *Ind.*II, 73; etc. šitügen: cf. BT šiltaγabar, etc. (see above 2a); sitügen L, M, T, K.

21 a *tegünčilen oγtorγui⟨-yin⟩ qiǰaγar turuγ*:
b *amitan-u ayimaγ-ud keǰiy-e-de*:
c *bügüdeger qutuγ-tur kürüge inaru*:
d *aγali-yin šiltaγan anu bi bolsuγai*::

21a oγtorγui⟨-yin⟩: cf. BT 163b8-9; oγtarγui L, M, T, K. qiǰaγar: cf. BT 163b9. turuγ: cf. *SH* turuq (*Wört.* 155), but see below, n. 91 **21b** ayimaγ-ud M, T, K; ayimaγ L; for ayimaγ, cf. OS 579a; N1431, 76. **21c** bügüdeger: cf. BT 157b1 et p. inaru: see below, n. 89. **21d** aγali-yin K; aγali M, T; anaγalai-yin L. šiltaγan: see above 2a; siltaγan L, M, T, K.

22 a *yambar erten-ü sayibar oduγsad*:
b *bodičid sedkil egüskeǰü*:
c *bodistv-nar-un surtaqui-dur*:
d *ǰergeber tedeger aγsan bögesü*::

22a yambar: cf. BT 163b10, 164a1, 10. erten-ü: for erte, cf. BT 162b2. sayibar oduγsad L, T, K; s. oduγsan M; cf. *Ind.*II, 205. **22b** bodičid sedkil egüskeǰü L: cf. BT 165b9, OS 581a; b. sedkil-i e. M, K; bodhičid s.-i e. T; cf. Ligeti, 1970, p. 277. **22c** bodistv-nar-un: see above, 3b; bodistva-nar-un L, M; bodhisatuva-nar-un T; bodi-satu-a-nar-un K. surtaqui-dur: cf. BT 165a8. **22d** ǰergeber: cf. *Ind.*II, 39; OS 589a; ǰerge-ber L, M, T, K; cf. durabar~dura-bar, Ligeti, 1970, p. 274.

23 a *tegünčilen amitan-u tus-a-yin tulada*:
b *bodičid sedkil egüskeged*:
c *tegünčilen surtaqui-dur ber anu*:
d *ǰergeber surulčan yabusuγai*::

23a amitan-u K; amitan-a L, T; amitan-i M; cf. above 10c. **23c** anu L, M, K; inu T. **23d** ǰergeber, as above 22d. yabusuγai: for yabu-, cf. BT 156a13 et p.

24 a *uqaγatan bilig-ten-e tere metü*:
b *süs-üg-iyer bodičid sedkil-i bariǰu*:
c *ečüs-i ber ösken nemegülkü-yin tulada*:
d *sedkil-iyen eyin kemen degdegüldeküi*::

24a uqaγatan L, T, K; uqaγan M; cf. *Ind.*III, 99. bilig-ten-e: cf. bilig-tü BT 166b3. tere metü: cf. BT 158b2, 165a10. **24b** süs-üg-iyer: süs-üg, as above 15b. bodičid, as above 22b. sedkil-i bariǰu: cf. *Ind.*II, 165. **24c** ečüs-i: for ečüs, cf. BT 162a12. ösken: for öske-, cf. *Ind.*II, 126. nemegülkü-yin L, K: cf. BT 161a7, 10; 163b10; 164a9; nemegülküi-yin M, T; for neme-, nemegül-, cf. BT 163b2; *Ind.*III, 76. **24d** eyin: cf. BT 156b5 et p. degdegüldeküi: for degde-, cf. *SH* (*Wört.* 35).

25 a *edüge amidu aγsan–u qabiy–a bütübe*:
b *kümün–ü töröl–i sayitur olba bi*:
c *ene üdür burqad–un uǰaγur–tur töröbe*:
d *burqad–un köbegün ber edüge bolba bi*::

25a edüge: cf. BT 161b14. amidu: cf. *Ind.*II, 161. **25b** kümün–ü M, T, K; kümün–i L; k.–ü töröl–i sayitur olba bi: cf. BT 160b4–5. **25c** üdür L; cf. *Ind.*II, 144; edür M, T, K. uǰaγur: cf. *Ind.*I, 123 et p.; iǰaγur L, M, T, K. **25d** burqad–un köbegün T, K: cf. BT 157b11–12; b.–un köbegüd L, M. edüge L, T, K; deest M.

26 a *edüge ber bi ker ber kiǰü*:
b *uǰaγur–tur–iyan ǰoqistu üiles egüskesügei*:
c *gem ügegü⟨i⟩ ariγun ene uǰaγur–i*:
d *ülü bulunggiraqu metü üiledsügei bi*::

26a bi ker ber kiǰü: cf. ker ber kiǰü MBVIII, 164c; bi kerkin ber L, T; bi ber ker kin ber M; ber ker kin ber K. **26b** uǰaγur, as above 25c. ǰoqistu: cf. BT 160a3; ǰokistu L, M, T; ǰokistu K. üiles M, T, K; üilesi L. **26c** gem ügegü⟨i⟩: gem ügegüi L; gem ügegüi–e M, T, K; for gem, cf. *Ind.*II, 182; OS 586b; for ügegüi, cf. uq–a ügegüi ǰọndeg maγui *MonP.* 158 (25); etc. ariγun: cf. OS 579a. uǰaγur, as above 25c. **26d** bulunggiraqu: cf. bulunggir OS 581b; *HIIY* (*Mat.* 43).

27 a *balai kümün šigürügsen široγai–ača*:
b *yambar erdini oluγsan metü*:
c *tegünčilen atala kü ölǰei–e metü*:
d *ene bodičid sedkil nadur töröbei*::

27a balai: cf. *Ist.* 18. šigürügsen: sigürügsen L, M, K; s.–ü T; for ši–, cf. šiltaγan 2a; for šigür–, cf. *HIIY* ši'ür– (*Mat.* 98). široγai–ača: siroγai–ača L, M, T, K; for ši–, see above; for široγai, cf. *SH* širo'ai (*Wört.* 142). **27b** erdini, as above 19a. **27c** atala M, T, K; adali L. ölǰei–e metü: ölǰei metü T; ölǰei–e minu L, M, K; for ölǰei–e, cf. *Ind.*IV, 245 (Bosson, 1969, pp. 143, 213, 314). **27d** bodičid, as above 22b.

28 a *amitan–u ükül–ün eǰen–i ilaγuγči*:
b *rasiyan manglai ber ene buyu*:
c *amitan–u ügegü–yi tarqaγaγči*:
d *barasi ügei sang ber ene kü bui*::

28a ükül–ün: for ükül, cf. *Ind.*II, 217. eǰen–i M: cf. BT 166b4 (no *pl. maj.*!); eǰed–i L, T, K. ilaγuγči: cf. above 5a. **28b** rasiyan: cf. OS 597b. manglai: cf. BT 167b2. **28c** ügegü–yi K; ügegüi L; ügegü M, T. tarqaγaγči K; tarqaγaǰu M; tarqaγči L, T.

29 a *amitan–u eber–i amurliγuluγči*:
b *em–üd–ün manglai ber ene kü bui*:
c *orčilang–un mör–iyer tögöriǰü čilegsed–ün*:
d *amuqu següder–tü modun ene ⟨kü⟩ buyu*::

29a eber–i: for eber, cf. *SH* (*Wört.* 40). **29b** ene kü bui L, K; ene buyu M, T. **29c** orčilang–un L, M, K; orčilang T; for orčilang, cf. OS 595a; for orči–, cf. BT 165a5.

mör: cf. BT 161b7 et p. tögörijü: for tögöri-, cf. above 5c; tögerijü L, M, T, K. čilegsed-ün M, T, K; čilaγsad-un L; for čile-, cf. *SH* (*Wört.* 27). **29d** amuqu: cf. *SH* (*Wört.* 7). següder-tü: for següder, cf. *SH* se'üder (*Wört.* 134). ene ⟨kü⟩ buyu: anu buyu L, M, T and K probably a misprint for ene kü buyu or ene kü bui (cf. 28d!).

30 a *qamuγ amitan-i maγui mör-eče:*
b *könggegülügči bürin-ü mör anu bolai:*
c *amitan-u nis-vanis-un qalaγun tarqaγaγči:*
d *bodičid sedkil-ün sara urγubai::*

30a qamuγ amitan-i K; amitan-i M, T; amitan L: cf. TB 'gro ba thams cad. maγui: cf. BT 156a5 et p. **30b** könggegülügči: for könggegül-, cf. *SH* (*Wört.* 103). bürin: cf. *Ind.*II, 26; etc. mör anu L, M; mör inu T; mör K. bolai: cf. BT 161b5 et p. **30c** amitan-u L, T, K; qačorli ügei amitan-u M. nis-vanis-un: for nis-vanis, cf. *Ind.* II, 199; nisvanis-un M; nisvanis-tu L, T, K. qalaγun: cf. *Ind.*II, 186. tarqaγaγči T, K; tarqaγči L, M. **30d** bodičid, as above 22b. sara L: cf. BT 166a10 et p.; saran M, T, K. urγubai: for urγu-, cf. *Ind.*II, 214; OS 603b.

31 a *amitan-u mungqaγ bürküg-üd-i:*
b *ujaγur-ača γarγaγči yeke naran buyu:*
c *sün metü sayin nom-i bülegsen-eče:*
d *garba jirüken tosun inu ⟨buyu⟩::*

31a mungqaγ: cf. *Ind.*II, 197. bürküg-üd-i T, K; bürkeg-üd-ün L; bürkegüd-ün M; for bürkü-, cf. *Ind.*I, 15 et p.; *Muk.* 463c; *HIIY* (*Mat.* 45); but 'ph. bụrkig! (*Ind.*III, 28). **31b** ujaγur, as above 25c. γarγaγči: for γar-, cf. BT 157b4 et p. naran: cf. BT 158a13, 166b11. **31c** sün: cf. *SH* (*Wört.* 138); N1431, 88. sayin nom: cf. *Ind.*III, 77. bülegsen-eče: for büle-, cf. *SH* (*Wört.* 21). **31d** garba: see below, n. 129. jirüken: cf. *SH* (*Wört.* 91); N1431, 83. tosun: cf. BT 167a8. M, T, K; anu L. ⟨buyu⟩: see below, n. 128.

32 a *amitan sansar-un mör-iyer jiγulčilan odču bürün:*
b *amuγulang ed-i edlesügei kemen küsegčid-te:*
c *amuγulang-ud-un ele manglai anu ene bolju bürün:*
d *jočid amitan ele bügüde-yi qangγaγuluγči bui::*

32a jiγulčilan L, T, K: cf. OS 589a; jiγulčin M. bürün, as above 15a. **32b** ed-i L, K; ed M; öni T. edlesügei: for edle-, cf. BT 156a3. **32c** anu ene bolju M, T, K; anu bolju L. bürün, as above 15a; for bolju bürün, cf. BT 156a8-9. **32d** jočid M, T, K; yeke jočid L; for jočin, cf. *Ind.*II, 108; etc. qangγaγuluγči M, T, K; qaγuluγči L; for qangγa-, cf. *SH* (*Wört.* 59); *Ind.*II, 186 (*qanγa-*).

33 a *ene üdür qamuγ ibeged-ün ilete bi:*
b *burqan-u qutuγ kiged amuγulang orod-tur-i:*
c *amitan-i jočilan urin baraba bi:*
d *tngri-ner kiged asuris terigüten bayasudqun::*

33a ene üdür, as above 25c. ibeged-ün M, K; iteged-ün L; itegel-ün T. ilete: cf. BT 167a14. **33b** orod-tur-i L, T, K; oron-dur-i M; for orod, cf. BT 156b7 et p.

33c amitan–i ǰočilan L, T; amitan–i ǰoči M; göröġe inaru amitan–i ǰočilan K; for ǰočila–, cf. ǰočinla– *Muk.* 208a. urin: for uri–, cf. BT 158b12, 159b1. baraba: cf. *Ind.*II, 164. **33d** asuris: cf. BT 161b10; asuri L, M, T, K. bayasudqun L, T, K; bayasdqun M.

Col. a *bodistv–nar–un yabudal–dur oroqui šastir–ača:*
b *bodičid sedkil–i bariqui* ⟨*neretü*⟩ *γutaγar bölög:: : ::*

Col. a bodistv–nar–un L, M; bodhi–satuva–nar–un T; bodisatu–a–nar–un K; for bodistv–nar–un...šastir–ača, cf. BT 166a1–2. **Col. b** bodičid, as above 22b. ⟨neretü⟩: cf. BT 157b4 et p.; ner–e–tü L, M, T, K; see below, n. 140. γutaγar: cf. BT 158b7 et p. bölög: cf. BT 156b et p.

Translation

III

1 I rejoice in unison [1] at the virtues that alleviate [2] the suffering of the three evil destinies [3] of all living beings, and at the suffering ones being in (a state of) happiness [4].

2 I rejoice in unison at that – the accumulation [5] of virtue which is the cause [6] of enlightenment [7]. I rejoice in unison at the certain liberation [8]

[1] *Bayasun nököčemü bi*, lit. 'I join (= take part in) rejoicing', i.e. 'I share the joy of others', here meaning 'I rejoice at the virtue (*buyan*) of others'. Cf. below 3b *bayasulcămu bi*. The word *dayan*, lit. 'following', before *bayasun* renders TB *rjés su*/SB *anu* and, therefore, need not be translated. For tib. *rjés su*, see Sum.I, 722b; Jä. 181b; Les. 1167a. Cf. also Weller, 1949, pp. 18–19; Aalto, 1973, p. 10.

[2] M, T and K have *amuyuluyči*, L gives *amurliyuluyči*; however, the latter may well be the original reading for it certainly is the appropriate form in the present context. TB has *ňal so* 'to cure weariness' (Jä. 127a), which corresponds to *amurliyul-* 'to cause (an illness) to improve; (for suffering) to subside' (Les. 41a). Cf. also N1431, 77 (in particular 21.24: *qamuy nigül masida amurliysan*), and the occurrences of *amurliyul-* in OS 578b.

[3] *Γurban mayui ǰayayan*. For this expression, cf. BT 161a13; Cleaves 1954, p. 79, p. 108, n. 192. If corresponds to skr. *tisṛṇām durgatīnāṃ*. Of the five states of existence (*gati*) into which rebirth is possible, the first three are regarded as evil. See Edg. 208b. TB has only *ňan soň*, corresponding to SB *apāya* 'evil state' (Jä. 126b; Edg. 46b) = *mayui ǰayayan*. See Sum.I, 507b. Cf. Weller, 1955, p. 26. Following TB, MB links 'the three evil destinies', instead of 'the virtues' (skr. *śubha* 'good or virtuous action') as SB does, with 'all living beings', thus altering the meaning of the original. Cf. BT 164a14–164b1, 165a2–3; Cleaves 1954, p. 83.

[4] *J̌obolang-tan amuyulang-a aqun-dur*, lit. 'in the suffering ones being (pl.) in happiness'. I write *ǰobolang* throughout for this is the form that occurs twelve times out of thirteen in BT (see Cleaves, 1954, p. 62a). Cf. Ligeti, 1970, p. 275. However, it should be noted that in one instance (164a1) BT has *ǰobalang*. As for *amuyulang*, this term renders TB *bde ba*/SB *sukha* 'happiness (i.e. the happiness of rest), bliss'. See Jä. 270a; Les. 1160a.

[5] *Quriyaysad*, lit. 'what has been collected (pl.)'. The plural form here merely indicates a multiple concept. TB has *bsags pa* 'accumulation' (Jä. 579a). Cf. below 2b *toniluysad*.

[6] *Šiltayan bolqu*, lit. 'which becomes the cause'. *Šiltayan* renders TB *rgyu* (= skr. *hetu*) 'basic cause'. See Sum.I, 453c; Les. 1183b. Cf. Ligeti, 1971, p. 159. *Siltayan* is the reading found in T and L, in place of which M and K have *ündüsün*. I wonder whether the word *ündüsün*, which normally renders skr. *tantra* and tib. *rgyud* (Les. 1191b), is not due to a later misreading of TB *rgyu*, i.e. *rgyud* for *rgyu*.

[7] *Qutuy* = *bodi qutuy* 'the bliss of enlightenment', or simply 'enlightenment'. Cf. M, K *bodi qutuy-un*. TB has *byaň chub* (= skr. *bodhi*). See Sum.II, 225g; Jä. 374b.

[8] *Mayad toniluysad-ta*. *Mayad* 'certain(ly), sure(ly), real(ly)' corresponds here to TB *ňes par* (= skr. *nir-*, see Les. 1175a), and in combination with *toniluysad* it renders

of living beings from the suffering of *saṃsāra* [9].

3 I share in rejoicing [10] also [11] at the states [12] of enlightenment and of Bodhisattvas (i.e. at the states of Buddhahood and Bodhisattvahood) of all Protectors [13]. Let me rejoice in unison [14] at the ocean-like virtue of the thought (= resolution) which they have produced [15] to the effect of relieving all living beings [16], and at (their) realizing the welfare [17] of (i.e. at benefiting) living beings.

4 (As to) my praying [18], joining the palms of my hands [19], to the Bud-

TB *ṅes par thar*/SB *nirmoksha* 'liberation'. Cf. Sum.I, 912d; M.-W. 556b. Strictly speaking, *mayad* need not be translated, but in view of the fact that by itself this word conveys a definite meaning in Mongolian I have preferred rendering it into English. For *toniluγsad*, lit. 'what has been liberated (pl.)', see above, n. 5.

[9] *Sansar* = skr. *saṃsāra*. *Sansar* is the regular form in pmo. and mo. See Cleaves, 1954, p. 116, n. 269; Les. 1182b–1183a. Cf. below, n. 120.

[10] *Bayasulčamu bi*. *Bayasulča-* (co-oper. form of *bayas-*) has the same meaning of (*dayan*) *bayasun nököče-*, on which see above, n. 1. TB has *yi raṅ ṅo* 'I rejoice', without *rjés su*. Cf. Sum.II, 825g.

[11] *Ber* 'also', cf. BT 156a9 et p. Here it corresponds to TB *'aṅ* 'also, even'. Cf. below, nn. 42 and 56.

[12] *Γaǰad-tur*. *Γaǰad* is the pl. of *γaǰar* 'land, earth, place', meaning here 'state of being, condition' (= English *-hood*). It corresponds to tib. *sa*, also lit. 'earth' (= skr. *tva*). Cf. TB *byaṅ chub daṅ rgyal sras sa*/SB *bodhisattvatva buddhatva*. VaP. 18: 'la qualité de Bodhisattva et de Bouddha'; Fin .38: 'l'état de Bodhisattva et de Bouddha'.

[13] *Qamuγ ibeged* 'all Protectors'. *Ibeged*, pl. of *ibegen* (~*ibegel*) is supported by L, M, K and by *bodistv-nar* (also a pl.) in 3b. T has *ibegel*. Although in pmo. and mmo. both forms are used (cf. *SH ihe'el*, 'ph. *ihe'en*), BT has only *ibegen*. In mo. *ibegel* means 'protection' (Les. 396b), as also in pmo. and mmo; however, the meaning of 'protector' (mo. *itegel*) is confirmed by TB *skyob pa*/SB *tāyin*. Cf. below, n. 136.

[14] T has *üǰügülsügei* 'let me show', i.e. 'let me teach (*or* instruct)', which does not fit the context. However, this (in my opinion later) revision may reflect SB *śāsinām* 'of the teachers', which has no correspondence in TB.

[15] *Egüskegsen sedkil*, rendering TB *thugs bskyed*/SB *cittotpāda* 'production of intention, resolution' (Edg. 229b–230a). See *TSD* 1032a. Cf. Les. 1168a *sedkil egüske-* 'intention to enter the path leading to enlightenment'. For *sedkil*, cf. also Aalto, 1973, p. 11.

[16] Lit. 'saying, "Let me relieve all living beings"'.

[17] *Tusa üiledküi-dür*, lit. 'at the fact of realizing (*or* producing, making) the benefit (*or* help)', i.e. 'at the benefiting (*or* helping)'. Fot *tusa üiled-* 'to help, assist, benefit,' see Les. 999b. This stanza (III,3) is unusually long – six lines instead of four – both in TB [1] and MB (all versions), the latter reflecting exactly the former. Weller has rearranged the Tibetan text, so that in TB the third stanza has only four lines, and the second stanza consists of only two lines (cd), with the first two lines (ab) left blank. This confusion arises from SB, where the lines corresponding to MB III, 2ab (= TB[1] III, 2ab) are missing. For a line by line correspondence in the Sanskrit, Tibetan and Mongolian texts, see Weller, 1950, p. 3.

[18] *Öčikü minu*, lit. 'my petitioning (= requesting from a superior)'. Cf. TB *gsol ba ni* 'as to the making of a request'.

[19] *Alaγaban qamtudqaǰu*, lit. 'joining together my palms (of the hands)'.

dhas of all directions [20], (I pray as follows): ' Deign to light the lamp of the Law [21] (*dharma*) for the living beings who are confused by suffering [22].

5 (As to) my praying, joining the palms of my hands, to the Victorious Ones [23] who aspire to enter *nirvāṇa* [24], I pray that they remain (here) for countless aeons [25], so that those living beings will not fall into confusion [26].

[20] *Bükü ǰṳg-ün* ⟨*ile*⟩ *burqan-nuγud-ta*. For *bükü* ' all ' (lit. ' what there is *or* which there are '), cf. Cleaves, 1954, p. 108, n. 190. The normal pmo. orthography of *ǰüg* ' direction ' is *ǰṳg*, i.e. *ǰug*. Cf. Mostaert et Cleaves, 1952, p. 426. *Bükü ǰṳg* = *bügüde ǰṳg*. Cf. BT 157a10; Cleaves, 1954, p. 96, n. 65. See also Weller, 1955, pp. 17–18. L, T and K have *ile burqan*, only M has *burqan tout court*. *Ile* ' manifest(ly), clear(ly) ', usually rendering the skr. prefix *abhi* (see Les. 1171a), is not warranted in the present case since TB has simply *saṅs rgyas* ' Buddha ', regularly translated in MB with *burqan*. See, e.g., Weller, 1955, p. 14 et p. Possibly, *ile burqan* is a later revision attempting to render SB *saṃbuddhā*; in this case, *ile* would correspond to skr. *sam*, which is unusual, as *sam* = mo. *üneker*. See Sum.II, 813g–814c; Les. 1191b. For *ile*, cf. also Aalto, 1973, p. 10.

[21] *Nom-un ǰula*⟨*-yi*⟩ *sitaγan soyurqa*. Cf. 'ph. *ǰula šita·aqu* 'to light the lamp(s) ' (*Ind.*III, 57; *Mon.* 130b). On the basis of the 'ph. document, which dates from 1305 and is, therefore, exactly contemporary with our text, I am of the opinion that *ǰula* may have also been in the absolute case. On the term *ǰula*, see Les. 1193b, and L. Ligeti in *AOHung.* 14, 1962, p. 39.

[22] *J̌obolang-a tengčiregsed amitan-a*. Cf. TB *sems can sdug bsṅal mun 'thoms la* ' for beings who are confused by the darkness of suffering '. SB has *mohād duḥkhaprapātinām* ' for those who have fallen into suffering through confusion '. Cf. VaP. 18: ' pour les ignorants qui tombent dans le précipice du malheur '; Fin. 39: ' pour les égarés qui tombent dans le gouffre de la douleur '; Bat. 30: ' For all bewildered in misery's gloom '. *Tengčire-* = mo. *tengčire-*, *tenčire-* ' to feel great anxiety; to suffer, worry, be tormented, be in despair, be confused ' (Les. 801a; cf. Kow. 1694b–1695a). For *teng-* > *ten-*, cf. *SH šingtal-*, mo. *sintala-*.

[23] *Ilaγuγsad-ta*. For *ilaγuγsan* = skr. *jina*, tib. *rgyal ba* ' conqueror, victorious ', see Les. 1171a.

[24] *Nirvan bolqu-yi küsegčid*, lit. ' who aspire to (*or* crave for, desire) the fact of becoming *nirvāṇa* '. For the expression *nirvan bol-*, see Les. 585b.

[25] *Toγ-a ügei kalb-ud-tur*. M has *toγ-a tomsi ügei*, which is the standard expression also in pmo. (cf., e.g., *Mat.* 101), but I think *toγ-a ügei* of L, T and K is preferable in view of the length of the line. L, M, T, K have all *galab-ud-tur*; however, the reading *kalb-ud-tur* is supported by pmo. *kalb-ud* (see *Ind.*II, 181, where however *γalb-ud* should read *kalb-ud*), as well as by 'ph. *kalbud-un* (*Ind.*III, 65; *Mon.* 125). Pmo. *kalb*(*a*) < *k̇alp*, which is the regular Uighur transcription of skr. *kalpa* (M.-W. 262b–263a). See Tekin, 1980, 107b, 322b; *DTS* 289a. Cf. also BT 157a7, b4: *kalbavarags* (= skr. *kalpavṛkṣa*); see below, n. 81.

[26] *Ede amitan-i ülü tögörigülkü-yin tulada*, lit. ' for the sake of not causing those living beings to be confused (*or* misled) '. Pmo. *tögöri-* = mo. *tögöri-*, *tögeri-* ' to be lost; to fall into disorder; to be confused '. See Les. 832b; Kow. 1932b. Cf. TB *ldoṅs par mi dgod*/SB *mā bhūd andham* ' lest (they) become blind '.

6 Having performed [27] all these (actions) [28] like that, whatever merit I have accumulated may thereby [29] clear out (= remove) all the sufferings of all living beings.
7 So long as (there are) sick living beings and until (their) illnesses are healed [30], may I become their [31] physician, medicine and the sick person's servant (i.e. attendant or nurse).
8 Causing a rain of food and drink to fall [32], may I dissipate the harms [33] of hunger and thirst [34]. In the period of the 'hungry intermediate aeon' [35], may I become (= turn into) food and drink [36].
9 I, becoming an inexhaustible treasure house [37] for poor and destitute [38]

[27] *Üiledčü*, lit. 'performing'.

[28] *Edeger* = *edeger üiles.*

[29] L, M, T and K have *tegün-iyer.* However, to my knowledge this form of the instrumental case of *tere* is not attested in pmo. and mmo. The regular form is *tegüber* (= mmo. *te'über*), which fortunately occurs also in BT 163a8. Cf. *Index* 318a; *Mat.* 101. 'Thereby' = 'by means of it (i.e. of the merit I have accumulated)'.

[30] The sentence construction with *...kejiy-e-de...inayši-da* corresponds to TB *...ji srid du. bar du* 'so long as...until...' Cf. Sum.I, 695d–e.

[31] The pronoun *inu* 'his' is the counterpart of TB *de yi.* Here one would rather expect *anu* 'their'. In Mongolian, however, *inu* may stand for *anu.* For this usage in pmo., cf. *Pas.* [95], [182], [257], n. 244. The same usage is found in BT 160b1, 161a10 and 11. See also below, n. 36. Cf., however, Ligeti, 1970, p. 278, for an instance where *inu* T ~ *anu* BT, K (and L). In the present case the reading *inu* is supported by all versions.

[32] *Qur-a oroyulju*, lit. 'causing rain to come down'. Cf. Cleaves, 1954, p. 75 [4–158a] § 39.

[33] *Adas-i tarqayasuyai. Adas-i*, and not *idesi* as in T, is the correct reading. Cf. TB *gnod pa*/SB *vyathā* 'harms, pains, injuries, anguish' (Jä. 331b; M.-W. 1031a). For *tarqaya-* 'to dissipate', cf. Cleaves, 1954, p. 93, n. 30.

[34] *Ölösküleng umdayasqulang.* One would expect *o. u.-un* (gen.); however, these two nouns are here in apposition with *adas* which qualifies them both ('hunger and thirst – the harms'). For a similar apposition, cf. *Pas.* [29-30] X.

[35] *Jutaysan dumdadu kalb-un čay-tur*, lit. 'in the time of the middle *kalpa* that will have suffered from hunger (*or* famine)'. *J. d. kalb* is a technical expression rendering tib. *mu ge'i bskal pa bar ma* 'the intermediate *kalpa* of hunger', which in turn corresponds to skr. *durbhikṣāntara-kalpa.* See Das 966b; Edg. 38a, *s.v. antara-kalpa.* This is the 'intermediate' *kalpa* or aeon before the end of the world, characterised by famine and during which life expectancy will not exceed ten years.

[36] *Idekü uyuqu anu bolsuyai bi.* Here *anu* is employed to emphasize the two preceding nouns. In this role of syntactical subject designator it alternates with *inu.* Cf. its usage in BT, in particular 164b11 (*inu*) and 165a4 (*anu*). In BT, *inu* occurs as a pronoun ('his' twice; 'their' three times) and as subject designator (four times); *anu* as a pronoun ('their' four times) and as subject designator (six times). Cf. above, n. 31, and below, n. 71.

[37] *Barasi ügei sang.* On the word *sang* (< tu. *saŋ* < chin. *ts'ang*) 'granary, storehouse; treasure, treasury', see Cleaves, 1951, pp. 79–80, n. 45; Les. 672a, 1182b. This

(*see n. 38 p. sg.*)

living beings, let all kinds of different goods for (their) needs [39] be accomplished (= materialize) [40] before them.

10 For the sake of the welfare of all living beings, may I give, without there being (a sense of) attachment [41], and [42] body, and, likewise [43], goods and possessions [44], and the merit (that I have, or will have, accumulated) in the three times [45].

11 If one renounces everything, one is at rest and my mind indeed desires the happiness of rest [46]. When (= if), surely, I am to renounce all (anyway) [47], it is far better [48] if I give it to living beings.

12 I have given this body of mine to all living beings for (their) pleasure [49].

term, which corresponds to tib. *gter* 'treasure', occurs also in BT. See Cleaves, 1954, pp. 87–88, n. 5.

[38] *Ügegü dutayu*, rendering TB *phoṅs śiṅ dbul ba* 'needy and poor'. *Ügegü* is, literally, 'without; having nothing'. Cf. Cleaves 1954, pp. 107–108, n. 188; and below, n. 41.

[39] *Kereg-iyer eldeb ed ele.* The words *barasi ügei*, *sang*, *kereg* and *bütükü* (see below, n. 40) appear in a different combination in BT 156b10–11. See Cleaves, 1954, p. 74. Cf. Poppe, 1962, pp. 43–44. The generalizing/corroborative and conditional/optative particle *ele* occurs three times in BT. See Cleaves, 1954, p. 60a. In the present instance, it renders TB *dgu* indicating plurality; it is, therefore, used as a generalizing particle. Cf. Sum.I, 370f. However, in our text the correspondence *ele:dgu* is not regular. Cf., e.g., 11c (see below, n. 47), 32c and d (see below, n. 132).

[40] In BT the expression *bütükü boltuyai* occurs twice in this form (156b11, 162b13) and five times as *bütüküi boltuyai* (158a4, 158b14, 159b6, 162a2–3, 162a4). The form *bütüküi* has been regularly changed into *bütükü* in K. See Cleaves, 1954, pp. 70–71, and Ligeti, 1970, p. 275. It is impossible, therefore, to say whether in the present instance B had *bütükü* or *bütüküi*.

[41] *Qayiralal ügegüi-e*, lit. 'without there being love (i.e. longing for, attachment to – the fruits thereof)'. For *ügegüi-e*, cf. Cleaves, 1954, p. 89, n. 9; and above, n. 38.

[42] *Ber* 'and, also', here rendering TB *daṅ* 'and'. Cf. above, n. 11.

[43] *Tegünčilen*, on which see *Mon.* 114, n. 137, renders TB *de bžin* 'like that, likewise'.

[44] *Ed tabar.* For this expression, see Cleaves, 1954, pp. 88–89, n. 7. For *tabar v. tavar*, see Ligeti, 1970, p. 275.

[45] I.e. past, present and future. Cf. TB *dus gsum*/SB *tryadhva.* See Das 635b; Edg. 260b.

[46] On this line, cf. Weller 1950, 33. Here *amuyulang* 'happiness of rest' (see above, n. 4) renders TB *mya ṅan*/SB *nirvāṇa.*

[47] *Qamuy mün ele tebčiküi-dür*, lit. 'at the moment when I surely renounce all', i.e. at death. In other words, since one has to renounce all anyway when one dies, it is better if one gives it away to other living beings now. The expression *mün ele* indicates that what is expressed as a possibility is in actual fact a certainty, i.e. it is bound to happen. It renders TB *chabs gcig* 'in the possibility'.

[48] *Deger-e ülegü bui*, lit. 'it is higher (= superior) and in excess of'.

[49] *Tayalaqui-bar*, lit. 'in order to love (*or* please)'. On this use of the instrumental case with a future noun, cf. *Gram.* 53, §532(e).

Let them always and continuously[50] perform as they please[51] (acts such as) beating it and the like[52], even if they kill it and despise it[53].

13 If they play with my body, and even if it (i.e. my body) becomes a cause of derision and laughter, this body of mine I have already given[54] (to them): what is (then) the use of anxiously caring for it[55]?

14 Let them perform any act[56] (they wish on it), in a manner (i.e. provided) that it will not be (of) harm[57] to them. When they turn towards[58] (= rely on) me, let it never[59] be (of) disadvantage[60] to anyone[61].

[50] *Nasu ürgülǰi* = *nasu turqaru.* Cf. BT 159b4, and below, 20b. This expression renders TB *rtag tu* 'always'.

[51] *Tayalaysayar*, lit. 'according to (their) loving (= being pleased),' i.e. 'according to (*or* following) (their) pleasure'.

[52] *Terigüten-i* (acc.), rendering TB *sogs* 'and so forth, and the like'.

[53] I.e. even to the extent of killing, etc.

[54] *Öggün baralayai*, lit. 'I have finished giving'. Here *bara–* is merely an auxiliary verb of completed action (see Les. 82b) corresponding to TB *zin.*

[55] *Egün–i soyin asaraǰu yayun kereg. Soyin asaraǰu* is, literally, 'taking care tending'. For *soyi–*, cf. Ordos *sòö–* (= mo. *soyi–*) 'lier au poteau en plein air et ne pas laisser manger (un cheval qu'on vient de monter), l'hiver, la nuit; lier au poteau pendant de longues heures (un cheval) au soleil, le printemps (ces pratiques ont pour but de conserver la santé des chevaux); tendre; etc. etc.' (*DO* 583b). TB has *kha ta* which Sum.I, 150c, renders as *qayirala–* 'to love; to take care of'. *Soyin asara–* therefore means 'to be anxiously concerned about, to anxiously care for' and the like. For *yayun kereg* = TB *ci źig bya*, lit. 'what will I do?', cf. Weller, 1957/8, pp. 24–25; Poppe 1962, p. 44.

[56] *Ali ber üiles.* For this expression, cf. *Ind.*III, 12. *Ali ber* renders TB *gaṅ yin pa 'aṅ* 'whatsoever there is', tib. *'aṅ* (*yaṅ*) being regularly rendered into Mongolian with *ber*. Cf. above, n. 11.

[57] *Qoor ada*, lit. 'harm and misfortune', renders TB *gnod pa* 'harm'. On *qoor ada*, cf. Mostaert et Cleaves, 1952, p. 460.

[58] *J̌ori–* 'to aim or point at; to go in the direction of, turn or lean towards', renders tib. *dmigs pa*, usually meaning 'to fancy, imagine' (see Jä. 422b), but corresponding, in the present case, to skr. *ā–$\sqrt{\textit{lamb}}$* 'to hang from; to rest or lean upon'. See M.–W. 153b. Cf. Sum.II, 424a.

[59] *Kejiy–e ber bögesü* + negat. verb (*buu bol–*) = 'not ever, never'. Cf. TB *nam du yaṅ...ma gyur cig* 'let there never be'.

[60] *Qabiy–a ügei*, lit. 'without relevance (application, usefulness, meaning, purpose, etc.)'. This expression renders TB *don med* 'without meaning (*or* purpose)', which in turn corresponds to SB *an–artha* 'without meaning, worthless; disadvantage, damage'. See M.–W. 26b; Macdon. 13a; *PTSD* 24a. Cf. Kow. 753b: *qabiy–a ügei* 'inutile, bon à rien; périssable, fragile, nul'.

[61] *Nigeken ber*, lit. '(not) even a single one'. Cf. TB *'ga' yaṅ* 'whosoever, anyone'. See Ligeti, 1970, p. 263, n. 114. For tib. *yaṅ* = *ber*, cf. above, n. 56.

15 When [62] anyone [63] turns towards (= relies on) me, whether they engender (a feeling of) anger or devotion [64], let that very [65] (feeling) always become for them the cause of achievement of all (their) actions (= purposes) [66].

16 If anyone derides [67] me, or others inflict harm on me [68], and even if they will vilify [69] me, let them all have the fortune [70] of achieving enlightenment.

17 May I become a protector of (= for) those who are without a protector [71]; a guide [72] of (= for) those who have set out on the Path [73];

[62] *Bürün*, rendering TB *nas*, a gerundial particle equivalent to *te*. See Jä.304b, and below, n. 133. On this usage of *bürün*, cf. Cleaves, 1954, p. 90, n. 20. Cf. also below, n. 130.

[63] *Ked ber.* The plural form *ked* reflects TB *gaṅ dag gis* 'whosoever' (pl.). For *ked ber* ~ *ked be* (16a), cf. *ker ber* ~ *ker be* (*Ind.*II, 191; etc.).

[64] *Urin ba taqi süs-üg törögülbesü. Ba* ('and') *taqi* ('even, and') render TB *'am* 'or, else, or else'. *Taqi* < tu. *taqï* (*tayï*) ~ *daqï* (*dayï*) 'and, also, still, further (in addition)' = mo. *daki* '(yet) again'. See *Wört.* 144; *Mat.* 92; *DTS* 536a. On lines a and b, cf. Weller, 1950, p. 19.

[65] *Tere böged. Böged* = TB *ñid* 'self, same, the very (emph.)'. Cf. Cleaves, 1954, p. 90, n. 18; Weller, 1957/8, pp. 28–31; Poppe, 1962, pp. 45–46; Ligeti, 1970, p. 279, n. 13.

[66] *Üiles*, here rendering TB *don*/SB *artha* 'purposes'. See above, n. 60.

[67] One of the meanings of *da'ari-* (= *dayari-*) in the *SH* is 'to deride, mock, ridicule'. See *Wört.* 30, *s.v.* 'da'ariḫu (c)'. Cf. mo. *dayari-* 'to attack with words or insult indirectly' (Les. 218a). TB has *kha zer*, which Sum.I, 60g, renders into Mongolian with *mayudqa-* 'to blame, slander, reprimand'.

[68] Lit. 'to me'. For *qoor kürge-*, lit. 'to cause harm to reach' = 'to inflict harm', cf. BT 162a9 and 164a11: *tus-a kürge-* 'to bring welfare, be of service', and the Sino-Mongolian inscription of 1335 (line 32): *qoor ada kürge-* 'to inflict harm'. See Cleaves, 1950, p. 75 [32], p. 100; and Mostaert et Cleaves, 1952, p. 460. On line 16b, cf. Weller, 1950, p. 21.

[69] All versions of MB have *qubiyaqun* 'will share (*or* apportion)', which does not make sense in the present context. This must be a mistake for *qoblaqun*, from *qobla-* 'to slander, vilify' (Les 949b). One must point out, however, that TB has *phyar kha gtoṅ* which Sum.II, 114g, renders as *γočila-* 'to mock at, make fun of, reprove' (Les. 357b); cf. Jä. 348b: *phyar kha* 'blame'. The rendering of *phyar kha* with *γočila-*, rather than with *qobla-*, is in agreement with SB *utprāsakāh* 'mockers'. The reason why I have amended MB and adopted *qobla-* is twofold: 1) the form *qobla-* is graphically closer to *qubiya-* than *γočila-*; and 2) the verb 'to mock' appears already in the first line (*dayaribasu*). Nevertheless, because of both SB and TB, one cannot exclude that *dayari-* in the present context is used with the meaning of 'to insult', and that the correct reading in the third line is *γočilaqun* 'will mock'.

[70] *Qubitan boltuyai*, lit. 'let them (*or* may they) become ones having fortune'. *Qubitan* is the pl. of *qubitai* 'having a certain fortune or fate; fortunate' (Les. 979a). It renders TB *skal ldan* 'having the fortune of, blessed with'.

[71] The word *anu* in this and the following lines is not a pronoun, but an emphatic particle or subject designator (see above, n. 36) rendering TB *ni* (on which see Jä. 304b).

(see n. 72, 73 p. sg.)

a boat of (= for) those who say, 'Let me cross (the water);' and (may I become) also a bridge and a raft.

18 May I become an island [74] of (= for) those who desire an island; a lamp of (= for) those who desire a lamp [75]; a bed of (= for) those who desire a bed; (and) a slave of (= for) all living beings if they desire a slave [76].

19 May I become a wish-granting jewel (*cintāmaṇi*) [77]; a good vase (i.e. a vase of fortune) [78]; an efficacious *dhāraṇī*; [79] a great (= powerful) medicine [80]; a wish-fulfilling *kalpavṛkṣa* tree [81]; (and) a cow of plenty (*kāmadhenu*) [82] of (= for) (all) living beings.

As for *ber* following *anu* in the last line, this combination corresponds to TB *dan...ñid*/SB *eva ca* 'and indeed'. For tib. *ni* = *ber*, cf. Ligeti, 1970, p. 280, n. 13. For tib. *ni* = *inu* (subj. design.), cf. *ibid.*, p. 259, n. 71; Aalto, 1972, p. 26.

[72] *Uduriyulsun* 'leader, guide, teacher, instructor'. See Kow. 387b. Not registered in Les. Cf. TB *ded dpon*, which Sum.I, 1014a, renders as *uduriduyuluysan noyan* 'a chief who leads, leader'.

[73] *Mör-tür oroysad*, lit. 'who have entered the way'. These words correspond to TB *lam žugs rnams* 'those who have set out on the path'.

[74] *Qoi*: a rare and obsolete word. The reading *qoi* is, I think, preferable to *qui*, since this word is almost certainly related to mo. *qoyiy* 'island, peninsula'. See *MEPD* 197b; Cev. 683b, *s.v. xoĭg*; and Bosson, 1969, pp. 307–308, n. 23.

[75] SB has *dīpa* 'light, lamp', corresponding to MB *ǰula*, and there is no mention of an 'island' (MB *qoi*, see above, n. 74); hence, SB has only one line whereas the Tibetan and Mongolian versions have two. The Tibetan translator has taken skr. *dīpa* to mean 1) 'a lamp' (*mar me*), and 2) 'an island' (*gliṅ*), and this accounts for the additional line. All versions of MB follow the Tibetan interpretation. For this ambiguity, cf. pa. *dīpa* = 1) 'a lamp'; 2) 'an island' (*PTSD* 232b). In TB, Weller has omitted the second line on the basis of SB. See Weller, 1950, pp. 10–11, p. 30, p. 37.

[76] This very long line is syntactically a calque of TB, hence the unusual break between *amitan* and *qamuy-un* (= TB *lus can...kun gyi*). *Boyol ǰalayu.* lit. 'slave-lad/servant' = 'slave'. Cf. lat. *puer* 'boy, lad; servant, slave'. Here this expression renders TB *bran* 'slave, servant'. Cf. Bosson, 1969, p. 343, n. 257.

[77] *Cindamani* = skr. *cintāmaṇi*. See Kow. 2137a. For skr. *cintāmaṇi*, see M.-W. 398b. For *erdini* (~ *erdeni*) 'jewel, gem', and its derivation, see Cleaves, 1954, p.96, n. 71.

[78] *Sayin qumqan* renders TB *bum pa bzaṅ*. For tib. *bzaṅ* = mo. *sayin* 'good', see Sum.II, 776a ff.; for tib. *bum pa* = mo. *qumqan* 'vase', see *ibid.*II, 203a. Although *qumqan* corresponds to skr. *kumbha* 'vase, pitcher, jar, vessel' (see Kow. 937a–938b; Les. 961b), from which it derives, the expression *sayin qumqan* is actually the equivalent of SB *bhadra-ghaṭa* 'vase of fortune', on which see M.-W. 746a.

[79] *Bütügegsen tarni*, lit. 'a *dhāraṇī* that has accomplished (the desired effect).' Cf. TB *rig sṅags grub* 'an efficaceous magic formula'. For *rig sṅags* = mo. *tarni*, see Sum. II, 914f. On the word *tarni* (< skr. *dhāraṇī*), see Cleaves, 1954, p. 99, n. 100.

[80] *Yeke em* renders TB *sman chen* idem.

[81] *Sedkigsen-i bütügegči kalbavarags modun*, lit. 'a *kalbavarags* tree fulfilling what one has intended (= wished)'. For the expression *kalbavarags modun* = skr. *kalpavṛkṣa*, see Cleaves, 1954, p. 96, n. 63, where other transcriptions of this term are also cited. TB

(*see n. 82 p. sg.*)

20 Just as the four great elements [83], such as earth, and space [84], should always and continually [85] become a manifold [86] sustenance of life [87] of (= for) the countless [88] multitude of living beings,

21 In the same way, until [89] the realms of living beings [90] (reaching to) the ends of the sky [91] have all [92] attained enlightenment, may I always [93] become (their) cause (= source) of life.

has *dpag bsam gyi ni śiṅ*, *dpag bsam śiṅ* being the 'n. of the fabulous tree, that grants every wish' (Jä. 326a). Cf. also Sum.II, 28f–g; Aalto, 1973, p. 10.

[82] *Kamidini* = skr. *kāmadhenu* 'the cow of plenty', on which see M.-W. 272b. For the Mongolian equivalent, see Kow. 2434b, *s.v. kamidi üniy-e*. TB has *'dod 'jor* = *'dod 'jo'i ba* 'a cow that is able to fulfil every wish' (Jä. 179a). Cf. VaP. 19: 'une vache d'abondance'; Fin. 40: la Vache des désirs'.

[83] *Dörben maq-a-bud*. For *maq-a-bud* (mo. *maqabud*) = skr. *mahābhūta*, see Kow. 1980b; Les. 531a, 1176a; Sum.II, 327b. The four elements are earth, air, fire and water; however, the traditional *mahābhūta* are five, viz. ether, air, fire, water and earth. See M.-W. 798b. Thus the 'space' (= 'ether') mentioned in the second line is not included in the 'four great elements' of the first line, just as in TB. Cf. VaP. 19: 'De même que les éléments, terre, [eau, feu et vent]'; Fin. 40: 'De même que la terre et les autres éléments'; Bat. 32: 'Just like space/And the great elements such as earth'.

[84] *Oγtorγui* (in BT always written with *o* in the second syllable, see Cleaves, 1954, p. 64b) means both 'sky' and 'space' (= 'ether' — as an element). Cf. TB *nam mkha'* 'sky, ether' (Jä. 303b).

[85] *Nasu turqaru*, as in BT 159b4. Cf. the expression *nasu ürgülǰi* in 12c. In TB the former corresponds to *rtag tu* 'always' and the latter to *rtag par* idem (see Jä. 212a). The Mongolian translation as usual reflects the lexical differences of TB.

[86] *Olan ǰüil*, lit. 'many kinds'. Cf. TB *rnam maṅ* idem.

[87] *Aγali-yin šitügen*, rendering TB *ñer 'tsho'i gži* 'basis of living' or 'sustenance of life'. The term *aγali* 'character, conduct, individual characteristic', is evidently used here with the meaning of 'way of being', hence 'the life or existence of a particular being'. As for *šitügen* 'basis, foundation, support', see Les. 1183b; *Mon.* 108, Note 97.

[88] *Čaγ⟨laši⟩ ügei* = TB *dpag tu med pa*/SB *a-prameya* 'without measure'. In BT 156b2 we find the expression *čaγlaši ügei* corresponding to TB *dpag med*. Cf. Sum.II, 28b–c. *Çaγlaši* (~ *čaγlasi*) *ügei*, and not *čaγ ügei*, is the regular expression for 'countless, boundless' in pmo. See, e.g., *Ind.*II, 172; N1431, 78; OS 583a. The expression *čaγ ügei* occurs in *Muk.* 130b, but with the meaning of 'untimely, inopportunely'. In later editions or recensions of preclassical works *čaγ ügei* is used exactly like *čaγlasi ügei*. See Bosson 1969, 302 n. 10. Cf. also *Ind.*V, 105. In view of the fact that it is impossible to determine whether B had *čaγ* or *čaγlaši*, I have written *čaγ⟨laši⟩*. The latter form could, of course, have been written *čaγlaši* or *čaγlasi*, as both forms appear in BT (156b2 and 161a2).

[89] *Inaru* = TB *bar du* 'until'. The word *inaru* (< tu. *īnaru* 'there, on that side') is an Uighurism, since this term seldom, if ever, occurs in pmo. texts. On it, see Kotwicz 1936, p. 67; Lewicki, 1938, p. 23, p. 26; Buck, 1955, p. 102, no. 43. For tu. *īnaru*, see also Claus. 190a–b.

[90] *Amitan-u ayimaγ-ud* renders TB *sems can khams* 'realms of living beings'. For the modern literary usage of the expression *amitan-u ayimaγ*, see Les. 21a.

[91] *Oγtorγui⟨-yin⟩ qiǰaγar turuγ* renders TB *nam mkha'i* (!) *mthas gtugs pa'i* 'that

(*see n. 92, 93 p. sg.*)

22 In whatever manner [94] the previous Ones who have well gone [95] (*sugatas*) have engendered the *bodhicitta* thought [96] (i.e. the thought of enlightenment) and have dwelt, in the (proper) order [97], in the pratcices of Bodhisattvas [98],

23 In the same manner, for the sake of the welfare of living beings, may I engender the *bodhicitta* thought and, in the same manner, insofar as the practices of Bodhisattvas are also concerned [99], may I practice [100] them in the (proper) order.

24 Holding like that the *bodhicitta* thought with devotion, those who have discernment and intelligence [101] should extol [102] their (*bodhicitta*) tought

reach to the end(s) of the sky'. Although the various versions of MB have *oγtarγui* (for *oγtorγui* see above, n. 84) in the absolute case, in B this noun was almost certainly in the genitive case as in TB (*mkha'i*). Cf. BT 163b8–9: *oγtorγui–yin qiǰaγar–tur kürtele* (Cleaves, 1954, p. 51, p. 82). Cf. also Kow. 1889b; Les. 844a. In MB the word *kürtele* 'reaching, as far as' is not found in any of the versions; instead we have the word *turuγ* (X, 54a). In view of the fact that the expression *oγtorγui–yin qiǰaγar–tur kürtele* in BT 163b8–9 also renders TB *nam mkha'i mthas gtugs pa'i*, I wonder whether *turuγ* may not be a corruption of *–tur kürtele.*

92 *Bügüdeger* renders TB *thams cad* 'all'.

93 Here *keǰiy–e–de* corresponds to TB *rnam kun tu*/SB *anekadhā* 'in various ways, often'. See M.–W. 42b. Cf. Kow. 2491a; Les. 462a.

94 *Yambar...bögesü* = TB *ji ltar...ltar.* Cf. BT 163b10–11 and Cleaves, 1954, p. 82. See, however, Weller, 1957/8, pp. 57–58; Poppe, 1962, p. 58. For *ji ltar...ltar*, see also below, n. 112.

95 *Erten–ü sayibar oduγsad. Sayibar oduγsan* = skr. *sugata* '"One who has attained bliss" ep. of a Bu.' (Les. 1182a).

96 *Bodičid sedkil* '*bodičid* thought' is a tautology, since *bodičid* (skr. *bodhicitta*) already means 'thought (*or* mind) of enlightenment' (mo. *bodi sedkil*). See Les. 1164b. On the term *bodičid*, cf. Cleaves, 1954, p. 91, n. 26. VaP. (17 et p.) and Fin. (38 et p.) render skr. *bodhicitta* as 'la pensée de Bodhi' and 'la Pensée de la Bodhi' respectively; cf. Bat. (29 et p.) 'Awakening Mind'.

97 *J̌ergeber* renders TB *rim bžin*/SB *anupūrvyāḥ* 'successively, one after the other', i.e. 'in due (proper, regular) order'. Cf. Jä. 530a; M.–W. 35b. *J̌ergeber* is the form found in *Ind.*II, 39, and OS 589a; it is, therefore, preferable to *ǰerge–ber.*

98 *Surtaqui–dur*, lit. 'in the fact of being trained', i.e. 'in the training.

99 Here *ber anu* (only T has *inu*) corresponds to TB *'aṅ* 'also'. Cf. above, nn. 11, 56.

100 *Surulčan yabusuγai* corresponds to TB *bslab par bgyi* 'I will do practicing'. Here *yabu–* 'to go' may be taken as an auxiliary verb of continuity of action. See *Pas.* [195], [237], n. 221; Les. 420b. On the basis of TB it appears, however, that in the present context it means 'to do, perform', thus simply reinforcing the idea expressed by the main verb.

101 *Uqaγatan bilig–ten*, rendering TB *blo daṅ ldan pa* 'the one(s) possessing wisdom'.

102 *Degdegüldeküi*, lit. 'should (*or* must) cause to rise'. The verb is a *nomen futuri* in *–küi* of the passive, expressing the necessity to perform the action. See *Gram.* 169, §607. TB has *gzeṅs bstod do* 'will praise'.

saying thus (= in the following manner), so as to also [103] increase [104] (= extend further) (its) limits:

25 Now I have realized the advantage of the living state [105] and have well acquired the birth (= reincarnation) of (= as) a man [106]. This day I was born into the family of the Buddhas [107] and [108] have now become a son of the Buddhas.

26 Now, in whatever way I perform [109] (i.e. whatever I do), may I produce deeds appropriate to my family: may I act in a way not to pollute [110] this faultless and pure [111] family.

27 In the manner like [112] (that of) a blind man who has found a jewel from (= in) swept away earth [113], in the same way, though as if by good luck [114], this *bodhicitta* thought has been born to me.

103 *Ber* corresponds here to TB *kyaṅ*/SB *punaḥ* 'again, also'. Cf. above, nn. 11, 42.

104 *Ösken nemegülkü-yin tulada.* For the expression *ösken nemegül-* 'to increase raising', i.e. 'to increase further, to add to', see Les. 645b. For *öske-*, cf. also *Mat.* 84–85. TB has *rgyas par bya* 'to make wide'.

105 *Amidu aγsan-u qabiy-a*, lit. 'the advantage of having been alive'. TB has *bdag tshe 'bras bu yod* 'my life has fruit (= reward)'.

106 For the expression *kümün-ü töröl-i ol-* 'to acquire the birth (= reincarnation) of (= as) a man', cf. BT 160b4–5.

107 *Burqad-un uǰaγur. Uǰaγur* (mo. *iǰaγur*) 'root, source, origin, descent' renders TB *rigs* 'family, lineage'. For the use of this term in Buddhist texts with the meaning of '"mystic" family', cf. Les. 1172b.

108 *Ber.* There is no counterpart in TB and SB.

109 *Edüge ber bi ker ber kiǰü.* This is a tentative reconstruction. L and T have *edüge bi kerkin ber kiǰü*, M has *edüge bi ber ker kin ber kiǰü*, K has *edüge ber ker kin ber kiǰü.* The expression *ker kin* (or *kerkin*) *ber kiǰü* 'acting in whatever manner' does not occur, to my knowledge, in any genuine pmo. text. Moreover, TB has simply *ci nas kyaṅ* 'even from what', i.e. 'in what(ever) way'. The same expression occurs also in TB VIII, 164c, the Mongolian rendering of which in MB (all versions) is *ker ber kiǰü.* For *edüge ber*, see, e.g., *Ind.*II, 176, *s.v. ạdüge.*

110 *Ülü bulunggiraqu metü* corresponds to TB *rñog par mi 'gyur de ltar bya* 'I will do in that way not to pollute', with *de ltar* a correlate of *ci nas kyaṅ.* Cf. SB *yathā... tathā* 'in what way...in that way'. As for *bulunggira-* 'to pollute', a denominal verb in *-ra* from *bulunggir* 'turbid, polluted' (mo. *bulanggir, bulunggir* idem), it is a rare word not found in dictionaries.

111 *Ariγun* = TB *btsun pa.* Cf. Weller, 1957/8, pp. 36–37.

112 *Yambar...metü* renders TB *ji ltar...ltar.* Tib. *ji ltar* corresponds to skr. *yathā* 'in what way (*or* manner), as' (see above, n. 110). Cf. Sum.I, 695a, where *ji ltar* is rendered in Mongolian as *yambar metü.* Cf. also above, n. 94.

113 *Šigürügsen široγai* renders TB *phyag dar* 'sweepings'. Cf. SB *saṃkara* idem. See Jä. 348a; M.-W. 1126b.

114 *Tegünčilen atala kü öljei-e metü*, lit. 'although (*or* while) it is that way, as if by good luck'. TB has *de bźin ji źig ltar stes nas* 'in that way, by some chance occurrence'. The expression *ji źig ltar stes* in TB IV, 26b, is rendered in MB (all versions) as *öljei-ber genedte* 'unexpectedly, by good luck', and *ji źig ltar* in TB VII, 36c, as

28 This is also the supreme [115] elixir of life (*rasāyana*) [116] that conquers the Lord of death [117] of living beings; and this is also the inexhaustible treasure house that drives away the living beings' poverty.

29 This is also the supreme medicine that alleviates the pains of living beings; this is the shadowy tree [118] to rest (under) of (= for) those who have become weary [119] wandering on the path of the round (= cycle, i.e. of rebirths) [120].

30 It is the path of all [121] (i.e. the universal path) which makes all living beings go far away (i.e. releases them) from the evil path [122]; the moon of *bodhicitta* thought that dispels the heat [123] of the passions [124] of living beings has risen.

31 It is the great sun that removes from the root [125] the darkness [126] of

genedte 'unexpectedly'. It appears, then, that in MB, the expression *atala kü* is used merely to convey the idea of the chance element ('somehow, unexpectedly') – expressed in TB by *ji žig ltar* – which qualifies *tegünčilen.*

115 *Manglai*, corresponding to TB *mchog* 'the best'.

116 *Rasiyan*. For this term, see Les. 651b, where the English renderings are, however, inadequate. For skr. *rasāyana*, see M.-W. 870d. Cf. VaP. 20 and Fin. 41: 'élixir'. TB has *bdud rtsi* 'the drink of gods, nectar' (Jä. 269b). Cf. Sum. I, 1069d; Aalto, 1973, p. 3.

117 *Ükül-ün eǰen* renders TB *'chi bdag* 'the lord of death' (Jä. 169b), corresponding to SB *mṛtyu*, on which see M.-W. 827d. Cf. VaP. 20: 'la mort universelle'; Fin. 41: 'la mort du monde'.

118 *Següder-tü modun.* Cf. TB *ljon śiṅ* 'a tree from paradise, or any large and beautiful tree' (Jä. 183b).

119 TB has *'gro ba'i ṅal bso'i* 'that cures the weariness of living beings'.

120 *Orčilang-un mör*, rendering TB *srid lam*/SB *bhavādhva* 'path of existence'. Cf. VaP. 20: 'les chemins de l'existence'; Fin. 41: 'les chemins de la vie'. For *orčilang* = skr. *saṃsāra*, cf. Kow. 470a–471a; Sum. I, 240b and II, 1207e.

121 *Bürin-ü mör.* TB has *spyi stegs* 'bridge', corresponding to SB *setu*. Cf. Sum. II, 67a.

122 *Könggegülügči* renders TB *sgrol bar byed pa'i* 'which carries across (= rescues, delivers)'. Cf. Jä. 122b–123a. For *könggegül-* 'to lighten, alleviate, relieve', see Ligeti, 1970, p. 255, n. 24; Les. 489a. *Mayui mör* corresponds to TB *nan 'gro*/SB *dur-gati* 'evil destiny or state of being'. See Edg. 266b.

123 *Qalayun*, rendering TB *gduṅ*, here meaning 'heat'. See Sum.I, 1056a. Cf. SB *uṣma* idem. For a different usage, cf. Ligeti, 1970, p. 264, n. 122.

124 *Nis-vanis* is the orthography found in the Turfan document TM 1 D 130, line 11. See *Ind.*II, 199. On *nisvanis* (< tu. *nïzvanï* < sogd. *nyzβ'ny*) = tib. *ñon moṅs*, skr. *kleśa* 'passion, (moral) defilement', see Sum.I, 760e; Les. 586a. Cf. also Gershevitch, 1961, p. 106, §677; p. 144, §966.

125 *Uǰayur-ača*, corresponding to TB *dpyis* 'thoroughly, completely'. Cf. Sum.II, 41c, where *dpyis* is rendered into Mongolian as *ündüsün-eče*, a synonym of *uǰayur-ača*.

126 *Bürküg-üd* is the pl. of *bürküg* (~ *bürkig*) 'darkness'. For this word, see *Mon.* 113, n. 132. Cf. *HIIY bürkü-* 'couvrir' (*Mat.* 45). TB has *rab rib*, rendering SB *timira* 'dark(ness)'.

ignorance [127] of living beings; it ⟨is⟩ [128] the *garbha*-heart (= essential) butter [129] (produced) from the churning of the milk-like good Law (*dharma*).

32 For the living beings who, when they go travelling (= when they travel) on the path of *saṃsāra*, wish to enjoy [130] the bounties of happiness [131], the supreme happiness [132] being this one (here) [133] (i.e. the *bodhicitta* thought) is the one that will satisfy all the guest (i.e. the travelling) living beings [134].

33 This day, I, in the presence [135] of all the Protectors [136] (= Buddhas),

[127] *Mungqaγ*, rendering TB *mi śes*/SB *avidyā*. See Les. 1177b.

[128] In MB, line 31d ends abruptly with *inu* (M,T,K) or *anu* (L), whereas TB has *yin* as in line 31b. It seems that the copula (*?buyu ?bui ?bolai*) has inadvertently dropped in an early ms. and I have, therefore, tentatively restored it as ⟨*buyu*⟩.

[129] *Garba ǰirüken tosun*. *Garba* (not *kerbe* as in Ligeti, 1966, p. 40) = skr. 'womb; the inside, middle, interior of anything' (M.-W. 349b). Together with *ǰirüken* 'heart, essence' it forms a hybrid compound rendering TB *ñiṅ khu* 'essence'. Cf. the expression *sñiṅ po* 'heart, chief part' (= skr. *garbha*) in Jä. 198b. For SB, cf. VaP. 21 and Fin. 42: 'un beurre nouveau'.

[130] Lit., 'When (*bürün*) living beings going travelling...to (= for) those who desire (*küsegčid-te*) saying, « Let me enjoy »'. For *bürün*, see above, n. 62. Here *bürün* renders the tib. gerundial particle *źiṅ*, on which see Jä. 140b–141a. Cf. also below, n. 133.

[131] *Amuyulang ed-i*, lit. 'happiness' (valuable) goods (acc.)'.

[132] *Amuyulang-ud-un ele manglai*, lit. 'the supreme of happinesses'. The generalizing/corroborative particle *ele* in this and the following line has no counterpart in TB. Cf. above, n. 39.

[133] *Ene bolǰu bürün*, lit. 'by (= owing to the fact of) being this (one)'. TB has *ñer gnas te* 'being at hand'. Here *bürün* renders the tib. affix of gerund *te*, on which see Jä. 204b. Cf. the same usage of *bürün* (= tib. *te*) in MB X, 55c. See Weller, 1957/8, p. 59; Poppe, 1962, p. 58. Cf. also above, nn. 62 and 130.

[134] *J̌očid amitan*. TB has *sems can mgron chen*, with *'gron* given as the Narthang variant of *mgron*. But the word *ǰočid* in MB (M,T,K; L has *yeke ǰočid*, on which see below) clearly renders tib. *'gron* 'foreigner, stranger'. Cf. SB *abhyāgata* 'a guest'. It should be noted, however, that *ǰočin* 'guest' is a word that one seldom, if ever, meets in pmo., although it is attested in the *Muk.* (208a) and the *HIIY* (*Mat.* 67). See Pelliot's reservations on the use of this word in the ancient language in Pelliot, 1949, p. 20ff. Nevertheless, all versions of MB give *ǰočid*. The *yeke* qualifying *ǰočid* in L no doubt reflects TB *chen* 'great', which apparently corresponds here to SB *sakala* 'all' and MB *bügüde*. If so, *yeke* is merely a later amplification. Cf. Weller, 1950, p. 38.

[135] *Ilete*, lit. 'manifestly, in the sight of' (mo. *iledte* idem). Cf. TB *spyan sṅar* 'before the eyes'.

[136] *Qamuγ ibeged-ün*. *Ibeged* (M, K) renders TB *skyobs pa*/SB *tāyin*, exactly as in 3a. See above, n. 13. The reading *ibeged* is preferable to *iteged* (L) and *itegel* (T) also because in BT 162a3 the word *itegel* renders TB *mgon po yis*/SB *nātha*. Cf. Sum.I, 397b; Les. 1172a. See also Ligeti, 1970, p. 280, n. 13.

I have invited [137] the living beings to feast in the place [138] of Buddha-enlightenment and of happiness: may the gods and the *asuras* [139], and the others (all) rejoice!

Col. The Third Chapter, on holding the *bodhicitta* thought, from the *śāstra* whereby one enters into the conduct (= practice) of the Bodhisattvas [140] (i.e. the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*).

[137] *Urin baraba bi*, lit. 'I have finished inviting'. However, here the verb *bara-* plays the role of auxiliary of completed action. See Les. 82b; *Pas.* [114], n. 106. Cf. TB *bos zin gyis*, with *zin* playing the same auxiliary role of *baraba*. The pronoun *bi* 'I' is repeated in the third line for poetic reasons. Cf. the word *bürün* in the previous stanza.

[138] *Orod–tur–i* = *orod–tur inu*, lit. 'at their places'. Cf. MB VIII, 27b: *γaǰad–tur–i*. For the use of the dative case in conjunction with *i* (= *inu*) in pmo., see Cleaves, 1951, p. 101, n. 158. TB has *bar du* 'at the same time, simultaneously; in the meantime', corresponding to SB *antarā* idem. The meaning of the sentence in TB is 'I have invited the living beings to Buddhahood (*bde gśegs ñid*) and at the same time (*daṅ ni bar du*) to happiness (*bde la*)'. Since tib. *bar* 'interval, space' is, in certain cases, translated into Mongolian with *oron* (see Sum.II, 188a), *orod–tur* must be regarded merely as a slavish calque of *bar du*, with *–i* probably representing the *ni* of TB. This point deserves further investigation. Cf. Aalto, 1972, p. 26. The pl. form *orod* is due to the place in question being that of Buddha-enlightenment (*burqan–u qutuγ*) and of happiness (*amuγulang*). See, however, Ligeti, 1970, p. 278, for an instance where *orod* T (and also L, OS) ~ *oron* BT, K. In the present case, *orod* L, T, K ~ *oron* M. Therefore, one cannot exclude the possibility that the B reading was *oron*. For *oron*, cf. also Aalto, 1973, p. 11.

[139] *Asuris*. I have adopted the pl. form against the *asuri* of MB (all versions) on the strength of BT 161b10. For this term, see Cleaves, 1954, p. 109, n. 204.

[140] For the concluding two lines, i.e. the colophon (Col.) of this chapter, cf. the concluding lines of Ch. X in the 1312 edition (= BT 166a1–2; see Cleaves, 1954, p. 53, p. 85). Although all versions of MB have *neretü* (*ner–e–tü*) 'named' after *bariqui*, rendering TB *žes bya ba*, I think that this may well be a later addition, since the word *neretü* is omitted in BT.

MARYLIN MARTIN RHIE

THE STATUE OF SONGZEN GAMPO IN THE POTALA, LHASA

Individual statues of the famous early Tibetan king Songzen Gampo (Srong-brtsan-sgam-po), who ruled ca. 627–649 A. D.[1], and each of his two foreign queens have been reported to be in the Potala in Lhasa[2]. Although information concerning these statues is scant, recent publications for the first time show the full figure of the king (Pl. I) and of his Chinese queen, Lady Wen Ch'eng (Gyalya) (Pl. II)[3]. These are reported by the Chinese to be located in the "Qoigyal Zhubpug" (the king's secret room) in the Potala[4]. Since a partial view of the statue of

[1] Songzen Gampo is the first great ruler of Tibet to consolidate a Tibetan empire and establish the dynasty on a firm footing. During the next 200 years, until ca. 842, Tibet became a formidable power in Central Asia from the borders of Persia into China and especially in the Taklamakan area. D. Snellgrove and H. Richardson, *A Cultural History of Tibet*, N. Y., 1968, pp. 27, 31–32, 49. (Hereafter, *CHT*).

The author wishes to take this opportunity to express sincere gratitude to Prof. G. Gnoli and Prof. M. Taddei of IsMEO for the honor of receiving an invitation to contribute to this volume celebrating the work of Prof. Giuseppe Tucci, whose towering accomplishments in bringing knowledge of the Buddhist world to us go beyond even extraordinary limits and far deeper and broader than seems humanly possible. We indeed joyfully acknowledge and revere such a scholar whose work not only opened up many new areas, but provides inestimately rich foundations for future studies of religion, art, history, language and culture of Asia and especially of Tibet.

Also, the author is very thankful for the help and encouragement graciously given by Ven. Jampel Thardo, Geshe, and Prof. Robert Thurman.

[2] Liu I-ssu (ed.), *Hsi-tsang fo hsiao i shu* (Tibetan Buddhist Art), Peking, 1957, where partial views of each are reproduced in Figs. 53, 54, 55. (Hereafter, Liu, *Hsi-tsang*). Also, «The Potala Palace in Tibet», *China Pictorial*, February, 1980, pp. 24–25.

[3] Emporer T'ai-tsung of China granted the Chinese princess as a bride to Songzen Gampo in 640 A. D. She arrived in Tibet in 641, bringing with her the famous statue of Sakyamuni which has been the main image of the Jokhang temple in Lhasa.

[4] "The Qoigyal Zhubpug [probably ཆོས་རྒྱལ་མཛོད་ཕུག་] chapel houses the ancient clay images of king Songzen Gampo and Princess Wen Ch'eng. It is an early palace building. It is said that the king used to sit here in meditation".

the Nepalese queen, Bhrikuti Devi (Beyal), was published in 1957 (Pl. III), there has been no recent report on its present whereabouts or condition. The setting for the statues is in the form of an artificially made rocky grotto. It is said they are approximately life size, sculpted in the round, and made of terracotta [5]. They appear in fine condition with apparently very little repair [6]. Dating of this set of statues (there are at least three other sets in the Jokhang) [7] by western and Chinese scholars has as yet been quite varied and tentative [8]. With the new publication of good photographs of the Songzen Gampo and Wen Ch'eng statues it is possible to study these works in some detail, especially in regard to their stylistic relationship with other Asian art as well as with that of Tibet in order to arrive at a more conclusive dating and clearer assessment of their style and importance. This paper will concentrate primarily on the image of the king, analyzing the pose, dress and style in relation to other works of Asian art with a view to specifically clarifying its date and stylistic sources.

Ibid., p. 25. According to the recollection of Geshe Jampel Thardo, who lived at the Potala, the king's statue was located in a room of moderate size at the end of a long series of rooms inside the Potala. This room is traditionally said to be Songzen Gampo's secret meditation room and part of the original structure built by Songzen Gampo in the seventh century on Marpo–ri (Red Hill) around which the Fifth Dalai Lama later built the present Potala in the mid–seventeenth century. Also, according to Geshe Thardo, the traditional Bon incense burner and banner used by Songzen Gampo are located in this room as well.

[5] According, respectively, to Geshe Thardo; Liu, *Hsi–tsang*, captions from Figs. 53–55; and Ulrich von Schroeder, *Indo–Tibetan Bronzes*, Hong Kong, 1981, p. 398. (Hereafter, *ITB*).

[6] There seem to be slight changes in the painting of the king's face and a little repair to the earrings in the statue of Wen Ch'eng when the recent photos are compared with the photographs published in Liu, *Hsi–tsang*. Probably the images were recently repaired in these small ways, repainted and gilded.

[7] These are published in L. Jisl et al, *Tibetan Art*, London, 1957 (?), Figs. 55–57 and Fig. 60. Both of these sets appear to be of terracotta; the third, seen in Ngapa Ngawang Jigmei et al, *Tibet*, N. Y., 1981, Fig. 170 (Hereafter, *Tibet*, 1981); *ITB*, Fig. 398; A. Topping, *The Splendors of Tibet*, N. Y., 1980, Figs. on pages 64, 159, appears the latest in date and seems to be bronze.

[8] Tucci states: "These works do not belong to any clearly defined artistic schools, and the Tibetans themselves consider them as having been supernaturally created. In my view, however, one of them clearly shows striking resemblances to a statue which formerly stood in a temple at Tiak in western Tibet founded by Rinchensangpo". G. Tucci, *Transhimalaya*, Geneva, 1973, pp. 79–80. (Hereafter, Tucci, *Transhimalaya*). Snellgrove and Richardson call these statues "possibly fourteenth century" in *CHT*, pp. 88, 154. In Liu, *Hsi–tsang*, Figs, 53–55, the figures are labelled "T'ang" (618–906).

I. *The Pose*

The pose of the Songzen Gampo statue is an unusual and interesting variation of the lalitāsana or posture of royal ease. Though various forms of the lalitāsana are known from Indian art of early times and the individual components of the pose in this Songzen Gampo figure are all commonly used in images of Asian art of the seventh century and later, the particular combination which appears in the Potala statue is unique and no exactly similar example is seen in Asian art aside from other Tibetan images of this king.

Though there is some resemblance of the leg positions with those of the male figures in the banquet scene from the wall paintings at Pendzhikent (Pl. IV) [9], the Sogdian style is more rigid and symmetrical. This is also true of other examples from Central Asian art, such as some seated figures from Khotan of the late seventh and early eighth century [10]. A more relaxed depiction closely resembling the manner of tbe Tibetan king is known among some Indian images, especially of the early Pala dynasty, ca. late eighth to ninth century (Pl. V) and in some paintings of Bodhisattvas at Tun-huang from the T'ang period (618–906 A. D.) [11]. Yet in all these figures where the leg positions are similar the corresponding arm positions differ from those of the Songzen Gampo statue. The Pendzhikent figures generally hold an object, such as a wine cup, and usually place one hand on their thigh with the elbow sharply akimbo, creating a much more heroic, active and tense gesture than the generally relaxed arm positions in the Tibetan king. In the Indian and Tun-huang images the left arm may support the body as seen in the Potala statue, but in these cases the corresponding right hand is raised rather than lowered (Pl. V).

A posture similar to that of the arms of the Tibetan statue appears in some early Pala sculptures, but usually the right hand is in the vara

[9] The Pendzhikent paintings are generally dated from the seventh century to ca. 722 A. D., the date of the destruction of the site by Arab invaders. They display several stylistic cycles which are classified by Diakonov as Style I (volumetric and delicate) and Style II (two-dimensional, linear and decorative). B. Rowland, *The Art of Central Asia*, N. Y., 1974, pp. 56, 62. Belenitsky generally dates the banqueting scenes to the 7th–8th century. A. Belenitsky, *Central Asia*, N. Y., 1968, caption for Fig. 144.

[10] M. Bussagli, *Painting of Central Asia*, Geneva, 1963, p. 57; Rowland, *ACA*, p. 131.

[11] This leg posture begins to be seen at Tun-huang in images dating from the early T'ang period, especially for figures in Pure Land representations. However, it is not used for the major Bodhisattvas nor is it seen in depictions of secular figures. There is an increase in the usage of the position during the eighth and ninth century in the Tun-huang wall paintings.

mudrā [12] unlike the hand of the Songzen Gampo image which appears to be in a type of vitarka mudrā with palm lowered and inverted. Closely comparable arm postures also occur in representations in East Asian art of Avalokiteśvara in the form known as the "moon–water" Kuanyin, the earliest extant example of which in China dates from the tenth century [13]. This type of Kuanyin is generally depicted seated on craggy rocks supporting the body with a vertical left arm and resting the right arm on the right leg with the hand gracefully lowered palm facing inward. In some Chinese and Korean examples these images seem to be making the gesture of the vitarka mudrā with hand down and palm inverted, but usually it is the thumb and middle finger which are touching rather than the thumb and forefinger. Yet in all these cases cited, there is no example combining this posture of the arms with the same leg position as seen in the Songzen Gampo image. Invariably, one leg is either raised higher or lower than in the king's case (i.e., one leg is upright on the pedestal or else hanging over the pedestal). Apparently, in its complete form the pose of the Songzen Gampo image is unusual, even though each of its major components resembles forms current in Asian art from the seventh century and later. In its relatively close resemblance to the "moon–water" type Kuanyin, however, the Songzen Gampo statue becomes of interest for the study of that iconographic form, especially as it is known in China and Korea. Since Songzen Gampo is regarded as an emanation of Avalokiteśvara and wears, like that Bodhisattva, the figure of Amitābha on his head, the pose of the king may reflect evolving ideas concerning the expression of Avalokiteśvara which bear upon the origins of the "moon–water" type of representation. The depiction of the king in a rocky grotto further corresponds with this Kuanyin, which is thought to portray Avalokiteśvara on Mt. Potala as described in the *Gandhavyūha*. The fact that later the Fifth Dalai Lama erected the present Potala on the site of Songzen Gampo's palace (which contained the room where this statue is located) may not be without a particularly meaningful relation.

The gesture of the right hand of the Tibetan king could be a form of the vitarka mudrā or simply be a customary gesture without special meaning. It also appears in a painting of the king Glang Od srung (son

[12] F. Asher, *The Art of Eastern India, 300–800*, Minneapolis, 1980, pls. 248, 251. (Hereafter, Asher, *AEI*).

[13] The earliest known representations appear in several tenth century banner paintings from Tun–huang (for example, see *Sekai Bijutsu Zenshū*, Vol. 16 (*Chūgoku*, V), Tokyo, 1965, color plate 27) and the mid–tenth century bronze sculpture discovered at the Wan–fo t'a pagoda in Chin–hua, Chekiang (*Chin–hua Wan–fo t'a ch'u t'u wen wu*, Peking, 1958, pl. 2).

of king Glang darma) dating ca. thirteenth century in the 'Bri-gung monastery (Pl. VI) as well as in some of the later statues of Songzen Gampo and in some later paintings, generally of teachers [14]. This exact form of the gesture with the hand lowered and palm inverted seems to appear only rarely in Indian art; when it does occur it is mainly in figures of the eighth or ninth century [15]. Perhaps most significantly, it does appear in a number of examples among the Tun-huang paintings dating around the mid-ninth century. The most important of these is the banner painting now in the British Museum dated 836 A. D. and the main Bodhisattva from the west side of the ceiling in Cave 161 at Tun-huang, a late T'ang cave [16]. Both, interestingly, contain figures executed in a decidedly Indian rather than Chinese style (Pl. VIII), i.e., a style sometimes referred to as Indo-Tibetan, Nepali-Tibetan or Tibeto-Nepalese – a style believed to derive from painting under the Palas in Magadha. The left hand of the Mañjuśrī image in the 836 banner painting (Pl. VII), which probably was executed during the period of the Tibetan occupation of Tun-huang (ca. 781-848 A. D.) [17] and which contains a Tibetan inscription naming a Tibetan artist, is in the exact form and has a similar curvilinear and soft style as Songzen Gampo's right hand. Though a few other examples of his gesture occur at Tun-huang, they appear limited to the mid-ninth century period [18]. Interestingly, the vitarka mudrā, customarily symbolizing a teaching or speaking gesture, is translated into the Chinese language as the " an-wei yin " meaning the gesture of tranquillity or conso-

[14] See G. Tucci, *Tibetan Painted Scrolls*, Rome, 1949, pl. L.

[15] It occurs in a form similar to the Songzen Gampo figure in a female figure from a door jamb from Sakrigali and now in the Patna Museum. (Asher, *AEI*, pl. 241). She may be holding her scarf and it could be that the Songzen Gampo statue was originally holding some object. A bronze Mañjuśrī from Salban Vihara, Mainamati seems to have a similarly held right hand possibly holding something. (*Ibid.*, pl. 247).

[16] For a study of the 836 painting see H. Karmay, *Early Sino-Tibetan Art*, Warminister, 1975, pp. 8-14. (Hereafter, Karmay, *ESTA*). For Cave 161 see *Chūgoku Sekkutsu*: *Tonkō Bakko-kutsu* (The Grotto Art of China: The Mogao Grottos of Dunhuang), comp. and ed. by the Dunhuang Institute for Cultural Relics, Tokyo, 1980-82, Vol. IV, Fig. 144. (Hereafter *Tonkō*). In this case, however, it is difficult to tell if the Bodhisattva is making the mudrā with the thumb and forefinger or middle finger.

[17] The dates 781-848 are given by Fujieda; those of 787-848 by Demieville. Karmay, *ESTA*, p. 11 and note 65. According to C. Beckwith, *Tibet Society Bulletin*, Vol. 15, June, 1980, p. 71, the Tibetan conquest of the Tarim Basin was completed by 790-91 and some forts in the area were still being maintained by the Tibetans as late as 866.

[18] The main examples include a Cintāmanicakra Bodhisattva in Cave 14 of ca. mid-ninth century, the Samantabhadra figure on the west wall of Cave 159 and also, possibly, one of the attendant figures in the Tibetan king painting in Cave 159. *Tonkō*, IV, Figs. 168, 80 and 91 (far left side) respectively.

lation. One Japanese source suggests the vitarka mudrā with palm inverted and turned downward with the thumb and forefinger joined " 'symbolizes the thought of consoling all Beings' "[19]. In the case of the Songzen Gampo statue, the relation of the gesture to that used in some Bodhisattva images, especially ca. 836 A. D., has significance not only in dating the figure, but in suggesting added religious meaning to the Tibetan statue as an expression of Songzen Gampo's identity with Avalokiteśvara, the Bodhisattva of great compassion.

II. *The Dress*

The attire of the Songzen Gampo statue is a complex mixture which cannot be easily classified and even in comparison to known examples of Tibetan garb it is unique, especially in certain details which seem to imply special, informal, sometimes religious, associations. Basically, however, in general type, the attire can be most strongly related to the traditional Central Asian male dress which is derived from Persian (Parthian and Sassanian) modes, with leather or felt boots and belted robes (usually of a tunic or fitted coat type) which have narrow sleeves. Yet there are notable differences in the dress of Songzen Gampo, among which is the generally looser, more flowing, less fitted nature of the robes, a characteristic usually associable with traditional Chinese styles of dress. It has been suggested by the Tibetan historian dGe-'dun chos-'phel in his *White Annals* that Songzen Gampo dressed in the Tazig (Persian) style[20]. He is also said to have given up his felt and homespun garments and adopted Chinese manners after marryng Princess Wen Ch'eng[21]. In this statue we can perhaps see the concrete form of these two statements; it seems to reflect both "Persian" and Chinese influences, though often in rather subtle or unusual ways.

Although the basic constituents of "Persian" type dress are present in the Potala statue, the robe is certainly not as specifically "Persian" or Sogdian as the one portrayed on his minister mGar sTong-btsan yulzung as seen in a painting attributed to Yen Li-pen (ca. 627–673 A. D.) (Pl. IX). With its tightly fitted outer coat with round neck and straight

[19] E. Dale Saunders, *Mudrā*, N. Y., 1960, pp. 68–69.

[20] " In his *Deb-ther dkar-po*, pp. 12–13, the great modern Tibetan scholar, dGe-'dun chos-'phel (1904?–1951) discusses the costume of the early Tibetan kings. He suggests that they and their ministers followed the customs of Tazig (Persia) and that it was from this country, with whom they had closest connections at the time, that the turban *thod*, of light red cloth *dar*, the cloak *ber*, of glossy silk cloth *za-'og*, and the slippers with curled-up toes worn by Srong-btsan sgam-po, came". Karmay, *ESTA*, p. 15.

[21] Snellgrove and Richardson, *CHT*, p. 64.

frontal opening decorated with borders of medallion designs, the minister's garment more closely resembles the seventh century Sogdian male dress (Pl. IV) than do the robes of Songzen Gampo, which are looser with diagonally overlapping openings forming a beautiful series of V-shaped necklines. However, the diagonal opening as well as the looser cut of the robes appears in the dress of the Tibetan kings portrayed in the wall paintings in Tun-huang Caves 158 and 159 (Pl. X), which date stylistically ca. 800 and 820–840 respectively [22], that is, during the period of the Tibetan occupation of Tun-huang. Yet despite these similarities, these figures, as well as others depicted in the Śāriputra and Raudrākṣa scroll [23] show outer robes with prominent lapels unlike the Songzen Gampo statue. Examples of eleventh century Tibetan dress mostly display the coatlike outer robe with lapels, though some paintings at Alchi show figures with a diagonally overlapping outer robe or V-necked tunic [24], but in these cases the details are different from the garments of Songzen Gampo. The Buddhist figures at Iwang photographed by Tucci wear "Persian" style robes with frontal openings unlike the Potala statue [25]. The ca. thirteenth century painting of Glang Od srung in the 'Bri-gung monastery depicts a generally similar dress as the Potala king's image, but there is a marked difference in many details and in the style and manner of wearing the robes, which have an even greater emphasis placed on openness and looseness (Pl. VI). Later representations, such as the three king statues in the monastery at Gyantse of the early fifthteenth century [26] show such distinct stylistic differences from the style of the Potala statues as to preclude any close relation, even though the components of the dress are related to those seen on the Songzen Gampo and Glang Od srung figures. It may be that these other portrayals of the early Tibetan kings are generally patterned after the Potala statue; the dress, therefore, may be similar in type, but the style

[22] There are few dated Chinese works in the mid and late T'ang periods, but within a stylistic chronology of the periods (see M. Rhie, *The Fo-kuang ssu: Literary Evidences and Buddhist Images*, N. Y., 1977, pp. 116–156) Cave 158 dates ca. 800 (with the Kōbō Daishi shrine of ca. 806 A. D.) and Cave 159 dates ca. 820–840 (closely related to the shrine which the Korean monk Bojo brought from China in ca. 840, as discussed in *Ibid.*, pp. 125–128). It may be that the Tibetan kings portrayed in Cave 158 and 159 refer to Trisong Detsen and Trirelwajen respectively.

[23] See H. Karmay, « Tibetan Costume, Seventh to Eleventh Centuries », in *Essais sur l'Art de Tibet* (ed. by A. MacDonald and Y. Imaeda, Paris, 1977), pp. 67–99 and Fig. 5 where this Tun-huang scroll is dated early eighth century. (Hereafter, Karmay, *Essais*).

[24] Ibid., pp. 76–78; P. Pal and L. Fournier, *A Buddhist Paradise: The Murals of Alchi, Western Himalayas*, Hongkong, 1982, Figs. D22–23, S5–8, S40–41, LS 36.

[25] Tucci, *Transhimalaya*, Figs. 159, 163.

[26] Views are published in Liu, *Hsi-tsang*, Fig. 66; and in *Tibet*, Fig. 215.

is different since it reflects the artistic modes of the period in which each work was executed. Although the robe of the Songzen Gampo statue does not precisely match any other known representation in all respects, an examination of the details of his attire further reveals a correspondence with T'ang period examples as well an interesting relation of some elements with the "Persian" style as seen, not in seventh century Sogdian dress, but in the Kushana period royal portraits of ca. second century A. D.

A shawl such as the king wears in the Potala statue is not a part of ordinary Central Asian or Chinese male attire, nor is it seen in any of the other Tibetan examples cited above. It may be that the wearing of the scarf or shawl indicates an informal or private dress or occasion, that is, dress for wear inside the palace as distinct from the formal, ceremonial or public dress, seen, for instance, in the Cave 159 Tibetan king (Pl. X). A cape is seen in some representations of Parthian and Sassanian gods, kings or military commanders [27], but in style and manner of wearing, the shawl of Songzen Gampo is not like these, but is more like the representations of the shoulder scarves seen on Bodhisattva images, especially as depicted in the mid and late T'ang period paintings at Tun-huang, such as the Bodhisattva in the 836 banner (Pl. VIII).

The wide borders of the diagonally overlapping robes on the statue are another special feature of Songzen Gampo's dress. There may be a delicate floral or cloudlike raised design on the neckline borders, but this cannot be clearly determined. Such a border does seem to exist in the lower hems of the robes of the Cave 159 Tibetan figures (Pl. X). Border decoration, both painted and raised, is common in representations of Persian and Central Asian male dress, but the overlapping is not; rather it is much more common to traditional Chinese manner of dress. However, interestingly, among the portraits from the great Kushan shrine at Māt near Mathurā the large statue provisionally identified as king Caśtana of the Śaka Satrap of Ujjayinī dating ca. 130 A. D. [28] shows an outer garment with similar wide borders (Pl. XI). The garment is also worn with the right side diagonally overlapping the left in the same manner as that of Songzen Gampo and the border has a similar delicate and sensitive curved edge.

There is another interesting apparent relation between the Songzen Gampo statue and Kushan period royal portrait sculpture in regard to the belt, which is similar in most respects to the belt of the great Kushan king Kanishka as depicted in the famous statue of ca. late first to early

[27] R. Ghirshman, *Persian Art*, N. Y., 1962, Figs. 10, 71, 89, 110, 196 to note a few examples all dating from the first-third century A. D.

[28] J. Rosenfield, *The Dynastic Arts of the Kushans*, Berkeley, 1967, pp. 145–146.

second century A. D. also from the sanctuary at Māt (Pl. XII). The belt strap in both statues is separated into a series of square plaques, each decorated with a floral design. The particular design used on the plaques of Songzen Gampo's belt, that is, a kind of fleur-de-lis shape with main radii of the design reaching diagonally to the four corners, though similar to the design on Kanishka's belt, corresponds nearly identically with one of the plaque designs on Kanishka's sword scabbard (Pl. XIII). The belt worn in the Songzen Gampo image is an especially prominent feature which suggests its importance in his dress. It is definitely wider than the belts seen in the portrait of his minister (Pl. IX) and of the Tibetan kings in Cave 158 and 159 (Pl. X) and its design of square plaques is a distinctively different type from the belt of Glang Od srung in the 'Bri-gung painting (Pl. VI). The belt of Kanishka is also obviously special, being unlike any other known on images from the Kushana period. Although it is as yet difficult to postulate the reason for this apparent similarity between these two statues, the fact that Kanishka was the first Buddhist king of the Kushans is nevertheless an intriguing parallel to Songzen Gampo, who is the first Buddhist king of the Tibetans.

In relation to Persian prototypes, there is a particularly apt example of a wide belt with square plaques on the statue of king Sanatrug of Hatra dating ca. first - second century A. D. (Pl. XIV), but the interior design of the plaques is geometric, as seems to be the case with other Persian belt designs. Other examples of the wide belt composed of square plaques (all, however, without the floral design like the Potala and Kanishka statues) appear occasionally in some Indian sculptures from Bihar of the fifth - sixth century [29], but appear frequently in mid-T'ang period figures at Tun-huang [30], on several Bodhisattva statues from the Ta-hai ssu detable to ca. 820 A.D. (Pl. XVI) [31], on the portrait statue of Ning Kung-yü, benefactress of the main shrine hall of the Fo-kuang ssu, dating to the

[29] Asher, *AEI*, pl. 32. Sometimes the devi sculptures in Nepal wear a wide belt, but seldom with the square plaque design. P. Pal, *Art of Nepal*, Part I: Sculpture, Leiden, 1974, Fig. 216 shows a devi statue of ca. seventh century having a belt with floral designs; Fig. 222 shows a ca. tenth century devi wearing a square plaque belt having patterns of alternating incised floral and geometric designs.

[30] Examples occur in Caves 468, 159 and 199, all of the mid-T'ang period (ca. 755–820). *Tonkō*, IV, Figs. 116, 80, 81 and 49. Also in the Tun-huang banner paintings, such as several in the British Museum from the mid-T'ang period: R. Whitfield, *The Art of Central Asia*, Vol. I (Paintings from Dunhuang: I), N. Y., 1982, pls. 42-1, 43-1, 55-1, 56-1.

[31] Among the stone sculptures discovered from the site of the Ta-hai ssu some bear inscriptions of 820 and 824 A. D. and this figure dates stylistically with those. See " Honan Yung-yang Ta-hai ssu shih k'e tsao hsiang ", *Wen wu*, 3, 1980, pp.56-65.

third quarter of the ninth century [32], and on a Korean image of Mahāsthāmaprāpta at Chil-bul sa in Kyungju, datable to ca. 850 A. D. While the belt with large square plaques seems to have primarily Persian-Kushan origins, it becomes a relatively prominent feature in the Buddhist art of East Asia in the mid-T'ang period [33].

Different from all of these examples, however, is the lotus rosette buckle on the Tibetan king's belt. Some Sassanian kings depicted on fourth - sixth century A. D. vessels appear to wear a somewhat similar buckle on their chest bands [34]. On the other hand, the lotus rosette is a motif very common in the jewelry of Buddhist imagery from India to Japan, but in regard to the exact style with rather flat lotus petals, the Potala image corresponds to examples appearing especially in Chinese and Japanese Buddhist art from the seventh to the ninth century [35]. An example where it is specifically used as a buckle on a wide belt like that of Songzen Gampo is, however, very rare and only appears, as far as I have been able to find, on the figure of the mythical king in the Samantabhadra panel in Cave 159 at Tun-huang (Pl. XV). Since this cave is stylistically datable to ca. 820-840, it is another factor in pointing to the specific dating of the Songzen Gampo statue around this time.

The boots of Songzen Gampo resemble those on the Tibetan king in Cave 159 (Pl. X). In shape they differ from the Sogdian narrow toe style (Pl. IV), but are similar to the boots worn by the guardian images in the Tun-huang caves dating from the Sui and T'ang periods. The strap across the instep may be a distinctive feature. The turban of red cloth supporting a head of Amitābha Buddha is also special to the Songzen Gampo image, although it can be generally related to the turbans depicted on the Tibetan king in Cave 159 [36]. Representing only the head of Amitābha is like the customary manner of portrayal on images of the 11-headed

[32] For Ning Kung-yü see M. Rhie, *The Fo-kuang ssu*, Fig. 25.

[33] The belt with square plaques (with abstract design) makes a reappearance in twelfth century Buddhist art of China, a period in which we can see the revival of mid-T'ang modes in Buddhist art.

[34] Ghirshman, *Persian Art*, Figs. 247, 208, 210, 253.

[35] An example from early T'ang appears in Cave 57, and Cave 372 (*Tonkō*, III, Figs. 13 and 56 respectively). In flourishing T'ang (684-755) the lotus rosette jewel has a rounder shape, like those seen in Kashmir sculpture. See for example Cave 45 (*Tonkō*, III, Fig. 129). The kind with flat petals executed in a rather free style appears prolifically in the figures of Cave 158 (*Tonkō*, IV, Figs. 73-74) and in the jewelry of figures in Cave 159 (*Tonkō*, IV, Figs. 80-81, 89). Also a closely similar example appears in the clay sculpture of Gakkō in the Sangatsudō of the Tōdaiji in Nara of ca. 750 A. D. (Fig. 23).

[36] For a discussion of the Tibetan king's turbans see Karmay, *Essais*, pp. 74, 81.

Avalokitésvara. In general appearance the braided hair of the king resembles the style of tightly curled hair known in the representations of Bodhisattvas dating especially in the seventh–ninth century, such as the Maitreya of Group K Cave 3 and the Bodhisattva of Niche E, both at Bamiyan and dating ca. late sixth to early seventh century and many bronzes of the early Pala school at Nalanda (Pl. V) as well as other eastern Indian sculptures [37]. The Tibetan kings in Caves 158 and 159 apparently wear braids plaited with ribbons and coiled up behind their ears. That may be a formal style while the Songzen Gampo statue mode may represent an informal style or possibly a certain respectful manner [38].

It can be seen that nearly all elements of dress in the Songzen Gampo statue relate to Persian derived forms, but these are invariably modified, usually in ways that relate to forms appearing in Buddhist imagery or to Chinese styles, thus imparting subtle overtones of Buddhist allusion and Chinese manner. In considering a dating according to elements of dress, aside from the relation with Kushan period sculptures of ca. second century A. D., the elements in the Songzen Gampo statue most closely and consistently accord with works of Asian art dating in the seventh–ninth century. There is some specific relation with the caves at Tun–huang dating in the period of the Tibetan occupation, between ca. 781 and 848.

III. *Style and Date*

In a stylistic dating of this Potala sculpture, reliance is made upon the chronologies of Asian art in general since so little is yet known about the early phase of Tibetan Buddhist art. This is possible because of the inter–relationships within Asian Buddhist art and also because of the appearance of diverse sources of inspiration within the Songzen Gampo sculpture which contains enough similarity with works from other regions to apprehend comparable stylistic points. Because there is no dated work which so exactly corresponds to the Songzen Gampo statue as to establish its date, one must use many works of Asian art to find the individual motifs and stylistic elements as well as to understand its overall or general style. In each of these comparisons possibly only one or two elements

[37] For the Bamiyan works see Ghirshman, *Persian Art*, Fig. 424 and Rowland *ACA*, figure on p. 91. For examples of Indian sculpture, see the figure from Lalitgiri in Orissa of ca. eighth–ninth century in D. Snellgrove (ed.), *The Image of the Buddha*, N. Y., Unesco, 1978, Fig. 215.

[38] It is said, for example, that king Trirelwajen would sit in his Ushangdo Chapel " with his hair parted and plaited, surrounded with silks and brocades, offering splendid hospitality to Buddhist monks – a gesture of great respect toward the religion ". *Tibet*, 1981, p. 163.

may correspond in any given example; but this must be expected considering the large range of territory we are considering and the variety of representations within any period.

In proportioning of the body the king is portrayed elegantly and naturally and without distortion. The form is broad and manly but the trunk is neither corpulent nor elongated. The limbs are long and the head and hands are not overemphasized by exaggerated size. The limbs have a moderate freedom away from the trunk and their mass is clearly understood beneath the drapery even though the specific body contour is only seen in the areas of the shoulders and legs. There is a sensitivity to the distribution of weight: the left shoulder raises slightly in response to the vertical position of the left arm and the right shoulder is relaxed. Conversely, the right leg is slightly tilted to support the right arm and the left leg is the more relaxed one. This subtle cross–balance of tense versus passive weights in the structural composition of the form shows skill beyond the common and reveals a sophisticated awareness of body naturalism, the subtleties of the lalitāsana, and of the yin–yang conception of balance.

In regard to the specific shape of the body the most comparable examples are to be found in Korean and Japanese sculpture of ca. 750–850. The particular shoulder shape – a little wide and flat without a massive roundness – is fairly unusual yet it can be seen in the two famous large bronze Buddhas in the Pulkooksa temple which date stylistically ca. 800 A. D. (Pl XVII). The Songzen Gampo image does not, however, share the elongated abdomen, a feature also common in Central Asian figures, but has a rather square and broad trunk similar to those seen, among others, in the Fudō of the Meidō of the Tōji and in some of the Five Akāśgarbha Bodhisattvas from China dating ca. 845 A. D. [39]. The shape of the right leg with its slightly swelling contour is particularly similar to images in Korea from around 800–860 A. D., such as the Pulkooksa Buddhas (Pl. XVII) and the Vairocana of the Suto–am, as well as to images in Japan from the first half of the ninth century, such as the Brahma figure in the Kōdō of the Tōji and the priest Mangan, which has a slightly clearer treatment of the leg shape (Pl. XVIII) [40]. It is important to note that the degree of disclosure and the shape and quality of the contour line produced in all these examples closely correspond to that of the Potala statue; the contour line is not sharp and tense, but, though it is clear, it is subdued

[39] *Genshoku Nihon no Bijutsu*, Tokyo, 1967, Vol. V (Heian Temples and Jōgan Sculpture), Figs. 14, 20. (Hereafter: *Genshoku*).

[40] *Kukpo Torok* (Korea's Treasures – Registered National Treasures of Korea), 6 vols., Seoul, 1959, Fig. 49 and *Genshoku*, IV, Fig. 12 for the Suto–am and Tōji images respectively.

and quiet. As a whole, the body creates a solid underpinning; its mass is generalized and broad, implying strength of form while disclosing individually specific shapes very little. The degree of solidity, however, is an important factor in its dating to ca. 750–850. Later sculptures in East Asia, especially from the 10th century onwards, have even less sense of solid, naturalistic mass beneath the drapery.

The face of the king is smooth and idealized, yet it also has naturalistic modelling and a sense of refined bony structure which is advanced from the more abstract shapes of the seventh century in East Asian sculpture. This idealistic naturalism is suitable to the T'ang period norms of the late eighth century, such as seen in the portrait of the monk Ganjin of ca. fourth quarter of the eighth century in the Tōshōdaiji (Pl. XIX). There is a strong likeness with a terracotta head from Adzhina Tepa, probably dating in the first half of the eight century, particularly in the shape of the face and modelling of the mouth and chin [41]. A comparison with the terracotta images from Fondukistan, Afghanistan, of ca. early eighth century shows resemblances in the shape of the face and in the sleek, smooth, idealistic yet natural modelling (Pl. XX). Also there is some similarity with the shape of the face and nose in particular with some images of the early Pala style (Pl. V). The painted features of the Songzen Gampo image, though probably recently repainted, nevertheless follow the traditions of Gandharan and Central Asian sculpture from as early as Kushan times. The image is not depicted in meditation, but looks outward with golden eyes and a serene and composed expression commensurate with his generally relaxed position. Portraits of the tenth century and later in Tibetan and Asian art in general tend to have more powerful and penetrating projection or a more forceful realism. In the period ca. 750–850 there is a gentleness and softness to the naturalism which is lacking in later images [42].

While the body pose, shape and proportion show subtle awareness of naturalistic traits and form a solid underpinning, the drapery creates a corresponding masterwork of individual diversity and skillful harmony of the abstract and the naturalistic. Over the lower part of the legs the

[41] B. A. Litvinsky and T. I. Zeymal, *Adzhina Tepa*, Moscow, 1971, Figs. 46–47. The monastic site at Adzhina Tepa is generally dated as flourishing in the seventh to first half of the eighth century (*Ibid.*, p. 220).

[42] Although it may not be possible to specifically link this reference with this image, it is nevertheless interesting to note the description of the sculptures from the period of the early Tibetan kings as stated in a manuscript translated by Tucci in « A Tibetan Classification of Buddhist Images According to Their Style », *AAs*, Vol. XXII, 1959, p. 185, where some features of naturalism, such as the soft hands, accurate facial features and big body seem to correspond to the style of the Songzen Gampo statue.

folds lie in a few heavy steplike layers (these may be the hems of various robes) and over the calf area they form short rib folds. On the trunk, clasped by the wide belt, the drapery crinkles into a series of sharply notched angular creases of startling design and ingenuity. Over the forearms the folds are thickly bunched and some sharp creases also appear in the area of the upper arms. The fluid hemlines, intersecting narrow creases and graceful cuvilinear turns of the shawl, which passes lightly over the right shoulder, falls vertically from the left shoulder and moves across the lap and right thigh, create a contrast with the sharper folds of the main body area and the heavier layers of drapery over the legs. The lines of the shawl are ultimately important in providing an elegant, harmonizing movement over the entire figure.

There is an astonishing range and variety among the drapery folds, not only in their diversity of kind and shape, but also in regard to contrasts of weight and quality. While the folds over the forearms, legs and pedestal are thick and heavy, falling with considerable sense of weight, those on the chest are crisp and light and appear to be weightless or even to have a sense of rising movement. Then the folds of the scarf, whose material appears so light and thin, fall with the strongest gravitational pull of all the folds. Such contrasts of weight and diversity in fold types utilized harmoniously to create a richly detailed yet coherent whole not only bespeaks of the mastery of the sculptor, but they are also a characteristic feature of the mid and late T'ang period sculptural style, which displays this kind of diversity as compared with styles of the early and flourishing T'ang period from ca. 618–755, which stressed regularized fold lines in more strictly formal patterns especially utilizing the rib fold rather than a great variety of folds as in this statue. The loosely draped folds that appear in the Songzen Gampo statue over the pedestal and in the lap and arm areas become a prevalent feature in mid–T'ang sculpture [43]. This type is also richly employed in the art of the Sung period and later, but the restraint and lack of exaggeration even within the range of diversity witnessed in the Songzen Gampo statue is a distinct characteristic of the norms of East Asian sculpture from ca. 750–850 rather than of the Sung, Ming or later times.

Further correspondences in specific fold types confirm a relation with sculpture of ca. 750–850 for the Songzen Gampo image. The wide layers of hem folds over the legs of the Potala statue have the same slow move-

[43] The draped fold, as distinct from the rib or crease fold, occurs in images of the mid–T'ang period, such as those from the Wu–t'ai shan area, including the stucco sculptures of the Nan–ch'an ssu dating ca. 782 or a little earlier. See M. Rhie, *The Fo–kuang ssu*, Fig. 27 and *Shansi wen wu chieh shao*, T'ai–yüan, 1955, Fig. 13.

ment and gentle edge as the wide folds in the Ganjin statue (Pl. XIX) and as seen in the sculptures of Cave 159 at Tun-huang (Pl. XXVI) [44]. The short rib folds that appear at the calf are similar to those of the same area of the legs of the Pulkooksa images (Pl.XVII). The bunched folds over the forearm have a resemblance to those over the forearm of the Hokkeji Nunnery Yuima (Pl. XXI) of ca. 800 A. D. Bunched sleeves also appear in the painted male worshipping figure at Adzhina Tepa probably dating ca. first half of the eight century (Pl. XXII). Close, thin vertical folds like those in the shawl which have a remarkable sense of weight and fluid ease occur in Japanese sculpture from ca. 775–800 [45] and appear with a similar sense of thinness in the attendant Bodhisattva of the 836 banner painting (Pl. VIII). The delicate edges of the shawl are similar in quality to the fluttering edges of the garment of the Jingoji Yakushi Buddha dating early ninth century [46] and of the Pulkooksa Buddhas (Pl. XVII). The shawl's hem pattern of two repetitive folds which lie without excessive curvilinear flair or interior crease lines is frequently seen in images of Japan from ca. 750–850 and in Tun-huang paintings of the ninth century [47]. It also occurs in the sculpture from Adzhina Tepe (Pl. XXVI) [48]. This particular fold pattern seems to be a specific feature of the artistic style of the mid-eight to mid-ninth century in East and Central Asia. Even though it may re-occur in the Sung period art, it is not executed with the same restrained and simple elegance as in these cases. Later renderings are invariably more elaborate or exaggerated in curvature and do not have the same quality of weight which is always present in these works from 750–850.

Perhaps most unusual in the Songzen Gampo sculpture are the creased folds with triangular shaped knotches seen around the waist and near the elbow. This is a daring but slightly abstract and mannered way of depicting natural creases. This amount of mannered fold depiction within a sculpture which has much naturalistic fold portrayal accords in principle with images like the Yakushi of the Jingoji. The more fully evolved mannered concept of fold representation occurs a little later as seen in the seated

[44] For views of the Cave 159 sculpture see *Tonkō*, IV, Figs. 77–78.

[45] Example may be seen in the eleven-headed Kannon of the Shorinji and the Yakushi Buddha of the Shin yakushiji (*Genshoku*, III, pl. 79 and IV, pl. 68).

[46] *Ibid.*, IV, pl. 27.

[47] Examples of this soft double wave fold are common in Japanese sculpture of ca. 750–850 (see *Genshoku*, III, pls. 79, 87, 91, and IV, 58, 59, 75, 77). It occurs in Tun-huang sculptures of Cave 194 (ca. 775) and in the mid-ninth century painting of Cave 17 (*Tonkō*, IV, Figs. 42, 47, 127). It can be see also in a painting from Sorcuq of ca. eighth - ninth century (Bussagli, *Painting of Central Asia*, p. 92).

[48] *Adzhina Tepa*, Figs. 38, 39.

Shaka from the Murōji of ca. mid ninth century [49]. One may see, on the other hand, an early form of a triangular or knotched fold in the clay sculpture of Gakkō the Sangatsudō of the Tōdaiji dating ca. 750 (Pl. XXIII). Similar sharply sliced or cut creases occur in the Ta–hai ssu images of ca. 820 (Pl. XVI) and also in the paintings of Cave 158 and 159 at Tun–huang. Especially notable in this latter example are the folds in the figures painted at the head and foot of the colossal Nirvana Buddha in Cave 158, which are so different from the typical Chinese style of painting of that time that they may be considered to be executed by a foreign (possibly Tibetan) hand (Pl. XXIV) [50]. Yet none of these examples have the strongly notched triangular patterns of the folds crinkled by the belt as in the Potala statue. This may be a more developed portrayal of the creases which appear on either side of the waist belt in some Kushana or Central Asian images, such as the representations in the statue of Caśtana (Pl.XI), and in the torso and male worshipping figure from Adzhina Tepa (Pls. XXII, XXVI). Rather than an East Asian motif, it is probably a Central Asian one, occurring at least around the area of Adzhina Tepa in the mid–eighth century. Also, within the stucco tradition of Gandhāra, triangular fold shapes can be seen, for example in some of the recently uncovered images of the Kushana period at Tapa–i–Shotur in Hadda, Afghanistan (Pl. XXV). The thin and fluttering edge of the drapery is also a technique superbly employed in the statues of this site [51]. It seems that certain elements not only of dress as noted earlier, but also of style and tecnique interestingly seem to relate the Potala statue to the traditions of the Kushans and also of Central Asia from the region of present day Soviet Turkestan.

The above considerations of sculptural style confirm the dating of the Potala Songzen Gampo statue within the broad range of the seventh–ninth century, but more certainly within the period ca. 750–850. This points to a date for the statue between the reigns of Trisong Detsen (r. ca. 755–797) and Glang–darma (r. 838–842). This period up to the ascension of Glang–darma, who suppressed Buddhism, is well known from Tibetan sources to be one of intense, fresh and great vigor for achieving the work of Buddhism, including the building of temples and making of images, especially during the reigns of kings Trisong Detsen and Trirelwajen (r. 815–838), both of whom most fervently supported

[49] *Genshoku*, IV, text Fig. 83, color pl. 87.

[50] Karmay in *Essais*, p. 72 notes the distinctiveness of the style and suggests this painting may be done by a Tibetan artist.

[51] Snellgrove, *Image of the Buddha*, Fig. 132.

Buddhism [52]. If one considers an even more precise dating for the Songzen Gampo statue relying upon dated Chinese works, the statue most likely dates stylistically to ca. 820's, during the reign of Trirelwajen. In the graceful linear curves the style relates more closely to images in Cave 159 (Pl. XXVII) and the Bojo shrine of ca. 840 (Pl. XXVIII) than to the stiffer and more forceful styles of Cave 158 (Pl. XXIV) and the Kōbō Daishi shrine of ca. 806 [53]. The combination of gentle curves with some sharp creases most exactly corresponds to the style of the Ta–hai ssu sculptures of ca. 820 (Pl. XVI).

In its diversity of sources, the statue revels not only the profound knowledge and skill of the artist, but it also emerges as a masterwork illuminating the nature of early Tibetan art under the last of the religious kings. It is known from literary records that in the period from Trisong Detsen to Trirelwajen foreign artists were especially invited to Tibet from Nepal, China and Khotan [54]. Since the statue does not reveal dominating characteristics of a purely Indian, Nepalese or Chinese hand [55], the artist is most likely Central Asian or Tibetan, – certainly one who is a master of terracotta technique and conversant with the artistic style which was circulating throughout Asia from India to the Far East [56]. However, no matter who the artist was, the work is ultimately Tibetan in character.

This statue shows a sense of the powerful and sturdy form combined with a gentleness, elegance and grace which is characteristic of Tibetan art in general. The attractions of the surface prevent a feeling for the internal mass unlike the quality of swelling form of Indian sculpture or the sense of deep inner awareness projected from Chinese works. Instead, there is the subtlety and brilliance of the outer surfaces whose clarity and

[52] Snellgrove and Richardson, *CHT*, pp. 77–94; Thubten Jigme Norbu and Colin Turnbill, *Tibet*, N. Y., 1968, p. 170 (on the period of Trirelwajen).

[53] See *Genshoku*, V, Fig. 93 and M. Rhie, *The Fo–kuang ssu* Figs. 31–32 and discussion on pp. 120–121.

[54] Von Schroeder, *ITB*, pp. 397–399; Karmay, *ESTA*, p. 5. These accounts come from such sources as the *sBa–bzed*, a chronicle of Samye Monastery.

[55] Though clearly related to Chinese linear styles of ca. 820's, there is a special sharpness and a lack of dominating control by a cohesive and fluid line uncharacteristic of a Chinese hand. Yet there is too much fluid line and complexity of folds to suggest a Nepalese or Indian hand.

[56] There is literary evidence for the use of both Central Asian, especially Khotanese, and Tibetan artists. King Trirelwajen is known to have summoned artists from " India, China, Nepal, Kashmir, Khotan and Tibet " and to have especially requested a famous artist from Khotan, who came to Tibet with his three sons. Karmay, *ESTA*, pp. 4–5. With the Arab conquests in Central Asia there was apparently also the movement of Buddhists into Tibet from areas such as Khotan from the early eighth century. Snellgrove and Richardson, *CHT*, p. 77.

sharpness is so breathtaking that it shatters any veil of separation between the viewer and the image and creates an immediacy of relationship which is shocking, stunning, intriquing and penetrating. Rather than the viewer penetrating the image, it penetrates the beholder; yet it remains calm, placid and serenely quiet and because of this it is also receptive. From the image there seems to emanate an unseen radiance of energy through the clarity, precision and sleek smoothness of the various surfaces and at the same time it is open, relaxed and inviting so there is no fear or hindrance in the viewer's heart. Then, there are the allusions to the Buddhist and Kushan motifs which add their own deeper level of symbolic implication to the figure and this, too, is typically Tibetan. Possessing these genuinely Tibetan qualities, it would seem that the Songzen Gampo image, even if executed by a non–Tibetan artist, must nevertheless be considered Tibetan in style [57].

Finally, a study of the accompanying statues of the two queens of Songzen Gampo (Pl. II and III) results in similar conclusions regarding pose, style and date as for the king's statue. Briefly stated, the body form of the Wen Ch'eng sculpture with its alert and tall torso and prominently rounded breasts relates with female figures of Persian and Gandharan art and with the terracotta female figure from Fondukistan as well as with other sculptures of the Central Asian tradition [58]. Her crossed legs have a shape similar to those of the priest Mangan (Pl. XVIII). The creases of the sleeves resemble the Adzhina Tepa mode (Pl. XXII) while their sharp carving is equatable with examples from the Ta–hai ssu sculptures (Pl. XVI). The lovely draping of the languid cloth over the shoulders and upper arms derives from forms known since mid–T'ang period sculpture, such as seen in the images of the Nan–ch'an ssu of ca. 782 A. D. [59] and as they are depicted in the Ta–hai ssu figures (Pl. XVI). While the face of Lady Wen Ch'eng accords with examples from Fondukistan and Central Asia especially, the facial type of the Nepalese queen is more in the Pala style [60]. Though the painted designs on the Wen Ch'eng statue may be

[57] There is an interesting account quoted in Karmay, *ESTA*, pp. 4–5 telling of a foreign artist named mTshan–ma–can from Hen–pen–dpe–har using Tibetan models in making images in the "Tibetan style" for Trisong Detsen's Tārā temple.

[58] Closest comparisons are seen with secular figures in Persian and Gandharan art: Ghirshman, *Persian Art*, Fig. 95 (from Hatra); Rosenfield, *DAK*, Fig. 50 (from Gandhāra); B. Rowland and F. M. Rice, *Art in Afghanistan*, Coral Gables, 1971, Fig. 149 (from Fondukistan).

59 See note 42.

[60] The broad, round face with small mouth of the Chinese queen is typical of many Central Asian examples while the large but thin nose, broad mouth and bony structure of the face of the Nepalese queen relates to the forms well known of Pala sculpture

recently repainted or may not be original, the motif of the flower with pointed leaves in the skirt interestingly occurs in the painted designs on the cushions of the seated Buddhas in the wall paintings at Adzhina Tepa [61].

These two statues, if placed on either side of Songzen Gampo, form a wonderful complimentary composition in contrast to the relaxed pose of the king. They are both alert and seated in a symmetrical posture, though each has a different hand position: Wen Ch'eng in meditation and the Nepalese queen in adoration (dhyāna and añjali mudrās respectively). In the meaning conveyed by these hand gestures these figures seem to embody two essential factors of Buddhist religious practice – those of wisdom and faith respectively. As such they form a perfect triad with the karunā (compassion) aspect of the Songzen Gampo in the center.

Long cherished by the Tibetans as images deeply connected with the most sacred aspects of their religion and history, these sculptures now emerge as works also significant among all Asian art. In addition to being a splendid and rare set of royal portrait sculptures in the art of Asia of this time [62], the deep and subtle levels of Buddhist connotation contained within them place these works with the most marvelous and inspiring manifestations of Buddhist art as well.

and in some Nepalese sculpture. Asher, *AEI*, Fig. 241; Pal, *The Arts of Nepal* (Sculpture), Fig. 222.

[61] *Adzhina Tepa*, Fig. 10.

[62] Besides the royal portraits of the Persians and Kushans of the first–third century A. D., there is a notable one in South India at Mahabalipuram from ca. mid seventh century of a king and his two queens. Also the portrait tradition is strong in East Asia, but few survive from the T'ang period. There are only three known to me from the late T'ang period in China. In Japan there are several famous Buddhist monk statues, the earliest being of Ganjin in the late eighth century, and there is a painting of Shōtoku Daishi with two attendants (*Genshoku*, II, pl. 49). In Tibet there is reference to existing portrait statues of Songzen Gampo in the T'əng account of the 822 A. D. Chinese ambassador's visit to Tibet on the occasion of signing a treaty: "one in stone placed on his tomb in Phyong–rgyas and the other inside the tomb itself, made of clay mixed with silk and paper". Karmay, *ESTA*, p. 4.

Portrait statue of Songzen Gampo (ca. 609–649/50), terracotta, The Potala, Lhasa, approximately life size. (from Ngapa Ngawang Jigme et al, *Tibet*, N. Y., McGraw–Hill Book Company, 1981, Fig. Fig. 10).

Portrait statue of Lady Wen Ch'eng, terracotta, The Potala, Lhasa. (from Zheng Shi-feng et al, *China*, N. Y., McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1980, Fig. 199).

Portrait statue of Bhrikuti Devi, The Potala, Lhasa. (from Liu, *Hsi–tsang fo hsiao i shu*, Peking, 1957, Fig. 55).

Seated male figure from wall painting of banqueting scene, Sector XVI, Room 10, Pendzhikent, Uzbekistan, seventh – early 8th century, Hermitage Museum, Leningrad. (from A. Belenitsky, *Central Asia*, N. Y., 1968, Fig. 144).

Avalokiteśvara from Nalanda, Site L, bronze, ninth century, 17 × 12 cm, Nalanda Museum No. 00148, photo American Institute of Indian Studies.

King Glang Od srung, painting in the 'Bri-gung monastery, ca. thirteenth century. (from Liu, *Hsi-tsang*, Fig. 24).

Detail of the left hand of Mañjuśrī Bodhisattva from the Tun-huang banner painting dated 836 A. D., British Museum. (from R. Whitfield, *The Art of Central Asia*, Vol. I, Fig. 16-5).

Attendant Bodhisattva, banner painting dated 836 A. D. from Tun-huang, British Museum. (from Whitfield, *ACA*, I, Fig. 16-2).

Detail of mGar sTong–btsan yul–zung from a painting attributed to Yen Li–pen (627–673). (from *Tibet*, Fig. 13).

Detail of a Tibetan king, east wall south side, Cave 159, Tun-huang, ca. 820–840 A. D. (from *Tonkō Bakko kutsu*, IV, Fig. 91).



Portrait statue usually identified as Caśtana, from the shrine at Māt, Mathurā, Kushana period, ca. mid-second century A. D. (from J. Rosenfield, *The Dynastic Arts of the Kushans*, Berkeley, 1967, Fig. 3).



Portrait statue of King Kanishka from the shrine at Māt, Mathurā, Kushana period, ca. late first or early second century A. D. (from Rosenfield, *DAK*, Fig. 2).

Detail of plaque design ornamenting the sword scabbard on the statue of Kanishka Mathurā (from Rosenfield, *DAK*, Fig. 2a).

Statue of Sanatruq, King of Hatra, first–second century A. D., Baghdad Museum.
(from R. Ghirshman, *Persian Art*, N. Y., 1962, Fig. 94).

Detail a king figure in the Samantabhadra Bodhisattva panel, west wall, Cave 159, Tun-huang ca. 820–840. (from *Tonkō*, IV, Fig. 80).

Bodhisattva from the Ta-hai ssu, Yung-yang, Honan province, stone, ca. 820 A. D. Municipal Museum, Cheng-chou.

Amitābha, Pulkooksa, Kyungju, bronze, United Silla period, ca. 800 A. D.

Priest Mangan, Hakone-jinga, Kanagawa, ca. ninth century, wood.
(from *Genshoku Nihon no Bijutsu*, Vol. V, Fig. 118).

Portrait of Ganjin, Tōshōdaiji, Nara, ca. last quarter of eighth century, dry lacquer. (from *Genshoku*, III, Fig. 54).



Buddha from Niche D, Fondukistan, ca. early eighth century, terracotta, now in the Museum, Kabul.

Yuima (Vimalakīrti), Hokkeji Nunnery, Nara, ca. late eighth – early ninth century, wood. (from J. Rosenfield, « Studies in Japanese Portıaiture: the Statue of Vimalakīrti at Kokkeji », *AOr.*, VI, 1966, Fig. 1).

Male gift bearer from Room XXXL, Adzhina Tepa, Tadzhikistan, seventh century–first half of eight century A. D. (from Litvinsky and Zeymal, *Adzhina Tepa*, Moscow, 1971, Fig. 4).



Gakkō, Sangatusudō, Tōdaiji, ca. 750, clay (from *Genshoku*, III, Fig. 9).

Painting accompanying the Buddha's Nirvana representation, Cave 158, Tun–huang, ca. 800. (from *Tonkō*, IV, Fig. 64).

Fragment of an attendant, Tapa–i–Shotur, Hadda, Afghanistan, ca. third century A. D.

Torso from Room XXIII, Adzhina Tepa, clay. (from *Adzhina Tepa*, Fig. 39).

Sculptures from Cave 159, Tun-huang, ca. 820–840. (from *Tonkō*, IV, Fig. 77).



Shrine of priest Bojo, ca. 840 A. D., National Museum, Seoul.

HUGH E. RICHARDSON

THE SUCCESSION TO GLANG DARMA

It is a tradition well known in Tibet that on the death of Glang Darma two infants were put forward as possible heirs to the throne: one, 'Od–srung, generally described as a posthumous son born to his younger queen; the other, Yum–brtan, surreptitiously adopted by the senior queen who was childless but pretended the infant was hers. Supporters of the two did not agree and the kingdom was divided between them.

The earliest historians of the *phyi dar*, the revival of religion – 'Brom–ston in the eleventh century, Sa–skya Grags–pa–rgyal–mtshan in the twelfth, Ne'u Pandita in the thirteenth (?), and Bu–ston in the mid–fourteenth century – name the two princes but devote their attention exclusively to 'Od–srung whom they see as the legitimate king. 'Phags–pa in the thirteenth century does not even mention Yum–brtan nor does the *Deb–ther sngon–po* of 'Gos Lo–tsa–ba in the fifteenth century.

The first appearance of the story about the different parentage of the two princes and the explanation of their names seems to be in the *Hu–lan deb–ther* c. 1346 and it is repeated in much the same form in later histories – e.g. the *Rgya bod yig–tshang* c. 1434, the *Deb–ther dmar–po gsar–ma* and *Rgyal rabs gsal–ba'i me–long*, both sixteenth century; the *Chos–'byung* of Dpa–bo gtsug–lag (1564) adds some picturesque details.

In the earliest Tibetan manuscripts those from Tun Huang, which will be examined later, 'Od–srung and his mother, the queen 'Phan, are named but no surviving document from there mentions Yum–brtan.

In a previous article I asked " Who was Yum–brtan? " and concluded that there was no such person and that the introduction of a second claimant to the throne was to conceal the fact that the direct line from Srong–brtsan sgam–po had become extinct and that 'Od–srung was adopted.

Here, the question is " Who was 'Od–srung? " Of his existence the Tun–huang documents leave no doubt but his identity and the whole course of events after the death of Glang Darma are far from clear. Fortunately Chinese histories throw some light on the matter. The story re-

lated in the New T'ang Shu dating from the middle of the tenth century, as translated by S. W. Bushell in *JRAS* 1880, is that Tamo (Darma) had no sons and Ch'i li hu (Khri 'Od?) a son of Shangyenli the elder brother of his wife, whose name was Lin, was made tsanp'u. He was only three years old at the time and the wife was regent of the kingdom. The account then describes the trouble this caused. In *Le Concile de Lhasa*, p. 26 P. Demiéville cites the *Tseu tche t'ong kien* (A. D. 1085) to the effect that K'i–li–hou was considered illegitimate as not being of the royal line but in fact a nephew of one of the wives of Dar–ma, the lady Tch'en, who governed the kingdom with favourites of the late king because K'i–li–hou was only three years old. Demiéville here follows Pelliot's reading of the queen's name in *Histoire Ancienne du Tibet* rather than "Lin" which is that of Bushell and Chang Kun. These early histories may depend on reports from Li Ching, the last T'ang envoy to Tibet in 843; and although the *Tseu tche t'ong kien* appears to imply that Darma had more than one queen, there is agreement that K'i–li–hou was three years old and was adopted from the family of the queen, who then governed the kingdom; there is no mention of a rival infant prince.

The first appearance in later Tibetan histories of a name that can be attributed to a wife of Glang Darma is in f. 25 b of the *Chos 'byung* of Ne'u Pandita, probably of the later thirteenth century, where in a list of religious foundations it is said that a temple at 'Phags–bsam lhang–bu was founded by Tshes–pong–bza' Yum–rje btsan–mo, whom a gloss calls 'Phan. Yum–rje btsan–mo may be translated "the royal queen–mother". It is not specifically stated that she was the wife of Glang Darma; and the list is chronologically strange since she is followed by 'Ol–rgod gza' 'Bro–gar stong–btsun who was the grandmother of Srong–brtsan sgam–po; but the identification is possible from f. 123 b of the *Rgya bod yig tshang* (c. 1324) which seems to derive from a similar source to that of Ne'u. There a temple of Yar–lung Dpag–bsam ljon–shing is attributed to Dar–ma's queen *btsun–mo* Rtsan–mo 'Phan. The list continues with foundations by *mkhas btsun sngags pa dang btsun chen rnams.* "learned exorcist priests and holy monks".

The Chos–'byung of Dpa'–bo gtsug–lag vol *ja* f. 139 a names the mother of 'Od–srung as *btsun–mo chun–ma* Tshe–spong–bza' btsan–mo 'Phan. It is also the only history, so far as I can discover, to name the senior queen – *chen–ma* Sna–nam–bza'. Sna–nam was a well–known clan from which Khri Lde–gtsug–brtsan took a bride but it may be wondered whether Dpa'–bo gtsug–lag, whose work reveals considerable acquaintance with early records at Bsam–yas, might have assumed – rightly or wrongly – that *btsun–chen rnams* in *Rgya bod yig tshang* or some similar work was in error for *btsun–mo chen–mo sna nam.*

At all events threre is general agreement in three histories between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries that 'Od-srung's mother was from the Tshe-spong (properly Tshes-pong) clan and that her name was 'Phan.

The name 'Phan as that of 'Od-srung's mother is confirmed by contemporary evidence in two manuscripts from Tun-huang which can be dated between the death of Glang Darma in 842 and the loss of Tun-huang in 850. Another mentions 'Od-srung and his queen-mother without naming her. The most important of these documents is Pelliot Tibétain (Pell T) 999 because a specific date can be attached to it. It was edited - with some errors in copying - by the late Marcelle Lalou and has recently been reproduced photographically in the invaluable *Choix de Documents de Touen-houang*, Paris 1978/1979. It may be noted in passing that in the first line, where Lalou has *sun lha sras*, the reading should be *sngun lha sras*. The document records a dedication in a mouse year on behalf of *Jo mo btsan mo 'phan gyi yum sras gyi pho brang 'Od srung*. The first *gyi* is perhaps pleonastic and the meaning appears to be "the lady queen 'Phan and her son the *pho-brang* 'Od-srung". The date can only be A. D. 844 because by the next mouse year 856, Tun-huang was again under Chinese control. Incidentally it rebuts the suggestion put forward by some Japanese scholars that Glang Darma died in 846.

The title *pho-brang* is repeated in Pell T. 131 which is a prayer to the Buddhas and many deities to protect the kingdom and maintain the faith practised in the time of the previous Tibetan kings; with it are associated *bod yongs gyi (rgyal) pho chen po Lha bal dum na bzhugs pa jo mo 'phan gyi pho brang 'Od srung rjes 'bangs 'khor dang bcas pa*, "the great king of all Tibet, dwelling at Lha-bal-dum, 'Od-srung the *pho-brang* of the lady, queen 'Phan with their retinue of followers and subjects".

Pell T 230, another prayer, of which unfortunately the right half of the document is missing, also names in l. 7 *Lha sras Khri 'Od srung btsan yum*, "the son of god, the enthroned 'Od-srung, the *btsan-po* and his mother". In l. 20 there is a reference to *jo mo btsan mo yum gyi thugs rje*, 'the kindness of the queen mother". It is possible that 'Od-srung was also named in the preceding line which is lost. In l. 24 *btsan yum sras*, "the btsan-po, mother and son" can be read. There are fragments of prayers that disloyal subjects may be brought to justice and lasting peace restored. Another *ms* from Tun-huang, no. 752 in the India Office Library, also prays for the cessation of disturbances in the kingdom.

These documents leave no doubt that in Tun-huang 'Od-srung, though still a minor, was regarded at some time before A. D. 850 as the enthroned king; that the queen 'Phan was a person in authority; and that the régime had troubled times to face.

The description of 'Od-srung as *pho-brang* suggests some unusual

relationship. The title is found elsewhere only in connection with Zhi-ba-'od, a monk-prince of western Tibet instrumental in the revival of Buddhism in the mid-eleventh century. In his *Preliminary Report on Two Scientific Missions to Nepal* p. 52 Professor Tucci states that it is borne by the second son of a ruling family. There does not appear to be any other evidence of this; and in the case of 'Od-srung it seems more likely to mean that he was of the *pho-brang* – the palace or family of Btsan-mo 'Phan, the queen dowager, from which, if the disinterested Chinese accounts be accepted, he was adopted. The formal description of him as *sras*, "son", is what might be expected.

It has been seen that later Tibetan histories give the queen's family name as Tshes-pong. That conflicts with Pelliot's reading of the character in the T'ang Annals as "Tch'en" which he identifies with the Tibetan "Mchims". But the character there differs from that used for Mchims in the bilingual treaty inscription of 821/822 at Lhasa which has the authority of a state document. Further, Pelliot's translation shows that the Chinese simply reads "the lady Tch'en" and that it is only an assumption that this is a family or clan name. The Tun-huang documents refer to the lady by her personal name, 'Phan, a syllable which features in the names of many personages in the Tun-huang *mss* and might be connected with the extensive region of 'Phan in north-east Tibet. It is probable that the Chinese would have known her by that name; and as there is some doubt about the reading of the character, sinologists might be able to study it again and find something like 'Phan in it.

A search in early documents for a clue to the clan of the queen's brother Shangyenli reveals only one similar name– Zhang Gnyan-lod of Sna-nam who was a witness to the edict by Khri Lde-Srong-brtsan of c 812, recorded in Dpa'-bo gtsug-lag vol *ja* f. 128 b to 130 b.; at the lowest estimate he would be about 48 in A. D. 842. Sna-nam was the clan of the senior queen according to Dpa'-bo gtsug-lag. When he wrote, historians since the fourteenth century, and probably earlier, were aware of a story about adoption and were determined to avert such a stigma from 'Od-srung and to claim him and his descendants who were patrons of Atisha the great figure in the revival of Buddhism, as in the direct line from Srong-brtsan sgam-po, its founder in Tibet. If Dpa'-bo gtsug-lag, who had access to the archives at Bsam-yas, did actually find the names Tshes-pong and Sna-nam in early records, he might have transposed them in view of the tradition attributing the adoption to the senior queen.

That is highly speculative; but in the absence of any evidence in Tibetan sources, early or late, to link 'Od-srung's mother with Mchims the identification of the lady Tch'en is not conclusive. At all events, to whatever clan queen 'Phan belonged both Chinese and early Tibetan documents

point to the fact that she adopted 'Od-srung from outside the royal line.

Although the prayers from Tun-huang, mentioned above, hint at troubles surrounding the accession of 'Od-srung it is the T'ang Annals that provide a connected account and lively details of the events. They relate how the Chief Minister Chiehtuna (Dba's Rgyal-to-re stag-snang) was killed when he protested at the appointment of Shangyenli's son as tsanp'u; and very soon the whole country was in a state of revolt. That rather meagre intelligence about affairs in central Tibet might have been communicated by the last T'ang envoy who had gone to Lhasa in 843 to condole on the death of Glang Darma. The Chinese are far better informed about the internecine warfare between Tibetan ministers in the border regions in which they were marginally involved and which soon led to the recovery of many towns and districts which the Tibetans had held for some eighty years. Shangk'ungje of Mo, who can be identified with Dba's Khrom-bzher mentioned in Khri Lde-srong-brtsan's edict, military governor of Lomenchuan, well within Shensi, denounced the ministers who had murdered Glang Darma; and, claiming to be divinely commanded to chastise the rebels and traitors, attacked the senior border governors including his immediate superior Shangpipi of Mou whose personal name was Tsansinya (Btsan-bzang of 'Bro?). After seven years of fighting with varying success Shangpipi gave up the struggle and retired to the neighbourhood of Tun-huang. Shangkungje having failed in an attempt to secure Chinese patronage, continued his career of indiscriminate rapine and slaughter over a wide area from Turfan to Ling-chou; but he was increasingly isolated as the Tibetan colonial empire collapsed around him. From 849 onwards Chinese generals recaptured their western districts and the fortress cities of the silk route through Kansu. In 866 Shangk'ungje, who must by then have been over seventy years old, was defeated and killed by the Uighur general P'ukuchun, at that time in alliance with the Chinese.

In these events it is evident that Shangk'ungje was out for his own ends, arrogating first the title of Chief Minister and later even that of *btsan-po*. His attack on Shangpipi may have been directed against him as a supporter of the new régime or because of the long competition, from at least A. D. 705, between the Dba's and 'Bro clans for power in Tibet. The latter suggestion is supported by a statement in Du Halde's *History of China* that when "Champipi" gave up the fight he told his followers that since there was no legitimate *btsan-po* they might as well offer their allegiance to China; from which it seems he was not primarily a champion of 'Od-srung. The greater part of the fighting men on both sides being drawn from peoples of the border regions, his advice would be readily accepted.

Later Tibetan historians, preoccupied with the eclipse of Buddhism under Glang Darma and its eventual restoration, seem to know nothing of the well-organized and successful colonial administration which dominated the silk route and extensive tracts of territory in China's western districts for nearly three generations; and they are no better informed about the fighting on the frontier after the death of Glang Darma or the principal personages involved. Dpa'-bo gtsug-lag (vol. *ja* f. 140 a.) states that when the two princes were twenty-three – i.e. 865/866 by his calculations – there was a popular uprising and that Dba's Kho-bzher legs-stang was responsible for spreading it to Mdo-khams. In fact that was just the year when Dba's khrom-bzher met his end after twenty-four years of warfare and raiding. There is also vague mention of fighting between 'Bro and Sbas in Dbu-ru. There is what seems to be a hazy reference to the death of Khrom-bzher in f. 92 a. of the *Rgyal-rabs gsal-ba'i me-long* where it is said that a Sog-po general came to Tibet and killed the minister Khyung-zhags.

Much more is known about the personalities by the Chinese whose accounts show a sympathetic interest in Shangpipi whom they regard, in comparison with the violent and brutal Shangk'ungje, as a man of culture. The 'Bro clan had been familiar to them for a long time as part of the Yangt'ong. A remnant of that people which remained on the borders of North-west China when the main body migrated to the west was in touch with the Chinese court up to 647 after which they came under Tibetan domination; but their earlier contact led to the continuation of some sort of relationship. The lady Khri-ma-lod of 'Bro, the queen of Mang-slong mang-btsan was an influential figure in Tibetan politics. She survived her husband, who died in 676, for a long time but it was not until after the elimination of the dominant Mgar clan by her son 'Dus-srong in 698 that she was able to exert her influence and she is mentioned in the Tun-huang annals every year after that until her death in 712. She took the lead in securing a Chinese princess as bride for her grandson Khri Lde-gtsug-brtsan. In 677 she had perhaps been behind an attempt to obtain princess Tai-ping, daughter of the Empress Wu in marriage for her son 'Dus-srong. Later, Khri Srong-lde-brtsan also took a wife from 'Bro – the lady Rgyal-mo-brtsan who became a nun with the name Byang-chub and was a devoted follower of the Chinese religious teacher the Master Mahayana during his stay in Tibet. Khri lde-srong-brtsan, Khri Srong-lde-brtsan's son by another queen, also married a 'Bro lady. The 'Bro appear to have had a close connection with Tun-huang and it is probably not mere chance that the general who conquered it for Tibet was 'Bro Khri-sum-rje and that another 'Bro Khri-sum rje with the name Stag-snang dominated the frontier administration in conjunction with Lha-bzang

klu-bal of Tshes-pong some twenty-five years later. A eulogy of Zhang Khri-sum-rje by a Chinese of Tun-huang, quoted by Demiéville (*op. cit.* pp. 287, 288) shows knowledge of his forbears back to his great-grandfather.

The T'ang dynasty disintegrated about the same time as the rule of the Chos-rgyals of Tibet. Chinese annals have no information about events in Central Tibet after the return of their last ambassador in 843; by 873 imperial orders no longer reached the frontier generals; in 889 the capital was moved eastwards to Lo-yang; and in 929, according to Ma Tuan-lin there was no one who could read a letter in Tibetan. But the succeeding Sung dynasty had some knowledge of the Tibetan peoples still living in the border regions. A passage in Du Halde's history, based on Sung records, states that when Lun Kongjo (Shangk'ungje) was in the ascendant some princes of the royal blood retired to distant places in Szechwan while others fortified themselves in the mountains. Most remained in their patrimonies in the region governed by Champipi and later there emerged from among them, c. A. D. 951, Pan-lo-tchi, prince of Lou-chou – the Liang-chou district – who had been protected by the sons of Champipi. Who these princes of the royal blood may have been is uncertain. Although the direct descent from Srong-brtsan sgam-po through a senior queen was extinct it can hardly be supposed that no children by some of the many lesser royal wives did not survive; and it seems probable that the Bro would support someone connected with their own clan.

Pan-lo-tchi, who is said to have been a rival of the king of Hsi-hsia, died c 1008 and was followed as principal leader of the Tibetan tribes of Mdo-khams by a youth, Kie-so-lo who was eventually established at Tsong-ka, south-east of the Kokonor. The argument about his origin is too involved to pursue here but it appears that envoys had been sent to the west to find a descendant of 'Od-srung to rule them and the boy they chose may have been a grandson of 'Od-srung's grandson Bkra-shis rtsegs-pa dpal. Chinese histories follow the fortunes of the Tsong-ka princes down to the thirteenth century when their rule was ended by Chengiz Khan.

Tibetan histories know nothing of these events apart from the bare mention that some princes went to Mdo-khams and Tsong-ka; and their accounts of affairs in central Tibet for about a century and a half after Glang Darma are obscure and confused. The best outline of the chronology in probably that in the histories of Sa-skya Grags-pa rgyal-mtshan and 'Phags-pa which are regarded as of special value by Professor Tucci in his "Validity of the Tibetan Historical Tradition", *India Antiqua*, 1947. By those accounts 'Od-srung was elected king immediately on the

death of Glang Darma and died at the age of sixty-three (A. D. 903). His son Dpal-'khor-btsan was born c. 892 and died aged thirty-one (923). There followed a popular rebellion (*khyen-log*) in the earth-ox year 929; and in 941 the royal tombs were violated. The sons of Dpal-'khor-btsan divided the kingdom and some of his grandsons set out to found new kingdoms in the west. That can be put speculatively in the middle of the tenth century. The kings of Ladakh and the Lha-rgya-ri family in E-yul near Dwags-po are held to be descended from those western rulers.

The fate of religion in central Tibet before the migration to the west shares in the same general obscurity. The Sakya historians relate that Glang Darma ruled righteously at first for six months; and this may be reflected in Pell T. 134 which is a long prayer dedicated to him, under his name Wu'i-dun-brtan, as a devotee who will build temples and maintain the faith. It may be noted that, apart from the change of names, this is a verbatim copy of Pell T. 132 which is dedicated to his murdered predecessor and brother Khri Gtsug-lde-brtsan (Ral-pa-can) and seems to be the sort of stereotyped compliment the subject people of Tun-huang turned out for the ruler of the day. According to the Sakya histories the subsequent persecution of religion by Glang Darma was confined to the remaining six-and-a-half months before his assassination; but they appear to have gone astray in assigning to him a reign of only a year and half a month for the Tsen tche t'ong kien states definitely that the Tibetan king Yi Tai – which was the name of Ral-pa-can's regnal era – died in the third year of K'ai Cheng (838), and was succeeded by his brother Ta-mo. But whether Glang Darma reigned for a year and half a month of for four years the persecution, which has left so strong a mark on Tibetan history, seems to have been aimed principally at the monks, probably because of the political influence they had acquired in the preceding reign. The principal temples and images were not destroyed and the scriptures were still venerated in the houses of laymen. Both 'Od-srung and Dpal-'khor-btsan were regarded as pious kings and the latter is credited with the founding of many temples. I have seen that at Bya-sa near Yar-lung. It is similar in design to the earlier royal foundations at Khra-'brug and G-yu Lha-khang but simpler and more austere. As a temple with no one to perform offerings is improbable, some monks must have survived; but while political dissension may have made it economically impossible for the religious body to be supported by Glang Darma's immediate successors on the same scale as in former times, the most severe blow to the practice of Buddhism in central Tibet was probably the rebellion of A. D. 929 followed by the dispersal of the descendants of Dpal-'khor-btsan and half a century of neglect until the arrival from the east of Klu-mes Shes-rab tshul-khrims in A. D. 978 marked the beginning of the *phyi-dar*. Among

his disciples was a member of the old nobility, Sna–nam Rdo–rje dbang–phyug, but in Tibetan minds the *phyi–dar* is dominated by coming of Atisa; and the part played in bringing that about by 'Od–srung's descendants, the western Tibetan kings Ye–shes–'od and Byang–chub–'od, has quite obscured the fact that the blood of Srong–brtsan sgam–po no longer ran in the royal veins.

DAVID SEYFORT RUEGG

A KAR MA BKA' BRGYUD WORK ON THE LINEAGES AND TRADITIONS OF THE INDO–TIBETAN DBU MA (MADHYAMAKA)

I.

Peoples incline to order their world and the ideas they have of their civilization and traditions in a variety of characteristic ways. In Tibet one of the most typical structures so employed is the lineage. Such lineages may be articulated into princely and royal genealogies (*gduṅ rabs*, *jo rabs*, *rgyal rabs*) belonging to 'clans' or 'races', into abbatial (*gdan* [*sa'i*] *rabs*) or magisterial (*mkhan rabs*) ones connected with monastic seats, and into genealogies of hierophanies (*sku 'phreṅ*, *sku rabs kyi 'phreṅ ba*) in lines (*'khruṅs rabs*) of rebirths (*yaṅ srid*). While these lineages together with the individuals who make them up might seem at first sight to be, according to the particular case, either secular or religious, they very frequently turn out to have been regarded in Tibet as possessing both a temporal and a spiritual side. Thus a sovereign or prince may be thought of as born in a lineage having heavenly, divine antecedents, and also as a King by/of the Dharma (*chos rgyal*). On the other hand, religious heads, abbots and spiritual masters – who occupy their positions either by heredity, or through pupillary succession within a magisterial or preceptorial line (cf. *bla brgyud*, *mkhan brgyud*, *sgrub brgyud*, *bšad brgyud*), or again in virtue of being regarded as a link in a line of hierophanies (*sprul sku*) – are regularly invested with temporalities that are frequently considerable and sometimes indeed truly princely; very often, therefore, they are in effect abbot–princes in hierocratic lines [1].

[1] This conception may be linked with the religion–political system known as the 'conjunction of Dharma and polity' (*chos srid zuṅ 'brel*), or the 'two–fold way' (*lugs zuṅ*, *lugs gñis*), which came to be embodied in lines of temporal–cum–spiritual figures

Genealogies are given in detail in the Tibetan historiographical and hagiographical–biographical literature, and they occupy an especially prominent place in the rGyal rabs literature starting with Sa skya Grags pa rgyal mtshan (1147–1216) and in the Deb ther literature starting with Tshal pa Kun dga' rdo rje (dGe ba'i blo gros), who composed the body of his *Deb ther dmar po* (*Hu lan deb ther*) in 1346; and genealogical material thus occupies much space in 'Gos lo tsā ba gŽon nu dpal's *Deb ther sṅon po* composed in 1476–78. In the 'archival' works of the Yig tshaṅ literature too genealogies are as is to be expected very prominent; and in a work that reflects this genealogical approach in a characteristic fashion, the *rGya bod yig tshaṅ mkhas pa dga' byed* which is a collection of records compiled in the 15th century by the archivist (*yig mkhan*) 'Śrībhūtibhadra' (dPal 'byor bzaṅ po?), we find listed the royal and princely lineages of India, Li yul, China, Mi ñag, Tibet and Mongolia side by with the lineages of the prince–hierarchs of the Sa skya, bKa' brgyud and other schools [2].

It was the bKa' brgyud pas in particular who developed to the highest degree the idea of combining the concepts of hierophany and hierocracy in a single line of *sprul sku* type rebirths. In the case of the Kar ma pa branch of the bKa' brgyud pa school this latter development was evidently occasioned by certain political and social conditions in conjunction with the fact that the Kar ma pas were among the chief transmitters of the doctrine of the projection (*'pho ba*) of the conscious principle into a new state of existence, one of the Six Dharmas of Nāropa (Naḍapāda). Historically as well as ethnographically, the various kinds of lineage mentioned above undoubtedly have different origins and belong to distinct systems. But in effect they appear to have merged together in a single representation in which they reinforce each other, being held together by the common theme of ancestry, biological or spiritual.

The Kar ma pas' propensity to view their history and traditions in terms of lineage and genealogy has evidently had a strong influence on their conception and articulation of the traditions of the Indo–Tibetan dBu ma (Madhyamaka) with which this article is concerned.

such as the Dalai Lamas in Tibet and the Jebtsundampa Qutuγtus in Mongolia. The dating of this religio–political system depends in part on the date of the *Čayan teüke* (recently edited and translated by Klaus Sagaster); though sometimes ascribed to the 13th century, this work was edited (in a *recensio nova*) in the 16th century by Sečen Qung Taiyiǰi, an associate of Altan Qan (1507–1582) who was, very significantly, a donor–patron of bSod nams rgya mtsho (Dalai Lama III 1543–1588, who received the title of Dalai Lama from Altan Qan) and the ancestor of Yon tan rgya mtsho (Dalai Lama IV, 1589–1616/7).

2 Cf. Ariane Macdonald, *JA*, 1963, pp. 58–62.

A noteworthy example of the combination of doxography and spiritual genealogy is found in the introduction to the commentary on Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra* and *Bhāṣya* entitled *dBu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bšad, dPal ldan dus gsum mkhyen pa'i žal luṅ dvags brgyud grub pa'i šiṅ rta* [3] where Mi bskyod rdo rje (1507–1554) – the eighth hierarch in the Žva nag Kar ma pa line – sets out the main lineages and teachings of the Madhyamaka/dBu ma in India and Tibet. By its very title this work already clearly shows that Mi bskyod rdo rje's conception of the traditions of this school centre on the precepts of Mi la ras pa's great disciple Dvags po lha rje – otherwise known as sGam po pa bSod nams rin chen (1079–1153) – which were handed down to the Kar ma pa school of the bKa' brgyud pas by sGam po pa's disciple Dus gsum mkhyen pa (1110–1193), the first hierarch in the line of Žva nag Kar ma pas [4].

Of particular interest to us is the fact that for each lineage and teaching Mi bskyod rdo rje has also traced the line of transmission down to himself. This combination of genealogy and doxography thus serves to authenticate and validate a tradition for its recipient – the hierarch – and his disciples.

II.

After recapitulating briefly the basic points in Madhyamaka thought (fol. 2a3–3b2), Mi bskyod rdo rje turns his attention to the origin of the

[3] This text was published in 1975 by the Dharma Chakra Centre of Rumtek (Rum btegs, Sikkim) in 403a folios. An earlier edition in 412a folios was published in 1969, also from Rumtek. The *Dvags brgyud grub pa'i šiṅ rta* was begun in the author's 39th year (1545).

[4] On Dus gsum mkhyen pa, the disciple of sGam po pa and the founder of the 'Tshur phu/mTshur phu monastery, see 'Gos lo tsā ba gŽon nu dpal, *Deb ther sṅon po* (= *DṄ*), ña, 31b f. (G. N. Roerich, *The Blue Annals*, p. 473 f.).

Beside the *DṄ* (written in 1476–78) and dPa' bo gTsug lag phreṅ ba's *mKhas pa'i dga' ston* (completed in 1564), Chapter pa, the main source for the history of the Kar ma pas is the *bsGrub brgyud karma kaṃ tshaṅ brgyud pa rin po che'i rnam par thar pa rab 'byams nor bu zla ba chu šel gyi phreṅ ba* by Si tu Chos kyi 'byuṅ gnas (1699/1700–1774) and 'Be lo Tshe dbaṅ kun khyab, contained in volumes da and na of the dPal spuṅs edition of Si tu's bKa' 'bum (reprinted in two volumes, New Delhi, 1972). See also Karma Ṅes don bstan rgyas, *Chos rje karma pa sku 'phreṅ rim byon gyi rnam thar mdor bsdus dpag bsam khri šiṅ* (Brief biographies of the successive embodiments of the Black Hat Karma pa Lamas, written in the *lcags yos* year [1891] and published by Topden Tsering, Tibetan Bonpo Monastic Centre, Ochghat, H. P., 1973); H. E. Richardson, "The Karma-pa sect", *JRAS*, 1958, pp. 139–64, and 1959, pp. 1–18; N. Douglas and M. White, *Karmapa*, London, 1976; Karma Thinley, *History of the sixteen Karmapas of Tibet*, Boulder, 1980; E. G. Smith, Introduction to Lokesh Chandra (ed.), *Autobiography and diaries of Situ Paṇchen*, New Delhi, 1968, p. 20 f.

lines of transmission of the Madhyamaka. In the first place, he notes that this system of thought (*lugs* = *naya*) had its origin with – literally it was 'opened up' (*'byed pa*) by – the preceptor N ā g ā r j u n a – p ā d a, about whom prophetic indications (*luṅ bstan pa*=*vyākaraṇa*) given by the Buddha himself are found in the scriptures of the Mahāyāna (3b2).

Next Nāgārjuna's great disciple Āryadeva is mentioned, followed by Ś ū r a (dPa' bo)[5] and Ś ā n t i d e v a. Mi bskyod rdo rje observes that since these masters have not been opposed by any proponent of the Madhyamaka, their teachings are known as the Madhyamaka of the 'matrix–texts' (*mātṛkā*, i. e. the basic sources of all the branches of the Madhyamaka school) (*gžuṅ phyi mo'i dbu ma*). (3b3)

Thereafter[5a] the preceptor B u d d h a p ā l i t a expounded the meaning of the Madhyamaka, but he was combatted by the preceptor B h ā v a v i v e k a. And because this rebuttal required to be investigated in its turn, the preceptor C a n d r a k ī r t i – who is regarded as a manifestation (*rnam par 'phrul pa*) of Buddhapālita himself – appeared in the world in order to explain in detail the unlimited meaning of the Madhyamaka. Later there also appeared preceptors such as the authors of the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* (Ś ā n t a r a k ṣ i t a), the *Madhyamakāloka* (K a m a l a ś ī l a) and the *Satyadvayavibhaṅga* (J ñ ā n a g a r b h a), all of whom differed slightly from Candrakīrti (3b4–5).

Still, with respect to their doctrine of the ultimate Madhyamaka (*mthar thug gi dbu ma'i bžed pa*) these preceptors did not disagree in the slightest, for all of them were proponents of the Middle (*dbu ma par smra ba*).

In support of this statement Mi bskyod rdo rje quotes inter alia the *Prajñāpāramitāsaṃcayagāthā* (xxii.3ab) where it is stated that the Pāramitā alone is the Path of all past and future Jinas in all the directions. And he cites too the words of Master 'B r i g u ṅ g l i ṅ p a[6], who declared of the Vajra–logia of the Master 'J i g r t e n g s u m g y i m g o n p o 'B r i g u ṅ p a c h e n p o (1143–1217)[7] that, in all their extensiveness, they set out just one thing, namely the real essence or nature of

[5] A *slob dpon* dPa' bo is mentioned in Bhāvaviveka's *Tarkajvālā* iii. 199 (P, fol. 113b8) for example.

[5a] The word 'thereafter' (*phyi nas*) is justified *doxographically*, from the point of view of the tradition, but of course not historically since Śāntideva, just mentioned, is *chronologically* later than Buddhapālita, Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti, who are about to be mentioned.

[6] Cf. *DṄ*, ña, 76b (p. 577). Here and elsewhere the 1969 edition reads 'Bri khuṅ (which is possibly the more usual spelling). This is Šes rab 'byuṅ gnas (1187–1241).

[7] See *DṄ*, ña, 85a–87a (pp. 596–601).

all the factors of existence (*chos thams cad kyi gšis sam babs kyi gnas lugs*) in conformity with the Buddha's own teaching [8] (3b5–4a2).

Here in Tibet, however, prattlers led astray by error pertaining to faulty direct perception and inference (*mṅon sum daṅ rjes dpag ltar snaṅ gi log šes*) [9] talk, with regard even to Mādhyamikas such as Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti, about a higher and a lower degree of theory (*lta ba*) and comprehension (*rtogs pa*), and also about a right and a wrong philosophical doctrine (*grub mtha'* = *siddhānta*). But if this were correct, those described as inferior would in fact not be Mādhyamikas at all; for so long as the meaning of the Madhyamaka remains unrealized in such a way, there would be nothing but the mere names ' Madhyamaka ' and ' Mādhyamika ', as is the case with [the names] *Alīkākāra–Madhyamaka* and [*Alīkākāra–*] *Mādhyamika* [10] (4a2–4).

To trainee–disciples (*gdul bya* = *vaineya*/*vineya*) of higher and lower capacities attracted to the four philosophical doctrines (*siddhānta*) [11] the Buddha has accordingly taught the Dharma in accordance with the intellect of each. And for this reason the doctrines of the three lower Siddhāntas appear to various trainee–disciples in accordance with the Buddha's having variously taught either the indirect (*neyārtha*) or the certain meaning (*nītārtha*) (*draṅ ṅes ci rigs par gsuṅs pa ltar*). In the Madhyamaka, the highest of the four Siddhāntas, on the other hand the teaching is exclusively in terms of what pertains to the ultimate certain meaning (*ṅes don* = *nītārtha*). How then could it be appropriate for superior and inferior theories to exist in the doctrine of the Madhyamaka? For here there is found no teaching in terms of a division between *neyārtha* and *nītārtha*. To support this view Mi bskyod rdo rje refers to Mañjuśrī [12], who has stated that whereas in the texts of the Vaibhāṣikas, Sautrāntikas and Yogācārins there is found the quasi–true (*cuṅ zad bden*) and the untrue (*mi bden*) the system of the Madhyamaka is entirely true (4a4–6).

Now, to the question as to which of the above–named preceptors had the greatest power of intellect for overcoming especially quickly the mental capacity of both non–Buddhist and Buddhist sectarians (*mu stegs byed* = *tīrthakara*) when explicating the intended purport (*dgoṅs pa*) of the Madhyamaka, the Reverend Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna has replied

[8] This is presumably an allusion to the *'bri khuṅ/guṅ dgoṅs gcig*, a fundamental doctrine of 'Bri guṅ 'Jig rten mgon po.

[9] The 1975 edition reads *log ges* instead of *log šes*.

[10] On this see below.

[11] The four Siddhāntas (*grub mtha'*) referred to here are the Vaibhāṣika, the Sautrāntika, the Vijñānavāda (or ' Cittamātra '), and the Madhyamaka.

[12] I. e. Mañjuśrīkīrti? – On Mañjuśrīkīrti, a follower of Candrakārti, see below, fol. 8b6, and n. 68.

that the great preceptor Candrakīrti-pāda was without a rival[13]. (4a6–b1).

Coming then to the task he has set himself, from among the independent and commentarial works composed by Candrakīrti Mi bskyod rdo rje proposes to sum up the meaning of the independent treatise called the *Madhyamakāvatāra*. And with this end in view he takes up first the topic of the persons who have transmitted this Dharma and then, secondly, the actual exposition of this Dharma which is to be explicated (4b1–3).

In this article we shall be concerned only with what Mi bskyod rdo rje has written concerning the first topic, namely the transmitters of the Madhyamaka–Dharma. This section is divided into three sections[14] (4b3–32b5).

1.1. The sources of Gracious Conferment (*bka' drin*) generating certainty in respect to the three kinds of discriminative knowledge (*šes rab gsum gyi ṅes pa*, i.e. *śrutamayī*, *cintāmayī* and *bhāvanāmayī prajñā*) pertaining to this Dharma–system. This section is subdivided into three divisions.

1.1.1 The lineal transmission (*brgyud pa*) from within the Precious Preceptive Line itself (*bka' brgyud rin po che ñid*).

1.1.1.1 The lineal transmission from Lord Nāropa[15].

Where it is accepted that the bKa' gdams pas were in direct relation with Candrakīrti and also with Nāgārjuna[16], in an ancient document on the History and Lives of the lineal transmission of the Four Precepts (*bka' bži brgyud pa'i lo rgyus rnam thar gyi yig rñiṅ*) composed by Lord Mar pa the Translator[17] there is very highly praised the Life (*rnam par thar pa*) called ' Excellence of the prophetic indication (*vyākaraṇa*) to Candrakīrti ' (*Zla grags la luṅ bstan gyi che ba*). According to this document, following on the Nirvāṇa of the sun–like Protector Nāga [i.e. Nāgārjuna], a prophetic indication was given to the effect that, after the passage of 500 years, a Paṇḍit born in a pure family and named Candrakīrti would dispel the darkness, just as the moon (*candra*) does when the sun [i. e. Nāgārjuna] has set. He is stated to have been the disciple of Āryadeva (4b4–5a1).

13 See *Satyadvayāvatāta* (P ha, fol. 70b = gi, fol 7b), where Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna refers in particular to Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra*.

14 Sections Two and Three are actually treated together in a single short paragraph (fol. 9b1–4). In the following our translation has been condensed and abridged.

15 Nāropa (Naḍapāda) died probably in 1040. He was a teacher of Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna.

16 This connexion was through Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna (Atiša). See below.

17 On Mar pa's dates (1012–1097) see G. Tucci, *Tibetan painted scrolls* (Rome, 1949), p 257 n. 163.

The following is then the line of transmission: Sambuddha-Bhagavat; Rigs gsum mgon po [Avalokiteśvara, Mañjuśrī and Vajrapāṇi]; Nāgārjuna; Āryadeva; Candrakīrti; Mātaṅgi[18]; Tailo; Nāro; Mar pa; Mi la; Dvags po[19]; Dus gsum mkhyen pa [Žva nag I, 1110–93][20]; 'Gro mgon Ras chen[21]; sPom brag pa[22]; Karma pa [Pakṣi, Žva nag II, 1204 or 1206–83]; Auḍyāyana pa[23]; Raṅ byuṅ ba [Raṅ byuṅ rdo rje, Žva nag III, 1284–1339]; g-Yuṅ ston pa[24]; Rol pa'i rdo rje [Žva nag IV, 1340–83]; mKha' spyod dbaṅ po [Žva dmar II, 1350–1405]; De bžin gšegs pa [Žva nag V, 1384–1415]; Ratnabhadra[25]; mThoṅ ba don ldan [Žva nag VI, 1416–53]; 'Jam dpal bzaṅ po and/or dPal 'byor don grub[26]; Chos grags rgya mtsho [Žva nag VII, 1454–1506]; sÑe bo[27] Go śri and rJe btsun Ras pa chen po; and Mi bskyod rdo rje [Žva nag VIII, 1507–54] himself (5a1–4).

1.1.1.2. The lineal transmission from Lord Maitrīpāda[28].

Having understood that the Madhyamaka of Saraha the Elder, Saraha the Younger, Nāgārjuna, and Candrakīrti is one in meaning, the Sovereign (*mṅa' bdag*) Jina Maitrīpāda taught it to others. And this cycle of the Madhyamaka-Dharma according to his system was then known as the Dharma-cycle of non-mentation (*yid la mi byed pa*: *amanasikāra*).

Concerning his being known as Victor (*jina*) Maitrīpāda, he debated with Ratnākaraśānti – who adhered to the thesis of the Alīkākāra-Cittamātra – and was victorious over him[29]. Now in his *Tattva-*

[18] The 1969 edition reads Mataṅgi, and the 1975 edition Mātaṅgi. On Mātaṅgi as a pupil of Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva, see Tāranātha, *rGya gar chos 'byuṅ* (ed. A Schiefner), pp. 70 and 164.

[19] Dvags po lha rje = sGam po pa bSod nams rin chen (1079–1153). See e. g. *DṄ*, ña, 22a f. (p. 451 f.).

[20] See above, n. 4.

[21] Saṅs rgyas ras chen dpal grags, a disciple of Dus gsum mkhyen pa. Cf. *DṄ*, ña, 34a (p. 480).

[22] See *DṄ*, ña, 35b (p. 483).

[23] Orgyan pa Seṅ ge dpal (1230–1308/9).

[24] g-Yuṅ ston rDo rje dpal (1284–1365). See *DṄ*, ga, 22b (p. 149); ña, 40a (p. 493).

[25] Sog dbon Rin chen bzaṅ po (?)

[26] rGyal tshab I.

[27] The 1969 editions reads sÑe 'og.

[28] See *DṄ*, da, 2a (p. 841–2), where Maitrīpa (Maitrīpāda) is said to have been born in 1007 or in 1010.

[29] See also below, fol. 23a3–4. Cf. *DṄ*, da, 2b (p. 842); Nag tsho Tshul khrims rgyal ba, *rNam thar rgyas pa*, fol. 42b–43a.

daśaka (verse 2) Maitrīpāda has written: 'For one wishing to know *tathatā* there is neither the Sākāra nor the Nirākāra: a middle not endued with a Guru's instructions is only middling' [30]. Therefore Sahajavajra has stated in his comment on this passage [31] that the Mādhyamika thus wishes to know *tathatā* having the mark of origination in dependence proclaimed by Ārya–Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Candrakīrti and the others. As was stated by the Bhagavat with this meaning in mind: What is born from conditions (*pratyaya*) is [really] unborn, there being no birth by self–nature; what is dependent on conditions is stated to be empty (*śūnya*), and he who knows Emptiness is attentive; what arises in dependence has no self–nature whatever, and whatever has no self–nature arises nowhere; no factor (*dharma*) is found which is something born, [but] the foolish hold *dharmas* that do not arise to arise. Therefore, if Maitrīpāda has stated that 'A middle not endued with a Guru's instructions is only middling', the remainder (*lhag ma*) after the rejection of the specific [i.e. the Sākāra and Nirākāra doctrines of the 'Cittamātra'] is a cognitive object (*viṣaya*) that is postulated; so this teaching of the essence of the *tathatā* of *yuganaddha* endued with the excellent Guru's instructions – the Madhyamaka–Bhagavatī – captivates the minds of the learned. After having rejected the specific – that is, after having rejected the Cittamātra – to assert that the postulation of a remainder, namely cognition established in reality (*šes pa bden grub*), is the Madhyamaka is then itself a middling middle, and not the very pure Madhyamaka system. It is accordingly indicated that here [in Maitrīpāda's teaching] lies the explication of the meaning of the Middle endued with the teachings of Nāgārjuna and the other superiors (*guru*) (5a4–b6).

With regard to the *Yid la mi byed pa'i dbu ma* of Maitrīpāda, there have arisen in Tibet three distinct ways of developing the intended purport (*dgoṅs pa skoṅ tshul*). These are (i) practice with concentration on the *Mantra–Madhyamaka* of the Profound and Luminous (*zab gsal sṅags* [32] *kyi dbu ma rtsal du bton nas ñams su len pa*), (ii) practice with concentration on the *Sūtra–Madhyamaka* of the Profound (*zab pa mdo'i dbu ma rtsal du bton nas ñams su len pa*), and (iii) practice with concen-

[30] *Tattvadaśaka* (ed. Haraprasād Śāstrī, *Advayavajrasaṃgraha* [Gaekwad's Oriental Series, vol. XL], Baroda, 1927), p. 59: *na sākāranirākāre tathatāṃ jñātum icchataḥ| madhyamā madhyamā caiva guruvāganalaṃkṛtā||* (The Tibetan translation is in the bsTan 'gyur, rGyud 'grel, vol. mi, fol. 122b–123a of the Peking edition.) On Advayavajra = Maitrīpāda see G. Tucci, *Tibetan painted scrolls*, p. 232.

[31] Sahajavajra, *Tattvadaśakaṭīkā*, fol. 182a of the Peking edition, vol. mi. (The text of Mi bskyod rdo rje's quotation differs slightly from the text found in the Peking edition.)

[32] The 1969 edition omits the word *sṅags*.

tration on the *Madhyamaka of the Alīkākāra–Cittamātra* (*sems tsam rnam rdzun gyi dbu ma*). (5b6–6a2)

The latter (iii) – which explains as the sense of the *Dohās* a cognition empty of the objective and subjective (*gzuṅ 'dzin gyis stoṅ pa'i šes pa*) that is self–cognitive (*raṅ rig*), self–luminous (*raṅ gsal*) and established in absolute reality (*don dam du grub pa*) – has been widely represented in India and Tibet by Phyag na (Vajrapāṇi) of India [33], Asu of Nepal [34], Kor Ni ru pa [35], et al.

However, many thinkers such as the philosopher Gro luṅ pa [36] did not agree to interpreting this system as the Madhyamaka; and they have refuted it, saying that various systems such as that of the proponents of non–mentation etc. are not consonant with the Madhyamaka system. It also turns out that basing themselves on the mere term [non–mentation], Sa skya Paṇ chen [37] as well as different bKa' gdams pas have developed a hostile attitude (*sdaṅ žen*) to the whole non–mentation cycle, which is the Reverend Maitrīpāda's very pure Dharma [38]; and in addition it turns out that there have lived persons whose disposition was to deny (*skur 'debs pa'i skal pa can*) the Great Brāhmaṇa's

[33] See *DṄ*, da, 2b (p. 842 f.); and ja, 15a (p. 384) which states that Phyag na was a direct disciple of Maitrīpāda. He was born in 1017 (*DṄ*, da, 13a [p. 866]). From him comes the sTod lugs of the Mahāmudrā (*DṄ*, da, 3a [p. 843] and 8b f. [p. 855 f.]). He settled in Nepal in 1066 according to Sum pa mkhan po's *Re'u mig* (= *RM*).

[34] *DṄ*, da, 3a (p. 843) states that Asu spent his life in the dBus province of Tibet. From him comes the sMad lugs of the Mahāmudrā (*DṄ*, da, 10a f. [p. 860 f.]). Cf. H. V. Guenther, *The Royal Song of Saraha* (Seattle and London, 1969), p. 16 f.

[35] (s)Kor Ni ru pa (Ni ru pa ta) was born in 1062 (*DṄ*, kha, 15b [p. 97]) and died in 1162 (*RM*). See also *DṄ*, ga, 11a (p. 124); and da, 7b (p. 853 f.).

[36] Gro luṅ pa Blo gros 'byuṅ gnas, an early bKa' gdams pa master, was the disciple of rṄog Blo ldan šes rab (1059–1109). He composed a *bsTan rim* and *Lam rim*. His bKa' gdams pa tradition was kept distinct from the Mahāmudrā teaching, a fact that differentiates it from sGam po pa's which merged with the bKa' brgyud pa and hence with the Mahāmudrā teachings.

[37] In his *sDom gsum rab dbye* (fol. 25b–26b) Sa skya Paṇḍi ta has criticized the 'Neo–Mahāmudrā' (*da lta'i phyag rgya chen po*) along with the rDzogs chen belonging to the Chinese system (*rgya nag lugs kyi rdzogs chen*) as being nothing but a version of the teachings of the Chinese Bhikṣu, i. e. the so–called Hva šaṅ (Ho–shang). See also the same author's remarks in his *Thub pa'i dgoṅs pa rab tu gsal ba*, fol. 49b–52b. In his *gNas lugs kyi mdzod* (fol. 33b) Kloṅ chen rab 'byams pa indeed concedes that a link exists between rDzogs chen and the teachings of the Hva šaṅ.

For 'Gos lo gŽon nu dpal's defence of the Mahāmudrā against Sa skya Paṇḍi ta's objections, see *DṄ*, ña, 141b–142a (pp. 724–5).

[38] The theory of *yid la mi byed pa* (*amanasikāra*) was identified by many Tibetan writers with the so–called 'Doctrine of the Chinese Hva šaṅ' discussed at the time of the Council of Tibet (bSam yas), and reputedly refuted by Kamalaśīla followed by the main lines of Tibetan Buddhism deriving from Śāntarakṣita and Kalamalaśīla.

[i.e. Saraha's] non-mentation doctrine-which is the meaning of the *Dohākoṣagīti* – as well as Maitrīpāda and Saraha the Elder and Younger (6a2–4).

The preceptive traditions (*bka' srol*) of practices (i) and (ii) belong in their entirety to Lord Mar pa and Mi la [ras pa] and have been practised. The middle one (ii) has in addition been concentrated on and practised by Lord sGam po pa, and its precept has accordingly been widely propagated.

Now, in the *Samādhirājasūtra* the Sugata has himself greatly praised this Lord [sGam po pa under the name of Candraprabha Kumāra(bhūta)] as the propagator of the Madhyamaka, which is the intended purport of the *Samādhirājasūtra.* To this Dharma–system of the Madhyamaka this tradition has therefore given the name of *Mahāmudrā*, the appellation Mahāmudrā being used for the Gnosis of Bliss and Emptiness (*bde stoṅ gi ye śes*) which has its source in Supreme Mantra [39]. And when its Madhyamaka–theory has arisen in the conscious stream, the realizing of natural awareness (*tha mal gyi śes pa mṅon du mdzad*) and the realizing of *dharmakāya* (*chos sku mṅon du byas*) are spoken of; and when it is understood that a sprout [for example] as substratum of properties (*chos can* = *dharmin*) as well as dichotomic construction (*vikalpa*, relating to this substratum) are not established apart from *dharmatā*, this is termed the appearing of dichotomic construction as *dharmakāya.* This theory and meditative realization (*lta sgom*) is then extolled as very necessary, being the counteragent that removes the continued presence of latent tendencies towards discursive development (*spros pa'i bag ñal*: *prapañcānuśaya*) and of turbulence (*gnas ṅan len*: *dauṣṭhulya*) when there has arisen the most excellent experience of the Gnosis of Bliss and Emptiness belonging to Mantra. So, according to the instruction, it serves completely to eradicate all obscuration (*sgrib pa* = *āvaraṇa*), being like the medicinal substance called *dkar po chig thub* for example [40] (6a5–b3).

[39] *mtshan gsaṅ sṅags bla med nas 'byuṅ ba'i bde stoṅ gi ye śes la phyag chen du grags pa'i phyag chen de'i miṅ du 'dogs par mdzad pa.*

Cf. *DṄ*, ña, 141b–142a (pp. 724–5), and na, 49a–b (p. 977) on the applicability of the term *mahāmudrā*, which belongs to the Mantra–system, to a Sūtra–system such as the Madhyamaka. See also below, fol. 7a–b. It may be recalled that Maitrīpāda's (Advayavajra's) works which touch on the Madhyamaka are included in the rGyud 'grel section of the bsTan 'gyur, and not in the Madhyamaka section.

[40] The *dkar po chig thub* of which Mi bskyod rdo rje speaks here and below has been identified by Sa skya Paṇḍi ta with the 'simultaneist' (*cig car pa*) doctrine brought to Tibet at the time of Khri Sroṅ lde btsan by the Chinese Ho–shang(s). See his *Thub pa'i dgoṅs pa rab tu gsal ba*, fol. 48b, 50a. The word *dkar po chig thub* refers to a plant used in the Tibetan pharmacopoeia.

[Mi bskyod rdo rje here goes on to allude to the Vajrayānist dimension of this Madhyamaka, with reference being made to the preliminary character of tranquillity and insight pertaining to the third and fourth Consecrations (*dbaṅ* = *abhiṣeka*) and the *dpe don gyi ye šes* and to the need in addition for perfect *brda don* for the achievement of comprehension, and also to the nature of connascent Bliss (*sahajānanda*) as the theme of an exchange between Lord Phag mo gru pa and first the Master Sa skya pa and then later Lord sGam po pa[41] (6b3–b6).]

In a logion of 'Bri guṅ pa chen po[42] it is declared that the *Mahāmudrā* in our system (*kho bo'i lugs kyi phyag rgya chen po*) surpasses the four Ānandas (*dga' ba*), that it is superior to Luminosity (*'od gsal* = *prabhāsvara*), and that it is untouched by the three great factors (*chen po gsum gyis ma reg pa*)[43]. For theory and meditative realization (*lta sgom*) arise in equilibrium in the conscious stream, so that this becomes the supreme counteragent against discursive grasping (*spros 'dzin gyi gñen po*) that posits as inferior the *saṃvṛtisatya*, the conditioned (*saṃskṛta*), the adventitious (*āgantuka*) and the *dharmin*, but as superior the *paramārthasatya*, the unconditioned, nature (*raṅ bžin*) and *dharmatā*. And unless it removes such discursive development positing something superior (*mchog 'dzin gyi spros pa*: *parāmarśa–prapañca*), like a medicine working as poison theory and meditative realization free from discursive development would be affected by discursive developement. With this in mind the Lord [Buddha] has then affirmed that the view of a self as large as Sumeru were better than a dogmatic view of non–self[44] (6b6–7a3).

With reference to this particularity of the Dharma–system of the Madhyamaka, therefore, Jñānakīrti has written in his *Tattvāvatāra* that when

[41] See *DÑ*, ña, 68b (p. 558–9) for details on the meeting of Phag mo gru pa (1110–1170) with, first, the *bla ma* Sa chen Kun dga' sñiṅ po (1092–1158) and, later, with sGam po pa.

[42] See above, p. 4.

[43] See dBon po Šes rab 'byuṅ gnas (1187–1241), *Dam chos dgoṅs pa gcig pa'i gžuṅ*, vi (ed. D. Tsondu Senghe, Bir, 1977, fol. 5a, in *dGoṅs gcig and bsTan sñiṅ texts*). See also dbon po Šes rab 'byuṅ gnas *Dam chos dgoṅs pa gcig pa'i rtsa tshig rdo rje'i gsuṅ brgya lṅa bcu pa*, vi.8 (reprinted under the title *dGoṅs gcig yig cha*, Bir, 1975), fol. 9b7; and Rig 'dzin Chos kyi grags pa (17th century), *Dam pa'i chos dgoṅs pa gcig pa'i rnam bšad luṅ don gsal byed ñi ma'i snaṅ ba* (reprinted in *'Bri guṅ pa Texts*, Volume II, by S. W. Tashigangpa, Leh, 1972), fol. 36a ff. In these sources the expression *chen po gsum* refers to the *dbu ma chen po*, *phyag rgya chen po*, and *rdzogs pa chen po*. According to Koṅ sprul Blo gros mtha' yas, *Šes bya kun kyab*, III, fol. 204a–b, there is a correlation between the *chen po gsum* and *rim skyes* (the progressive method), *thod rgal* (the skipping method) and *cig car* (the simultaneous method).

[44] See *Kāśyapaparivarta* (ed. A. von Staël–Holstein), § 64 (quoted in Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* xiii.8).

a person of superior faculties applying himself to the Pāramitā realizes in medition both tranquillity (*ži gnas* = *śamatha*) and insight (*lhag mthoṅ* = *vipaśyanā*), and when even on the stage of the ordinary worldling he is certainly endowed with the Mahāmudrā, this is the sign of unfailing perfect understanding (*yaṅ dag par rtogs pa phyir mi ldog pa'i rtags ñid*) [45]. And in his *Commentary on the Tattvadaśaka* Sahajavajra has mentioned the possession of three particularities, viz. being essentially Pāramitā, being in conformity with Mantra, and being termed Mahāmudrā [46]. For conferring experiential guidance (*myoṅ khrid*) in this Dharma-system of the Mahāmudrā, the Consecration (*dbaṅ bskur ba*: *abhiṣeka*) of Mantra is not carried out. And while the direct teaching (*dṅos bstan*) of this Mahāmudrā is the Madhyamaka of non-discursive Emptiness pertaining to the Sūtra-system (*mdo lugs*), there is taught implicitly (*šugs las*) the ordinary and extraordinary ultimate *sugatagarbha* that constitutes the profound sense of Sūtra and Mantra. It is, then, in consideration of this that Lord sGam po pa, Śrī Phag mo gru pa, 'Jig rten gsum gyi mgon po 'Bri guṅ pa and other masters have declared that our Mahāmudrā treatise is the *Mahāyānottaratantra-Śāstra* composed by Bhagavat Maitreya [47] (7a3-b2).

With this is mind rGod tshaṅ pa [48] and his disciple have declared that the initiators of this reaching of the Mahāmudrā are the Great Brahman [Saraha] and Nāgārjuna [49], the Great Brahman having taught the Mahāmudrā under the cataphatic aspect (*sgrub phyogs nas*) and Lord Nāgārjuna under the apophatic aspect (*dgag phyogs nas*).

The great Lo tsā ba gŽon nu dpal (1392-1481) – the tutor of the fourth bearer of the Žva dmar diadem [50] – has accordingly stated: 'This line known as the *dPal dvags po bka' brgyud* is a transmission of the sense (*don*) rather than of the letter (*tshig*); the sense is constituted

[45] Jñānakīrti, *Tattvāvatāra*, fol. 43b5 (Peking ed., with variant readings differing from Mi bskyod rdo rje's quotation). Cf. *DṄ*, ña, 142a (p. 725). On Jñānakīrti's views, see also Tenzin Gyatsho (Dalai Lama XIV) and J. Hopkins, *Tantra in Tibet* (London, 1977), p. 73 etc.

[46] Cf. *DṄ*, ña, 142a (p. 725).

[47] Cf. *DṄ*, ña, 141b (p. 724). On Maitreya, to whom the *Ratnagotravibhāga* is ascribed, as a *bhagavant* – in other words a *buddha* – see our *Théorie du tathāgatagarbha et du gotra*, pp. 52-53. Mi bskyod rdo rje returns to the question further on in his discussion of the interrelationship between the Madhyamaka of the Sūtra-system and the Madhyamaka of the Mantra-system (fol. 24a f.).

[48] On rGod tshaṅ pa mGon po rdo rje (1189-1258?), see *DṄ*, ña, 122a f. (p. 680 f.).

[49] Cf. *DṄ*, da, 2a (p. 841). See also *DṄ*, ña, 142a (p. 725), where rGod tshaṅ pa is said to have connected the Mahāmudrā of the Prajñāpāramitā also with Maitrīpāda.

[50] Chos grags ye šes (1453-1524).

by the lineal transmission of comprehension (*rtogs pa'i brgyud pa*) of the immaculate Mahāmudrā, the superior (*guru*) from whom comprehension of the Mahāmudrā is obtained receiving the name of *rtsa ba'i bla ma*' [51]. We approve this impartial statement. With respect to the Mahāmudrā, however, the Mahāmudrā of ultimate reality (*gnas lugs*) on the one hand and of Bliss and Emptiness (*bde stoṅ*) on the other have been taken to constitute the separate purport of Sūtra and Mantra; and we have already refuted elsewhere the statement maintaining that the former is superior to the latter Mahāmudrā and is the doctrine of the Precious bKa' brgyud since this statement is altogether wrong. Thus, although according to the early (or: Mantra) [52] system there exists no separate instruction on the Mahāmudrā different from the Six Dharmas (*chos drug*) [of Nāropa], those who follow this lineal transmission, being aware of this implication of the matter (*don gi dbaṅ*), have distinguished between an instruction (*khrid*) they hold to be of the Six Dharmas and one they hold to be of the Mahāmudrā (7b2–8a1).

In addition to this Precious bKa' brgyud, the Dharma–system in question has had very many propagators in Tibet. Thus, as forms of this Dharma–system there exist the three teachings – the earlier, the later and the intermediate – of what is renowned as the Good Dharma Calming Ill (*dam chos sdug bsṅal ži byed*) transmitted by the Reverend D a m p a from India [53], and specially those Mahāmudrā traditions communicated to the Bodhisattva K h r o p h u L o t s ā b a (1173?–1225) by numerous scholars and adepts of India such as the great adept M i t r a Y o g i [54] and the great Paṇḍit Ś ā k y a ś r ī (?–1225) [55]. The portion of that Mahāmudrā transmitted later, after the arrival in Tibet of the great Paṇḍit V a n a r a t n a (1385–1468) [56], to the great Lo tsā ba B y a m s p a g l i ṅ p a, to the great Lo tsā ba g Ž o n n u d p a l, to K h r i m s k h a ṅ L o c h e n [57] and to others also belongs to this Dharma–system (8a1–3).

The single burden (*don po gcig*) of the Dharma has thus been given

[51] *DṄ*, ña, 141b (p. 724). Cf. *DṄ*, da, 2a (p. 840–1); and na, 49a–b (p. 976–7).

[52] The 1969 ed. reads *sṅar lugs*, but the 1975 ed. has *sṅags lugs*.

[53] Cf. *DṄ*, na, especially fol. 49a (p. 976), on the link between the Ži byed doctrine and the Mahāmudrā.

[54] On Mitrayogi/Mitradzoki, a contemporary of Khro phu Lo tsa ba, see *DṄ*, pha, 12a f. (p. 1030 f.).

[55] This is Śākyaśrībhadra, the great Kashmirian Paṇḍit known in Tibet as Kha che paṇ chen. On his dates see our *Life of Bu ston Rin po che*, Rome, 1966, p. 42 n.l.. On the date of his disciple Khro phu Lo tsā ba's birth see *op. cit.*, p. 14 n. l.

[56] On Vanaratna see e.g. *DṄ*, tha, 21a f. (p. 797f).

[57] The 1969 ed. reads: Khrus khaṅ Lo chen.

concordant expression by different persons. But masters of the Sa [skya] and dGe [lugs] as well as Bo [doṅ] and Dol [bu pa] have asserted that this Mahāmudrā theory and practice of the Precious bKa' brgyud only is the theory and meditative realization (*lta sgom*) of the Hva šaṅ, whereas this has not been asserted of the system of other excellent persons [58]. How is this known? In reply it has been suggested that the working only (*phrin las tsam*) of the Precious bKa' brgyud having been transmitted, it was not available to others; and so they have not [59] made such an assertion. This is, however, not correct. Indeed, it has been stated [by the Buddha] that among the four recourses (*rton pa* = *pratisaraṇa*) *dharma* rather than an individual (*pudgala*) is to be had recourse to; but there has been a deviation from this principle because of hostility [on the part of some masters to the Mahāmudrā of the Precious bKa' brgyud] (8a3–5).

After Lord sGam po pa the lineal transmission of this Dharma from Dus gsum mkhyen pa is accordingly the same [as above] (8a5–6).

1.1.2. The transmission from Jo bo Dīpaṃkara[śrījñāna, Atiša] (*c.* 982–1054).

From the preceptor Nāga, Āryadeva, Candrakīrti, and the Elder and Younger 'Vidyākokila' (Rig pa'i khu byug che chuṅ) [60] this second transmission reached Jo bo Atiša. From him it passed on to the Kalyāṇamitra sTon pa chen po [i. e. 'Brom ston rGyal ba'i 'byuṅ gnas, 1005–1064], and then to the latter's disciple sPyan sṅa ba [Tshul khrims 'bar, 1033/1038–1103] and to Bya yul pa (1075–1138) [61]. From many bKa' gdams pa masters Lord sGam po pa then heard it.

Alternatively: from Bu to ba [= Po to ba] [62] it passed to the great sage Ša ra ba [63], who then handed it down to the glorious Dus gsum mkhyen pa [64]. After the latter the lineal transmission is the same as the one already indicated (8a6–b1).

[58] Mi bskyod rdo rje turns below to the opinions of the Jo naṅ pa, Šākya mchog ldan, Bo doṅ and Tsoṅ kha pa on the relation between the Sūtra and Mantra systems.

[59] There is no negative particle here in the 1969 ed.

[60] Rig pa'i khu byug (= *Vidyākokila) is/are often mentioned as a link/links in the Madhyamaka line between Candrakīrti and Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna. A *Vidyākokila is reported to have been a teacher of Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna; see *DṄ*, ca, 2a (p. 243); *rNam thar rgyas pa*, fol. 4b–5a, 7a, 9a, 10a.

[61] See also below, fol. 126b ff.

[62] On Po to ba (1031?–1105) see *DṄ*, ca, 11a f. (p. 263 f.).

[63] On Ša ra ba/Šar ba pa (1070–1141) see *DṄ*, ca, 15a f. (p. 271 f.).

[64] On Dus gsum mkhyen pa as a disciple of Ša ra ba, see *DṄ*, ña, 32b (p. 475).

Now the question arises whether the precepts (*bka'*) of the Madhyamaka having the name of Mahāmudrā transmitted from the Reverend Maitrīpāda and the precepts of the Madhyamaka transmitted from Jo bo [Atiša] are both the same Dharma–System.

Our reply is that there is no difference in purport. In the latter preceptive tradition, however, fixation (*gtan la phab pa*) takes place by means of constructive analysis (*rtog dpyod*); and there is equalizing concentration (*mñam par 'jog pa*) through discriminative knowledge (*šes rab = prajñā*) where some clear image (*gsal snaṅ*) is achieved in the aspect of non–implicative exclusion–negation (*med par dgag pa'i cha*). But in the former preceptive tradition fixation takes place with the discriminative knowledge of constructive analysis being entirely eliminated, like fire when its fuel is spent; and there is equalizing concentration in that which involves neither negation nor affirmation (*dgag sgrub gaṅ gi'aṅ don can ma yin pa žig*). Such is the difference between the two preceptive traditions.

So, when Lord sGam po pa once brought to completion the theory and meditative realization of the tranquillity and insight (*ži lhag*) of the Madhyamaka according to the bKa' gdams pa system, and when having come to Mi la [ras pa] he presented him with this comprehension (*rtogs pa*) [65], Mi la explained to him that, good though all this was, in the aspect of tranquillity (*ži gnas = śamatha*) it did not go beyond the causal condition for the higher spheres (*khams goṅ gi rgyu*), and that in the aspect of insight (*lhag mthoṅ = vipaśyanā*) all was in danger of falling into the four pitfalls of Emptiness (*stoṅ ñid šor sa*) [66]. Nevertheless, even though this serves as a counteragent against some part of the positing of an entity (*dṅos 'dzin*), such as positing as real (*bden 'dzin*), one is fettered because of the danger of even all this quite good theory and meditative realization becoming the *jñeyāvaraṇa* since one is unable to eradicate all positing of extreme positions (*mtha' 'dzin*) [67]; and, if fettered, there is then no difference between being fettered by an iron chain or a

[65] This event is placed in 1110 in Sum pa mkhan po's *Re'u mig*.

[66] On the *šor ba bži* see dBon po Šes rab 'byuṅ gnas, *op. cit.* (note 43) vi.9, fol. 9b–10a, and Rig 'dzin Chos kyi grags pa, *op. cit.*, (note 43), fol 39b ff.; cf. Koṅ sprul Blo gros mtha' yas, *Šes bya kun khyab*, III, fol 204a. The sources list the four *šor ba* as *šes bya'i gšis la šor ba* (i.e. *chos thams cad stoṅ par 'dzin pa gšis la šor ba*), *rgyas 'debs su sor ba* (i.e. *snaṅ ba la stoṅ ñid du blos bzo ba*), (*stoṅ ñid lam du byas nas 'bras bu phyis dus su re ba spaṅ gñen dbyer med du ma šes pa'i*) *gñen por šor ba*, and (*stoṅ ñid kyi go ñams cuṅ zad thob pa na de kas chog par bzuṅ ste bsags sbyoṅ gi rgyun gcod pa stoṅ ñid*) *lam šor ba*. See also Sa paṇ, *Thub pa'i dgoṅs pa rab tu gsal ba*, fol. 50b (who speaks first of a *phyag rgya chen po gšis la šor ba*, and then of a *bsgom du šor ba* instead of a *gñen por šor ba*).

[67] Cf. *DŇ*, da, 2a–b (p. 840–1).

golden chain. Later Lord sGam po pa declared that he would have risked birth as a denizen of the sphere of the Long-lived Gods had he not met the very reverend Mi la. So runs the report (8b1–6).

1.1.3. The transmission from Pa tshab Lo tsā ba [Ñi ma grags] (1055–?).

From Candrarkīti this third transmission passed to his direct disciple Mañjuśrīkīrti[68] and then on to Devacandra, the Brahman Ratnavajra[69], Parahita[70], [Ma]Hasumati[71], Pa tshab Lo tsā ba[72], and Lord Dus gsum mkhyen pa[73]. After him the line of transmission is the same [as the one already indicated] (8b6–9a1).

Now the question arises as to whether this Dharma-system of the Madhyamaka and the Dharma-system of the Madhyamaka transmitted from Jo bo [Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna] are both the same.

Not only are they identical but the terms amount to the same. Still, in this [third transmission of the Madhyamaka] Madhyamaka theory is fixed (*gtan la phab pa*) by means of inference based on learning (*thos byuṅ rjes dpag*: *śrutamaya-anumāna*), and there then predominates equalizing concentration (*mñam par 'jog pa*) through discriminative knowledge relating to the object to be correctly cognized that has been fixed in this way (*de ltar phab pa'i gžal bya'i don*). But in the other transmission [descending from Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna] fixation is achieved through all kinds of reasoned knowledge deriving from learning, reflection and meditative realization (*thos bsam sgom pa'i rig pa*[74] *mtha' dag*), and then there is

68 A Mañjuśrīkīrti is reported to have been a teacher of Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna; see *rNam thar rgyas pa*, fol. 9b. He is evidently the author of the commentary on the *Samādhirājasūtra* (the *Kīrtimālā*), and perhaps also the author of the *Mañjuśrīnāmasaṃgītiṭikā*.

69 On the Kashmiri Brahman Ratnavajra – the father of Mahājana, the grandfather of Sañjana/Sajjana (a teacher of rÑog Blo ldan šes rab, 1059–1109), the great grandfather of Sūkṣmajana (a collaborator of Pa tshab Ñi ma grags, 1055–?), and the teacher of Rin chen bzaṅ po (958–1055) – see J. Naudou, *Les bouddhistes kaśmīriens au Moyen Age* (Paris, 1968), pp. 139 f., 174 f.

70 Parahita(bhadra?) – a disciple of Ratnavajra and the author of a Vivṛti on Nāgārjuna's *Śūnyatāsaptati*, which he translated into Tibetan together with gŽon nu mchog – was a teacher of rÑog Blo ldan šes rab and a collaborator of Zaṅs dkar Lo tsa 'Phags pa šes rab. Cf. J. Naudou, *op. cit.*, p. 182–3.

71 Hasumati seems to be a shortened form of Mahāsumati. He was a collaborator of Pa tshab Ñi ma grags in revising the Tibetan translation of Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās* and in translating Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā*.

72 (s)Pa tshab Ñi ma grags (1055–?). This is the lineage given in *DÑ*, cha, 8b (p. 344).

73 According to *DÑ*, ña 32b (p. 475), Dus gsum mkhyen pa was a disciple not only of Šar ba pa, who was a supporter and auditor of Pa tshab Lo tsa ba (*DÑ*, ca, 15a; p. 272), but also of Pa tshab himself.

74 The 1969 edition reads *rigs pa*.

equalizing concentration through discriminative knowledge without objectification (*dmigs pa*) relating to a sensory object to be correctly cognized that has been fixed in this way (9a1–3).

In consideration of the degree of superiority or inferiority relative to each other of the forms of discriminative knowledge that derive from learning, reflection and meditative realization – and which constitute the instrument establishing (*sgrub byed*) *madhyamaka* – and also in consideration of whether there is an object to be rightly known (*gžal bya*) – which constitutes the object to be established (*sgrub bya*) – some philosophers like rMa bya ba have said that there is a difference of superior and inferior degree between these two systems. Thus, between the Mādhyamika who establishes a [real] object (*don*) with respect to *madhyamaka* and the one who establishes [only] pragmatic usage (*tha sñad sgrub par byed pa*), they have considered the Mādhyamika establishing a [real] object to be *not* the best; and the Mādhyamika establishing pragmatic usage in order to prevent erroneous constructions (*log rtog*) without, however, establishing a [real] object they have considered to be the best. Also, with regard to discriminative knowledge comprehending the object to be established – *madhyamaka* or Emptiness – they have distinguished between an inference (*rjes dpag*) as the valid means of right knowledge (*tshad ma*) and a reasoned cognition (*rigs šes*) as the valid means of right knowledge [75] (9a3–5).

Now, with respect to the way of achieving theory and meditative realization, what is the difference thus brought about between Jo bo's system and Pa tshab's system?

As to the teaching there is no difference. But there is one based on the greater or lesser capacities (*skal ba*) in energy and discriminative knowledge of persons (*gaṅ zag*) applying themselves to the sense (*don*) of the Madhyamaka. Still, it is not altogether impossible for a follower of Pa tshab to achieve theory and meditative realization in accordance with Jo bo's Madhyamaka–system. Nor is it altogether impossible for followers of Jo bo to achieve theory and meditative realization in accordance with the Madhyamaka–system of Lord sGam po pa (9a6–b1).

1.2/3. The sources of the lineal transmission of the recitation tradition (*klag luṅ*) and the exegetical explication (*'bru sbyor 'god pa*) now current in Tibet.

Down to Pa tshab this lineal transmission is as already indicated

[75] On the rMa bya bas and the question of the function in the (Prāsaṅgika–) Madhyamaka of the *sgrub byed kyi tshad ma* and the *sgrub bya*, see our article on thesis and assertion in the Madhyamaka in E. Steinkellner and H. Tauscher (ed.), *Contributions on Tibetan and Buddhist Religion and Philosophy* (Proceedings of the Csoma de Körös Symposium of 1981, vol. 2), Wien, 1983, pp. 205–40, esp. pp. 230–31.

above. After Pa tshab it is as follows: Žaṅ Thaṅ sag pa[76], 'Brom dBaṅ phyug grags pa[77], Šes rab rdo rje[78], the two brothers (*mched*) bsTan tshul[79] and Grags ldan, bDe ba'i lha[80], Jo btsun[,] dBu ra ba[81], Šes rab dpal, Dar ma šes rab, Baṅ ston Šes (rab) rin (chen), bSod nams seṅ ge, Baṅ ston bSam (gtan) bzaṅ (po), Baṅ ston gŽon (nu) bsam (gtan), Thaṅ nag pa, bKra (šis) seṅ (ge), gŽon nu bzaṅ po, gSas khaṅ pa Chos grags, Thaṅ sag pa gŽon rgyal[82], rGyal mo roṅ pa chen po, Byams chen rab 'byams pa, Saṅs rgyas 'phel, 'Bum phrag gsum pa, and the excellent philosopher Karma phrin las pa[83]. I, the very least of the servants of the Karma tradition, was filled by the latter's Gracious Conferment (*bka' drin*). (9b1–4)

* * *

There now arises the question as to whether there exists a Dharma–system of the Madhyamaka belonging to the Mantrayāna which is different from the Madhyamaka Dharma–system of the great preceptor Nāgārjuna and his spiritual son [Āryadeva] together with their followers.

With respect to the aspect of freedom from discursive development (*spros bral gyi cha*) where once the neganda (*dgag bya*) – viz. the positing of extreme positions (*mthar 'dzin*) and the positing of discursive development (*spros 'dzin*) – have been stopped (*bkag pa*) there is no establishing of anything to be established (*bsgrub bya*), there is no difference. But there does exist a differential systematization (*'jog pa*) depending on whether there is or is not found some efficiency (*byed las*) of the *madhyamaka* that serves as the [yogic] instrumental path for the fixation (*gtan la 'bebs*

[76] See *DṄ*, cha, 8a (p. 343).

[77] sTod luṅs pa dBaṅ phyug grags (*DṄ*, ca, 14a; p. 269)?

[78] Šes rab rdo rje, the disciple of Šar ra ba (*DṄ*, ca, 20a; p. 284)?

[79] In its lineage of the *Prasannapadā* and *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya* transmitted through Žaṅ Thaṅ sag pa, *DṄ*, cha, 8a7 has sTan tshul (Roerich's Don–tshul ,p. 344, is presumably a misprint).

[80] *DṄ* cha 8a–b has Lu dbon Su ba de ba (?) (Roerich, p. 344, reads Su–kha–de–va).

[81] Jo btsun and dBu ra ba clearly figure as two persons in *DṄ*, cha, 8b1 (missing in Roerich's translation), but as one person in both prints of Mi bskyod rdo rje's text used here.

[82] Starting with this name *DṄ* differs, reading (cha, 8b2) Thaṅ sag pa bSod nams rgyal mtshan, rTse pa Kun dga' gžon nu, slob dpon Šākya gžon nu, Kun spaṅs gŽon nu rgyal mtshan, dMar ston gŽon nu rgyal mtshan, etc.

[83] Karma phrin las Phyogs pas rnam rgyal (1456–1539). On him see H. V. Guenther, *op. cit.* (n. 34), Introduction.

byed kyi thabs lam) of the foregoing; and in particular it depends on whether for the beginner–exercitant (*las dan po pa* = *ādikarmika*), in the absence of mental effort (*yid kyi rtsol ba*), there are or are not found the theory of Emptiness endowed with all excellent modes (*rnam kun mchog ldan gyi ston ñid kyi lta ba*) [84] spontaneously free from all discursive development through the utilization of further mystical [yogic] vital points that are secret (*gsan ba'i gsan gnad gžan bcins pa*) as well as the arising of Gnosis revealing this theory (*de rtogs byed kyi ye šes 'char ba*). This differential systematization depends moreover on whether there is or is not found the capacity (*las su byed pa*) in certain specific substrata (*chos can* = *dharmin*) of the *madhyamaka* to be the base (*gži*) on which discursive development is cut off. And when from the *dharmin saṃvṛtisatya* there has taken place a metaphorical transfer under the *dharmin*–name of *dharmatā–paramārthasatya* [85], differential systematization depends further on whether there is or is not then something to be attained in the form of the Fruit (*'bras bu*) of transmutation as the Kāya and Jñāna of Conjunction of the two Satyas [86].

This differential systematization I formerly comprehended, but without having the expository ability (*spobs pa*) to explain it because the intent (*dgons pa*) of Lord Ras pa chen po was somewhat withheld. The withholding of this intent having however been later resolved, this is explained here in its entirety [87] (9b4–10a3).

In addition, we have the following differing doctrines concerning the varieties of Madhyamaka theory in Sūtra and Mantra.

The Jo nan pa [Dol bu pa šes rab rgyal mtshan (1292–1361)] has maintained the following view [88]. The Madhyamaka of the Prāsan-

[84] On *sarvākāravaropetā śūnyatā* see our *Théorie du tathāgatagarbha et du gotra*, Paris, 1969, pp. 243, 253, 319, 351f.

[85] See above, fol. 6b1.

Like *śūnyatā*, *paramārtha* is in the Madhyamaka not a name that refers to a property–possessing thing (*chos can* = *dharmin*). Rather, it is nothing but a term (or metaterm) in philosophical usage for *dharmatā* = *śūnyatā*. See e.g. *MMK* xviii.7, 9–11; xiii.7–8; xxiv.18. Cf. also Bhāvaviveka, *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* iii.263.

[86] The 1975 edition reads *chos can kun rdzob bden pa las chos ñid don dam bden pa žes pa'i chos can žig gi min gis ñe bar btags nas de la bden gñis zun 'jug gi sku dan ye šes su gnas gyur gyi 'bras bu thob byar yod med kyis 'jog pa*. The 1969 edition reads at the end (fol. 10a6): ... *'bras bu'i cha 'ga' las thob par byar yod med kyis 'jog pa*. The English translation is tentative.

[87] The remainder of Mi bskyod rdo rje's commentary is devoted to this explanation. Because of the complexity of the terms and the philosophical and mystical concepts to which they correspond, the translation of this paragraph given here is only indicative.

[88] On the Jo nan pa doctrine and Dol bu/po pa, see our article in *JAOS* 83, 1963, p. 73 ff.

gikas' and Svātantrikas' Niḥsvabhāvavāda being Emptiness of self–nature (*raṅ stoṅ*: *svabhāvaśūnyatā*) – which is as insubstantial (*sñiṅ po med pa*: *asāra*) as the trunk of the plaintain tree and not permanent – it is therefore not the Madhyamaka theory taught in the last Cycle (*'khor lo*, of the Dharma) and in Mantra. This is because it is not Emptiness of the heterogeneous (*gžan stoṅ*: **para*[*bhāva*]*–śūnyatā*), which is the *paramārthasatya* that is unconditioned, permanent, self–existent (*raṅ byuṅ*) and beyond production in dependence (*rten 'brel las 'das pa*). Nevertheless, it is not the case that the theory and meditative realization of these two systems [of the Prāsaṅgikas and Svātantrikas both maintaining *svabhāvaśūnyatā* in contradistinction to the *gžan stoṅ*] were not taught by the Teacher [i.e. the Buddha], nor is it the case that exercising (*ñams su len pa*) in accordance with them is useless; for they serve simply to remove views of conceptual attachment (*žen lta*) that are opposed to this relative *svabhāvaśūnyatā* (*kun rdzon raṅ stoṅ*). However, the exercise of the theory and meditative realization in this [*raṅ stoṅ*] alone does not constitute supreme Emptiness leading to the highest good (*ṅes legs*: *naiḥśreyasa*) of Mahābodhi. This is because this Emptiness [of self–nature] is not Emptiness endowed with all excellent modes (*rnam kun mchog ldan gyi stoṅ ñid* = *sarvākāravaropetā śūnyatā*). (10a3–6)

Zi luṅ pa [Śākya] mChog ldan (1428–1507) has maintained the following view. When cutting off discursive development by theory relating to the Madhyamaka of both Sūtra and Mantra, there is no difference between the two with respect to non–implicative exclusion negation (*med pardgag pa* = *prasajyapratiṣedha*) where there is cut off production in terms of the four extremes (*mtha' bži*) of existence, non–existence [, both existence and non–existence, and neither existence nor non–existence with respect to all factors of existence] from *rūpa* to *sarvākārajñatā*. There does, however, exist the following difference when one exercises by means of mediative realization. [On the one hand,] in Mantra [89], the luminous Gnosis endowed with specific exclusively interiorized experience (*ye šes 'od gsal ba kha naṅ kho nar phyogs pa'i myoṅ ba khyad can*) – the ground of the negation (*dgag gži*) of things such as existence and non–existence – is Mantra–Madhyamaka with respect to being sustained by profound Mantric means (*sṅags kyi thabs zab mo*). And [on the other hand] the theory wherein experience derives from something even without being sustained by profound Mantric means is the Madhyamaka–theory that is superior to the Madhyamaka–theory of the Niḥsvabhāvavāda, for it is the supreme Madhyamaka–theory explained in the Final Dharma (*chos phyi ma*) [i.e. the *Ratnagotravibhāga–Mahāyānottaratantra* together with the *Dhar-*

[89] The words *sṅags su* are missing in the 1975 edition.

madharmatāvibhaṅga] of Bhaṭṭāraka Maitreya. The appelation Alīkākāra–Madhyamaka (*rnam rdzun dbu ma*) having been established for this system by both scriptural tradition and reasoning[90], it must be so designated; and it is not right for Tibetans to extend an appellation such as 'Advocate of the Alīkākāra–Cittamātra' (*sems tsam rnam rdzun pa*) to a *Cittamātrika. Indeed, Satyākāra and Alīkākāra are divisions respectively of the *Cittamātrikas and Mādhyamikas. The following differences are then observed. (i) The first corresponds to the difference constituted by the [Satyākāravādin–*Cittamātrikas'] accepting cognition (*rnam šes* = *vijñāna*) as truly established (*bden grub pa*), whereas the [Alīkākāravādin–Mādhyamikas] accept Gnosis (*ye šes* = *jñāna*) as truly established. (ii) Whereas the two schools agree in not accepting the objectively cognized and the subjective cognition as materially different (*gzuṅ 'dzin rdzas gžan*) with respect to an external object (*phyi don*), there exists the difference constituted by the [Satyākāravādins'] accepting, and the [Alīkākāravādins'] not accepting, the objectively cognized and the subjective cognition as materially different with respect to internalized cognition (*naṅ šes pa*). (iii) There is the difference constituted by the [Satyākāravādins'] accepting *abhūtaparikalpa* or the objective aspect (*gzuṅ rnam*) as truly established, and by the [Alīkākāravādins'] accepting this as being like an illusory projection (*sgyu ma lta bu* = *māyopama*). And (iv) there is the difference between the [Satyākāravādins'] accepting all that appears (*snaṅ ba*) as mind (*sems* = *citta*) and the [Alīkākāravādins'] accepting all that appears as *dharmadhātu*. Now the *dharmadhātu* in this [theory] is not to be taken to be the doctrine of the Niḥsvabhāvavāda holding non–implicative negation (*med dgag*) comparable to empty space; rather, it is to be taken to be naturally luminous mind (*sems raṅ bžin 'od gsal ba*). Since for the mind too there exist both the relative (*kun rdzob*) and the ultimate (*don dam*), it is to be taken as the latter of the two. And since there exists besides the difference between *vijñāna* appearing in the duality of objective and subjective cognitions (*gzuṅ 'dzin gñis snaṅ gi rnam šes*) and non–dual *jñāna* (*gñis med kyi ye šes*), it is to be taken to refer to the latter of these two (10a6–11a1).

The great Bo doṅ pa[91] has maintained the following view. For thorough analysis (*šin tu dpyad pa*), there is no difference at all with respect to the non–discursive theory (*lta ba spros bral*) of both Sūtra and Mantra; for in the case of all factors of existence belonging to both Saṃsāra and Nirvāṇa, no thing at all exists which is established as withstanding analysis (*dpyad bzod du grub pa*). For partial analysis (*cuṅ zad dpyad pa*), however,

[90] See above, fol. 5a–b.

[91] This may be Bo doṅ Phyogs las rnam rgyal (1375–1450 according to Sum pa mkhan po's *Re'u mig*).

the Mantra–Madhyamaka establishes what is to be attained – the three Kāyas (*sku*), etc. – by means of what is nature (*ṅo bo*), self (*bdag ñid*) and agent (*byed pa po*) possessing three special features: the *paramārtha-satya* established spontaneously in nature (*raṅ bžin lhun gyis grub pa'i don dam bden pa*) or the Yogic relative (*kun rdzob*) of the Vajrayānists, the psychical (*dvaṅs ma*) and the imperishable (*mi śigs*). And thus there exist also the psychical person as agent (*byed pa po'i dvaṅs ma'i gaṅ zag*), the insensate (*bems po*), etc.[92]. But in the case of non–analysis (*ma dpyad pa*) one proceeds [simply] in accordance with what is [generally] accepted [in usage] (*ji ltar grags pa*). Although this is postulated as having the nature of the psychical person (*dvaṅs ma'i gaṅ zag*), the agent in respect to *dharmas* (*chos kyi byed po*) and the self (*bdag po*), there nevertheless exists no truly real *dharma*–substance (*chos kyi bdag bden*); for one must accept the non–substantiality of the factors of existence (*dharmanairātmya*) pervading (in an ontic–logical nexus, *vyāpti*) all factors of existence (11a1–4).

Tsoṅ kha pa (1357–1419) from the East has maintained the following view. Between Sūtra and Mantra there is no difference of superior and inferior degree in Madhyamaka theory with respect to Emptiness, which is empty of true establishment established with respect to the sensory object itself, and unimposed by mental construction (*blo rtog pas phar bžag min pa'i yul raṅ ṅos nas grub pa'i bden grub kyis stoṅ pa'i stoṅ pa ñid*). There does, however, exist a very significant difference in degree between the Paths of Sūtra and Mantra inasmuch as the former does not comprise an instrument of comprehension (*rtogs byed*) of this theory through the Bliss of sensing the tangible of the Prajñā as the instrument for ascertaining it (*de ṅes byed śes rab ma'i reg bya tshor bdes*), whereas the latter does comprise such an instrument of comprehension[93]. This is because the absence [of this instrument] in the Sūtras makes perfect comprehension impossible (*ji lta bar rtogs mi nus pa*), so that it is impossible to overcome also the subtle obscuration to the knowable (*śes sgrib phra mo*: *jñeyāvaraṇa*). On the Mantra–Path on the contrary it is possible, through perfect comprehension due to this, to overcome even the subtle *jñeyāvaraṇa*. If in Awakening to Supreme Bodhi one does not augment the Sūtra–Path with the Mantra–Path, it will be impossible to attain Awakening by means of the Sūtra–Path alone. Even after his encounter with Mañjughoṣa Tsoṅ kha pa did not come to understand this crucial matter before he had made even greater spiritual progress through his

[92] See above, fol. 6b–7a.

[93] For a recent discussion of this, see Tenzin Gyatso (Dalai Lama XIV) and J. Hopkins, *Tantra in Tibet*, London, 1977, pp. 20 f., 47 f., 55 f., 60 f., 69 f., 73, 110 f., 134, 205, 212; and *The Yoga of Tibet*, London, 1981, pp. 41, 233.

subsequent practice of Withdrawal (*dben pa = viveka*) and so forth. As a consequence there was a difference, due to his first not possessing but later possessing complete spiritual perfection (*thugs dam rtsal rdzogs*), between the [earlier] period when he composed his *sṄags lam rim* [i.e. the *sṄags rim chen mo*] and the [later] period when he composed his comment clarifying the *Pañcakrama* (*Rim lṅa gsal sgron*) [94]. Of these two works it is, then, only in his *Rim lṅa gsal sgron* that he finally brought out the profound and specific details in the sense of Mantra. This is what has been stated (11a4–b2).

In the final part of the introduction to his comment on Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra* Mi bskyod rdo rje critically discusses and rebuts these four opinions on the relationship between Sūtra–Madhyamaka and Mantra–Madhyamaka ascribed to Dol bu pa (fol. 11b2–13b3), Śākya mchog ldan (fol. 13b3–27b4), Bo doṅ pa (fol. 27b4–30b6), and Tsoṅ kha pa (fol. 30b6–32b5). This he does with a view to establishing the Karma bKa' brgyud doctrine of the Madhyamaka in relation to the Mahāmudrā and the Vajrayāna.

III.

Mi bskyod rdo rje was thus the representative – the 'holder of the lineage' (*brgyud 'dzin*) – of several lines of the Madhyamaka tradition handed down in the Karma branch of the bKa' brgyud pa school and also, through sGam po pa, in the bKa' gdams pa school.

His comment on the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, begun c. 1545 in his 39th year, can be presumed to contain Mi bskyod rdo rje's response to the searching questions and objections directed to him by Ser byes rje btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan (1469–1546) in his *Kar lan Klu sgrub dgoṅs rgyan*. This last work by a follower of the dGe ldan pa tradition of Tsoṅ kha pa was a close critique of Mi bskyod rdo rje's earlier comment on the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* together with Haribhadra's *Śāstra–vṛtti* (*'Grel pa don gsal* or '*Sphuṭārthā*'), where the doctrine of Prajñāpāramitā was evidently interpreted by Mi bskyod rdo rje in terms of the non–dual Gnosis (*gzuṅ 'dzin gñis med kyi ye śes*) in the frame of the Emptiness–of–the–other (*gžan stoṅ*) theory and according to the so–called *rnam rdzun lugs kyi dbu*

[94] The latter work is dated to Tsoṅ kha pa's 55th year whereas the *sṄags rim chen mo* is dated to his 49th year; Tsoṅ kha pa's comment on Candrakīrti's *Pradīpoddyotana*, finally, is dated to his 58th year. The first encounter of Tsoṅ kha pa and Bla ma dBu ma pa brTson 'grus seṅ ge with Mañjuśrī is dated much earlier, followed by a long period of meditative withdrawal. Cf. R. Kaschewsky, *Das Leben des lamaistischen Heiligen Tsoṅkhapa Blo–bzaṅ–grags–pa*, I, Wiesbaden, 1971, pp. 102, 106 ff., 190 f., 196.

ma chen po, or Great Madhyamaka of the Alīkākāra system, purportedly taught in the Hymnic Corpus (*bstod tshogs*) of Nāgārjuna[95]. Like Mi bskyod rdo rje in the introduction to his comment on the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, but in the rather different doctrinal and doxographical frame of the *raṅ stoṅ* doctrine, Chos kyi rgyal mtshan has also affirmed the agreement with Candrakīrti of Maitrīpāda, Mar pa and Mi la ras pa as well as of Tsoṅ kha pa (*Klu sgrub dgoṅs rgyan*, fol. 20b3 ff.); and he has examined (fol. 22a1 ff.) the passage from Maitrīpāda's *Tattvadaśaka* (verse 2) concerning the inapplicability of both the Sākāra (or Satyākāra) and the Nirākāra (or Alīkākāra) doctrines to the genuine Madhyamaka endued with the instructions of the Guru – namely Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva and Candrakīrti (fol 22a3)[96].

The record of the lines of transmission of the Madhyamaka in India and Tibet provided by Mi bskyod rdo rje is of interest to us in several ways. In the first place, like the vast majority of Tibetan accounts of a doctrine, it places great emphasis on the preceptorial lineages responsible for its transmission. Not only are such accounts of objective historical interest in themselves – in the manner of a *rgyal rabs* or *vaṃśāvalī* – but they provide our authors with an essential means of authenticating and validating a lineage and its teachings – be it in the Sūtra (*mdo lugs*) or the Mantra (*sṅags lugs*) system – and with an invaluable doctrinal and doxographical taxonomy that takes into account the multiple forms in which a teaching may have been handed down.

Secondly, Mi bskyod rdo rje's account brings out the links between the Śāstraic teaching of the Madhyamaka school and the other teachings with which it has come into intimate contact in the course of its history. In India there already existed close connexions between the Madhyamaka and the Mantrayāna/Vajrayāna; and an important line of Vajrayānist masters, beginning apparently in the 7th century with Nāgārjuna-pāda, is in fact credited with having spread the Madhyamaka and having com-

[95] This work by Mi bskyod rdo rje, listed by A khu Šes rab rgya mtsho in his *dPe rgyun dkon po 'ga' žig gi tho yig* (published by Lokesh Chandra, New Delhi, 1963, no. 11542), is unavailable at present. Our information on it is based on the *gSuṅ lan* (or *Kar lan*) *Klu sgrub dgoṅs rgyan* by Chos kyi rgyal mtshan (Žol par khaṅ edition of 1944; reprinted in Delhi in 1969).

A work on the *gžan stoṅ* theory the author of which is, according to its colophon, Mi bskyod dga' ba'i dbyaṅs is also connected with Mi bskyod rdo rje; in addition to the third Cycle of the Dharma, the *Ratnagotravibhāga* and the *dbu ma chen po* of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, it also quotes Candrakīrti (perhaps trying to bridge the *gžan stoṅ* and the *raṅ stoṅ* of Candrakīrti). Its title is *dBu ma gžan stoṅ smra ba'i srol legs par phye ba'i sgron me* (reprinted at Rum btegs in 1972).

[96] Cf. Sahajavajra, *Tattvadaśakaṭīkā*, fol. 182a.

posed treatises on it. Several such works are extant either in the original Indian languages (Sanskrit and Apabhraṃśa) or in Tibetan translations included in the bsTan 'gyur.

This connexion was then very well established by the 11th century when Maitrīpāda (*alias* Advayavajra) wrote works that clearly reflect the links between Madhyamaka and Mantrayāna[97]. The Karma bKa' brgyud line to which Mi bskyod rdo rje belongs regards Maitrīpāda as one of its main Indian forbears since he was the renowned master of Mahāmudrā (*phyag rgya chen po*) teachings. In Mi bskyod rdo rje's treatise the introduction to which is analysed in this article, reference has been made in particular to Maitrīpāda's *Tattvadaśaka* and to Sahajavajra's commentary on it.

Now the question whether the Mahāmudrā teachings agree with the Madhyamaka as taught for example in the *Samādhirājasūtra* as well as in the treatises by Nāgārjuna and his great Mādhyamika followers was a crucial one that has been discussed in Tibet since early times. Although Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna (Atiśa), who helped to introduce the Madhyamaka into Tibet in the middle of the 11th century, is reported to have also on occasion taught the *Dohās* and the *Grub sñiṅ* Cycle associated with the Mahāmudrā, and although he is even stated to have received teachings from Maitrīpāda himself, his great disciple 'Brom ston is nevertheless said to have refrained from spreading it widely since he feared for the good conduct of Tibetans[98]. In Tibet, Maitrīpāda's Mahāmudrā has not infrequently been regarded as a teaching that integrates the methods of both Sūtra and Mantra, a view that seems to be corroborated by Sahajavajra as quoted by Mi bskyod rdo rje[99]. However, on the basis of certain Indo-Tibetan traditions, 'Gos lo tsā ba gŽon nu dpal has chosen to distinguish the Mahāmudrā in question here from the Mantrayāna by postulating a Sūtra-method Mahāmudrā[100]. But, as seen above, any attempt at radically separating the two has been criticized by Mi bskyod rdo rje (fol. 7b–8a).

A source for this linkage of one Madhyamaka tradition with Mantra-

97 Matrīpāda's works on the Madhyamaka are, however, to be found not in the Madhyamaka section of the bsTan 'gyur but in the Tantra section.

98 See *DṄ*, da, 3a (p. 843–4). Another early bKa' gdams pa master is reported to have declared that, even though the Mahāmudrā conveys the meaning of the *Samādhirājasūtra*, one should nevertheless neither engage in the practice of the Mahāmudrā nor depreciate it. See *DṄ* ca, 13b (p. 268–9).

99 Fol. 6b, where Sahajavajra is quoted as saying that the Mahāmudrā is essentially Pāramitā but is at the same time in conformity with Mantra. In the same place Mi bskyod rdo rje has referred to Jñānakīrti's *Tattvāvatāra* (on which compare Tenzin Gyatso [Dalai Lama XIV], *Tantra in Tibet*, p. 73).

100 *DṄ*, ña, 141b–142a (p. 724–5); and na, 48b–49b (p. 976–7).

yāna was considered to be the *Ratnagotravibhāga–Mahāyānottaratantra-śāstra.* For a long period of time this important text had apparently fallen into oblivion and was passed over in silence by many of the great Indian Buddhist philosophers (in particular the masters of the Madhyamaka) despite the fact that it was well enough known already at the beginning of the 6th century – that is, the time of Buddhapālita and Bhāvaviveka – to be translated into Chinese by Ratnamati and Bodhiruci (Taishō 1611) [101]. Then, according to one account, it was recovered from an old Stūpa by Maitrīpāda in the 11th century [102]. And from this time onwards the *Ratnagotravibhāga* was to occupy a most prominent place in Buddhist thought in India, and especially in Kashmir where it was taught by Sajjana. It was above all Sajjana's disciples who were instrumental in introducing it in Tibet. Although the *Ratnagotravibhāga* as one of the so–called ' Five Dharmas of Maitreya ' (*byams chos sde lṅa*) has been included by the editors of the bsTan 'gyur in the Sems tsam ('Cittamātra') section of that collection, it has very often been classified in Tibet as a work that is in harmony with and even reflects Madhyamaka thought [103]. At the same time, however, the *Ratnagotravibhāga* has figured in Tibet – and evidently in India also – as what might be described as a typologically proto–Vajrayānist work, for it expounds theories such as the *tathāgatagarbha* and *buddhadhātu* – the non–dual Ground of both Saṃsāra and Nirvāṇa – and the natural luminosity of Mind which occupy a fundamental place in Vajrayānist thought too. As for the connexion between the *Ratnagotravibhāga* and (at least one of) the Mahāmudrā traditions, it is attested in Mi bskyod rdo rje and also, for example, in the *Deb ther sṅon po* of 'Gos lo tsā ba gŽon nu dpal [104]. And this link is as it were concretized in the dual rôle played by Maitrīpāda as both teacher of the Mahāmudrā and rediscoverer of the *Ratnagotravibhāga.* Just like the *Ratnagotravibhāga,* Maitrīpāda's Mahāmudrā, although it was held to be consonant with the Mantrayāna, is as we have just seen still stated not to have been classified by several authorities with the Tantras [105]. This Mahāmudrā has indeed been equated rather with the Prajñāpāramitā [106].

[101] See D. Seyfort Ruegg, *La théorie du tathāgatagarbha et du gotra,* pp. 32 f., 443; and *Le traité du tathāgatagarbha de Bu ston Rin chen grub,* Paris, 1973, p. 18.

[102] Cf. *DṄ,* cha, 9b (p. 347).

[103] See our *Théorie du tathāgatagarbha et du gotra,* p. 55 f.

[104] Vol. ña, 141b (p. 724).

[105] Cf. *DṄ,* na, 48b–49a (p. 977).

[106] See for example *DṄ,* ña, 141b–142a (p. 724–5). This has been questioned by Sa skya Paṇḍi ta Kun dga' rgyal mtshan in his *sDom gsum rab dbye,* fol. 25b ff.; cf. also the same author's *Thub pa'i dgoṅs pa rab tu gsal ba,* fol. 50b f.

Between Maitrīpāda and Ratnākaraśānti, a master of the Nirākāra- or Alīkākāra-Cittamātra doctrine, there existed a deep division according to Mi bskyod rdo rje, who recalls that Maitrīpāda is said to have defeated Ratnākaraśānti in a debate [107]. Indeed, as already noticed above, in his *Tattvadaśaka* Maitrīpāda has rejected the Nirākāravāda as well as the Sākāravāda. By Mi bskyod rdo rje this rejection is interpreted, in accordance with Sahajavajra's commentary, as a rejection of what is termed 'Cittamātra' (*sems tsam*, i.e. the main Mahāyānist school opposed to the Madhyamaka). At the same time, however, Mi bskyod rdo rje has stated that one of the three lines of transmission for the Mahāmudrā concentrated on the Madhyamaka of the Alīkākāra-Cittamātra (*sems tsam rnam rdzun gyi dbu ma*, fol. 6a); but this particular tradition he connects with [Vajra]pāṇi, Asu and (s)Kor Ni ru pa, who were among the principal transmitters of the Mahāmudrā [108]. Clearly, then, it is according to Mi bskyod rdo rje necessary to differentiate carefully between the Vijñānavāda- (or 'Cittamātra'-) type Nirākāra/Alīkākāra doctrine of Ratnākaraśānti – who attempted a synthesis of the Madhyamaka and the Vijñaptimātra which, in the form of the *rnam rig gi dbu ma*, was one of the sources of the *gžan stoṅ* theory – and a Madhyamaka-type Alīkākāravāda considered to be consonant with the Mahāmudrā of Maitrīpāda – who represented rather a synthesis of Madhyamaka and Mantrayāna [109]. This current of thought Mi bskyod rdo rje has then explicated following the *raṅ stoṅ* theory of Candrakīrti in his comment on the *Madhyamakāvatāra*. This is despite the fact that Mi bskyod rdo rje had apparently himself previously adhered to the *gžan stoṅ* in his commentary on the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* together with Haribhadra's *Śāstra-vṛtti* on it [110]. Mi bskyod rdo rje's approach in his commentary on Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra* may then very well represent his response to the criticism of his earlier work by Chos kyi rgyal mtshan in his *Klu sgrub dgoṅs rgyan* [111].

[107] Ratnākaraśānti may also, in addition to Atiśa, have had something to do with Maitrīpāda's expulsion from Vikramaśīlā for a breach of the Vinaya. See Nag tsho Tshul khrims rgyal ba, *rNam thar rgyas pa*, fol. 42b–43a.

[108] See for example the chapter on the Mahāmudrā in the *Deb ther sṅon po* (vol. da).

[109] Tāranātha in his *bKa' babs bdun ldan gyi brgyud pa'i rnam thar*, fol. 7b–8b (Grünwedel, p. 23 f.) has, however, made Maitrīpāda a disciple of Ratnākaraśānti; and he casts doubt on the report of a debate between the two masters. But Tāranātha – and the Jo naṅ pa school as a whole – belonged to a tradition that had close links with Ratnākaraśānti and his 'Vijñapti-Madhyamaka' (*rnam rig gi dbu ma*).

[110] See above, note 95, where another work on the *gžan stoṅ* theory connected with Mi bskyod rdo rje is also mentioned.

[111] Mi bskyod rdo rje seems in fact to wish to turn the tables on Tsoṅ kha pa and the dGe ldan pas by maintaining that it is their theory of *śūnyatā* that represents the (inferior)

Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna (Atiśa) was, for a time at least, the follower at Vikramaśīlā of Ratnākaraśānti [112], but he appears to have later abandoned this Vijñānavādin's Alīkākāravāda doctrine; and he has indeed described Candrakīrti's interpretation of the Madhyamaka as the most satisfactory of all [113]. As for Maitrīpāda, Atiśa's opposition to him on points of Vinaya–discipline is mentioned in several sources; and it is reported that he was one of those responsible for expelling Maitrīpāda from Vikramaśīlā for a breach of this discipline [114]. Now, in the kingdom of Western Tibet – where he arrived in 1042 in the company of Nag tso lo tsā ba Tshul khrims rgyal ba at the invitation of *lha bla ma* Ye šes 'od, of King 'od lde and of *lha btsun pa* Byaṅ chub 'od – one of Atiśa's first tasks was to combat certain deviant practices, such as *sbyor sgrol*, which were being spread in northwestern India and western Tibet by some self–styled Mantrins who were apparently under the influence of a putative Mahāmudrā teaching that seems, however, to have been an amalgam of Śaiva, popular magical and Buddhist elements. And a form of the Mahāmudrā is in fact explicitly mentioned in the *Bodhimārgadīpa–Pañjikā* (P, fol. 334b5 = D, fol. 289a5) – a text presented in the bsTan 'gyur as Atiśa's autocommentary on his *Bodhipathapradīpa* – as something to which such self–styled Mantrins unjustifiably laid claim [115]. At the same time, as already noted above, Atiśa is stated not to have completely neglected

Empty–of–the–other doctrine of *itaretaraśūnyatā* (*gcig la gcig med pa'i stoṅ pa ñid*) criticized in the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* (ii, pp. 74–75) and the *prādeśika-śūnyatā* (*ñi tshe ba'i stoṅ pa ñid*) criticized in the *Samādhirājasūtra* (ix 47). And Mi bskyod rdo rje therefore remarks that this theory of theirs is not fit to serve as a basis for the Path of liberation (fol. 331a–b, 338a–b). They are indeed accused of looking for their logical negandum (*rtags kyi dgag bya*) in quite the wrong place, i.e. elsewhere than in empty *dharmas* themselves (fol. 328b–329a). On the *itaretaraśūnyatā* and the *prādeśika–śūnyatā* see also fol. 344a. Cf. our *Théorie du tathāgatagarbha et du gotra*, p. 325 ff., and *Le traité du tathāgatagarbha de Bu ston Rin chen grub*, pp. 122, 126–8.

112 See e. g. the *rNam thar rgyas pa*, fol. 12a.

113 See Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna's *Satyadvayāvatāra* (cited above, n. 13).

114 See Tāranātha, *bKa' babs bdun ldan gyi brgyud pa'i rnam thar*, fol. 8a (Grünwedel, p. 23), as well as the *rNam thar rgyas pa*, fol. 12a and 43a. Atiśa's journey to Tibet has even been represented as a kind of atonement for the banishment of Maitrīpāda, who was in truth a Bodhisattva. See *rNam thar rgyas pa*, fol. 43a.

115 See D. Seyfort Ruegg, « Deux problèmes d'exégèse et de pratique tantriques », in *Tantrik and Taoist studies in honour of R. A. Stein* (*Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques* 20, 1981), pp. 212–26.

The *Bodhipathapradīpa* is stated to have been translated into Tibetan by the author himself together with the *žu chen gyi lo tsā ba* dGe ba'i blo gros at Tho liṅ in Žaṅ žuṅ; and the **Bodhimārgadīpa–Pañjikā* is stated to have been translated by the author Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna himself together with (Nag tsho) Tshul khrims rgyal ba. Doubts have, however, been expressed concerning the authorship of the *Pañjikā*.

the teaching of the Mahāmudrā in Tibet [116]. Moreover, he is reported to have received the *Ratnagotravibhāga* directly from Maitrīpāda, who had recently rediscovered it in an old Stūpa [117]. And as has been mentioned above, the doctrine of the *Ratnagotravibhāga* is connected not only with the *gžan stoṅ* theory but also with the Mahāmudrā by Indo–Tibetan traditions [118].

Against this background of complex, and indeed shifting, interrelationships and cross–currents we can better understand Mi bskyod rdo rje's juxtaposition of (i) a bKa' brgyud pa tradition of the Madhyamaka descending through sGam po pa from Nāropa and Maitrīpāda (the former of which is evidently the Six–Dharma tradition, and the latter a Mahāmudrā tradition); (ii) another quite distinct Madhyamaka tradition descending from Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna through sGam po pa, who combined the bKa' brgyud pa tradition of Mar pa and Mi la ras pa with the bKa' gdams pa tradition of Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna and his Tibetan disciples; and (iii) still another distinct Madhyamaka tradition which descended from Pa tshab lo tsā ba Ñi ma grags and represented in particular the Śāstra–tradition of the (Prāsaṅgika–) Madhyamaka in the sense that it was combined neither with any teaching belonging specifically to the Mantrayāna/ Vajrayāna nor with any other Sūtra (or Śāstra) doctrine that is not specifically Madhyamaka.

Finally, Mi bskyod rdo rje's introductory remarks on the traditions of the Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka are of special interest for the relationship between the Madhyamaka and Mantrayāna/Vajrayāna and the question whether, over and above the Dharma–system of Nāgārjuna and his great Mādhyamika followers, there exists a quite distinct – and even superior – Dharma–system of the Madhyamaka belonging not to the Sūtra–system (*mdo lugs*) and the Pāramitāyāna, but to the Mantrayāna. This problem has prompted much discussion and even controversy in the history of Indian and Tibetan Buddhist thought [119]. And it has a parallel in the question as to whether beside the Mahāmudrā teachings belonging to the Mantrayāna/Vajrayāna there exists a separate Mahāmudrā teaching which

[116] See *DṄ*, da, 3a (p. 843–4).

[117] Cf. *DṄ*, da, 3a (p. 843); and cha, 9b (p. 247).

Since Atiśa is however also reported to have expelled Maitrīpāda from Vikramaśīlā for a breach of the Vinaya (see above, n. 114), and since Atiśa's school preferred not to spread the Mahāmudrā teachings so closely associated with Maitrīpāda (see above, p. 1273), the statement that Atiśa could have received the *Ratnagotravibhāga* from Maitrīpāda has been questioned. Cf. Paṇ chen bSod nams grags pa (*RGV Ṭīk blo*, fol. 2b; see our *Théorie du tathāgatagarbha et du gotra*, p. 37).

[118] *DṄ*, ña, 141b (p. 724).

[119] See for example Sahajavajra, *Tattvadaśakaṭikā*, fol. 192a5 ff.

belongs to the Sūtra (or Pāramitā) system and is based *inter alia* on the *Ratnagotravibhāga–Mahāyānottaratantra* as a text representing a special tradition in the Madhyamaka.

It is to be noted that among the well-known and philosophically significant traditions of the Madhyamaka no reference has been made here in Mi bskyod rdo rje's classification of the transmission-lineages either to the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka descending in Tibet from Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla nor to the no less important Svātantrika (*raṅ rgyud pa*) Madhyamaka associated for example with rṄog lo tsā ba Blo ldan šes rab (1059–1109) and the great monastic seminary of gSaṅ phu Ne'u thog. And there is no allusion here either to Žaṅ Tshes spoṅ ba and Phya pa Chos kyi seṅ ge (1109–1169). The only master connected with this school mentioned is rṄog lo tsā ba's disciple Gro luṅ pa Blo gros 'byuṅ gnas; but this bKa' gdams pa master is mentioned in passing only, and not as a link in one of the lineages.

As for the Prāsaṅgika (*thal 'gyur ba*) Madhyamaka line, there is no mention of gTsaṅ nag pa, a disciple of Phya pa who later joined Pa tshab and became a representative in Tibet of Candrakīrti's school; and a certain rGya dmar ba, who evidently belonged to Pa tshab's school, is referred to only in passing. Next to Pa tshab Ñi ma grags (born in 1055) his disciple Žaṅ Thaṅ sag pa is, however, mentioned in the line of transmission of the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka in Tibet.

Equally remarkable is the absence of the line of Madhyamaka practice according to the *gžan stoṅ* theory represented by a senior contemporary of rṄog lo tsā ba, bTsan Kha bo che (born in 1021); this omission is very probably due to the fact that this tradition was not kept alive, as noted by 'Gos lo tsā ba, although a commentary on the *Ratnagotravibhāga* tentatively attributed to him apparently survived [120]. The fact that Mi bskyod rdo rje has included no lineage of the main *gžan stoṅ* tradition here is nevertheless highly noteworthy in view of his links with it at least in his earlier years, and despite the fact that he discusses the views of the Jo naṅ pas and Šākya mchog ldan [120a].

Since it cannot be said that Mi bskyod rdo rje knew nothing of these other Indo-Tibetan philosophical traditions of the Madhyamaka, their omission from the lineages of the Madhyamaka listed in the introduction to Mi bskyod rdo rje's commentary on Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra* can perhaps be best explained by supposing that Mi bskyod rdo rje was not heir to them through the Dvags po bka' brgyud line with which the

120 See, *DṄ* cha, 10a (p. 348).
120a See Addendum below, p. 1280.

work analysed in this paper is basically concerned. In other words, the absence of a Madhyamaka tradition here may be due less to strictly philosophical and doctrinal considerations than to the factor to which attention was drawn at the beginning of this paper, namely the overriding importance for the constitution and organization of the Madhyamaka in Tibet–at least in a school like that of the Kar ma bKa' brgyud pas – and possibly (if to a lesser degree) already even in India – of the preceptorial lineages which transmitted it.

Grounds for distinguishing in this manner between various currents of the Madhyamaka are provided by criteria that relate to both the forms and the contents of these traditions. Because the philosophical traditions in question are in fact often separated from each other by quite subtle doctrinal distinctions which are by no means easy to identify and isolate, in several cases it has been the demarcations formed by lines of transmission – the lineages – that have made it easiest for our authors to establish differences between them. The usefulness of such formal demarcations is especially great for a school (*chos lugs*) like Mi bskyod rdo rje's bKa' brgyud pa where – like the Sa skya pa school but in contrast to the dGe ldan pas /dGe lugs pas – several philosophical theories (*lta ba*) of the Madhyamaka have existed side by side.

Beside differences in philosophical content, accordingly, the preceptorial lineages into which the Tibetan schools have tended to articulate and classify a doctrine or textual corpus assist in defining the specific character and place of that doctrine or textual corpus for these schools. And in this way human and social factors linked with the transmission–lineages, no less than strictly philosophical criteria, furnish means for differentiating between various currents of thought [121]. Alongside the interest the Tibetans have regularly evinced in lineages – biological and spiritual – this circumstance helps therefore to account for the great importance attached by Mi bskyod rdo rje as well as other Tibetan authors to the lines of transmission in Indo–Tibetan traditions such as the Madhyamaka/dBu ma. And in the study of the Indo–Tibetan traditions such factors with their human, social and even psychological dimensions will have to be considered together with doctrinal and philosophical criteria on the levels of

[121] Such a situation is not peculiar to Tibet alone, and it appears to be quite old in the history of Buddhism. The ancient 'Śrāvaka' Nikāyas in fact appear not only as doctrinal schools in the strict sense, but also as Vinaya–orders and as communities transmitting particular recensions of the Canon, in other words as 'text–schools'. (See our article to be published in the Proceedings of the Buddhist Studies Symposium held at the Academy of Sciences in Göttingen in July 1982.)

learning (*thos pa = śruta*), reflective analysis (*bsam pa = cintā*) and meditative realization (*sgom pa = bhāvanā*). Here we may have something comparable in part to what are known today as ' knowledge traditions '. (March 1983).

Addendum. – Mi bskyod rdo rje's silence concerning the *gžan stoṅ* lineage of the Madhyamaka in the introduction to his commentary on the Madhyamakāvatāra (above p. 1278) and his turning away in this commentary from the position he had upheld in his earlier commentary on Prajñāpāramitā and the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* are all the more noteworthy since his predecessor, the third Karma pa Raṅ byuṅ rdo rje, is often considered to have been a *gžan stoṅ pa*, just like Mi bskyod rdo rje early in his life. (See Raṅ byuṅ rdo rje's short treatise entitled *De bžin gšegs pa'i sñiṅ po bstan pa.*) Koṅ sprul Blo gros mtha' yas has included Raṅ byuṅ rdo rje in his account of the *gžan stoṅ* traditions; see *Šes bya kun khyab*, II, fol. 276b (cf. also I, fol. 173a–b).

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CATEGORIES OF BUDDHIST TANTRAS

It is well known that the Buddhist tantras represent a bewildering variety of teachings, many of which are not only in conflict with what may be regarded as traditional Buddhist doctrine, but which are also in conflict, one with another, within the tantric tradition itself. In the past Indian and Tibetan scholars have attempted to produce some order from the resulting chaos by separating them into various categories, but the inevitably unsatisfactory nature of these is already suggested by the disputes which immediately arose between those who attempted thus to define them. It is not my intention in this short paper to participate in such disputes, but rather to approach the whole subject from a view–point, seldom if ever adopted by the traditional scholars, namely an historical one. According to traditional views all tantras are expressions of timeless absolute truth, and regarded in this way, their differences are difficult to resolve, apart from the general Buddhist theory that varieties of teaching were promulgated by Buddhas or Great Bodhisattvas as might be appropriate to the aptitudes of different kinds of living beings. However, when they are interpreted as types of teaching, which were produced in accordance with the conditions of religious theory and practice, as operative in different times and places, their differences are far more easily resolved, as they simply take their place within the whole pattern of Buddhist developments, which continued in India up to the last days of Buddhism in the land of its origin. Despite the far greater historical aptitude of Tibetan scholars, they still tended to treat the whole of the Buddhist heritage that they had received from India as a kind of timeless entity, and thus while they are clearly aware of the gradual historical progress which led to the conversion of their country to this imported religion, they do not appear to have applied chronological considerations to their actual interpretations of doctrine. One may note that the so called " Old Order " (*rNying–ma*) of Tibetan Buddhists, and in their own curious way even che "heretical " Bon–pos, preserve categories of tantras, which represent earlier arrangements of this complex literature, made at a time (the seventh century onwards)

when Tibet was as much open to Central Asian and Chinese Buddhist teachings as to the later Indian ones, and thus it is only within the terms of such cultural connections throughout a particular time–period, that their categories can be properly appreciated. On the other hand the later Tibetan Buddhist orders, which drew largely, indeed almost exclusively, on the Indian Buddhist materials available to them in eastern India, have adopted the general categories of tantras, as arranged according to the predilections on the tantric yogins of Bihar and Bengal. Thus we find the *yoga–* or *mahāyoga–tantras*, previously regarded as the highest category, relegated below the so called 'Tantras of Supreme Yoga' (*anuttarayogatantra*), which came to be recognized as the highest category.[1] Individual tantras of such a kind are certainly known of in the earlier period, when they are referred to as *yoginī–tantras* or *prajñātantras* (where *prajñā*, 'wisdom', stands for *yoginī* or feminine partner), but it is not yet suggested, as is certainly urged later, that tantras of this kind teach superior methods, which are not available to those who rely upon *yoga–tantras*. In this respect one may quote from the ordinance of Pho–brang Zhi–ba–'od, a royal monk–translator of Western Tibet, which was issued according to Samten Gyaltsen Karmay's calculation in 1092. Having listed all the various works which he regards as erroneous, he summarized his conclusions thus:

> "Those who have joined the community (*rab–tu byung–ba–rnams*) must observe the monastic rule (*vinaya*), and even if they practise the 'Mantra Lore' (*bka' gsabg–sngags*) they must keep to the monastic rule and not transgress it. Thus they may practise *kriyā–tantras*, *upa–tantras*, *yoga–tantras* and even the *Guhyaṣamāja* without breaking their vows. Although *prajñā–tantras* are excellent, there have been many breaches of monastic teachings because of ignorance of the true meanings of the enigmatic terminology, and so there is nothing adverse in simply not practising them." [2]

It is interesting to observe that Zhi–ba–'od, one of the chief promoters of the 'second diffusion' of Buddhism in Tibet, continues to use categories from the earlier period, as preserved by the rNying–ma Order: *kriyā*, *upa* (also written *upaya* or *ubhaya*),[3] *yoga* and in effect *mahāyoga*, for it was to this category that the *Guhyasamāja* belongs before it is transferred to the

[1] See for example Jeffry Hopkins, *Tantra in Tibet, the Great Exposition of Secret Mantra by Tsong–Kha–pa*, London 1977 or Lessing and Wayman, *mKhas–grub–rje's Fundamental of the Buddhist Tantras*, The Hague, 1968, especially pp. 250–71.

[2] See Samten G. Karmay, « An open letter by the Pho–brang Zhi–ba–'od », *The Tibet Journal*, 5 (1980), pp. 2–28; the extract is translated from the last paragraph on p. 19.

[3] Concerning the variants *upa*, *upaya* and *ubhaya*, see below in the text.

new ' highest ' category of *anuttarayoga-tantras*.[4] Rather less surprisingly the same categories occur in the list of the Nine Ways in a curious little text, probably written in the late 10th century and discovered amongst the Tun-huang materials:

> " If one asks what are the Nine Ways, they are:
> (i) the Way of Men, (ii) the Way of Gods, (iii) the Way of the Early Disciples, (iv) the Way of Solitary Buddhas, (v) the Way of Sūtras, (vi) the Bodhisattva Way, (vii) Yoga, (viii) Kriyā, (ix) Upaya.
> Yoga is of four kinds: Yoga, Mahāyoga, Anuyoga and Atiyoga.
> Kriyā is of four kinds, namely of Early Disciples, Solitary Buddhas, Sūtras and Bodhisattvas.
> Upaya is of four kinds, namely the result obtained by Early Disciples, by Solitary Buddhas, by Sūtras and by Bodhisattvas." [5]

This list is slightly disordered, as here *yoga* (viz. *yoga-tantras*) in their various classes are clearly intended as the highest category. It may help to clarify matters, if we list forthwith the rather better known ' Nine Ways ' of *rNying-ma-pas* and *Bon-pos*, setting them against the various religious grades which lay claim to a certain rather spurious orthodoxy.

The nine stages of the *rNying-ma-pas* and *Bon-pos* are presumably fixed as nine, simply because this number represents three times three, but there can have been nothing sacrosanct about it. Thus we may note the existence of yet another list of ' ways ' in a short work attributed to the eighth century Tibetan translator dPal-brtsegs, which has been usefully analyised by Professor Tucci.[6] His list comes to ten or even eleven stages. The Early Disciples are divided into Sautrāntikas and Vaibhāṣikas, and after the Solitary Buddhas, the Mahāyāna is divided into ' logic ' (*mtshan-nyid*) and the ' middle way ' (*dBu-ma*). Thereafter comes the six classes of tantras as formulated by the rNying-ma Order. Doubtless one could find other lists with major or minor variants, and it would seem clear that they were drawn up to explain the different forms in which Buddhist teaching was known to exist in various different times and places. Thus none of these lists, all productions of later Indian Buddhism, can claim to be more orthodox than the rest.

Dealing with the tantras alone, we note that many of the categories are

[4] Here one must refer to an important paper ' The Eighteen Tantras of the Vajraśe-khara/Māyājāla ' presented by Kenneth Eastman at the 26th International Conference of Orientalists in Japan, an extract of which was published in *Transactions of the International Conference of Orientalists in Japan*, xxvi, 1981, pp. 95–96. This work is now being reworked for later publication.

[5] See Joseph Hackin, *Formulaire sanscrit-tibétain du Xe siècle*, Paris, 1924.

[6] See his *Minor Buddhist Texts*, vol. II, pp. 137–39.

GRADES OF BUDDHIST PRACTICE

The Indo-Tibetan Tradition			*The Heterodox Tibetan Tradition (Bon)*
INDIA	1. Śrāvaka-yāna (Early Disciples)		TIBET: 1. Phyva-gshen theg-pa (Way of Prediction)
INDIA	2. Pratyekabuddha-yāna (Solitary Buddhas)		TIBET: 2. sNang-gshen theg-pa (Way of Exorcism)
			TIBET: 3. 'Phrul-gshen theg-pa (Way of Coercion)
			TIBET: 4. Srid-gshen theg-pa (Way of the *Bar-do*)
Tibetan Tradition resulting from the 2nd Diffusion	*rNying-ma Tradition*		
Bodhisattva-yāna	3. Bodhisattva-yāna		5. dGe-gshen theg-pa (Buddhist layman's way) 6. Drang-srong theg-pa (Buddhist monk's way)
Kriyā-yoga	4. Kriyā-yoga		
Caryā-yoga (or Ubhaya-yoga)	5. Upa-yoga		
Yoga	6. Yoga	6. Yoga and 7. Mahā-yoga	7. A-dkar theg-pa (Way of the White A)
Anuttara-yoga	7. Mahā-yoga 8. Anu-yoga	8. Anu-yoga	8. Ye-gshen theg-pa (Way of Superior gShen)
	9. Ati-yoga (= *rDzogs-chen*)		9. Bla-med theg-pa (Highest Way = *rDzogs-chen*)

The Indo-Tibetan tradition

(i) Items 1 and 2 are retained as part of the traditional Indian arrangement of 'ways' (*yāna*); they are not directly relevant to Tibetan Buddhist practice, as there are no so called Hīnayānists in Tibet.

(ii) The term *mahā-yoga* as used by the *rNying-ma-pas*, seems to derive from its earlier eighth and ninth century use where it is applied to some *yoga-tantras* in a laudatory manner, thus scarcely to be understood as a separate category.

(iii) The term *anu-yoga* may have been adopted by the *rNying-ma-pas* in order to create a category of tantras, which should rank at least equal with the *anuttara* class of later Indian tantric Buddhism. It is significant that the *Bon-pos* have devised an equivalent class with their *Ye-gshen theg-pa* (described in my *Nine Ways of Bon*, pp. 190–225).

The heterodox Tibetan tradition

(iv) Items 1 – 4 represent Tibetan 'folk religion', which is as much practised by orthodox Tibetan Buddhists as by *Bon-pos*, although the former take no account of it as special ways (*yāna*). This one would scarcely expect of them in any case.

(v) Items 5 and 6 represent a separation of laymen and monks. Such a separation of the two categories is often made in Indian Buddhism, and they are even listed as separate *yāna* among several others in the list already quoted above.

(vi) It is interesting to note that the *Bon-pos* seem to remain unaware of the existence of the two 'lower' classes of tantras. The reason for this may be twofold: (a) they were not categorized as tantras until *yoga-tantras* became generally known from the eighth century onwards, and (b) they were then already surpassed in useful content with the result that the *Bon-pos* took no account of them.

common to all the lists. Thus there are tantras known as *kriyā*, *carya*, and *upa* (or *ubhaya* or *upāya*), which as we shall see below, operate on a 'Three Buddha-Family' structure, and *yoga-tantras* and *mahāyoga-tantras*, which operate on a 'Five Buddha-Family' structure, centering on the Buddha Vairocana. As for the first group, the term *upa* appears to have been understood in some cases as representing a separate sub-group from *caryā*, while in other cases they seem to be equivalent terms, and this is certainly the easiest way to understand them. *Upa* clearly stands for *Upayoga* and thus refers to those earlier tantras of the 'Three Family' kind, which approximate (hence the use of the prefix *upa-*) to *yoga-tantras* in that the central Buddha is known as Vairocana. A similar distinction seems to have drawn in the case of the so called *caryā-tantras*. As for the alternative terms *upaya* and *ubhaya* used instead of *upa-*, the first is probably a mistaken 'correction' of the term, since later *upaya-tantras* are referred to as a section of the *anuttarayoga* group, while *ubhaya*, which can logically only mean comprising 'both' *kriyā* and *yoga-tantra* elements, may also be regarded as an attempted 'correction' or improvement of the prefix *upa-*. Of *yoga* and *mahāyoga-tantras* more will be said below. Tantras of all these kinds, grouped from *kriyā-* up to *mahāyoga*, appear to represent a general stock of tantric material, the existence of which is attested certainly in India, Central Asia (to a limited extent), China, and finally Tibet already by the eighth century A.D. Although not so generally accepted, other types of tantras are already known, the *rDzogs-chen* ('Great Fulfilment') tantric tradition which develops against a Central Asian and Tibetan background, as preserved by both *rNying-ma-pas* and *Bon-pos*,[7] and the Śaivite-type tantras of Bengal and Bihar, sometimes referred to as *yoginī-tantras*, which were later grouped together as 'Tantras of Supreme Yoga', a high sounding title, for which the actual practisers themselves must have been responsible. In the earlier stages of their conversion to Buddhism, some leading Tibetans expressed considerable reserve concerning these particular tantras, but they were all duly accepted as 'orthodox' according to the simple rule which was very soon applied, namely that any soi-disant Buddhist text might be accepted as genuine if only an Indian original could be produced. Since this rule tended to operate against the tantras of the *rDzogs-chen* tradition, most of these were treated – quite unfairly – as spurious by the later Tibetan religious orders.

After these introductory observations we can now attempt to make distinctions between these various kinds of tantras according to their subject matter. But first of all, let us try and answer the question: what is a tantra?

[7] See S.G. Karmay, « A discussion of the doctrinal position of the rDzogs-chen from the 10th to the 13th centuries », *JA*, 1975, pp. 147-55.

According to traditional Buddhist usage, the word *tantra* designates a type of text, thus corresponding in use to the term *sūtra*. But whereas the *sūtras* are largely concerned with doctrinal matters, the *tantras* contain descriptions of rites, especially consecrations, of the relevant circles of divinities, their spells (*mantras*) and their gestures, etc., and of mental and physical yoga. For such doctrine as they may contain, they draw in a rather haphazard way either on Buddhist sūtras or (in the case of *anuttarayoga–tantras*) on Brahmanical teachings, which are often in flagrant conflict with traditional Buddhist doctrine. It is often urged that the special methods which they teach, are suitable only for those whose senses are sufficiently developed, and that without the guidance of a qualified teacher one has no hope of gaining the desired objective, namely complete and final enlightenment. It seems to be generally agreed (although some texts suggest otherwise) that this state of enlightenment differs in no way from that which may also be achieved by the slower path taught in *Mahāyāna sūtras*; it is simply far more quickly achieved. In very recent times some Western writers have begun to use the expression 'The Tantra' as a term covering the whole range of theories and practices described in the *tantras*. Such a usage may be judged quite as unsuitable as the term 'The Sūtra' might be for all Buddhist theory and practice based on the *sūtras*. We may note that the terms traditionally used for these two rather different 'paths' are 'Training in the Perfections' (*pāramitā-naya*) and 'Training in Mantras' (*mantra–naya*), both thus being regarded as branches of a all–inclusive Mahāyāna, at least by those who were prepared to accept these formulations.[8] While the term 'Training in the Perfections' designates well enough the traditional Mahāyāna path of a Bodhisattva, the term 'Training in Mantras' provides a rather less clear idea of all that is involved in tantric practice. Mantras certainly play a very large part not only in the rituals but also in meditation upon the various divinities; however, a great deal more is involved in tantric practice than their recitation. Nor is their use by any means restricted to the tantras, for they are often recommended, mainly for protective purposes, in the sūtras. Later on the term *Vajrayāna* comes into general use and in many respects this is a more appropriate name for tantric Buddhism, but as will be explained below, it applies properly only to those classes of tantras where the Vajra Family predominates. It is then conceived as a separate 'way' (*yāna*), in that one then thinks in terms of three 'ways', Hīnayāna, Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna (or Mantrayāna).

Defining tantric Buddhism in as few words as possible, one might

[8] This terminology is used for example by the tantric yogin Advayavajra in his short work *Tattvaratnāvalī*. See the *Advayavajrasaṃgraha*, Baroda, 1927, p. 14.

describe it essentially as a system of practices, either of ritual yoga or of physical and mental yoga, by means of which the practiser identifies himself with his tutelary divinity, which is identified both with the practiser's own teacher and with the goal of final enlightenment. However many different elements, few of which are peculiar to tantric Buddhism, have contributed to the formation of this complex literature. They may be listed thus:

(i) the philosophical basis
(ii) the cult of particular divinities
(iii) the development of the *maṇḍala* or circle of divinities
(iv) the use of *mantras* and symbolic gestures
(v) the concept of Buddha-Families
(vi) the concept of buddhahood as fivefold
(vii) the concept of Buddha-Bodies
(viii) the use of highly ritualized consecrations
(ix) the practice of yoga, both mental and physical
(x) the conception of the whole of existence as an essential duality in unity (Sanskrit: *yuganaddha*; Tibetan: *zung-'jug*).

All tantras do not comprise all these elements, and as we shall see, they have been categorized mainly in accordance with the particular elements which they happen to contain. It will thus be helpful to take these elements in turn and to note the way in which they are applied.

(i) *The philosophical basis*

This is one of the elements which is certainly not peculiar to Buddhist tantras, as it represents in the main the direct adaptation of Mahāyāna philosophical theories. Chief of these, in deliberate rejection of the teachings of the early schools, representing the so called Hīnayāna, is the assertion that there is no absolute distinction between *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa*. The whole of tantric practice is based upon this assumption that the physical universe, represented by the five elements of space, air, fire, earth and water, the human personality, represented by the five components (*skandha*) of body (*rūpa*), feelings (*vedanā*), concepts (*saṃjñā*), impulses (*saṃskāra*) and consciousness (*vijñāna*), and enlightenment, as represented by the 'Five Wisdoms' (see no. viii below) are essentially identical. It may be said fairly that the tantric masters draw the logical conclusions from Mahāyāna philosophical theory. If indeed there is no difference between *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa* except for our own erroneous views of the universe that surrounds us as mere appearance, then any method that corrects our actual condition deserves our serious attention. Conversely the teachings concerning the long progress of a Bodhisattva throughout innumerable rebirths towards the final goal of enlighten-

ment (which he might have achieved already if only he knew it) appear as a kind of deception, offered as a temporary measure to those who do not possess the keen faculties necessary for following the rapid path of the tantras. It is fair to observe that while tantric masters offer the possibility of buddhahood in the course of a single lifespan, they take for granted the general Buddhist doctrine of rebirth in accordance with the merits and demerits one has achieved in previous lives. Thus it may be argued that a successful candidate achieves his goal apparently in a single life, but he is able to do this only because he has been born and lives in this final life in circumstances which make success possible, and this happy state of affairs can only come about as a result of meritorious living in previous lives. Thus while on the one hand tantric theory may appear destructive of conventional Buddhist morality, on the other hand it quite logically takes it for granted. However, one should note at once that all those tantras which may be properly classed as *Vajrayāna* (see no. v below) go beyond Mahāyāna theory when they assert explicitly the identity of good and evil. In this context ' good ' may be understood as the perfection of buddhahood as represented by the Five Wisdoms, while evil is represented by the Five Evils of delusion, passion, wrath, jealousy and malignity. The new set of five, devised specially to accord with tantric theory, was produced by adding the last two evils, to the far earlier set of three, delusion, passion and wrath, which lie at the centre of the ever-turning ' wheel of existence '. This tantric theory of the essential identity of good and evil, both of which have to be transcended if final enlightenment is to be achieved, result in the notion of the perfected yogin who is free of all social and cultural restraints and wanders, doing just as he pleases.

One may further note that the concept of the essential identity of the perfect state of enlightenment and the imperfect state of unenlightened man is so fundamental to tantric theory, that many tantric yogins, especially those of eastern India, while claiming to be Buddhists, were well content to express this basic ' truth ' in non-Buddhist terms. A few verses from the *Hevajra Tantra* will demonstrate this without more ado:

> ' The supreme *ego* (*ahaṃ paraṃ*) exists in oneself just as in other beings, and in other beings just as in oneself ' (I.vii.25).
>
> ' This unity is known as Vairocana, Akṣobhya, Amogha, Ratna, Ārolika and Sātvika, as Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Śiva, Sarva, Vibuddha and Tattva. He is called Brahmā because he has gained *nirvāṇa* and enlightenment, Viṣṇu because he is all–pervading, Śiva because he is propitious, Sarva because he abides in all things, Tattva because he experiences real bliss, and Vibuddha because he is aware of such happiness.' (I.v.12-14).

It should be clear that when one speaks of a philosophical basis for tantric Buddhism, one finds oneself dealing with random terminology, used

as happens to suit the patterns of tantric theory. It is quite remarkable that later Tibetan tradition was prepared to accept such extravagent assertions as Buddha Word, while rejecting the far less extreme *rDzogs–chen* teachings, but as already observed above, the sole criterion seems to have been whether an Indian original existed or not.

(ii) *The cult of particular divinities*

Here the tantras draw largely upon the already considerable pantheon available in Mahāyāna sūtras, simply arranging them in accordance with their special requirements. This subject is best dealt with under the heading of Buddha–Families (no. v below), and here it is sufficient to observe that a personal divinity (*iṣṭadevatā*, ' a divinity who is yearned for ', significantly translated in Tibetan as *yi–dam–lha* ' a divinity to whom one is committed ') is essential for all tantric practice. Faith in such a divinity is far more than mere profession; he must be meditated upon until he actually appears manifest before the eyes of the practiser and he must then be absorbed into a state of identity with his devotee so that he becomes a veritable *alter ego*. In theory tantric Buddhism holds firmly to the universal Buddhist doctrine of ' no self ' (*anātman*); in practice it relies upon the imagined existence of a real self for achieving its objective. Thus the supreme divinity is ultimately denied, and yet at the same time he is always present. This aspect of tantric practice inevitably brought it very close indeed to Brahmanical theories, resulting in the use of Hindu terminology and even the ready acceptance of non–Buddhist divinities of śaivite type (Heruka, Hevajra, Śamvara, Caṇḍamahāroṣaṇa etc.) as tutelar divinities by tantric yogins of eastern India (modern Bihar and Bengal) to whose aberrations we have already referred.

(iii) *The development of the maṇḍala*

The *maṇḍala* or sacred circle is one of the most essential features of all tantras, being the supreme symbol of essential identity of *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa*, the sacred place of divine manifestation, and the sanctuary where the adept receives the consecrations which make him a partaker of his chosen divinity's ' self–nature ' as expressed in the ' Five Wisdoms ' (no. viii below), where all truth coalesces. As Buddhaguhya says in his *Dharmamaṇḍalasūtra* (edited and translated by Dr E. Lo Bue in this same volume), ' *maṇḍala*, consecration and *samaya* are the mainstay of all tantras '. The term *samaya* (Tibetan: *dam–tshig*), to which I have not devoted a special section, refers directly to the process of self–identification with one's chosen divinity, to which I have already referred above in my brief definition of tantric Buddhism. The Sanskrit term, which means literally ' coming together ' or ' concurrence ' (one of its easiest meanings is in fact ' occasion ') acquired in this special Buddhist

usage the meaning of the ' bond ' which unites the various aspects of truth as well as their physical or symbolic expressions. Thus the fivefold *maṇḍala* symbolizes on the one hand the whole physical universe in its fivefold expression, and again the human personality conceived of as the five *skandhas*, and on the other hand it is the abode of supreme buddhahood in its fivefold manifestation. The realization that they are essentially identical is one aspect of *samaya*, their ' bonded unity ' as it were. This unity is realized by the practiser through his self-identification or ' bonded unity ' with his chosen divinity, who is the expression of absolute buddhahood. He thus realizes in himself the ' bond ' of *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa*. *Samaya* also means ' bond ' in the sense of ' vow ', and this accounts for the Tibetan translation of the term as *dam-tshig* or ' solemn word ' although it retains the equivalent Buddhist Sanskrit meaning. As a highly mystic term, referring to the realization of supreme truth by tantric methods, it is often left untranslated in Tibetan ritual texts. As for the description of the *maṇḍala* itself, which is conceived physically as a stūpa or an enclosed sacred palace with four portals in the four directions, one may refer without more ado to Professor Tucci's admirable little work, *The Theory and Practice of the Maṇḍala*, and to Buddhaguhya's text in this volume. We should note however that both these renowned scholars conceive of the *maṇḍala* in symmetrical form, primarily as fivefold (with centre and four direction points) or as eightfold or even as multidirectional. This is certainly the form that it assumes in the *yoga-tantras*, where it first receives the highly symbolic values referred to above. However in the earlier less developed tantras (whether referred to as *kriyā- caryā* or *upa-* etc.), where there are normally only Three Families with mere suggestions of others, no such symmetrical form is possible. It then refers simply to the sacred precincts within the various divinities are arranged, as is still the case when they are represented three-dimentionally on a wall-painting or hanging scroll (*thang-ka*).

(iv) *The use of* mantras *and symbolic gestures*

As has been already observed, the use of *mantras* (spells) is widespread in the tantras, although their use is far older than this particular branch of Buddhist literature. A *mantra* may be the ' call sign ' of a particular divinity, in which case it may be regarded as the divinity's ' quintessence ' (*hṛdaya*) or as the ' special knowledge ' (*vidyā*) of the divinity in question, or it may be composed of potent words, which when pronounced in the proper ritual circumstances by a qualified practiser, have the effect which their meaning requires.

An example of the first kind could be:

OṂ Vāgīśvari MUṂ (= ' Lady of Speech ' in the vocative case) – *mantra*

of Mañjuśrī. or *OṂ Māṇipadme HUṂ* (= 'Lady of the Jewelled Lotus' again vocative) – *mantra* of Avalokiteśvara.[9] The *mantra* or *vidyā* of the divinity normally appears in the feminine gender for male divinities, as the sound is the partner of his physical form. One may note in passing that the *vidyā* is used like *prajñā* to refer to the *yoginī* or feminine partner in the rite of sexual yoga.

An example of the second kind could be:

OṂ yathā sarvatathāgatas tathāhaṃ = 'May I be as all Buddhas are!'

Other terms used as synonyms for *mantra* are *dhāraṇī* (that which comprehends the essence of something) and also *samaya* (the 'bond' with the divinity as already explained above) and even *mudrā*, which more usually has the meaning of gesture or symbol, often referring like *vidyā* and *prajñā* to the *yoginī* or feminine partner.[10] Fixing the meanings of all these key tantric terms can only be done within a particular context, and literal translations thus become often quite meaningless. The usual term for 'symbolic gesture' is *mudrā*, frequently referring to a whole variety of hand–gestures. These serve either to identify iconographically a divinity, e.g. the distinctive hand-gestures of the Five Buddhas, or to indicate symbolically a particular ritual action or state of mental yoga. As already noted above, the term *mudrā* may be used of any other kind of symbolic representation, e.g. as a synonym for the *mantra* or *hṛdaya* (seed-syllable) of a divinity, or for the *yoginī* or feminine partner, who represents Wisdom (*prajñā*); see no. x below.

(v) *The concept of Buddha–Families*

The notion of categories of human beings is a very ancient one in Buddhism, expressed throughout the history of the doctrine in various ways. Thus Śākyamuni, surveying the world immediately after his enlightenment, saw "beings of little impurity, of much impurity, of keen or dull faculties, of good or bad conditions, easy or hard to teach".[11] In certain Mahāyāna sūtras such categories are referred to as *gotra* (folds or clans), distinguished primarily as those who follow the three 'ways' (*yāna*) of Early Disciple,

[9] The use of this particular mantra, which has become so popular with Tibetans, is already attested in the *Kāraṇḍavyūha Sūtra*, which must have been known from the sixth century onwards. For further references see Yoshiro Imaeda, « Note préliminaire sur la formule *oṃ maṇi padme hūṃ* dans les manuscrits tibétains de Touen–houang », in *Contributions aux études sur Touen–houang*, Geneva/Paris, 1979, pp. 71–76.

[10] Examples of the terms *samaya* and *mudrā* used as synonyms of *mantra* will be found for example in the opening passages of Chs 10 and 20 of the *Sarvatathāgata–tattvasaṃgraha*, ed. by Isshi Yamada, New Delhi, 1981, pp. 246 f. and 404 f.

[11] See E.J. Thomas, *Life of the Buddha*, revised ed. London, 1949, p. 82.

Solitary Buddha or Bodhisattva. To these are sometimes added two others, those who have not made up their mind, and those who never desire salvation.[12] In early tantras (those classed as *kriyā* and *carya*) which were produced in close dependence on Mahāyāna sūtras, in that they may be regarded as their ritual counterparts, various 'families' (*kula*) are mentioned, of which the three main ones are those of the Buddha or Tathāgata, the Lotus and the Vajra. It is not unlikely that these special categories were suggested by the triad of images, representing Śākyamuni in the centre, flanked by the Bodhisattvas Padmapāṇi (Avalokiteśvara) and Vajrapāṇi, as these two divinities are specifically named as the 'family-heads', while Śākyamuni comes to be represented by his divine spokesman, Mañjuśrī. The original purpose of these new families was to accomodate within the general Buddhist framework various non-Buddhist divinities, to whose cult many Buddhist layfolk, and probably monks as well, continued to remain attached. Gentle divinities were placed within the 'family' of Avalokiteśvara and troublesome divinities, whose conversion was supposedly difficult, within the family of Vajrapāṇi, who subdued them with his *vajra* ('sceptre of lightning').[13] These early tantras preserve a hierarchy of such families, the Tathāgata Family coming first, the Lotus Family second and the Vajra Family third. It is clearly taught that those who have received consecration in the Vajra Family can perform rites relating to that family only, while those who have received consacration in the Lotus Family can perform rites in that family and in the Vajra Family as well. Those consecrated in the Tathāgata Family can operate within all three families.[14] Thus these tantras can hardly be referred to as representing the Vajrayāna; it would therefore seem possible to draw a certain distinction between the use of Mantrayāna, which can apply to all tantras, and Vajrayāna, which can only logically apply in those tantras where the Vajra Family, represented by Vajrapāṇi, comes to the fore.

This important development occurs in the *yoga-tantras*, of which the main one is the *Sarvatathāgata-tattvasaṃgraha* ('Symposium of Truth of all the Tathāgatas'), where Vajrapāṇi, also referred to as Vajradhara or Vajrasattva, appears as Śākyamuni's chief spokesman. This is perhaps the most significant development in the history of Buddhist tantras, for it opens the

[12] See the *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra* (edition by Etienne Lamotte, Louvain/Paris, 1935) pp. 73–74 and 198, and the *Laṇkāvatāra Sūtra* (translation by D.T. Suzuki, reprinted London 1968), pp. 58–60.

[13] Part II (especially chs 6 and 11) of the *Sarvatathāgata-tattvasaṃgraha* contains an interesting account of Vajrapāṇi's victory over Maheśvara (Śiva) and a whole assembly of Hindu divinities. For a summary see the Introduction, pp. 39 f.to the Facsimile ed., New Delhi, 1981. Here, as in other *Yoga Tantras*, he achieves a position of pre-eminence.

[14] See for example Lessing & Wayman, *mKhas-grub-rje's Fundamentals of the Buddhist Tantras*, pp. 148–49.

way to other tantras, where the main divinities have no otherwise acceptable Buddhist genealogy. While the main divinities in the *yoga–tantras* remain spontaneous Buddhist creations, the earlier concept of a superior Tathāgata- or Buddha–Family disappears, and all the *maṇḍalas* are modelled on the *Vajradhātumaṇḍala* (the *maṇḍala* of the Vajra–Sphere), which is composed largely of divinities with Vajra–hyphened names. Śākyamuni with the title of Vairocana (Resplendent) certainly remains central, but the hierarchy of families no longer pertains, in that they are now reinterpreted as representing the fivefold manifestation of buddhahood (see next section, vi). The three families are therefore increased to five, with the addition of a Gem Family, represented by Ratnapāṇi, and a Sword or Action Family, represented by Viśvapāṇi.

For reasons that will become clear in the next section these five families are equated with the Five Evils: delusion, passion, wrath, jealousy and malignity, where the last two are later additions to the far earlier group of Three Evils, just as the two extra families are deliberate matching additions. The pre-eminence of the Vajra Family, which is the Family of Wrath, explains the new rôle given to powerful divinities of śaivite origin (most chief divinities of the so called ' Tantras of Supreme Yoga ') who are all identified doctrinally as emanations of the Buddha Akṣobhya, whose eastern quarter of the *maṇḍala* (according to *yoga–tantra* tradition) corresponds with the Family of Wrath. Apart from the *Guhyasamāja Tantra*, which was earlier (certainly in the eighth century) grouped with *yoga–* or *mahāyoga–tantras* and thus retains the Five Buddha arrangements (with certain modifications to be mentioned at once) in its main *maṇḍala*, most of the ' Tantras of Supreme Yoga ' have their own special *maṇḍalas*, e.g. Hevajra with Nairātmyā as partner and a circle of eight *yoginīs*, Śamvara with Vajravārahī as partner and an entourage of four *yoginīs* (known as Ḍākinī, Lāmā, Khaṇḍarohā and Rūpiṇī), or Caṇḍamahāroṣaṇa with Vajradhātviśvarī as partner, and a circle of eight, four male all referred to as Acala (= Immovable, thus a synonym for Akṣobhya) but of the four directional colours, white, yellow, red and dark green, and four female, all *Vajrayoginīs* and named after the Evils, namely: delusion, passion, jealousy and malignity; wrath coalesces with Vajradhātvīśvarī at the centre, since she and the chief divinity are of the family of wrath. Thus these *maṇḍalas* consist of divinities, who are entirely subservient to the Vajra Family, even though in some cases they are suggestions of allegiance to other families. In a sense there is now only one family, that of the central divinity, the Vajra Family of Wrath.

This predominance of the Vajra Family results logically in the transference of Akṣobhya to the central position in the fivefold *maṇḍala*, displacing Vairocana, who moves to the east, as for instance in the *Guhyasamāja Tantra*. The same arrangement is taken for granted in other tantras of the Heruka or

yoginī-type, although they have their own special *maṇḍalas* as described just above. In order to assert their utter transcendence, all these later tantras refer to a sixth supreme Buddha, who unites the fivefold set within himself and is at the same time identical with the particular tutelary divinity of any particular tantra, Hevajra or any other. Maintaining its earlier connection with the *yoga*– (or *mahāyoga*–) *tantras*, the *Guhyasamāja* knows this sixth Buddha as Great Vairocana (*Mahāvairocana*), while the others use names which are used as alternatives for Vajrapāṇi in the *yoga-tantras*, namely *Vajradhara* or *Vajrasattva*. An iconographic distinction thus comes to be made between Vajrapāṇi as Bodhisattva and Vajradhara / Vajrasattva as supreme Buddha, who is in origin no other that Vajrapāṇi raised at last to the highest possible rank in the whole later Buddhist pantheon.[15] Mention of a sixth Buddha leads to the suggestion that there are now six families, but no *maṇḍala* can be arranged in such a way, and the sixth family, referred to in the *Hevajra Tantra* as the ' Family of Bliss ' is Hevajra's own family, which subsumes the other five. As he explains (II.iv.100-103):

> " In full the families are six, but they are also five and three.
> Just listen, Yoginī'
> They are those of Wrath, Delusion, Malignity, Passion, Jealousy and Bliss, envisaged as purified by Akṣobhya, Vairocana, Ratnasambhava, Amitābha, Amoghasiddhi and Vajrasattva in this order.
> By omitting Vajrasattva, we have a fivefold set of families, and they become three with just Wrath, Delusion and Passion.
> But these six or five families are comprised in one, that which has Mind as Lord (*citteśaṃ*) and consists in the Wrath of Akṣobhya, such being the Vajra power of Wrath. "

It may be noted that ' Mind ' (*citta*) is used here as synonymous with ' Consciousness ' (*vijñāna*), the centre one of the five components (*skandha*) of personality.[16]

The concept of family allegiance undergoes a subtle change as a result of the development described above. The original intention of the family structure seems to have been to incorporate various groups of avowedly

[15] Vajrapāṇi is probably the most interesting, certainly the most successful divinity in the whole Buddhist pantheon. From the position of personal guardian of Śākyamuni, he receives the tile of ' chief of *yakṣas* ', then becomes a Bodhisattva not yet equal in status with Avalokiteśvara, only to become the leading Bodhisattva in *yoga-tantras*, and using his alternative name of Vajradhara and Vajrasattva finally becomes supreme Buddha in ' Supreme Yoga ' tantras. See E. Lamotte, ' Vajrapāṇi en Inde ', in *Mélanges de sinologie offerts à Paul Demiéville*, Paris, 1966, pp. 113–159.

[16] This is clear from the diagram on p. 127 of my edition of the *Hevajra Tantra*, vol. I, p. 127.

non-Buddhist divinities within the Buddhist pantheon. They were therefore arranged in a hierarchy with the Buddha (or Tathāgata) and Lotus Families placed above the Vajra Family. But once the families were increased to five and brought into direct relationship with the fivefold *maṇḍala*, a new or rather modified interpretation appears. They are associated with the Five Evils, which in turn are ' purified ' by the Five Buddhas, and a tantric practiser is said to belong to any particular family, depending upon whether wrath, delusion, passion, jealousy or malignity predominates in his character. This is decided ritually by his throwing a flower or a splinter of wood (a toothpick) into a fivefold *maṇḍala*, drawn on the ground. Depending upon where it falls, he should receive his Master's Consecration (*ācāryābhiṣeka*, see no. viii below) in a *maṇḍala* where his Family-Buddha holds the central position. This is catered for in tantras of the *yoga-tantra* class, where the necessary variety of *maṇḍalas* is prescribed. It is also described as a necessary part of the ritual according to the tradition of Hevajra, although logically only those who belong to the Family of Wrath would seem to be acceptable candidates.[17] The group of tantras generally referred to as ' Tantras of Supreme Yoga ' (*anuttarayogatantra*) represent a strange particularization of *yoga-tantras* which can be referred directly to the special circumstances prevailing in north-eastern India (modern Bihar, Bengal, Orissa), where most of these tantras had their origins. Although clearly influenced by these Śaivite traditions, the tantras, which have been preserved by the later *rNying-ma* (Old) Order of Tibetan Buddhism remain more faithful to the *yoga-tantra* tradition in that they keep Vairocana in the central position in their *maṇḍalas*, choosing as their name for the sixth supreme Buddha that of *Samantabhadra* (All Good). This is the name of a Bodhisattva, popular in Central Asian and Chinese Buddhism, who is also identified with Vajrapāṇi in the *yoga-tantras*. It is also used as a title for their central Buddha Śākyamuni Vairocana. This may be an indigenous Tibetan development, for those heterodox Tibetan Buddhas, the *Bon-pos*. make use of the same primary Buddha-name.

(vi) *The concept of buddhahood as fivefold*

In its general applications this concept has already been explained in terms of the five families, but its origin is probably quite distinct. Mahāyāna Buddhism diverges considerably from the theories of the earlier schools so

[17] Described in the *Hevajrasekaprakriyā*, as edited and translated into French by Louis Finot, « Manuscrit sanscrits de sādhana retrouvés en Chine », *JA*, 1934, pp. 1-85. A similar account is also given in the *Abhiṣekavidhi*, available in Tibetan only in *Tib. Tripitaka* vol. 57, p. 19 ff. The actual reference to the throwing of the flower occurs of p. 24, 2nd folio, line 7 ff.

far as popular beliefs concerning Buddhas are concerned. Whereas the early Buddhists thought in terms of a series of Buddhas, appearing in some kind of historical succession, each presiding over a separate world–age, the Mahāyānists with their enlarged view of the universe as stretching to infinity in all directions, began to conceive of a vast numbers of Buddhas presiding over their various Buddha–fields in all parts of space, while holding firmly to the doctrine that all Buddhas were essentially one. Such is the cosmic setting of many Mahāyāna sūtras, where specific Buddhas of certain directions come to be gradually named. Except for Amitābha / Amitāyus in the west and Akṣobhya in the east many variations continue to occur in such designated lists, but the general principle of certain Buddha–names representing the main directional points is well established. The naming of Buddhas as 'family heads' seems to be a separate process, even more hesitant in its beginnings. Thus in the *Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa*, where Śākyamuni, represented by Mañjuśrī, presides over the central Buddha Family, and Avalokiteśvara and Vajrapāṇi preside respectively over the Lotus and Vajra families to either side, it is suggested that a Buddha named Saṅkusumitarājendra (Beflowered Lord of Kings) appears above Śākyamuni, while Amitābha is above Avalokiteśvara amd Ratnaketu above Vajrapāṇi.[18] The identification of such families with the various evils, whether in their set of three or the extended one of five, is a deliberate tantric development, based upon the Mahāyāna teaching that essentially there is no difference between *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa*. In Buddhism later developments seldom if ever negate the earlier formulations. For example the *Guhyasamāja Tantra* is structured according to the later Five Buddha arrangement; yet there are constant references to three as well as five families.[19] Thus the neat arrangement which we find in certain *yoga–tantras* of five directional Buddhas, represented by five leading Bodhisattvas, presiding over five families, related to five evils, merely represents one particular elaboration. Despite variations in names, the fivefold arrangement clearly commends itself as it corresponds ideally with the cosmic significance attached to the Buddhist stūpa with its gateways to the four directions or to any four–sided temple. Such symbolism is well developed in Buddhaguhya's *Dharmamaṇḍalasūtra*.

(vii) *The concept of Buddha-Bodies*

The theory of various grades of Buddha–manifestation has its origin in

[18] See Ariane Macdonald, *Le maṇḍala du Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa*, Paris 1962, pp. 112–3. One may note that the Buddha–names of Ratnaketu and Vikasitakusuma (= 'Wide–open Flower', presumably a variation of *Saṇkusumitarāja*) appear together with Śākyamuni in the main maṇḍala of the older version of the *Sarvadurgatipariśodhana Tantra*; see T. Skorupski's edition, Delhi, 1983, p. 309.

[19] See e.g. B. Bhattacharyya's edition, Baroda, 1931, pp. 20–21 and 129.

the early distinction between Śākyamuni's physical body (*rūpakāya*) in which he was visible to ordinary mortals, the 'mind–made' body (*manomayakāya*) with which he visits celestial realms, and the 'Dharma–Body' or absolute body into which he passes in the state of final *nirvāṇa*. Various other terminology was used which it is quite superfluous to treat in detail in this present context.[20] It is sufficient to draw attention to the later use of *nirmāṇakāya* ('creation body') which replaces the older term *rūpakāya* in the general Mahāyāna usage, and the application of the term *saṃbhogakāya* ('enjoyment body') to refer to the glorious form in which Buddhas manifest themselves to Bodhisattvas in their various Buddha–fields. The term *svābhāvikakāya* ('self–existent body') used as a synonym for *dharmakāya*, than which nothing can really be higher, is placed theoretically above it in certain tantric formulations in much the same way that a sixth Buddha is envisaged as in some way higher than the cosmic set of five, although this set already symbolizes supreme buddhahood than which again nothing can be higher. As will be noted in paragraph ix below, a resultant set of four Buddha–Bodies is correlated with the four psychic centres envisaged as existing within the yogin's body. The same set may also be used, although not in quite the same order, to explain a hierarchy of divinities as they may appear in later painting styles. Thus on a Tibetan *thang–ka* painted according to *rNying–ma* tradition the main figure of Padmasambhava, identified as *nirmāṇakāya*, may be surmounted by smaller figures of the Supreme Buddha Samantabhadra, Amitābha, the cosmic Buddha of the West, and the Bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara, in this descending order, representing the *svābhāvikakāya*, the *dharmakāya* and the *saṃbhogakāya*, respectively. Avalokiteśvara is thus raised incidentally to Buddha-rank.

(viii) *Consecrations*

The rite of consecration (*abhiṣeka*) is essential to tantric practice, indeed its mainstay, as Buddhaguhya says (see above) together with the *maṇḍala*, where it must be performed, and the experience of *samaya* (union with one's chosen divinity) which is the intention of the rite. In its origin this rite is probably directly associated with the rite of royal consecration, for just as a crown-prince may be consecrated to kingship, a fit disciple may be consecrated to buddhahood. Such is the aspiration of disciples about to enter the maṇḍala according to the rite described in the *Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa*:

> "O Master, I wish to enter upon the *mantra*-practice of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas; I wish to enter the secret circle of salvation which

20 The subject has been well covered by Louis de la Vallée Poussin in *La Siddhi de Hiuan–tsang*, vol. II, Paris 1929, pp. 762–813.

transcends all that pertains to this world; I wish to attain buddhahood involving universal sovereignty in the Dharma. In brief may I be a Buddha!"[21]

Jars (*kalaśa*) played an essential part in the rite, for not only did an actual sprinkling from a sanctified jar take place, but the jar itself was consecrated as the above of the divinity. Thus the whole ritual came to be known as the 'jar consecration' (*kalaśābhiṣeka*). Ever more elaborated, it came to consist of a series of related consecrations, varying in number according to different traditions. Thus the set, as described by the tantric master Advayavajra, is related neatly to the full set of six Buddhas:

"Firstly we deal with the Jar Consecration, which is in fact characterized as six jar consecrations, viz, those of water, crown, vajra, bell (also called royal), name and master. As one washes away exterior dirt with water, so one sprinkles water for the purification of the impurity of ignorance; for this reason it is called a 'sprinkling' (*seka*). As the jar is used in all of them, the name used is 'jar consecration'. There are the consecrations from which there can be no back-sliding because they are of the nature of the Six Tathāgatas:
The Water Consecration corresponds to the Mirror-like Wisdom of Akṣobhya;
the Crown Consecration to the Wisdom of Sameness of Ratnasambhava;
the Vajra Consecration to the Discriminating Wisdom of Amitābha;
the Royal Consecration to the Active Wisdom of Amoghsiddhi;
the Name Consecration to the Wisdom of the Pure Absolute of Vairocana being the wisdom which puts an end to ignorance,
while the Master Consecration corresponds to Vajrasattva."[22]

Within the developed context of the *yoga-tantras* this set of consecrations is also known as the 'Master Consecration' (*ācāryābhiṣeka*) in that it bestows mastery in a particular tantric cycle. A disciple would make lavish offerings to this teacher in exchange for such a consecration and the relevant texts. Indeed the history of the introduction of Buddhism into Tibet contains innumerable stories of Tibetan scholars travelling far and wide in India in search of tantric masters who would give them the desired consecrations together with the main tantra concerned and commentarial literature, usually

[21] See Ariane Macdonald, *op. cit.*, pp. 138–39.

[22] See the *Advayavajrasaṃgraha*, Baroda, 1927, p. 36. The short work from which this quotation is taken is correctly entitled *Sekatākāryasaṃgraha* and not as given here in Bhattacharyya's useful but rather faulty edition. The Tibetan text with correct Sanskrit title is in T.T. vol. 68, pp. 279–5–4 ff. A variant set will be found in the *Sekoddeśaṭika* (Carelli's ed., Baroda, 1941), p. 27.

in return for offerings of gold. Such a consecration was held to be fully effective only after a long apprenticeship with one's chosen master, and thus needs to be distinguished from the kind of public consecration ceremony which is still given nowadays by distinguished Tibetan lamas to all and sundry as a kind of general ceremony of blessing. One may note that the same ' Master Consecration ', usually according to the tantric cycle of Cakrasaṃvara, is performed in Nepal in order to consecrate a Newar Buddhist in the caste of *vajrācārya*. However, this is a special feature of Newar Buddhism, which has been subjected to strong brahmanical influences over the last six hundred years or more.[23]

Of special interest are the ' higher ' consecrations, based upon the practice of sexual yoga (see no. ix below) and known as the the ' Secret Consecration ' (*guhyābhiṣeka*) and the ' Consecration of the Knowledge of Wisdom ' (*prajñājñānābhiṣeka*). These consecrations are referred to incidentally and sometimes rather obtusely in *yoga–tantras*, while in tantras which were generally allocated to the ' Supreme Yoga ' class (*anuttarayogatantra*) the references are far more direct. Since these consecrations are based upon a changed ' philosophical ' theory, which no longer treats buddhahood as fivefold (although the terminology remains current) but as the unity of ' two–in–one ', they are best explained within that particular context (see no. x below). A final consecration, known simply as the ' Fourth ', was added as the consummation of the ' Knowledge of Wisdom ' and thus identified with the supreme state of buddhahood. While there is no doubt that such consecrations were performed physically exactly as described in commentaries, they were also given a symbolic interpretation, thus adapting them to the use of those who had entered monastic orders. That there was sometimes doubt about the advisibility of their use is proved by the reference to *yoginī–tantras* (or *prajñā–tantras*) in the ordinance of the royal monk Zhi–ba–'od (see above).

(ix) *The practice of yoga*

It might seem superfluous to mention the practice of yoga in tantric Buddhism, essential as yoga certainly is in all forms of Buddhism. However this subject needs to be touched upon if only to remove certain misapprehensions. It is commonly believed that sexual yoga and related symbolic forms represent an essential part of tantric Buddhism, and while there is much truth in this, it is not so readily appreciated that sexual yoga, like the yoga of breath control, is far older than the earliest of Buddhist tantras, and thus

[23] See John K. Locke, *Karunamaya: the cult of Avalokiteśvara-Matsyendranāth in the Valley of Nepal*, Kathmandu, 1980, p. 47 ff.

merely represents one of the several elements which were adopted and developed by tantric yogins. Since yoga is a matter for practice rather than one of theory, it is not so easy to find specific references to the type of training involved, which would normally pass as an oral tradition from master to pupil. It becomes a subject for discussion mainly where some kind of philosophical theory is concerned. It is in a context such as this that we find certain clear references to sexual yoga in an important treatise of the 5th century Yogācāra philosopher, Asaṅga, where precisely the same argument is used as in the later tantras. Thus in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, ch. XIII, vv. 11–13 we read:

"Now come three verses concerning extrication from the 'afflictions' (*kleśa*) by means of the 'afflictions':
There is no element (*dharma*) apart from the elemental sphere (*dharmadhātu*), so passion and the other evils (viz. wrath and delusion) serve as their own extrication in the opinion of the Buddhas.
Commentary: As the Lord has said: 'I say that there is no extrication from passion other than by means of passion'. It is the same in the case of wrath and delusion. Here he reveals the actual meaning (*abhisaṃdhi*). As there is no element apart from the elemental sphere, so there is no essentiality (*dharmatā*) apart from the elements. Therefore the essentiality of passion and the others (which is their purification) receives the connotation of passion etc., and it is this which serves as the extrication from passion and the others.
There is no element apart from the elemental sphere; such is the actual meaning accepted by the wise concerning the 'state of affliction' (*saṃkleśa*).
Commentary: As has been taught: 'Delusion and enlightenment are one and the same'. So the actual meaning is the same for the 'state of affliction' on the assumption that delusion is the essential truth of enlightenment.
In that one has recourse to them, passion and the rest, at the source *yoniśaḥ*), one is released by their means; thus they are their own extrication.
Commentary: Having recourse to them, passion and the others, at the source, one recognizes them and this is their release. Such is the actual meaning." [24]

[24] For the Sanskrit text and earlier French translation see the edition of Sylvain Lévi, vol. I, Sanskrit Text, Paris, 1907; vol. II, French translation, Paris, 1911. For references to this specific extract see vol. I, p. 87 and II, pp. 156–57.

Here Asaṅga is saying exactly the same as is so frequently said in the tantras, for example the *Hevajra Tantra* (II.ii.50–51):

"Those things by which evil men are bound, others turn into means and gain thereby release from the bonds of existence. By passion the world is bound; by passion too it is released, but by heretical Buddhists this practice of reversals (*viparītabhāvanā*) is not known".

In ch. IX of Asaṅga's treatise already quoted above there is a long list of such 'reversals' (*parāvṛtti*) among which sexual intercourse is specifically mentioned. The preceding verses are now given in order to provide an adequate context:

"Supreme self–control is achieved in the reversal of mental activity with consequent self–control with regard to knowledge which is free of discriminating thought and thus totally immaculate.

Supreme self–control is achieved in the reversal of appearances and their (imagined) significance in a (Buddha–)realm that is thus purified for the blissful vision just as desired.

Supreme self–control is achieved in the reversal of discriminating thought resulting in the non–obstruction at all times of all knowledge and acts.

Supreme self–control is obtained in the reversal of substrata resulting in that imperturbable state of the Buddhas, *nirvāṇa* without any substratum.

Supreme self–control is obtained in the reversal of *maithuna* (sexual intercourse) in the blissful Buddha–poise and the untrammelled vision of one's spouse.

Supreme self–control is obtained in the reversal of spacial perceptions resulting in the supernatural production of thought–forms and their manifestation in phenomenal spheres (*gati*).

Thus with regard to this immeasurable and supreme (power of) reversal, this self–control is said to be immeasurable in the immaculate state of the Buddhas since acts are performed spontaneously (lit. without mental reflection)." [25]

This yoga of 'reversals', i.e. of turning back the flow, whether of the

[25] *Ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 40-42 (verses 38–48) and vol. II, pp. 80–82. Shashibhusan Dasgupta refers to this passage in his *Obscure Religious Cults* (reprinted Calcutta, 1969) pp. 17–18 and 231, accepting it in its obvious sense. It is strange that B. Bhattacharyya in his 'Notes of the Guhyasamāja–Tantra and the age of the tantras' (*Indian Historical Quartely*, IX, 1933, pp. 1–10) attempts to circumvent the true meaning, while suggesting that Asaṅga himself may well have been the author of the *Guhyasamāja* in the introduction to his edition of this work. However, in the article referred to he retreats from that rather rash suggestion.

vital breath or the seminal fluid, is thus justified by the fundamental dogma of Mahāyāna philosophy that there is no essential difference between *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa*. If there are no ' elements ' apart from the ' elemental sphere ' (*dharmadhātu*) realized in the state of buddhahood, then this state can be achieved only by the reversal of those same elements. It is precisely this process of emanation and reintegration which is symbolized by the fivefold *maṇḍala*, as already described above. However since the actual process of reintegration takes place within the yogin's body, his ' five-limbed ' body is the true *maṇḍala*. The top of his head represents the central point of reintegration and his lower parts between the navel and the genitals the region of maximum dispersion. The passage of the breath to the two sides of the body maintains a continual process of activity in the phenomenal world of appearances. In order to reverse this process, thus achieving the primary state of complete reintegration, the two streams of breath, imagined as passing up and down two side-channels, have to be united at a point in his lower parts, where they are induced to enter an imagined central channel, which passes through various psychic centres to the top of his head. By this same central channel the seminal fluid, which instead of being emitted is retained by a yoga practice of ' reversal ', is assumed to continue its reverse direction, transmuting itself into the ' Thought of Enlightenment ' realized in the state referred to as ' great bliss ' (*mahāsukha*). In order to symbolize the process of emanation and reintegration four Buddha-Bodies are located at the four psychic centres: the ' Self-Existent ' Body at the top of the head, the ' Body of Enjoyment ' at the throat, the ' Dharma-Body ' at the heart and the ' Creation Body ' between the navel and the genitals. As is well known, this imagined bodily structure has its parallels in non-Buddhist tantric teachings, where as many as seven psychic centres are listed. As a result of such influences similar variations occur in some Buddhist tantric traditions.

The psychic power, which produces the state of reintegration, whether conceived of as a reversed stream of thought-bearing breath or as transmuted semen, is represented in Hindu imagery as the serpent-goddess Kuṇḍalīni, who suddenly springs to life, and in Buddhist imagery as the Yoginī, who is the yogin's companion in the rite of sexual yoga. She is often nick-named by the tantric yogins of north-eastern India Caṇḍāli or Ḍombi, both names of low-caste women, who are frequently mentioned in their songs, where the whole process of psychic reintegration is described in allusive language.

" She arises between the Lotus and the Vajra.
Caṇḍāli blazes through the union of sameness.
Ḍombi puts fire to the house and burns it.

Taking moon–water I sprinkle it.
No flaring thatch or smoke is seen.
Reaching the top of Mount Meru, it goes into space." [26]

The idea of heat and burning derives from a false etymology of Caṇḍāli, which is perfectly legitimate poetic licence. Translated as *gTum–mo* in Tibetan (representing Sanskrit *caṇḍa*, ' hot ', this name has given rise to the curious idea that the main purpose of this yogic practice is to keep the body warm, something which no one could possibly have thought of in the Indian climate and which is a strange Tibetan development, certainly popularized by Madame Alexandra David–Neil in her writings.[27]

(x) *Existence as ' duality–in–unity '*

As explained above, *yoga–tantras* are based upon a theory of buddhahood as fivefold, and thus the *maṇḍala* which expresses the identity of *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa* represents the five elements (space, air, five, water, earth) of the cosmos, the five components (*skandha*) of the human personality, the five evils, which are purified by the five aspects of wisdom, symbolized by the Five Buddhas. For the so called *yoginī–tantras* (later brought together with others in the ' Supreme Yoga ' group) this fivefold scheme, although still taken for granted, has ceased to be particularly relevant to their changed patterns of thought. The favourite expression is now twofold, for which various sets of terms are used such as Wisdom and Means, Moon and Sun, Vowels (*āli*) and Consonants (*kāli*), male and female.

" Therefore twofold is the Innate (*sahaja*), for Wisdom is the woman and Means is the man. Thereafter these both become twofold, distin-

[26] See Per Kvaerne, *An Anthology of Buddhist Tantric Songs*, Oslo, 1977, p. 255 for the complete *apabraṃśa* text, Tibetan translation, commentary, notes and interpretation. One may also take note of the verses sung by Hevajra's companions, including Ḍombi and Caṇḍāli, as preserved in the same Indian dialect in the *Hevajra Tantra* (my edition, II. v. 20–23)

[27] Her book *With Mystics and Magicians in Tibet* contains descriptions of such ' yogic sports ', which are not her own invention, as Tibetans popularly believe that the body can be kept warm by such methods. It may be interesting to note that *The Times of India* (New Delhi, 8th February, 1982) contained a report by ' a team of scientists ' who had carried out tests on Tibetan monks skilled in this particular yoga. ' Measurement monitored throughout one hour of meditation revealed that the temperature deep in the body remained normal while skin temperature of the lamas rose all over by 1 to 1.5 decrees Centigrade '. I remain convinced that the whole experiment is misguided and that it was never the intention of such yoga to produce heat at all. One may refer to Kazi Dawasamdup's translation of ' Yoga of Psychic–Heat ' in W.Y. Evans–Wentz, *Tibetan Yoga and Secret Doctrines*, p. 172 ff., where the idea of there being heat derives only from persistence in translating *gTum-mo* (*Caṇḍāli*) as ' Psychic Heat ', while the serious intention of this yoga, realization of self-identity with Vajradhara as Supreme Buddha, is made clear enough.

guished as absolute (*vivṛti*) and relative (*saṃvti*). In man there is this twofold nature, the life-force (*śukra*) and the bliss arising from it; in woman too it is the same, the life-force and the bliss arising from it." (*Hevajra Tantra* I.viii, 27–9.)

Wisdom and ' skill in means ' are a very old pair in Mahāyāna Buddhism but there is not space to trace their usage thoroughly in this short article. In it often said in ' Perfection of Wisdom ' literature concerning a Bodhisattva, that " however great may be his resolve and however great may be the uplifting of his thought for the realization of perfect enlightenment, if he is not encompassed by the Perfection of Wisdom and if he is deprived of skill in means, he will fall to the state of a *śrāvaka* or a *pratyekabuddha* ".[28] In effect ' skill in means ', first listed as one of the minor perfections added to the earlier group of six in order to make their number up to ten, comes to represent in Mahāyāna thought all the other perfections. A number of quotations on this theme will be found in the 8th century doctrinal work of Kamalaśīla, namely his *Bhāvanākrama*, written in defence of the gradual path of the Bodhisattva towards enlightenment, as opposed to the doctrine of spontaneous enlightenment, for which Chinese teachers (especially the Hva-shang Mahāyāna) were held responsible in seeming disregard of the fact that a very similar ' quick path ' was also being taught by Indian tantric yogins.[29]

The proposition of Mahāyāna philosophy that without the conjunction of Wisdom and Means in the practice of a Bodhisattva there can be no effective operation of the Thought of Enlightenment (*bodhicitta*) which leads him towards his final goal of buddhahood, comes to receive a specialized interpretation in the thought of tantric yogins. Without the conjunction of Wisdom (the feminine partner) and Means (the yogin) there is no proper production of the Thought of Enlightenment (*bodhicitta* referring now to *semen virile*), which is transmuted into pure enlightenment as it ascends (? symbolically) through the central channel of the yogin's body to the top of his head. The symbolism is carried yet further into the body of the yogin, for the two channels to the left and right of his body, up and down which

[28] See for example E. Conze, *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* (Calcutta, 1958, reprinted 1970), p. 116, and his *The Large Sūtra of Perfect Wisdom*, p. 380.

[29] For Kamalaśīla's *Bhāvanākrama*, see G. Tucci, *Minor Buddhist Texts*, vol. II. p. 157 ff. See especially, p. 194, line 6 f., and p. 197, line 1 f. It would be unsuitable within the context of this short article to review the matter of Sino-Indian disputes over the correct interpretation of Buddhist doctrine, which according to later Tibetan accounts led to the expulsion of the Chinese party, while contemporary Chinese and Tibetan accounts suggest quite otherwise. For a recent survey with all necessary references see Yoshiro Imaeda, « Documents tibétains de Touen-houang concernant le concile du Tibet », *JA*, 1975, pp. 125–146.

the two streams of vital breath are known to pass, are also identified with Wisdom and Means. The whole twofold structure with its final objective of the realization of enlightenment as the ' unity of two ' (Sanskrit: *yuganaddha*; Tibetan: *zung-'jug*) is thus transferred within the yogin's body. One may note that male and female identifications are continually mixed, as the cross-identifications of the threefold terminology in all their varied expressions result is a variety of combinations. This could be illustrated at length, but we might just take two of the verses quoted above:

> " She arises between the Lotus and the Vajra.
> Caṇḍāli blazes through the union of sameness ",

where ' lotus ' (female element) and ' vajra ' (male element) represent the channels of vital breath to either side of the yogin's body, and *Caṇḍāli* their fusion at the point where these channels join to form the central channel which reaches to the top of his head (Mount Meru). *Caṇḍāli* is thus here identical with *bodhicitta* (Thought of Enlightenment), while in another context she may be, like Ḍombi, one of Hevajra's feminine partners, placed to the south-west in his *maṇḍala.*

A quotation from the last chapter of the *Pañcakrama,* a short work by the tantric yogin Nāgārjuna, which was translated into Tibetan about 1000 A.D. by Rin-chen bzang-po and his Kashmiri teacher Ratnākaraśānti, may serve as a sufficient illustration of the importance of the ' two-in-one ' pattern of thought in later tantric Buddhism:

> ' Bowing before the Lord who personifies both cause and effect and yet is free of all duality, I write this final section on ' two-in-one '.
> Where there is freedom from the dual conception of *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa,* in the state where they are one, this then is called the ' two-in-one '.
> Knowing the afflicted state (*saṃkleśa*) and its removal in terms of absolute truth, whoever knows their unified state, he knows the ' two-in-one '.
> The yogin who goes his way unifying the concepts of things of form which yet are formless, he knows the ' two-in-one '.
> The wise man does not think of subject and object as distinct, and where there is no such distinction, that is the ' two-in-one ', I say.
> The one who has cast aside thoughts of eternity and non-eternity who, knows this truth we call the ' series two-in-one ' he is a paṇḍita indeed.
> Where there is knowledge of the unity of Wisdom and Compassion, that is proclaimed as ' two-in-one ' as the series of the Buddha-sphere.

Knowing Wisdom and Means as completely joined in union, there were
a great yogin takes his place, that is the ' two-in-one '.[30]

Having considered briefly under these ten headings the various elements of which the tantras are composed, at least so far as the main intention of self-identification with a chosen divinity is concerned, we may understand better the various categorizing of them which has taken place at various times. It may be noted that the above survey does not profess to describe all the materials that are found in tantric texts. Thus there has been no reference to the mundane powers (*laukikasiddhi*) of a yogin as distinct from his supramundane accomplishments (*lokottarasiddhi*), which involve a large number of magical rites, often grouped under the four headings of tranquillizing (*śānti*), prospering (*puṣṭi*), subduing (*vaśya*) and destroying (*abhicāra*), which are often described in detail together with lists of appropriate spells (*mantras*). Throughout the whole history of Buddhism miraculous powers of various kinds were generally considered as purely incidental to the main task of achieving enlightenment, and were thus discounted by the serious-minded as an unwonted distraction. Their effectiveness, however, was never denied. One notes that a far more positive attitude to them is manifest in many tantric texts, where a perfected yogin is clearly expected to be equally proficient in both supramundane and mundane accomplishments. The mundane powers, viz. those relating to his behaviour in the world in which he lives, also involve him in ' antinomian ' practices, with which it is difficult to find parallels in more traditional Buddhist teaching. Among the various recommended subjects for meditation in the early communities one may note " the ten kinds of foulness: the bloated, the livid, the festering, the cut-up, the gnawed, the scattered, the hacked and scattered, the bleeding, the worm-infested, and a skeleton ",[31] as conducive to a deeper understanding of the essential Buddhist doctrine of universal impermanence, especially as regards one's own human body. There is surely a considerable difference between teaching such as this, and the recommendation of ' foul foods ' as an essential aid towards the acquisition of magical powers, which one finds listed so frequently in certain tantras.

" With the pre-eminent sacrament of human flesh one attains to the
supreme threefold vajra (viz. the Vajra of Body, Speech and Mind).
With the pre-eminent sacrament of faeces and urine one becomes a
' lord of magical power ' (*vidyādhara*).

30 For the Sanskrit text see Louis de la Vallée Poussin, *Études et textes tantriques, Pañcakrama*, Louvain, 1896, p. 46.

31 See *The Path of Purification* (Visuddhimagga) of Buddhaghosa, as translated by Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli, Colombo, 1956, p. 112.

With the sacrifical flesh of the elephant one gains the five magical accomplishment (*abhijñā*).
With the sacrificial flesh of the horse one masters the art of becoming invisible.
With the sacrifical flesh of the dog one achieves all ritual successes (*siddhi*).
With the sacrifical flesh of the cow the vajra–power of conjuring forth (*ākarṣaṇa*) works best.
If all these kinds of flesh are not available, one should envisage them all by meditation. With this vajra–yoga one becomes empowered by all the Buddhas." [32]

Whatever later refined interpretation was placed upon such prescriptions, there need be little doubt that such 'sacraments' were used in the circles of tantric yogins, where these texts had their actual origin. Within the same 'antinomian' context one should also draw attention to the deliberate reversal of the first few essential rules of the Buddhist moral code, as expressed succintly in the *Hevajra Tantra* (II.iii.29–30):

"You should slay living beings; you should speak lying words;
You should take what is not given; you should frequent others' wives."

While one can find 'refined' interpretations for rules such as these, there are many more contexts avilable, where such teaching is taken quite literally.[33] It is often assumed that *yoga–tantras* are generally free of references to sexual yoga as well as the kind of 'antinomian' teachings which have been briefly illustrated. Thus in his study of the *Mahāvairocana–sūtra* R. Tajima observes that: "Esoteric teachings were introduced into Tibet after their establishment in China. As for their links, we have historical proofs that they derived principally from Vikramaśila as their centre. On the one hand research–work done on the Tibetan version of the scriptures are valuable for the texts themselves; but one notes that the strange esoteric teachings of Lamaist religion are in fact rather far from the Buddha's teachings. Thus one should

[32] *Guhyasamāja Tantra*, Bhattacharyya's ed. p. 55, line 17 ff. One may note also p. 128, lines 1–16, which is quite explicit concerning the use of human flesh, faeces and urine, blood and semen. Moreover a true practiser should envisage whatever food he eats as faeces, urine and meat as befits the ritual, p. 140 last line.

[33] On the social and moral 'freedom' of the tantric yogin, which permits such acts, see for example the *Caṇḍamahāroṣaṇa* Tantra, ed. C.S. George, Skr text, p. 32, lines 1–12. In a rather different context, e.g. within that of the *Sarvadurgatipariśodhana Tantra* (see T. Skorupski's adition pp. 66-7) a certain 'moral' value is given to these perverse injunctions, viz. one may slay those who are perverting the doctrine, seize the wealth of the avaricious and give someone else's wife 'for the sake of this *sādhana*, for delighting the Buddhas and keeping to one's pledge'.

never lose sight of the considerable distance separating Chinese esoterism, from which derives the whole of Japanese Shingon, from that of Tibet ". Thus he attempts to draw a distinction between those tantras which were " a development of Mahāyānist thought " and " an orthodox esoterism founded on the Vinaya " with Nālāndā as their centre, and those 'formed in a rather popular mould towards the end of the eight century and declining into the esoterism of the left '.[34] While it is certainly true that certain distinctions may be drawn between tantras which are closely linked with Mahāyāna sūtras (the *yoga–tantras* generally) and those which deliberately introduce non–Buddhist divinities of an horrific kind as Buddha–manifestations (Heruka, Hevajra, Cakrasaṃvara, Caṇḍamahāroṣaṇa etc.), it is not so easy to make distinctions in the teachings and practices prescribed. Thus the foremost of the *yoga–tantras*, namely the *Sarvatathāgata–tattva-saṃgraha*, which was already introduced into China in the early eight century long before there is any reference to it in Tibet (which is surprising), mentions frequently not only sexual yoga but also the antinomian teachings which are certainly typical of the so called *yoginī–tantras*.[35]

I conclude this contribution to our volume in honour of my revered master, Giuseppe Tucci, whose vast endeavours in the whole field of Buddhist studies have been a continuing inspiration to me throughout my whole academic career, by summarizing my own opinions to date concerning categories of Buddhist tantras. Such opinions can only be provisional, for there remain a very large number of tantras of which I have no direct knowledge at all. These are not literary works, which one can glance through in order to gain an idea of their main theses. Each tantra has to be studied in its own right from beginning to end with due attention paid to its various commentaries, if one is to avoid false assumptions about any one of them. Atiśa may have lectured Rin–che bzang–po severely on his preoccupation with a variety of tantras, asserting that any one, properly practised, will be equally beneficial,[36] but literary activity of the kind to which Rin–chen bzang–po had devoted his whole life to the enormous benefit of later generations of Tibetans, is rather different from the pursuit of the goal of enlightenment, for which one tantra may well be more than enough. The present writer feels a certain confidence in expressing his views on the basis of the few tan-

[34] See Ryūjun Tajima, *Étude sur le Mahāvairocana Tantra*, Paris, 1937, p. 7.

[35] See the Introduction, pp. 51 ff. to the Facsimile Edition of Lokesh Chandra and D.L. Snellgrove, New Delhi, 1981.

[36] This well known story will be found in a variety of sources, in the *Blue Annals*, pp. 249–50, in Atiśa's biography (see Helmut Eimer, *rNam–thar rGyas–pa*, Wiesbaden, 1979, part I, p. 233 ff.) and in Rin–chen bzang–po's biography (see Snellgrove & Skorupski, *The Cultural Heritage of Ladakh*, II, p. 96).

tras, which he has studied with attention, for the one reason than many greater scholars, Indian and Tibetan, who have read many more tantras with the express intention of categorizing them satisfactorily, sometimes make easy assumptions in their regard, which are patently false. As they so often confute one another in the explanations given there is no need for an outsider to give examples. It is probably sufficient to make the point that the so called ' Supreme Yoga ' tantras (*anuttarayoga-tantras*), which are often supposed to be superior to *yoga-tantras* because they teach the ' higher consecrations ' of sexual yoga, in fact teach nothing essential which is not already taught in *yoga-tantras*. The ' higher consecrations ', the theory of the four *mudrā*, the ' process of realization ' (*saṃpannakrama*) as well as the ' process of emanation ' (*utpattikrama*) are all to be found there. ' Supreme Yoga ' tantras may be more explicit in these matters, especially where sexual yoga is concerned, and they certainly provide a far greater choice of tulerary divinities usually of non-Buddhist extraction, but they can scarcely be said to offer superior means towards the realization of enlightenment.

It would be interesting to know when the term ' tantra ' first came into general Mahāyāna Buddhist usage, but this matter would be particularly difficult, if not impossible to investigate satisfactorily, because the term has clearly been freely used retrospectively to refer to texts which were probably never thought of as belonging to a special general category altogether distinct from *sūtras*. It is well known that certain texts which are included in the ' tantra ' section of the Tibetan Canon do not contain the term ' tantra ' in their titles at all. Even the all-important *Sarvatathāgata-tattavasaṃgraha* is clearly designated *Mahāyāna-sūtra*. Since we know that this work was in circulation by the eighth century, and doubtless existed even earlier than this, one might argue that the term ' tantra ' was only beginning to receive a sufficiently generalized meaning from perhaps the eighth century onwards. It is most unlikely that the works which were designated ' rites ' (*kriyā*) and ' ceremonies ' (*caryā*) were thought of as ' tantras ' when they first began to circulate, and only later when it was realized that a large number of texts, claiming canonical status, and yet generally distinguishable from *sūtra* literature in that they were far more concerned with rituals than with doctrine, was the term ' tantra ' applied to them in retrospect, together with their relegation to lower categories because of their apparent inferiority to *yoga-tantras*. They were presumably judged inferior in so far as they do not teach the higher consecrations, to which we have just referred. As already adequately argued above in section v. they can scarcely be referred to as *Vajrayāna* since they releghte the Vajra family to a comparatively lowly status. Theoretically it should be possible to arrange all texts, which were later classified as tantras, according to their family compositions. Thus one might assume that those texts which are concerned with three main

families, while remaining vague about other possible ones (as in the case of the *Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa*) are earlier than the *yoga tantras*, where the five-fold maṇḍala is accepted as normal. Again these might be earlier than those which refer to six families, while concentrating upon one particular family, namely Vajrapāṇi's Vajra family. Such a theory, however, is frustrated by the general rule that later developments seldom if ever annul earlier ones, with the result that the various traditions continue to develop side by side. It is also generally known that to date any sūtra or tantra with certainty is practically impossible, because most of them continued to change and develop over long periods of time, and the most that can be done is to date them at a particular stage of development when they happened to be translated into Chinese, or by such references as may be made to them during clearly recorded periods of Tibetan history.

Yoga-tantras and especially the *Sarvatathāgata-tattvasaṃgraha* are known in China from the early eighth century onwards, having reached there by the sea-route.[37] During the second half of the same century Indian and Tibetan scholars were actively introducing *yoga-tantra* traditions into Tibet, despite the restrictions placed upon such translations by royal edict. Thus a number of tantras in approved translations are listed in the lDan-kar catalogue, the compilation of which is attributed to dPal-brtsegs (a disciple of the famous Indian master of Yoga Tantras Buddhaguhya) and the sage Nam-mkha'i snying-po, whose connections with Central Asian and Chinese teachers seem to be well established.[38] Mr Kenneth Eastman (see fn 4 above) has drawn attention to interesting connections between an early group of eighteen Yoga (or Mahāyoga) Tantras and the set of eighteen Mahāyoga Tantras preserved in the *rNying-ma'i rGyud-'bum*, suggesting that these may well be the earliest known collections of tantric texts. During the first diffusion of Buddhism in Tibet, usually dated from the seventh until the ninth centuries, there were clearly no hesitations on the part of many Tibetans in accepting Chinese Buddhist traditions as valid, although these seem to have been challenged by some Indian teachers at that time. The so-called *yoginī-tantras* are certainly known, but there is no suggestion that they should be placed in a higher category known as ' Supreme Yoga ' tantras, at least in Tibetan circles.

This remains true also in Western Tibet in subsequent centuries, as

[37] See Chou Yi-liang, « Tantrism in China », *HJAS*, 8, 1945, pp. 241–332.

[38] See the relevant articles by Marcelle Lalou, « Les textes bouddhiques au temps du roi Khri-srong-lde-brtsan », *JA*, 1953, pp. 313–53, and « Document tibétain sur l'expansion du dhyāna chinois », *JA*, 1938, pp. 505–23. For more up to date references see the article by D. S. Ruegg, « Autour du *lTa-ba'i khyad-par* de Ye-śes-sde (version de Touen-houang, Pelliot tibétain 814) », *JA*, 1981, pp. 207–229.

is indicated by Zhi–ba–'od's ordinance already referred to above. It is likely that the claim of *yoginī–tantras* to belong to a superior grade originated in eastern India amongst the tantric yogins, who were their chief promulgators. Kaṇha's commentary on the Hevajra Tantra, which I dated hesitatingly to the ninth century although it may well be later, refers to *kriyā–*, *caryā–*, *yoga-* and *anuttarayoga–tantras* as a progressively higher series, and this tradition was certainly accepted by the later generations of Tibetans (11th and 12th centuries) who were responsible for completing the ' second diffusion ' of Buddhism in Tibet, as the ' correct ' one.[39] Meanwhile the earlier tantric tradition continued to develop amongst those who remained faithful to the ' old teachings '. Althought Tibetan dominance disappeared in Central Asia with the collapse of the Tibetan monarchy in the mid-ninth century, cultural and religious contacts were certainly maintained throughout the tenth and eleventh centuries not only with Chinese Buddhist centres in Tun-huang, but also with the Uighurs in the Turfan area and even further to the north-east with the Tangut–Tibetan kingdom of Hsi–hsiah, which survived until the Mongol conquest. All this represents an important extension of the ' first diffusion ' of Buddhism in Tibet, which is omitted altogether by later Tibetan historians who write in terms of the almost total destruction of Buddhism in their country, its struggling revival some hundred years later, followed by the fruitful labours of entirely new generations of scholars and translators who convert the country anew to orthodox Indian Buddhist teachings. The one-sidedness of such an account is proved beyond doubt by the vast quantity of Buddhist and quasi–Buddhist teachings which make their appearance in Tibet from the twelfth century onwards as the sponsored productions of those self–constituted religious groups, who call themselves *rNying-ma* (the old order) and *Bon–po,* both of whom have large collections of tantras which while clearly Indian in inspiration and sometimes in actual direct origin, have been strongly influenced by those earlier Central Asian and Chinese Buddhist influences, which formed part of the ' first diffusion ' of the new religion in Tibet. It is in a context such as this that the *ati–yoga* or

[39] See for example his *Yogaratnamālā* in my edition of the *Hevajra Tantra,* vol. II, p. 142, line 31 ff., where he is commenting on the main text II.iii. 10–12. One may note that it is the commentary and not the main text which relates four grades of tantras with the four attitudes of couples of divinities, namely: smiling, looking at one another, embracing and uniting. Yet this accidental suggestion seems to serve as the basis for Tsong–kha–pa's extraordinary idea that tantras may be distinguished into four groups depending upon whether the divinities whith which they deal are (i) smiling at one another (*kriyā–tantra*), (ii) gazing at one another (*caryā–tantra*), (iii) embracing one another (*yoga–tantra*) or (iv) united with one another (*anuttarayoga-tantra*). See Jeffry Hopkins, *Tantra in Tibet,* London, 1977, p. 151 ff., where one will find his admirable translation on Tsong–kha–pa's theories on how to identify the four classes of tantras.

rDzogs–chen tradition of both *rNying–ma* and *Bon–po* must be appreciated, no less valid as a form of advanced tantric teaching than the *yoginī–tantra* tradition of north-eastern India, strongly influenced as this certainly is by heterodox Hindu theories and cults. The considerable respect which the Tibetans have continued to have for India as the primary source of the religion which they adopted whole–heartedly, has led many of them to believe that almost any self-declared Buddhist text of proven Indian origin has a greater claim to validity, however late its appearace, than Buddhist works produced by Buddhist communities elsewhere. Once Buddhism spread as a living religion from India to other Asian Countries, there was manifestly no reason why the long process of Buddhist doctrinal developments, which cover a period of some seventeen hundred years on Indian soil, should not continue in China and Tibet.[40] It is within this very much wider context that work on Buddhist tantras has to be developed, and it is encouraging to note that a number of young scholars are now taking the lead in this field of study.

[40] Concerning the argued validity of Chinese 'apocryphal' Buddhist works see the brilliant article by Michel Strickmann, « India in the Chinese Looking–Glass » in Deborah E. Klimburg Salter's volume, *The Silk Route and the Diamond Path*, UCLA (Los Angeles) 1982, pp. 52-63.

ERNST STEINKELLNER

REMARKS ON *NIŚCITAGRAHAṆA**

The idea of the ascertainment (*niścaya*) of the three forms (*rūpa*) of a logical reason (*hetu*) as a necessary condition for its validity has an important function in Dharmakīrti's way of identifying his own logical theory with that of Dignāga. In all his relevant works it is a particular exigent concern of Dharmakīrti to show that Dignāga's theory of the *trilakṣaṇo hetu* implies his own theorem of an essential connection (*svabhāvapratibandha*) as the basis of any kind of logical nexus (*vyāpti*) [1]. At the same time he refutes with elaborate consistency all attempts – above all those of his teacher Īśvarasena – to propose the possibility of a logical nexus without such a basis in the reality of entities which is lastly referred to by the concepts involved in an inferential cognition and the process of its production.

On other occasions I have collected some materials regarding the way in which Dharmakīrti accounted for the central sameness of his theory with Dignāga's all related to his particular emphasis on the need for, and of the possibility of ascertainment (*niścaya*) [2]. A comparison of the different presentations in his works[3] does not only show a distinct increase

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1 Regarding this theorem of *svabhāvapratibandha* cf. my article: « Wirklichkeit und Begriff bei Dharmakīrti », *WZKSOA* 15, 1971, pp. 179–211. An interpretation quite different from mine gives Matsumoto Shiro [i.e. Shirō], « Svabhāvapratibandha », *IBK* 30, 1981, pp. 494–498, but cf. my answer: « Svabhāvapratibandha again » *Acta Indologica* 6, 1984, pp. 457–476.

2 Cf. HB II 207f., PVin IIa notes 57 and 442ff., and my preface to PVin IIa 6 f.; the materials and interpretations offered in these notes are partially restated here.

3 As to the sequence of Dharmakīrti's works I follow E. Frauwallner's explanation proposed in: « Die Reihenfolge und Entstehung der Werke Dharmakīrti's », *Asiatica. Festschrift Friedrich Weller zum 65. Geburtstag*, Leipzig 1954, pp. 142–154.

My own studies of some of Dharmakīrti's concepts and their development were started in the beginning deliberately without regard to "Frauwallner's sequence" for methodical reasons: I wanted to hear the voice of the texts unprejudiced by the historical

of clearness in Dharmakīrti's explanation of this idea, but also provides us with some surprisingly close observations of an Indian philosopher at work.

There can be no doubt that Dharmakīrti's continuous efforts towards relating his thought to his great predecessor, Dignāga, is neither mere lip-service with the purpose of sharing the latter's fame, nor aimed at procuring the necessary authorization for his own ideas in the eyes of the learned. Rather, in the best sense of Indian tradition, Dharmakīrti's innovations are nothing but his particular way of explaining the essential meaning of Dignāga's logical theory, and of laying bare its structure which had not yet been properly understood [4]. The exegetical effort Dharmakīrti puts into aligning his solutions with the Dignāgean tradition is an integral part, therefore, of his own, original contribution to this tradition [5]. If we are concerned with this contribution, then, any pronounced exegetical statement may also serve as a main clue for its contextually proper appreciation, as well as for an understanding of the questions that constitute its motivating background.

I.

The exegetical line chosen by Dharmakīrti to achieve the aim of identifying his theory of the logical reason with that of Dignāga is clearly

concept proposed by an experienced and venerated teacher but, nevertheless, still untested in actual interpretation. Already the resultats of my attempt to explain Dharmakīrti's development of the *kṣaṇikatvānumāna*, however, fully corroborated Frauwallner's idea of the sequence of these works, and these results were further corroborated by my experience with the relation between the Pramāṇaviniścaya and the first chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika and its Vṛtti. I found no reason so far to remain sceptical in this respect, nor has anybody else to my knowledge. "Frauwallner's sequence" is again confirmed by my present investigation of the development of Dharmakīrti's theory of the logical nexus and its verification of which I gave a preliminary survey at the International Dharmakīrti Conference held at the University of Kyōto 16–17th June 1982, and has again been confirmed by the present study. Thus I consider it as well-established.

[4] Cf. my general remarks in the preface to PVin IIa 6f. In the present context it is particularly revealing to observe the fact that while Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika was conceived as a commentary on the Pramāṇasamuccaya and the Pramāṇaviniścaya as an independent treatise, it is the "commentary" which shows a great degree of independence in its first pronouncements of a number of new theorems, and it is the "independent" treatise which shows a remarkable turn towards Dignāga.

[5] Dharmakīrti's example in this respect may be taken as a favourable point of departure for re-evaluating the concept of "traditionalism" as constituting a main feature of Indian spirituality. For, here, we can see a "dialectical" moment that has not been taken into consideration so far: A "new", "original" idea receives its place in the cultural context, becomes authoritative, respected, and worthy of being followed

expressed already in PV I 15 [= 17] and the following words of PVSV 10,28 f.: [6] " Therefore, he [i.e. Dignāga] spoke of an ascertainment (*niścaya*) with regard to the three forms of the logical reason as a suitable match for those (logical reasons) that are either unestablished (in the subject of the inference), or have a contradictory object, or are deviating. – For, if there is no connection (*pratibandha*), there is no ascertainment of the concomitance in agreement and in difference. Therefore, he spoke of ascertainment (*niścaya*) indicating this very (connection) " [7].

It is interesting to note, however, that Dharmakīrti here refers to a statement of Dignāga which does not use the words *niścaya* or *niścita*. He refers to PS III 11c: " (A reason) that is proven (*prasiddha*) to both (disputants) is the proving (element) " [8], and takes the word *prasiddha* to imply ascertainment. He then explains these words of Dignāga accordingly – with a view to his assumption that there is no ascertainment without a connection (*pratibandha*) [9].

Since Dharmakīrti's interest in this first presentation of his new logical thought is almost entirely concentrated on the three kinds of a logical reason (*trividhā hetu*) and the related theorem of the essential connection (*svabhāvapratibandha*), this is the only instance where he relates

or contested, if it is shown to be " non–new ", " traditional ". The result of this movement is a " changed tradition " which is neither the one nor the other. The developmental structure of pre-modern Indian thought should better be taken, then, in terms of such a " dialectical traditionalism ".

[6] Dharmakīrti's first work, called *Hetuprakaraṇa by Frauwallner (*loc. cit.* 152), was incorporated into the Pramāṇavārttika as its first chapter together with an " (auto–) commentary ".

[7] */ hetos triṣv api rūpeṣu niścayas tena varṇitaḥ / asiddhaviparītārthavyabhicārivipakṣataḥ //* (v. 15 [= 17]) *na hy asati pratibandhe 'nvayavyatirekaniścayo 'sti. tena tam eva darśayan niścayam āha.*

[8] *prasiddhas* (: *asiddhas*) *tu dvayor api sādhanam.* Quoted PVSVT 57, 21f.; PVSVT 57,20–22 (*yata … asiddhetyādi*) is a copy of PVT 33b 2 f.

[9] This description of the reason (*hetu, pakṣadharma*) which demands its being known to both speakers does not differ essentially from statements of the Nyāyamukha where, in fact, the word *niścita* is used instead of *prasiddha*. Cf. NMu (Katsura) 2.2: *pakṣadharmo vādiprativādiniścito gṛhyate* (quoted by Vibhūticandra, PVV 293, n. 5), or NMu (Katsura) 2.4: *ya eva tūbhayaniścitavācī sa sādhanaṃ dūṣaṇaṃ vā …* (quoted PVSV 153, 19 f.).

Finally, Dignāga used the term *niścaya* also to indicate in a general way the result of an inference; cf. NMu v. 13 (Katsura 5.5) = PS IV 6: *svaniścayavad anyeṣāṃ niścayotpādanecchayā / pakṣadharmatvasaṃbandhasādhyokter anyavarjanam //* (quoted PVBh 487,33).

Since the first two statements express the same idea as PS III 11, I fail to find a reason why Dharmakīrti would not, instead, refer to one of these. We have to conclude, therefore, that the word *prasiddha* in PS III 11 is a synonym of *niścita*.

this theorem to Dignāga's description of the three forms of the reason [10]. And the objective of this reference is none other than to provide an authorization for his refutation of those theories of the logical nexus that do not assume such an essential connection [11]. For, such theories – according to Dharmakīrti's understanding – are not in agreement with Dignāga's teaching: Although Dignāga does not actually speak of the essential connection, this concept is implied when he refers to the ascertainment of the three forms of the reason [12].

II.

Before proceeding to Dharmakīrti's next presentation of this exegetical idea, we have to survey Dignāga's usage of the terms *niścaya/niścita* in the two extant works considered as authoritative in this context, the Nyāyamukha and the Pramāṇasamuccaya with its Vṛtti. The passages cited by Dharmakīrti, and referred to above, seem to be all that are available [13]. These instances, NMu (Katsura) 2.2, 2.4, 5.5 and PS IV 6, PS

[10] In his refutation of Kumārila's *apauruṣeyatva*-argument Dharmakīrti concludes a step by stating that the pervasion (*vyāpti*) assumed by his opponent, i.e. " whatever refers to false objects (*mithyārtha*) is caused by ... (*pauruṣeya*) " is a non-pervasion (*avyāpti*) because of non-ascertainment (*aniścayāt*). Non-ascertainment, here, means, according to PVT 15b2f. (cf. PVSVT 545,20–22) that the absence (*vyatireka*) of the property " non-producedness " in the (presence of the) property "referring to false objects" is not ascertained.

Dharmakīrti, then, again refers to the idea of a necessary ascertainment: " If concomitance in agreement (*anvaya*), concomitance in difference (*vyatireka*), or presence in the property-bearer to be proven, are established by (such valid) cognitions which result in an ascertainment of these (three forms of the reason), (then these three forms) are a means of proving (*sādhana*) (what is meant to be proven). " (PV I 290 [= 292]: */anvayo vyatireko vā sattvaṃ vā sādhyadharmiṇi / tanniścayaphalair jñānaiḥ sidhyanti yadi sādhanam //*).

And, again, he supports his reminder by referring to a passage from Dignāga's Nyāyamukha which contains the phrase *ubhayaniścita–*, " ascertained for both [disputants] " (PVSV 153,19ff.: *ya eva tūbhayaniścitavācī sa sādhanam, dūṣaṇaṃ vā, nānyatarāprasiddhasaṃdigdhavācī, punaḥ sādhanāpekṣatvād iti*). These statements have already been alluded to earlier, in PVSV 13.17; they are from NMu (Katsura) 2.4. Although clearly pointing out the fact that the ascertainment of the logical reason's three forms has been called for by Dignāga, Dharmakīrti has no motive from this context, however, to explicitely relate his theory of an essential connection between the terms to this demand of Dignāga.

[11] PVSV 11,5ff., introduced by the words: *anyathā hy asati pratibandhe 'darśanamātreṇa vyatireke ...*

[12] Cf. PVT 34a6 = PVSVT 58,22: *tasmān niścayavacanād ācāryeṇāpi pratibandha iṣṭa eva.*

[13] For two reasons: I have come across no other, and – more convincing – the

III 11, have one thing in common: They do not belong to statements directly defining the logical reason or its forms, but are taken, rather, from discussions in elaboration of the definitions proper, with a view to ensuring the validity of these definitions within the context of the theory of proof (*sādhana, parārthānumāna*). Thus, the term *niścaya/niścita* needed to be stated separately as soon as the second person, the opposing speaker, came into consideration. With regard to the definition of the logical reason itself, however, such a term is clearly absent. And it is not only absent, but even explicitly denied a possible place among the primary definitory characteristics of the reason.

Dignāga defines and explains the three characteristics of a logical reason in PS II 5cd–6ab and his Vṛtti (Peking ed. V 30a1–8 = K 111a6–111b3) [14]. After presenting the three characteristics themselves, explaining the function of the particle *eva*, and clarifying the purpose of the statement of the third characteristic, Dignāga concludes with the information that it is the indicator (*liṅga*) endowed with these three characteristics through which the indicated (*liṅgin*) is cognized [15]. This then, gives rise to the question whether the cognition (*śes pa, jñāna*) of the indicator, the logical reason, should not also be mentioned as one of the characteristics. Dignāga counters: "It need not be mentioned, for – here [16] the cognition, too, is already obtained – " [17]. And he concludes by explain-

matter's import for Dharmakīrti is so great, that he would not have missed another chance to support his case, or support it better, I believe.

[14] For a translation (Japanese) and the edition of the text cf. Kitagawa Hidenori, *Indo koten ronrigaku no kenkyū – Jinna (Dignāga) no taikei.* Tōkyō 1965, pp. 96–102, 455 f.; a new translation (English) is given by Richard P. Hayes in his paper «Diṅnāga's Views on Reasoning (svārthānumāna)», *JIPh* 8, 1980, pp. 219–277, 252 f.

[15] V 30a4f.: ... gaṅ tshul gsum pa'i rtags las rtags can rtogs so ...; K 111b1: 'dir tshul gsum pa'i rtags gaṅ las rtags can rtogs pa yin no //

[16] "Here" can only refer to the definitory statement of the indicator with its three characteristics as given just above.

[17] V 30a5: ci ste śes pa yaṅ smos par bya ba yin no že na / smos par bya ba ma yin te / gaṅ gi phyir / 'di ru śes pa'aṅ thob pa ñid //; K 111b1f.: de ltar na śes pa smod par bya' o že na / smos par mi bya ste / gaṅ gi phyir / 'dir ni śes pa'aṅ 'phaṅs pa yin //

I prefer to translate PS II 6ab according to Vasudhararakṣita's version which shows a sequence clearer in its logic:

1. It need not be mentioned, because it is already obtained, available, at hand (*thob pa*).

2. How can something be obtained, without being mentioned?

3. Because of the implication when the indicator as cause of its cognition is taken as the subject.

It seems that Kitagawa (*loc. cit.* 101), too, takes it in this way, for he translates

ing how this cognition of the logical reason can be obtained without being expressly mentioned [18].

Dignāga, in this way, uses the term *niścaya/niścita* in what can best be called a natural manner. It is, in fact, " natural " that a logical reason can serve as a cognition–constituting factor only when cognised itself; so its cognition need not be mentioned separately as one of its characteristics. In the context of the theory or description of proof, however, the fact that it is acceptable through an ascertainment to both disputants (*ubhaya niścita*!) represents a discussion–related feature of the reason which is useful in defining the reason as valid in discussions, but does not determine its primary nature.

In other words, if Dharmakīrti states that Dignāga " spoke of an

the crucial verb both times by *ryōkai sareru* which means " to be understood, grasped " and, presumably, stands for *thob pa*.

In Hayes' translation (*loc. cit.* 253) – he seems to follow Kanakavarman's version – this sequence is less easy to follow:

1. It need not be mentioned, because " it is taken for granted ".
2. " How can what is not explicitly mentioned be taken for granted " ?
3. Because of the implications ...

In this rendering, the second step even compeletely loses the direct connection with the original question, since it should – logically – require an explanation as to how it could be taken for granted at all. Instead it raises the additional, unrelated problem, how something not explicitly mentioned can in fact be taken for granted. In other words, if we follow Kanakavarman's text (reading *'phaṅs pa*, against *thob pa*) and Hayes' translation, the phrase *ma bśad pa* (" what is not explicitly mentioned ") is, strictly speaking, superfluous, if we do not go so far as to assume that Dignāga gives a minute lecture, here, on the meaning of implication.

Irrespective of this argument in favour of the better quality of Vasudhararakṣita's version in this particular case – and, thus, for a verbal correspondence of *thob pa* instead of *'phaṅs pa* to be assumed for the original text of the PS – the second step in Hayes' translation seems to be formulated such, as to contain a clear contradiction: for it would suggest that only something that is explicitly mentioned can be " taken for granted ", while we have to understand, in this context, that " taken for granted " – being a translation of *'phaṅs pa* which means " hinted at, referred to " – has been used with the meaning " accepted as a fact without specific reason ", i.e. without being explicitly mentioned.

Beyond that, Jinendrabuddhi corroborates not only Vasudhararakṣita's reading *thob* – while he normally supports the translation of Kanakavarman rather –, but also tends to support a sequence of at least two explanatory steps (1. " obtained ", 2. " because indicated "): " With (the words) ' cognition, too, is obtained ' etc. he teaches, that no further effort needs to be made towards it, because the cognition is indicated by force (= implied) ", (Viś 108 b4: *śes pa'aṅ thob ces pa la sogs pas / śes pa ni śugs kyis phaṅs pa ñid kyi phyir de la rtsol ba gźan bsgrub par bya ba ma yin no źes ston to //*) I previously followed Kanakavarman's version (cf. HB II note VI, 53) but have since changed my view.

[18] Hayes explains the idea of this conclusion in *loc. cit.*, note 65.

ascertainment (*niścaya*) with regard to the three forms of the logical reason " [19], this is not, actually, the case. Thus, there was evidently no way left to Dharmakīrti but to draw upon the few proof-related statements using the term, and to present them as if they were meant to be statements defining the characteristics of a valid logical reason.

III.

In the second chapter of the Pramāṇaviniścaya Dharmakīrti presents the logical themes of his first work in a new and better arrangement [20]. Most of the textual material related to the issues of the logical nexus (*niyama*), pervasion (*vyāpti*), as being founded upon an essential connection, and of oppositional theories of pervasion not accepting such a basis, are gathered in the final part of the chapter which deals with this very problem [21]. This part also includes a slightly altered version of the text referred to above [22]. The essential meaning of this whole text on the logical nexus (*niyama*) is evident: Dharmakīrti applies all possible means of his exegetical art to prove that Dignāga's theory of the logical reason (*hetu*) is impossible without the assumption of an essential connection (*svabhāvapratibandha*) as a basis of the logical nexus (*niyama*). But he goes a step further, too.

In composing the verse containing the definition of the logical reason and an enumeration of its kinds in the very beginning of the *hetu*-explanation (PVin II 5, 1 ff.) Dharmakīrti brings his exegetical idea, that Dignāga's definition implies his own theorem of an essential connection to its final verbal shape: Dignāga's definition of the logical reason's three characteristics is enriched, now, by the word *niścita* (*ṅes pa*), and three kinds of logical reasons are stated as fulfilling the requirement to be endowed with these characteristics.

I came across this definition first while studying the Hetubindu [23], and took it up again in my edition and translation of PVin II [24]. The complete verse was always somewhat enigmatic to me, for two reasons: It was attributed to Dignāga – which was impossible –, and I could not find it in Dharmakīrti's works. But it had only escaped me. Dr Chri-

[19] Cf. above 3

[20] Cf. my analysis in PVin IIa 143–149.

[21] PVin II 37,32–47,25.

[22] PVin II 40,13–19 corresponds to PV I 15(= 17) with PVSV 10,28–11,1. The only textual difference consists in that Dharmakīrti includes a quotation of the relevant words from PS III 11.

[23] HB II 207 ff.

[24] Cf. PVin IIa 31 with note 57.

stian Lindtner, Copenhagen, has found it now[25], and thereby given a clear answer to some of my questions. The following is the textual situation after Dr Lindtner's striking identifications.

The complete verse as quoted in Siddharṣi's Nyāyāvatāravivṛtti 52, 17 f. is, in fact, none but PVin II 9:

anumeye 'tha tattulye sadbhāvo nāstitāsati /
niścitānupalambhātmakāryākhyā hetavas trayaḥ //

The Tibetan text of my edition has, therefore, to be rearranged. PVin II 5,1–3[26]:

tshul gsum pa ni /
rjes dpag bya daṅ de mtshuṅs la /
/ yod daṅ med la med par ni /
/ ṅes pa / (v. 9a–c|)
rjes su dpag par bya ba ni ...

and PVin II 10,2–6[26]:

mtshan ñid de daṅ ldan pa'i[27] */*
gtan tshigs[28] *mi dmigs daṅ /*
/ bdag daṅ 'bras bu źes bya gsum / (v. 9 | c–d)
kho na'o // rtags ni gsum ste / ...

Since, now, we have another verse 9, the numbers of verses 9–27 in my edition must also be changed to 10–28[28a].

This verse contains, then, Dharmakīrti's complete theory of the logical reason (*hetu*). It consists of two parts: a definition, which gives the criteria in form of the three characteristics of a reason, and an enumeration of the kinds of reasons that are possible. These two parts are

[25] Verbal communication of May 3rd 1983. Lindtner's additional materials were published as « Marginalia to Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścaya I–II », *WZKS* 28, 1984, pp. 149–175.

[26] My edition has a separate counting of pages with asterix for the purpose of counting the Tibetan text proper conveniently.

[27] The variants ... *daṅ ldan pa yi* (N, P) and ... *daṅ ldan pa pa'i* (D), both, can be explained as a result of the fact that this introductory attribute of the subject of verse 9 became considered as part of the verse itself in the Tibetan tradition, too. While Derge still retains the original form of the particle (*pa'i*) it also keeps, however, a metri causa (?)-duplication (*pa pa'i*) with *pa* in an otherwise unknown expletive (?) function. Narthang and Peking do not share in this corrupt transmission by changing the particle's form.

[28] *de ni* (after *gtan tshigs*) must be deleted from the text against all three versions. It has been added metri causa when it was no longer recognized that this incomplete *pāda* is the continuation of what was started with *ṅes pa* two folios above.

[28a] The succeeding numbers remain up to 34. Then, following Lindtner's findings, (*op. cit.*, 165) 32cd of my edition is prose, 35 (two *pādas*) becomes 32cd and the following verses 36–75 are to be numbered 35–74 respectively.

expressed by two independent sentences, and only the first is of interest to us, here.

Although there is no doubt that we know, now, the original Sanskrit phrasing of the definition, when we compare it with the Tibetan translation a last uncertainty remains to be removed. It is clear that the first two *pādas* of the verse are taken from Dignāga's PS II 5cd. To these words of Dignāga, Dharmakīrti not only added a new attribute (*ṅes pa, niścita*) [29], but also supplied an explanatory subject (*tshul gsum pa*) in order to introduce the verse. Finally, the Tibetan translation accounts for the additional word by changing the predicative construction of the PS in ... *med pa'o* [30] into *med par ni.*

Since the subject, *tshul gsum pa,* refers to *tshul gsum rtags* of PVin II 1b, quite in agreement with the PS [31], I interpreted it as a *bahuvrīhi* in my translation [32], thus taking *tshul gsum pa* to be a translation of **trirūpam* (*liṅgam*). The context and the substantives of the extant Sanskrit original, however, allow for no other interpretation than as a translation of **trairūpyam* [33].

Although this introduction of the *hetu*-definition refers to *tshul gsum rtags las* of PVin II 1b which is explained as *mtshan ñid gsum pa'i rtags las* (*trilakṣaṇāl liṅgāt*) in PVin II 1,26, at the beginning of the final listing of the logical reasons (PVin II 10,2), they are called *mtshan ñid de daṅ ldan pa* ("provided with this definition"). "This definition", however, is the one given in the first part of our verse; it represents the total of the definitory characteristics given in this part of the verse, the indicator's general character of having three forms (*trairūpya*). Thus, the definition should be translated: "The [indicator's] character of having three forms (*tshul gsum pa, *trairūpya*) consists in the ascertained presence in the subject of inference and in what is similar to it, and in the absence in (its) absence". This corresponds to the formulation of NB II 5 [34].

Surprisingly this definition of the *trairūpya* is ascribed to Dignāga by Arcaṭa and Durvekamiśra. In the beginning of the "*niścitagrahaṇa*-discussion" [35] (HBT 222,5–7) Arcaṭa, explaining the introducing objection

[29] What is the syntactical relation of *niścita*-? It can only be meaningful as an attribute of *sadbhāva* and *nāstitā* in concord with the latter, and should be read *niścitā.*

[30] V 30a1, K 111a6.

[31] Because of the lengthy preceding digression, the Vṛtti (V 30a1, K 111a6) introduces the verse with a similar reference, here to PS II 1b. Cf. Hayes, *loc. cit.* 252.

[32] Cf. PVin IIa 31: "der dreiformige (Grund)", as against an earlier attempt in HB II 207.

[33] Although unusual, *tshul gsum pa* does occur as translation of *trairūpya,* e.g. in the translation of the NBT.

[34] Cf. HB II 207 f.

in the Hetubindu, has the opponent stating that the word *niścita* which was used by the *ācārya*, i.e. Dignāga, and accepted "by you", i.e. Dharmakīrti, should not be used. To document this usage he quotes the "incomplete version" of PVin II 9. And later he states, again paraphrasing words of the Hetubindu, that the word *niścita* was used by the *ācārya*, i.e. Dignāga, and assented to "by us", i.e. Dharmakīrti [36]. Arcaṭa, finally, refers again to this usage of the word by the *ācārya*, i.e. Dignāga, in the concluding words of this paragraph [37].

The last two ascriptions are corroborated by Durvekamiśra. In his commentary on HBT 224,21 he identifies the *ācārya* mentioned as *ācārya* Dignāga [38]; and in the commentary on HBT 225,9 f. he specifies that Dignāga used the word in the Pramāṇasamuccaya, and Dharmakīrti in the Pramāṇaviniścaya (!) and other works [39].

This must have been the reason for the ascription of the whole verse to Dignāga by Rājaśekhara Sūri (NAVṬ 52,10) which as such is quite impossible because of the three kinds of reasons occurring in the second part, but which – for this very reason – corroborates the ascription of the above definition to Dignāga as being not a mere mistake, but rather a well-known state of affairs. Yet, as we have already seen [40], Dignāga did not use the term *niścita* in exactly the way that he is purported to have used it by these commentators, i.e. in his definition of the logical reason. There, the term is not stated in the way it is stated, e.g., in Dharmakīrti's definition of the PVin.

I can offer only one answer for this mysterious circumstance: [41] In the first presentation of his new logical theory, in the PV I and PVSV, Dharmakīrti declares – in a manner still somewhat restrained – that Dignāga "spoke of an ascertainment with regard to the three forms" [42], without really being able to produce a convenient and throughly convincing quotation from any of Dignāga's works. In his second and more refined presentation, Dharmakīrti offers a definition of the three forms

35 On this argument cf. below 13f.

36 HBT 224,21f.: ... *niścitaśabdaḥ prayukta ācāryeṇāsmābhiś cābhyupagata iti.*

37 HBT 225,9f.: ... *ity ācāryakṛte niścitagrahaṇe 'nyatrāsmākam abhimatatvāt* ...; *anyatra* means, of course, in the Pramāṇaviniścaya.

38 HBTĀ 408, 16–18: *ācāryeṇety ācāryadignāgena. sūtrakārīyaniścitagrahaṇasāphalyam upavarṇayatā vārtikakṛtā svānumatir atra darśitaivety abhiprāyeṇa* ...

39 HBTĀ 408,27–409,2: *evaṃ tāvad anena vyākhyātaṃ lakṣyate punar ayam asyārthaḥ, etad arthaṃ sūtrakāreṇa pramāṇasamuccaye mayā ca viniścayādau niścitagrahaṇaṃ kṛtam ity abhipretyācāryavārtikakāreṇāvābhyām ity asminn arthe 'smābhir ity abhidhāyīti.*

40 Cf. above 51.

41 Cf. HB II 208f. and PVin IIa note 57.

42 Cf. above 3.

that actually includes the word *niścita.* This definition makes literal use of Dignāga's famous definition – which cannot be mistaken for somebody else's because of its peculiar wording [43] –, but it is not a quotation. It can be taken as Dignāga's, but it is not his, strictly speaking. Or – with a view to the other party's interest –, it is the final definition given by Dharmakīrti, but it looks as if it were composed by Dignāga. And this excactly must have been the aim of Dharmakīrti when he offered to his scholarly world and posterity such a curiously formulated textual fragment.

The motive for this application of some exegetical force was the need to combine his own theorem of the logical nexus as being based upon an essential, real connection, and the resulting logic of the *trividhā hetu,* with Dignāga's theorem of the three characteristics of a logical reason, the *trilakṣaṇo hetu.* Under the pressure of both, his knowledge that the new theorem was the only sound explanation of Dignāga's logic, and the need for authorization of his new ideas, he may have phrased this definition in a way aimed at winning for itself the character of an authoritative quotation, without being able, on the other side, to really present it as a quotation, for such forgery would have been clearly discernible.

As an interpreting philosopher who believed he had found the inner secret of his predecessor's theory, he is not to be blamed for the subtlety with which he proceeded, consciously or unconsciously, to establish his thought in the lineage of Dignāga. His task was not that of a historian. He reached his goal perfectly, as we can see from the commentators who have no doubts in ascribing the *niścitagrahaṇa,* and even the enlarged form of the definition from the Pramāṇaviniścaya, to Dignāga.

IV.

The introduction of the word *niścita* into the definition may still have a touch of the tentative or daring in the Pramāṇaviniścaya, but in the Nyāyabindu, the succinct epitomizing statement of the Viniścaya's central ideas, the word is already canonized: *trairūpyaṃ punar liṅgasyānumeye sattvam eva sapakṣa eva sattvam asapakṣe cāsattvam eva niścitam* (NB II 5) [44].

[43] I.e. *tattulye sadbhāvaḥ* for *sapakṣe sattvam, nāstitāsati* for *vipakṣa* or *asapakṣe 'sattvam.*

[44] The new attribute, *niścita,* has to be read with all three forms of the logical reason in accordance with Dharmakīrti's statements in PVin II 6,17f. (quoted by Rājaśekhara Sūri): *ante vacanān niścitatvaṃ triṣv api rūpeṣu draṣṭavyam.* Cf. also Dharmottara's commentary on NB II 5, where he explains the word's function in the case of each of the three forms.

This form of the definition is a reiteration of the words in PVin II 5,1 f. Here, in the Nyāyabindu, Dharmakīrti has dropped the verbal material taken from Dignāga's peculiar definition in the Pramāṇasamuccaya in favour of the customary terminology. The authorization of the definition's new form by means of establishing identifying links with Dignāga's definition was achieved in the Pramāṇaviniścaya. Once this remarkable feat of exegesis was accomplished, Dharmakīrti could afford to apply customary formulations again.

V.

The Hetubindu, as it concentrates again on Dharmakīrti's first great theme, the three kinds of logical reasons (*trividhā hetu*), gives the first clear prescriptions with regard to the exact method of ascertaining (*niścaya*) the three forms (*rūpa*) of the reason pertaining to the three possible kinds of logical reasons [45]. The elaborate treatment of the *niścaya*-process itself, and the fact that the definition of the *trairūpya* proper is not given in the Hetubindu directly [46], clearly show that the presence of the word *niścita* in this definition is already taken for granted at the moment of the composition of this text. It is, then, from the polemics of the Hetubindu's final chapter only, i.e. the discussion of the *ṣaḍlakṣaṇo hetu* [47], that we receive further elucidation regarding the function of the word *niścita* in the definition of the characteristics, and the reasons for its introduction.

In this last chapter Dharmakīrti discusses, one by one, the three additional characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) of the logical reason which were propound-

[45] Cf. HB §§ 3.2, 3.31–3.42.

[46] Cf. below 13.

[47] Cf. § d. of my edition. In the notes (HB II 193) I said that it is possible that Īśvarasena was the creator of the *ṣaḍlakṣaṇo hetu*-theory, but was forced to refer to a future investigation of the relevant material. I have yet to complete this investigation, and I shall not be able to publish anything for some time, for the simple reason that I consider my collection of fragments and bits and pieces of information not yet concluded. Over the years I have come across Īśvarasena again and again, and I shall try to present his contribution to the Buddhist epistemological and logical tradition together with an edition of these materials.

At this occasion there are just two new pieces of external evidence to supplement my assumptions in the notes on § d. of the Hetubindu, one of which expressly attributes the *ṣaḍlakṣaṇo hetu* to Īśvarasena: Durvekamiśra assigns this *hetu* to " older logicians " (*pūrvayauga* DhPr 35,23f.). And rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen mentions the *ācārya* Īśvarasena (*slob dpon dBaṅ* phyug sde) as the author of this *hetu* when he provides a list of all the six characteristics in his bsTan bcos tshad ma rnam ṅes kyi ṭīk chen – dGoṅs pa rab gsal (Yab sras gsuṅ 'bum, rGyal tshab, Ja/2, 291b5f., in the microfiche of the Žol spar khaṅ-edition prepared by the Institute for Advanced Studies of World Religions, New York 1976); for the text cf. also PVin IIa note 475.

ed by the author of the *ṣaḍlakṣaṇo hetu*-theory. The last of these additional characteristics of the reason discussed is the characteristic of "being known" (*jñātatva*)[48]. This characteristic of the reason is required, according to my hypothetical interpretation[49], on the basis of Dignāga's additional remarks in PS II 6a:[50] "Being known" (*jñātatva*) must be mentioned as a separate characteristic, because Dignāga stated in PS II 6a and in the Vṛtti that the cognition of the reason is obtained, too, in the listing of the three characteristics just previous to it, if only by virtue of a particular implication. Dharmakīrti refutes this demand[51], with two arguments: That the number of characteristics of the logical reason must be limited to those properties which are not only necessary, but also specific (*ātmarūpa*) to the reason; and that cognition is already indicated (*ākṣepa*) by the formulation of the other characteristics. The first argument, which excludes the necessity to mention the cognition of the reason separately in the definition, gives rise to an objection: "The word 'ascertained' may, then, not be used"[52].

This objection against the *niścitagrahaṇa* can only refer to the usage of the word in the *trairūpya*-definition of the Pramāṇaviniścaya[53], because here, in the Hetubindu, the word is not to be found in the definition of the *trairūpya* – for the simple reason that there is no such definition in this text. Dharmakīrti only says[54] – in extension of his *vyāpti*-definition – that based on the two determinations[55] of the logical reason mentioned, the three forms of the reason (*anvaya*, *vyatireka*, *pakṣadharmatva*) are stated as ascertained by the respective valid cognition (*yathāsvaṃ pramāṇena niścita uktaḥ*).

The objection is borne of the spirit of the polemical tension between Īśvarasena's and Dharmakīrti's logical innovations, both in the garb of being comments on Dignāga's logical thought – if my hypothetical identification of the *ṣaḍlakṣaṇo hetu*-author and Īśvarasena may be accepted for the time being. The opponent counters: If "cognition" need not be stated as a separate characteristic because it is implied when the ordinary three characteristics are stated, then the word "ascertained, affirmed, definitely known" (*niścita*), too, is not to be used in the statement of these

[48] Cf. HB § d. 3.

[49] Cf. HB II note VI, 53.

[50] V 30a5: *'di ru śes pa'aṅ thob pa ñid* //; K 111b1f.: *'dir ni śes pa'aṅ 'phaṅs pa yin* // On the interpretation of this *pāda* and the related parts of the Vṛtti cf. above 5f.

[51] HB 33,3–9.

[52] HB 33,10: *niścitagrahaṇaṃ tarhi na kartavyam.*

[53] PVin II 5,1f.; cf. above 8.

[54] HB 2,9f.

[55] I.e. *pakṣadharma*- and *tadaṃśena vyāpta*-.

three characteristics. It is, probably, unlikely that Īśvarasena still "disputed" his interpretation with his student at the time of the Hetubindu's composition [56]. But his student was wary enough not to forget about his own vulnerability. A rhetorical objection, then, "in the spirit of Īśvarasena" serves, here, to introduce another clarification of his ideas about the purpose of the term and of its formulation in the definition.

Dharmakīrti reveals at the very outset: The word *niścita* does not serve the purpose of indicating a specific property of the logical reason which may be found among the conditions of the reason's logical function. It, rather, has the purpose of teaching that the inferring capacity of the reason comes from its real occurrence and non-occurrence, not from mere observation and non-observation, in similar and dissimilar instances [57]. And, although the respective cognition establishing real occurrence and non-occurrence is indicated already by the very formulation, the word *niścita* is used in the definition in order to teach (*pratipādana*) these two, i.e. real occurrence and non-occurrence [58]. And Dharmakīrti, further, offers two reasons for the necessity to teach these two properties in a specific way. First: Were there no indication of the proper cognition, the reality (*sattā*) of the occurrence and non-occurrence would not be established [59]. And, second, the composition of a scientific treatise has a didactic purpose [60]. The word *niścita* has the function to refute expressly (*tanniṣedhārtho niścitaśabdaḥ*) the opinion of certain logicians who think to determine occurrence and non-occurrence by mere observation and non-observation. And the word *niścita* is used in order to indicate that the reality (*sattā*) of occurrence in the similar, and non-occurrence in the dissimilar cases depends on their ascertainment (*niścaya*) [61].

[56] It is another indication, however, for the great proximity of the two. And the fact, that the *ṣaḍlakṣaṇo hetu*-theory has not been mentioned before the Hetubindu, e.g. in PV I and PVSV where we find the first polemics against Īśvarasena, could well mean, that Dharmakīrti's teacher has continued his studies on Dignāga's logic even after Dharmakīrti's first publication of the new logic, and has developed the *ṣaḍlakṣaṇo hetu*-theory in order to strengthen his own position. In this case Dharmakīrti's defense of the *niścitagrahaṇa* may well be taken as a response to a last direct attack from Īśvarasena.

[57] HB 33,11–14: *sapakṣavipakṣayor darśanādarśanābhyāṃ gamakaṃ hetum icchatāṃ naiva samartho hetur bhavati, sator api darśanādarśanayor agamakatvadarśanāt. tena bhāvābhāvābhyāṃ gamaka iti jñāpanārthaṃ niścitagrahaṇam.*

[58] HB 33, 17–19: *yady api bhāvābhāvavacanamātreṇa tatsādhanapramāṇam ākṣipyate, tayoḥ pratipādanāya niścitaśabdaḥ prayukto lakṣaṇe.*

[59] HB 33, 19–34,1.

[60] HB 34,1f.: *parārthatvāc ca śāstrapraṇayanasya.*

[61] HB 34,4–9: ... *tāv eva bhāvābhāvau kecid darśanādarśanamātreṇa vyavasthāpaya-*

The essential purpose of the term, thus, is the introduction of the new theorem of a connection in reality, the essential connection (*svabhāvapratibandha*), as the primary and only condition for the validity of the logical reason. And the essential purpose of the formulation of the term is the refutation of any logic – e.g. Īśvarasena's – that does not resort to this ontic foundation.

In this final argument for the *niścitagrahaṇa* the two major concerns of Dharmakīrti in this context, establishment of his own theorem in Dignāga's tradition, and exclusion of his teacher's logic from it, coincide, and reveal themselves to be the sole motives for an introduction of the word into the definition. For, if we accept Dharmakīrti's word that " in any case already the specification (*vyavasthā*) of the existence of something implicates that (particular) valid cognition which proves it " [62], and if we accept, moreover, that it serves the polemical purpose explained above, we may hypothetically conclude that – only to define the three characteristics of the reason - one could also do without the word *niścita* in the definition [63].

In other words, Dharmakīrti discloses, here, that the introduction of the *niścitagrahaṇa* has no logical meaning strictly speaking, in the sense that it would be necessary for the definition in the context of the stage of " formal logic " represented by Dignāga's theory; it gains logical significance only in the context of Dharmakīrti's new " ontological logic " [64]. As such it was necessary to meet the different pressures in his particularly delicate historical and personal situation as an innovating logician and a rebellious pupil.

VI.

The Vādanyāya, his last work concerned with logical matters [65], deals with the so-called " points of defeat " (*nigrahasthāna*). In the *siddhānta*–

ntīti tanniṣedhārtho niścitaśabda uktaḥ, ... tasmād yataḥ sattāprasādhakapramāṇād anayor niścayas tadadhīneti jñāpanārtham asmābhir grahaṇaṃ kṛtam.

[62] HB 33,20–34,1 *sarvatra sattāvyavasthaiva tatsādhanaṃ pramāṇam ākarṣati.*

[63] Cf. HB II note VI 75.

[64] I do not hesitate to speak of " logical " here, too, because I cannot consider it my task to judge a historical theory as worthy of being called " logic " in concordance with one or the other standard, e.g. a contemporary one, of one or the other logical thoughts, or unworthy of it, but rather to show what kind of " logic " – in the broader sense of the word – has been taught.

[65] A new, critical edition of the *siddhānta*-part, together with a German translation and notes, was submitted as a doctoral dissertation to the University of Vienna in 1983 by Michael Torsten Much. Dr Much intends to continue his work and publish the whole text in due time.

part of the text (VN 2,1–73,4) Dharmakīrti presents a new interpretation of these fatal mistakes in disputations (*vāda*) on the basis of his own new logical system. But he also tries to adapt the meaning and aims of the time-honoured institution of public disputations (*vāda*) [66]. According to Dharmakīrti's new conception, a public disputation has to serve the investigation of truth (*tattvacintā* VN 70,6), the explanation of truth (*tattvakhyāpana* VN 71,20), and must not be conducted merely as "a disputation by people who want to win" (*vijigīṣuvāda*) [67].

That part of the Vādanyāya that is most directly related to his logic, is VN 3,1–60,3 where "point of defeat" is defined mainly as "non-justification" (*asamarthana*) of the means of proof (*sādhanāṅga*), i.e. of the logical indicator (*liṅga*), the reason (*hetu*) [68]: If a logical reason is not justified, the speaker is defeated.

Dharmakīrti explains justification (*samarthana*) of the means of proof, i.e. one of the three kinds of logical reasons, as "proof of [its] occurrence in the locus of properties after the pervasion by the (property) to be proven has been proven" [69]; in other words, as a complex procedure in order to procure a definite cognition of the three characteristics or forms of the reason. Thus, the main prerequisite to success in the disputation is the participant's ability to establish the respective logical nexus (*vyāpti*), to provide the respective valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) for each case, to present to the public the definite cognition, the ascertainment (*niścaya*) of the positive (*anvaya*) and negative nexus (*vyatireka*), as well as of the reason's presence in the locus of the proof (*pakṣadharmatva*). This meaning of the term "justification" (*samarthana*) is aptly confirmed by Śāntarakṣita when he explains "Non-justification of the means of proof is non-indication of the ascertainment (*niścaya*) regarding the three forms [of the reason]" [70].

The different kinds of ascertainments in accordance with the three kinds of reason are, thus, the major issue in this first part of the Vādanyāya, where Dharmakīrti aims at forging his logical theory into a set of rules and formulas useful to educate a Buddhist disputant of high ethical standards. And he is Dharmakīrti's ideal disputant, who does not want to win by just any means, but by being able to achieve his logical and dialectical goal by means of ascertainments (*niścaya*), convincing, certain cognitions, with regard to the necessary parts of the inferences upon which

66 Cf. Much's summary of this development in his introduction, *loc. cit.* XLI ff.

67 Cf. VN 70,6 and 71,5–21.

68 Cf. VN 3, 1–3 and Much, *loc. cit.* XXXVI f.

69 VN 5,1 f.: *tasya samarthanaṃ sādhyena vyāptiṃ prasādhya dharmiṇi bhāvasādhanam.*

70 Vip 3,26: *sādhanāṅgasyāsamarthanaṃ triṣv api rūpeṣu niścayāpradarśanam.*

his argument as it serves the investigation of truth must be built.

In this way, Dharmakīrti returns to the beginnings. As we saw in the case of the Nyāyamukha and the Pramāṇasamuccaya [71], an ascertainment (*niścaya*) has been demanded with a view to its function within proofs (*sādhana*) and disputations (*vāda*), not as a part of the definition of the logical reason proper. This need for certainty in both disputants gives final support to the good reason introducing the ascertainment as part of the definition itself. It is true, that the apologetic and the polemic aspects of this introduction are prevalent in his earlier works, but in the Vādanyāya, when Dharmakīrti realizes the social dimensions of his life-long theoretical work, the ascertainment of the logical reason and its mediation to the opponent and the public turns out to be the central philosophical tool in the quest of truth. At this point of taking disputations (*vāda*) as a serious philosophical effort, there is, of course, no essential difference left in comparison with the scholar's work as such (*śāstra*). For this, too, has its object in the other person [72]. And at this point of appreciating the respective ascertainments as the core of scholarly argumentation, we may be inclined – quite against what he tells us more than once [73] – to see the introduction of the *niścitagrahaṇa* as a direct consequence of Dharmakīrti's logical thought, rather than as a consequence of his apologetic and polemic fixations.

ABBREVIATIONS AND LITERATURE

IBK = Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū.

K = Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti (Dignāga), translated by Kanakavarman and Dad pa'i śes rab: P 5702 (Tshad ma, Ce, 93b4–177a7).

JIPh = Journal of Indian Philosophy.

D = Derge-edition

DhPr = Dharmottarapradīpa (Durvekamiśra). Dec. and ed. D. Malvania. Patna 1955.

N = Narthang-edition.

NAVṬ = Nyāyāvatāravivṛttiṭippaṇa (Rājaśekhara Sūri) on Nyāyāvatāravivṛtti (Siddharṣi). Ed. L. Bhogīlāl, Pt. Bhagavāndās. Patna 1917.

NB = Nyāyabindu (Dharmakīrti): cf. DhPr.

NBT = Nyāyabinduṭīkā (Dharmottara): cf. DhPr.

NMu (Katsura) = Nyāyamukha (Dignāga) in: Katsura Shōryū, Inmyō shōrimonron kenkyū 1–5. Hiroshima Daigaku Bungakubu Kiyō 37, 38, 39, 41, 42 (1977–1982) [still incomplete!].

P = Peking-edition. Ed. D.T. Suzuki, Tokyo-Kyoto 1955–1961.

71 Cf. above 51.

72 HB 34,1 f.: *parārthatvāc ca śāstrapraṇayanasya.*

73 Cf. above 141.

PV I = Pramāṇavārttika, chapter I. Ed. R. Gnoli. Roma 1960.
PVin II = Pramāṇaviniścaya, chapter II. Ed. E. Steinkellner. Wien 1973.
PVin IIa = Pramāṇaviniścaya, chapter II. German translation and notes by E. Steinkellner. Wien 1979.
PVṬ = Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā (Śakyamati): P 5718 (Tshad ma, Je, 1–402a8; Ñe, 1–348a8).
PVBh = Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya (Prajñākaragupta). Ed. R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Patna 1953.
PVV = Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti (Manorathanandin). Ed. R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Patna 1938–1940.
PVSV = Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti: cf. PV I.
PVSVṬ = Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā (Karṇakagomin). Ed. R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Allahabad 1943.
PS = Pramāṇasamuccaya (Dignāga): P 5700 (Tshad ma, Ce, 1–13a5).
V = Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti (Dignāga), translated by Vasudhararakṣita and Seṅ (ge) rgyal (po): P 5701 (Tshad ma, Ce, 13a6–93b4).
Vip = Vādanyāyaṭīkā vipañcitārthā (Śāntarakṣita): cf. VN.
Viś = Viśālāmalavatī (Jinendrabuddhi): P 5766 (Tshad ma, Re, 1–355a).
VN = Vādanyāya (Dharmakīrti). Ed. R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Patna 1935–1936.
HB = Hetubindu (Dharmakīrti). Ed. E. Steinkellner. Wien 1967.
HB II = Hetubindu. German translation and notes by E. Steinkellner. Wien 1967.
HBṬ = Hetubinduṭīkā (Arcaṭa). Ed. S. Sanghavi, Muni Jinavijaya. Baroda 1949.
HBṬĀ = Hetubinduṭīkāloka (Durvekamiśra): cf. HBṬ.

JIKIDO TAKASAKI

ON UPĀDĀNA/UPĀDĀYAPRAJÑAPTI

§ 1. *Introduction*

The *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (MK), XXIV, 18 runs as follows:

yaḥ pratītyasamutpādas tāṃ śūnyatāṃ vyācakṣmahe /
sā prajñaptir upādāya pratipat saiva madhyamā //

In this verse Nāgārjuna aimed to emphasize the synonymity of four important terms which elucidate the fundamental concepts of Buddhism, namely 1) *pratītyasamutpāda,* 2) *śūnyatā,* 3) *upādāya-prajñapti,* and 4) *madhyamā pratipad.* Of these four, in contrast to other three which are already known to the Buddhists in those days, *upādāya-prajñapti* (*prajñaptir upādāya,* in the Kārikā) seems to be a terminology newly made by Nāgārjuna [1]. Inspite of its importance, however, this term has not been se-

* This article was originally written in Japanese and published under the same title (Upādāna ni tsuite) in the Commemoration Volume of Professor Yoshiro Tamura for his sixtieth birthday entitled "*Bukkyo kyōri no kenkyū*" (Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1982, pp. 39–52), and its English version was submitted and read at the fifth conference of the International Association of Buddhist Studies (Oxford, August 1982). The present article is a revised edition of the latter.

[1] This is the only occurrence of the term in Nāgārjuna's works as far as the available texts are concerned. It is therefore quite uncertain whether he regarded this term as a solid technical term or not. But the concept was quite clear for him and commentators made it finally in a compound word. Candrakīrti clearly uses this term once as a compound word: *paramagambhīrasya pratītyasamutpādasya śāśvatocchedarahitasya upādāyaprajñapty-abhidhānasya* – (*Prasannapadā,* ed. by de la Vallée Poussin, p. 215, 1.1). In the light of this use, the same term in the very passage commenting on v. XXIV, 18 may safely be regarded as a compound word although the editor kept '*upādāya*' and '*prajñapti*' separated. (*saiva śūnyatā upādāya prajñaptir iti vyavasthāpyate* / ibid. p. 504, 1.8). As for the possibility of making a compound by using a gerund in its first member, there is no rule in the Pāṇinian Grammar, but the very term '*pratītyasamutpāda*' is a good example in Buddhist use. (cf. Wackernagel, *Altindische Grammatik,* II, i, p. 69: § 28–γ; L. Renou, *Grammaire sanscrite,* p. 87: § 77. Premier membre). Also we have

riously studied by scholars [2]. Especially significant is its identification with *pratītyasamutpāda* and its similarity with the latter in its verbal construction (gerund + noun) have escaped scholarly observations. I am now going to investigate this concept mainly on the basis of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* and its commentary *Prasannapadā* written by Candrakīrti [3].

§ 2. *Upādāyaprajñapti*

First of all, let us see how Candrakīrti explained the term as used in the *Kārikā*. He states:

> *yā ceyaṃ svabhāvaśūnyatā "sā prajñaptir upādāya" / saiva śūnyatā upādāya(-)prajñaptir iti vyavasthāpyate / cakrādīny upādāya rathāṅgāni rathaḥ prajñapyate / tasya yā svāṅgāny upādāya prajñaptiḥ sā svabhāvenānutpattiḥ / yā ca svabhāvenānutpattiḥ sā śūnyatā //* (PrasP. p. 504, 8–10).

Here there is no direct interpretation of the term *upādāya-prajñapti*, but the explanation by means of the analogy of *ratha* tells us its basic meaning -viz, a concept or verbal expression (*prajñapti*) (conceived) on the basis of something (as its stuff or material) [4]. Any concept has its

a compound term '*upādāya-rūpa*' denoting materials made out of the four material elements (*mahābhūta*): *aṣṭau dravyāni catvāri mahābhūtāni catvāri côpādāyarūpāṇi rūparasagandhaspraṣṭavyāni* / (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, ed. by Pradhan, second. ed., Patna, 1975, p. 53, 1.1); *Mahāvyutpatti* 1846 (Sakaki Edition). Cf. Pāli '*upādā-rūpa*', '*upādāya-rūpa*' (*upādā* = *upādāya*). A further remarkable is the compound '*upādāpaññattānuyoga*' appeared in the *Kathāvatthu*, p. 45 (§§. 171–199), which is replaced by '*upādāyapaññatti-*' in the *Atthakathā*. See PrasP., p. 285, n. 4. Of the meaning of these compounds I will refer to later on.

2 Of few articles referring to '*upādāya-prajñapti*', the only detailed investigation is found in S. Yamaguchi's work *Bukkyo ni okeru u to mu tono tairon* (Controversy between being and non-being in Buddhism), Kyoto, 1941 (Reprint, Tokyo: Sankibo Busshorin, 1975), pp. 15–37 (referring to '*prajñapti*' in Nāgārjuna's doctrine and '*vijñapti*' in the Yogācāra doctrine). J. May's *Candrakīrti Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti*, Paris, 1959, gives notes to '*upādāya prajñapti*', '*upādāna*' and other related terms, but his investigation is not linked to each other.

3 *Prasannapadā nāma Madhyamakavṛttiḥ. Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (*Madhyamikasūtra*) *de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā commentaire de Candrakīrti*, éd. par L. de la Vallée Poussin, Bibl. Bud. IV, St. Petersbourg, 1903–13 (abbr. PrasP.). Correction to the text is given, whenever necessary, according to: J. W. de Jong, « Textcritical Notes on the Prasannapadā », *IIJ*, 20, 1978, pp. 25–29, 217–252.

4 The section on '*upādāpaññattānuyoga*' in the *Kathāvatthu* referred to above deals with the concept of *puggala* made on the basis of (*upādāya*) *rūpa* and others and discusses the characteristic of *puggala*. So the term *upādāyapaññatti* used in its *Atthakathā* should have the same meaning with this *upādāyaprajñapti* against that given in the *Critical Pāli Dictionary*, s. v., p. 494, (the concept " with reference to, accessory to ". Also q.v. upādāpaññatti).

counterpart among things material or immaterial, existent or non-existent. What is referred to here is that of which the counterpart is regarded as other than its own substance. In Buddhist philosophy a chariot exists merely as conceptual thing (*prajñaptitaḥ sat*), while its component parts exist essentially (*svabhāvataḥ sat*) or exist substantially (*dravyataḥ sat*) [5]. In the same way Ātman or 'self' is doctrinally deprived of substantiality and is said to be merely conceptual, but the aggregates of the five elements, *rūpa* and others, are regarded as the stuff (*upādāna*) for making up this concept. This understanding is explained by Candrakīrti as follows:

> *skandhān upādāya prajñapyamānaḥ pudgala ātmêty ucyate* / (PrasP. 303, 6–7)

The problem is this: to what extent may things be regarded as existent merely as a concept or verbal expression. The scope of '*prajñaptitaḥ sat*' seems to differ in Buddhism from sect to sect, from school to school. Of this, I will refer to later.

§ 3. *Upādāna*

In the previous section, the term *upādāna* was understood as the 'stuff' for making concept [6]. Thus, the aggregates of five elements 'taken' as the stuff for the concept of *ātman* are called '*pañcôpādānaskandhas*' or '*pañca upāttaskandhāḥ*' in contrast to *pañcaskandhas* as the elements of *dharma* in general [7]. Used in such a manner, *upādāna* is defined in the following way:

> *upādīyata ity upādānaṃ pañcôpādānaskandhāḥ* / (PrasP. 212.18)

[5] A famous example of this analogy of a chariot is observed in the *Milindapañho* where the passage is concluded with quotation of a gāthā:

> *yathā hi angasambhārā hoti saddo ratho iti,*
> *evaṃ khandesu santesu hoti satto ti sammutîti* (P.T.S. Ed. p. 28).

[6] Bhāvaviveka, in his *Prajñāpradīpa*, a commentary on the *Madhyamakakārikā*, giving definition to the term *upādāyaprajñapti*, uses '*upādāna*' as denoting stuff in general for making concept.

> *rten ciṅ 'brel par 'byuṅ ba shes bya ba / stoṅ pa ñid gaṅ yin pa de ni brten nas gdags pa* (*upādāya–prajñapti*) *ste/ 'jig rten pa daṅ jig rten las 'das pa'i tha sñad 'dod pas ñe bar len pa dag la brten nas gdags pa yin no* // (* *laukikalokottaravyavahārârthinā upādānāny upādāya prajñapyate*). (Derge Ed. Tohoku No. 3853, Tsha 230b, 4–5).

[7] See PrasP. p. 285, n. 3. In Pāli commentaries, the term '*upādānakkhandha*' is traditionally interpreted as 'the *skandhas* as the basis of *upādāna* (clinging)' (*upādānassa paccayabhūtā*) or 'those as the object of *upādāna*' (*upādānānam ārammaṇabhūtā*; *upādānagocarā*); also it is explained as 'those produced by *upādāna* or producing *upādāna*, (*upādānena janitā upadānājanakā vā khandhā upādānakkhandhā*). See *A Critical Pāli Dictionary*, 'upādāna–kkhandha', q.v. Of this meaning of *upādāna* (clinging, attachment), I will refer to later. (§ 6)

This sentence is found in the commentarial passages on verse 15 of chap. X, *Agnîndhana-parīkṣā* ('*ātmôpādānayoḥ*' in MK). As is shown in the chapter title, the analogy for *upādānaskandha* is *indhana* (fuel), i.e., fire stuff, which is also called '*upādāna*'. (This use is peculiar to Buddhist texts). For example, we have the following statement:

> *tad yathâgnir upādānapratyaye sati jvalaty, upādānavaikalyān na jvalati* / (PrasP. 568.13: Quotation from the *Śālistambasūtra*)[8].

A similar definition is given in another passage:

> *ihopādīyata ity upādānaṃ karma* / (PrasP. 576.10)

Here, again, the term *upādāna* in the Kārikā (*kathaṃ hi nāmôpādānam upādātā bhaviṣyati* // v. XXVII, 6 cd) refers to the *pañcopādānaskandhas*, *upādāna* being *karman* (object of action) in contrast to *upādātṛ* being *kartṛ*.

§ 4. *Upādāna* and *upādātṛ*

The *pañcôpādānaskandhas* are said to be the stuff of the concept of Ātman on the one hand, and those which are taken or seized by the *upādātṛ*, one who seizes, on the other. This *upādātṛ* is, in common parlance, no other than what is called Ātman; so the 'conceptuality' of Ātman, i.e., the state of being merely a verbal expression, is to be proved through conceptuality of *upādātṛ*. Thus, the relationship between the *pañcaskandhas* and *ātman* is repeatedly discussed in the *Madhyamakaśāstra* in terms of the *upādāna–upādātṛ* relationship.

The concept of *upādātṛ* first appears in the *Prasannapadā* in a passage in chapter I, where a debate is held between the Logicians and the Mādhyamika concerning the phrases '*śilāputrakasya śarīraḥ*' (body of a torso) and '*Rāhoḥ śiras*' (Rāhu's head). (PrasP. 66.1–68.4). As Buddhists, the Logicians maintain that the verbal expression *upādātṛ* can be assumed even in regard to a torso as that which possesses a body as its stuff (*saśarîrôpādāna*) though there is a body only, or in regard to Rāhu who possesses a head only. The Mādhyamika indicates the improperness of this example as an analogy for Ātman, because it is only linguistically possible, while the Ātman, though not existent apart from *rūpa* and other stuff, still admits of its existence as a worldly convention (*lokasaṃvṛti*) on the basis of the aggregates of elements (*skandhān upādāya*). Here the difference between them is not so clear, but Candrakīrti probably wished to maintain that *ātmaprajñapti* is a kind of *upādāya–prajñapti* and hence

[8] In the *Śālistambasūtra*, *upādāna* is used for the analogy for *kleśa* and *karman*, by which power the *vijñāna* in the maternal womb grows to *nāmarūpa*. See PrasP. 568.13–16. Of its significance, see § 7, below.

is within the scope of *saṃvṛti-satya*, but a torso or Rāhu is not as they both are *saṃvṛtimātra*, mere conventional[9].

The main concern of the author of the *Madhyamakaśāstra* is, however, to prove the relativity or mutual dependence (*parasparâpekṣitā*) of *upādāna* and *upādātṛ*, and hence the non–substantiality (*śūnyatā*) of both. And this problem of relativity is the underlying subject throughout the text.

The discussion on the *upādāna–upādātṛ* relation begins with v.13 of chap. VIII, *Karmakāraka–parīkṣā*, where the author insists upon the application of the same *parasparâpekṣitā* between *karma*, the work that is done, and *kāraka*, the doer, to '*upādāna*'[10]. Commenting on the term '*upādāna*', Candrakīrti says:

> *upāttir upādānaṃ / anena côpāttikriyām āha / sā ca svasādhanaṃ kartāram upādātāraṃ, karma côpādānaṃ saṃnidhāpayati /* (PrasP. 189.13–14) (*upādāna* here means 'taking'. And by this the action of taking is referred to. And this action combines together *upādātṛ* as *kartṛ*, agent, and *upādāna* as *karman*, object).

This sense of 'taking' (or 'seizing', 'depending' 'basing on', etc.), i.e., *upādāna* as *kriyā* is grammatically more basic to the term, and in contrast to it, *upādāna* as *karman* is called *upādeya*, the object to be taken. (ibid. 189.15–190.2).

The same idea is discussed in the next chapter (IX, *Pūrva–parīkṣā*) with the example of *darśana*, *śravaṇa* and other sense actions in their relationship to *pudgala*, the seizer or the possessor of these sense actions. Discussion is held with the Pudgalavādins (Sammitīyas) who maintain the pre–existence of *pudgala* without actions. The Mādhyamika objects against this view by saying that in that case the *upādānas* such as *darśana* and so

9 See S. Yamaguchi, *Chūron–shaku* (Japanese translation of the *Prasannapadā*), Vol. I, p. 201, n. 15. 1947, Kyoto, Kobundo. Yamaguchi's statement is based upon Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakâvatāra*, VI, 28 and commentary thereon.

10 *pratītya kārakaḥ karma, tam pratītya ca kārakaṃ /*
karma pravartate, nânyat paśyāmaḥ siddhikāraṇaṃ // (MK, VIII, 12)
evaṃ vidyād upādānaṃ vyutsargād iti karmaṇaḥ /
kartuś ca, karmakartṛbhyām śeṣān bhāvān vibhāvayet // (ibid. 13)

Thus chapter VIII in general and verse 12 in particular are the general statement of the *parasparâpekṣitā* * between *karma* and *kāraka* (*karmakārakayoḥ parasparâpekṣikī siddhi*), while verse 13 is the statement of the application of this principle to the *upādāna–upādātṛ* relationship (and other similar ones) concerning *bhāvas*. Actual application accompanied with examples concerning *upādāna* and *upādātṛ* starts from the next chapter and continues to chapter X and further as will be shown below. [* The term '*parasparâpekṣitā*' is not recorded anywhere in the *Prasannapadā*. The present author introduced it for convenience's sake. (*parasparâpekṣā* > °*apekṣin* > °*apekṣi* + *tā*, the state of being in mutual dependence)].

on could be existent without agent (PrasP. 193.11–15)[11], and concludes that, as in the case of *karman* and *kartṛ*, *upādāna* and *upādātṛ*, too, are to be relatively established (*parasparâpekṣā siddhiḥ*) and not by themselves (*na svābhāvikī*) (ibid. 200.3)[12].

To this conclusion, the opponent objects by saying that even those things, like fire and fuel, that have their own existences (*sāsvābhāvya*) can depend on each other (at the beginning of chap. X, *Agnîndhana-parīkṣā*, PrasP. 202.3–8). Here again the Mādhyamika maintains that the *parasparâpekṣitā* of the kind between *upādāna* and *upādātṛ*, applies to the relationship between fuel (consumed) and fire (consumer), clay (material) and pot (manufacture), as well as to *pañcaskandhas* and *ātman*, in view of a fivefold investigation on their relationship. Thus it is stated:

indhanaṃ punar agnir na, nâgnir anyatra cêndhanāt /
nâgnir indhanavān, nâgnāv indhanāni, na teṣu saḥ // (MK, X, 14)
agnîndhanābhyāṃ vyākhyāta ātmôpādānayoḥ kramaḥ /
sarvo niravaśeṣeṇa sārdham ghaṭapaṭādibhiḥ // (ibid. X, 15)

The term '*upādāna*' in v. X, 15 refers to the *pañcôpādānaskandha* as mentioned above (§ 3. *Upādāna*), while '*ātman*' in the same verse is explained by Candrakīrti as follows:

yas tān (= *pañcôpādānaskandhān*) *upādāya prajñapyate sa upādātā grahītā niṣpādaka ātmêty ucyate /* (PrasP. 212.18–19)

The fivefold way of investigation is, as shown in v. X, 14, 1) *ekatva* of both, 2) *pṛthaktva* of both, 3) *agni* or *ātman's* possession of *upādāna*, 4) inclusiveness of *upādāna* to *upādātṛ*, *agni* or *ātman*, and 5) vice versa. In the following passage referring to *ghaṭa* and *paṭa*, 3) is generalized in terms of *lakṣaṇalakṣya-* or *guṇa-guṇin* relation, while 4) and 5) are said to be in *avayavâvayavin* relation, and to them is added the *kārya-kāraṇa* relation. (PrasP. 213.15–16).

The same way of investigation beginning with *ekatva* and *anyatva* is repeatedly applied to prove the relativity and non-substantiality (*niḥsvabhāvatā*) of *ātman* and *upādānas* in chap. XVI (*pañcadhā mṛgyamāno 'sau nâsti kaḥ saṃsariṣyati*, v. 2cd, and PrasP. 284.8 with quotation of v. X.14–15), chap. XVIII, *Ātma-parīkṣā*, (vv. 1–2: *ekatva* and *anyatva*, PrasP. 341.5–7, 342.2: quotation of v. XXVII, 6), chap. XXII, *Tathāgata-parīkṣā* (v. 1, PrasP.

11 *yadi manyase darśanādibhyaḥ pūrvam pudgalo nāmâsti, sa darśanādikam upādānam upādatta iti /*

12 *tasmāt karmakārakavad evôpādānôpādātroḥ parasparâpekṣā siddhir, na svābhāvikîti sthitam //*

The same is said in the previous chapter in a similar way; viz.

tayoś côpādeyôpādātroḥ parasparâpekṣyoḥ karmakārakavad eva siddhir, na svābhāvikī // (PrasP. 189.4–15)

431.3–436.3; vv. 8–11, PrasP. 439.6–444.10: *tattva, anyatva, tadvat(tva), ādhāra(tva)* and *ādheya(tva)*, 439.8–11)[13] and chap. XXVII, *Dṛṣṭi-parīkṣā* (vv. 4–8, PrasP. 574.11–578.8).

In verse, v. XXVII, 8, the author expresses his conclusion to this problem thus:

> *evaṃ nânya upādānān na côpādānam eva saḥ /*
> *ātmā nâsty anupādāno nâpi nâsty eṣa niścayaḥ //*[14]
> (Thus Ātman is neither different from *upādāna* nor the same as *upādāna*.
> There is no Ātman without *upādāna*. Also we cannot decide its non-existence).

About this, Candrakīrti gives the following commentary:

> Of what is verbally expressed on the basis of *upādāna* how we can deny its existence. Indeed a son of a barren woman which is non-existent is never assumed (of its existence) on the basis of *skandhas* (since it is a contradiction in terms). Then how is it reasonable to say that there is no *upādātṛ* when *upādāna* exists? Therefore non-existence is also not applicable to it (= *ātman*). And hence to decide that Ātman does not exist is not reasonable. (PrasP. 578.4–6).

The same conclusion is expressed more positively thus:

> *evaṃ tāvat sāṃvṛtaṃ bimbākāram upādātāram upādānam câbhyupetyâpi śāśvatādidṛṣṭyasaṃbhavam pratipādya* – (PrasP. 591.1–2)
> (Even though admitting the conventional shadow-shaped *upādātṛ* and *upādāna*, still we do not fall into the eternalism and other views, –)

That is to say, both *upādātṛ* and *upādāna* are non-existent by themselves, i.e., have no own existence (*svābhāvena śūnya*) (this point is called '*śūnyatā*'), but they are said to exist from the worldly point of view (*saṃvṛtitaḥ*), i.e. as worldly convention and as verbal expression (*prajñaptitaḥ*) based upon (*upādāya*) certain stuff or cause (*upādāna, nimitta*). This is what is meant by the term '*upādāya-prajñapti*'. Thus, being neither existent

[13] *skandhā na, nânyaḥ skandhebhyo, nâsmin skandhā, na teṣu saḥ /*
tathāgataḥ skandhavān na, katamo 'tra tathāgataḥ // (MK, XXII, 1)
and
tattvânyatvena yo nâsti mṛgyamānaś ca pañcadhā /
upādānena sa kathaṃ prajñapyate tathāgataḥ // (ibid. 8)

[14] Previous two verses run as follows:
na côpādānam evâtmā vyeti tat samudeti ca /
kathaṃ hi nāmôpādānam upādātā bhaviṣyati // (MK XXVII, 6)
anyaḥ punar upādānād ātmā naivôpapadyate /
gṛhyeta hy anupādāno yady anyo na ca gṛhyate // (ibid. 7)

nor non–existent, this *upādāyaprajñapti* is defined as the *madhyamā pratipad.* From this we can know that the main theme of the *Madhyamakaśāstra* is to show the middle way of non–being and no non–being from the two standpoints of the highest and ultimate truth (*paramārthasatya*) and of the conventional truth (*saṃvṛtisatya*).

§ 5. *Anupādāya*

The saying "*ātmā nâsty anupādānaḥ*" in the last verse mentioned above leads to another problem.

In chap. XVI, *Bandhanamokṣa–parīkṣā*, the author rejects the Ātmavāda of the opponents through discussing whether Ātman is *sa–upādāna* or *an–upādāna* when it shifts from this life to another in the course of transmigration. The author says:

> *nirvāsyāmy anupādāno nirvāṇam me bhaviṣyati /*
> *iti yeṣāṃ grahas teṣāṃ upādāna–mahāgrahaḥ //* (v. XVI, 9)
> (If someone had the belief "having no *upādāna* I shall enter Nirvāṇa, Nirvāṇa will be with me", then he would have a big false belief concerning *upādāna*).

The second '*upādāna*' in the verse is commented upon by Candrakīrti as '*ahaṃkāramamakārâkyaṃ satkāyadṛṣṭyupādānam*', – namely the attachment to the view of the existence of personality. What is rejected here is the doctrine of the Heretical or certain Hīnayānistic concepts of Nirvāṇa that there exists a substantial Self as the subject of transmigration that will attain Emancipation or Nirvāṇa after getting rid of its *upādāna.* From the discussion at the beginning of chapter in question, we understand *upādāna* means 'body' or 'support'. But here another meaning 'clinging' or 'attachment', a well known meaning through Buddhist doctrine, is introduced. Actually, here '*upādāna*' seems to carry the two meanings of 'support' and 'attachment'. Buddhist doctrine admits the correlation between *anupādāna* and Nirvāṇa taking '*upādāna*' in any one of the two meanings. The same view is held by the author of the *Madhyamakaśāstra.* In chap. XXV, *Nirvāṇa–parīkṣā,* we find the following verse:

> *bhāvaś ca yadi nirvāṇam, anupādāya tat kathaṃ /*
> *nirvāṇaṃ nânupādāya kaś cid bhāvo hi vidyate //* (v. 6)
> (If Nirvāṇa is something, how could it be without *upādāna*? There is not a single thing, indeed, without *upādāna*).

Commenting on '*upādāya*' Candrakīrti says that it means '*svakāraṇasāmagrīm āśritya*' (depending on the totality or the congregate of one's own causes). (PrasP. 526.11–12).

In the next two verses[15], the opinion that Nirvāṇa is non-existent (*abhāva*) is also rejected because, according to Candrakīrti, *abhāva* is a kind of *upādāyaprajñapti* in the *lakṣaṇa-lakṣya* relation with regard to *bhāva* (PrasP. 527.13–528.4)[16]. Finally in v. 9, the definition of Nirvāṇa is given in the following way:

> *Ya ājavaṃjavībhāva upādāya pratītya vā |*
> *so 'pratītyânupādāya nirvāṇam upadiśyate ||*
> (When that which is moving to and fro in the Saṃsāra depending on something, or caused by something becomes not depending or not caused by anything, then this is indicated as Nirvāṇa).

Here '*upādāya*' and '*pratītya*' are mentioned side by side and they are explained respectively in the commentary that this (transmigrating one) is sometimes assumed to exist depending on the aggregate of various causes and conditions (*hetupratyayasāmagrīm āśrityâstîti prajñapyate*) just as long and short, and is sometimes assumed to be originated (*utpadyata iti prajñapyate*) just as a light (is produced from) a lantern and a germ (is grown from its) seed; therefore, it is established that this (migrating one) is always assumed either on some basis (*upādāya prajñapyate*) or as originating depending on something (*pratītya jāyate*). (PrasP. 529.3–6) Thus here the definitions of '*upādāyaprajñapti*' and '*pratītyasamutpāda*' can be said to be synonymous to each other as mentioned in v. XXIV, 18. They are synonymous to each other in that both show the state of things not of Nirvāṇa. The commentary defines Nirvāṇa as follows: whenever there is non-function (*apravṛtti*) of this (transmigrating one characterized as the) successive connections of birth and death (*janmamaraṇaparaṃparāprabandha*) by reason of not depending on or not being based upon (or not taking anything) (*apratītya vânupādāya vā*), this non-function is established as Nirvāṇa (ibid. 529.6–7).

There is another connotation of '*anupādāya*' in relation to Nirvāṇa. Just after the passage, Candrakīrti quotes a passage from the *Tathāgataguhyaka* in order to authenticate his view:

> *yāṃ ca rātriṃ, Śāntamate, tathāgato 'nuttarāṃ samyaksaṃbodhim abhisaṃbuddho yāṃ ca rātrim anupādāya parinirvāsyati, atrântare*

[15] *bhāvo yadi na nirvāṇam, abhāvaḥ kiṃ bhaviṣyati |*
nirvāṇam yatra bhāvo na, nâbhāvas tatra vidyate || (MK XXV, 7)
yady abhāvaś ca nirvāṇam anupādāya tat kathaṃ |
nirvāṇaṃ na hy abhāvo 'sti yo 'nupādāya vidyate || (ibid. 8)

[16] *lakṣaṇam āśritya lakṣyam prajñapyate, lakṣyam āśritya ca lakṣaṇaṃ |*
ataḥ parasparāpekṣikyām lakṣyalakṣaṇapravṛttau kuto lakṣyaṃ bhāvam anapekṣya anityatā bhaviṣyati | tasmād abhāvo 'py upādāya prajñapyate |

tathāgatenaikam apy akṣaraṃ nôdāhṛtaṃ na vyākṛtam nâpi pravyāharati nâpi pravyahariṣyati / (PrasP. 539.3–5)

The cliché '*yāṃ ca rātriṃ*' etc. is commonly used in Buddhist scriptures. In Pāli we find '*anupādisesāya nibbānadhātuyā parinibbāyati*' instead of '*anupādāya parinirvāsyati*'[17], and this '*anupādisesa*' is replaced in Buddhist Sanskrit texts by '*anupadhiśeṣa*'[18]. Thus we can know that '*anupādāya*' means '*upādānam śarīram anupādāya*' and signifies the Perfect Nirvāṇa of the Buddha, and that '*upādāna*' in the sense of '*upādisesa*' or '*upadhiśeṣa*' has a meaning of body as the remnant of attachment. And this equivalency reminds us of another connotation concerning *upādāna*.

§ 6. *Upādāna* to *Bhava*

In contrast to '*anupādāya*' that leads to Nirvāṇa, '*upādāya*' is the cause of '*bhava*' i.e. Saṃsāra. This is nothing but what is meant by the saying, '*upādānapratyayo bhavaḥ*' in the Twelvefold Chain of Causation (*pratītyasamutpāda*). In the *Madhyamakaśāstra*, this problem is dealt with in chap. XXVI, *Dvādaśāṅgaparīkṣā*, where '*upādānapratyayo bhavaḥ*' is explained in the following way:

upadāno sati bhava upādātuḥ pravartate /
syād dhi yady anupādāno mucyate, na bhaved bhavaḥ // (v. 7)

Here by '*upādāna*' is meant the fourfold attachment or clinging, beginning with *kāma*, as shown in the previous verse (v. 6), namely '*upādāna*' in the sense of *kriyā* with the meaning of *kleśa*, defilement. And in relation to this, '*upādātṛ*' is explained in the commentary as '*grahītṛ*', seizer or one who affectionally clings to *upādāna*, and consequently, '*utpādayitṛ*', producer (of *bhava*) (PrasP. 556.4).

This *upādātṛ* is what we call *pudgala* or Ātman, which is defined as '*avidyānivṛtaḥ*' and is said to make *saṃskārās* that land it in *bhava*, Saṃ-

tatrâbhāvo 'nityatā vā bhāvam upādāya prajñapyate / kharaviṣāmādīnām anityatânupalambhāt /

Here '*abhāva*' is replaced by '*anityatā*' (impermanence) in the sense 'cessation of something' in contrast to the 'absolute non-existence' of horns on the head of a donkey. See Th. Stcherbatsky, *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāna*, p. 194.

[17] e.g. *yañ ca rattim anupādisesāya nibbānadhātuyā parinibbāyati*, Itiv. § 112. See PrasP. p. 366, n. 1.

[18] At the beginning of chap. XXV, Candrakīrti explains two kinds of Nirvāṇa, viz. *sôpadhiśeṣa* and *anupadhiśeṣa*, and give the definition of '*upadhi*' as follows:

tatrôpadhīyate 'sminn ātmasneha ity upadhiḥ / upadhiśabdenâtmaprajñaptinimittāḥ pañcôpādānaskandhā ucyante / (PrasP. 519.9–10)

and, of '*anupadhiśeṣa–nirvāṇa*',

yatra tu nirvāṇe skandhamātrakam api nâsti tan nirupadhiśeṣam nirvāṇam / (PrasP. 520,1).

sāra (v. 1), while '*bhava*' is said to be '*pañca skandhāḥ*' (v. 8a) as the product of *upādāna* and to have a threefold *karman* which determines future existence or rebirth (*punarbhava*) (PrasP. 556.8–557.3).

The same kind use of '*upādāna*' is observed in the following case.

mamêty aham iti kṣīṇe bahirdhādhyātmam eva ca /
nirudhyata upādānaṃ tat kṣayād janmanaḥ kṣayaḥ // (v. XVIII, 4)

The commentary says that because of annihilation of this (*ahaṃkāra* and *mamakāra*), i.e. *satkāyadṛṣṭi,* due to no perception of 'I' and 'mine', the fourfold *upādāna* beginning with *kāma* is annihilated, and due to annihilation of the latter, there is the extinction of life (*janman*) characterized as rebirth (*punarbhava-lakṣaṇa*). (PrasP. 349.12–14).

A similar interpretation is given to '*anupādāna*' used in chap. XVI. Namely in verse 3, '*vibhava*' is said to be '*anupādāna*'[19], and explained as that which is separated (*vigata*) from or that which lacks *bhava,* i.e. *pañcôpādānaskandhāḥ* (so *upādāna* = *bhava*?) (PrasP. 285.6–7)[20], while in verse 6, '*upādāna*' is equated with '*bandhana*'[21] (*rāgâdikam upādānâkhyam bandhanabhūtam asti–*, PrasP. 290.14–15: this is the opinion of an opponent), and '*anupādāna*' is explained as '*bandhanarahita*', that which has no bondage (PrasP. 291.2–3).

Also we have another example of '*anupādāya*' used in the sense of 'without *upādāna,* attachment' in a quotation from the *Ratnakūṭa* (*Kāśyapaparivarta*):

atha teṣāṃ pañcānāṃ bhikṣuśatānāṃ anupādāyâśrayebhyaś cittāni vimuktāny abhūvan / (PrasP. 48.12)

(At that time these five hundred *bhikṣus* getting rid of attachment emancipated their mind from evil influences (*āśrava* = *āsrava*)).

§ 7. *Conclusion*

There are more than a hundred occurrences of terms derived from *upa–ā–dā–*, *upādāya, upādāna,* etc. in the *Prasannapadā,* but their varieties in usage and meaning have, I believe, been referred to in previous sections. In summary, a diagram may be given in the following way.

19 *upādānād upādānaṃ saṃsaran vibhavo bhavet /*
vibhavaś cânupādānaḥ kaḥ sa kiṃ saṃsariṣyati // (MK XVI, 3)

20 '*anupādāna*' is otherwise explained as '*prajñaptyupādānarahita*' (lacking the stuff for concept): *yaś ca vibhavo 'nupādānaḥ sa skandharahitatvāt prajñaptyupādānarahitatvān nirhetukaḥ syāt / yaś cânupādāno nirañjano 'vyakto nirhetukaḥ sa na kaś cit saḥ / nâsty eva sa ity arthaḥ //* (PrasP. 285.7–286.2)

21 *bandhanaṃ ced upādānaṃ sôpādāno na badhyate /*
badhyate nânupādānaḥ kim avastho 'tha badhyate // (MK XVI, 6)

A. 1) *upādāna(karman)* = *pañcôpādānaskandha* (= *upādi*, *upadhi*) = *upādeya*, *upātta*
2) *upādāna(kriyā)* = *upātti* in general, *darśana*, *śravaṇa*, etc.
3) *upādāna(kriyā)* = *caturvidha-upādāna* (*kāma*, *dṛṣṭi*, *śīlavrata* and *ātmavāda*) (which is caused by *tṛṣṇā* and is *pratyaya* of *bhava*)

B. 1) *upādānam* (A–1) *upādāya prajñapyata ātmā* (*upādātṛ*).
2) *upādāya* (by action of *upādāna* (A–3)) *bhava upādātuḥ pravartate*.

C. 1) *anupādāya* (without *upādāna* (A–1)) *parinirvāsyati*.
2) *anupādāya* (without *upādāna* (A–3)) *cittaṃ vimucyate* (or *nirvāṇam adhigamyate*).

B–1) is '*upādāyaprajñapti*', B–2) is '*pratītyasamutpāda*'

Schematically speaking, Ātman is a kind of '*upādāyaprajñapti*', or '*upādāyaprajñapta*', that which is conceived or assumed on the basis of *pañcôpādānaskandha* [22], while all the *dharmas* classified into *pañca skandhāḥ* are '*pratītyasamutpannāḥ*'. According to the Sarvāstivāda, Ātman is deprived of its substantiality because of its being presumed on the basis of *upādāna*, while the *upādānaskandhas* being *dharmas* are regarded as substantial (*sa-svabhāva*). The Mādhyamika, on the contrary, opposed this substantial view of *dharmas* and maintained the non-substantiality (*niḥsvabhāvatā*) of *dharmas* just as in the case of Ātman in term of '*śūnyatā*', which in turn is explained as '*parasparâpekṣatā* of *upādāna* and *upādātṛ*, of *kārya* and *kāraṇa*, etc. This means that, according to the Mādhyamika, all *dharmas* are, like Ātman, merely '*upādāyaprajñapti*', and thus '*pratītyasamutpāda*' is equated with '*upādāyaprajñapti*' through the intermediary of '*śūnyatā*' [23]. Close observation discloses a wider scope of '*upādāya-*

[22] Another typical example of this kind of '*upādāyaprajñapti*' is '*kāla*' (time). The Mādhyamika says: though it is admissible that time is presumed on the basis of *rūpa* and other phenomena in conditioning (*rūpādīn eva sa saṃskārān upādāya prajñaptaḥ kālaḥ* / (PrasP. 387. 4), still,

bhāvaṃ pratītya kālas cet kālo bhāvād ṛte kutaḥ /
na ca kaś cana bhāvo 'sti kutaḥ kālo bhaviṣyati // (MK XIX, 6)

Here '*pratītya*' is explained as '*upādāya*' by Candrakīrti.

Kāla is not counted among *dharmas* by the Sarvāstivādin.

[23] J. May calls '*upādāya prajñapti*' as 'désignation métaphorique' and says that to the Mādhyamika, this metaphor is in two degrees, viz. Ātman is 'désignation métaphorique des ensembles' and *dharmas* are 'désignation métaphorique de la réalité absolue' (J. May, *op. cit.*, p. 161, n. 494).

Difference of range between '*pratītyasamutpāda*' and '*upādāyaprajñapti*' is due to that between two gerunds, too. Namely '*upādāya*' has a variety of meanings and usages, viz 'on the basis of, based upon'; 'clinging to, attached to'; 'depending on' (*pratītya*, *niśritya*, *āśritya*); 'with reference to' (*adhikṛtya*, *ārabhya*); 'beginning with' (*ārabhya*); 'implying' (*saṃdhāya*); 'compared to' (*apekṣyā*), etc.; while the meaning of '*pratītya*' is almost fixed in Buddhist doctrine.

prajñapti' than that of '*pratītyasamutpāda*': viz, in contrast to the limitation of '*pratītyasamutpāda*' to '*saṃskṛtadharma*', '*upādāyaprajñapti*' is applicable to any concept denoting *saṃskṛta* and *asaṃskṛta* alike, e.g. Nirvāṇa, *śūnyatā*, etc., these being concepts by which the truth which is unutterable is denoted [24]. In other words, it covers the same range as the *saṃvṛtisatya* in Nāgārjuna's terminology [25]. But in this case, '*upādāya*' should not be understood as 'based upon attachment' because Nirvāṇa is '*anupādāya*'. Rather it may be interpreted as 'by means of verbal expression' (with *vyavahāra*), because Nirvāṇa being *paramārthasatya* is '*anupādāya*' (beyond *vyavahāra*).

After Nāgārjuna two problems remained. One is how to explain '*upādātṛ*' as the agent of transmigration under the doctrine of *anātman*, and the other, related to the first one, is how to interpret the relation between *upādātṛ* and *upādāna* in the doctrine of the twelve chain of causation. As for the second problem, a certain kind of solution was given even in the Canon of Early Buddhism where we observe the *parasparâpekṣitā* between '*vijñāna*' and '*nāmarūpa*' being *upādātṛ* and *upādāna* respectively [26]. Another case found in the Pāli Canon is the *upādāna–upādāniya*

[24] e.g. *śūnyam iti na vaktavyam aśūnyam iti vā bhavet /*
ubhayaṃ nobhayaṃ ceti, prajñaptyarthaṃ tu kathyate // (MK XXII, 11)

[25] Commenting on the verse mentioned above (see n. 24), Candrakīrti says: *sarvam etan na vaktavyam asmābhiḥ / kiṃ tv anukte yathāvad–avasthitam svabhāvaṃ pratipattā pratipattuṃ na samartha iti / ato vayam apy āropato vyavahārasatya eva sthitvā vyavahārârthaṃ vineyajanânurodhena śūnyam ity api brūmaḥ, aśūnyam ity api – /* (PrasP. 444.3–6)

Also see Bhāvaviveka's definition of '*upādāyaprajñapti*' (n. 6 above). Avalokitavrata gives a detailed comment on the term '*laukika–lokottaravyavahāra*' ('*jig rten pa daṅ 'jig rten las 'das pa'i tha sñad*) with examples such as eyes (grown from foetus), a germ (from seed), a vase (based upon earth and other conditions), cloth (out of thread and other conditions), and *bālapṛthagjana* on the basis of *karman*, *kleśa* and others as *laukika–vyavahāra*; *śrāvaka* and *pratyekabuddha* are assumed on the basis of *padapātha* and *kleśâvaraṇa–prahāṇa*, etc., *bodhisattva* and *tathāgata*, on *bhūmi* and *pāramitā*, and *daśabala* and other virtues as *lokottara–vyavahāra*. (Of these, examples up to vase and cloth are the metaphors of *pratītysamutpāda*, while after *bālapṛthagjana* are the *pudgala–prajñapti*). Further more he says that these all are, including those like *tathāgata* and others who realized the truth (*bden pa gzigs pa* = *dṛṣṭasatya*, *satyadarśin*), explained from the empirical standpoint (*saṃvṛtitaḥ*) as '*svabhāvena śūnya*', from the highest standpoint (*paramārthataḥ*), however, they are said to be '*svabhāvena śūnya*' because they are by no means produced from these conditions (*pratyaya*). (*Prajñāpradīpa–ṭīkā*, Tohoku No. 3859, D. Za, 241a4–b3).

[26] As observed in the doctrine of the nine (or ten) chains of causation (SN, Nidānasaṃyutta No. 67: *Nalakalapiyam*), where the relation between *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa* is said to be reciprocal and is compared to a bundle of reeds *naḍakalāpa*, *nalakalapiya*. Also *Śālistamba* refers to '*naḍakalāpa–yogena*'. (Quotation in PrasP. 561.11).

relation in the doctrine of fivefold chain of causation beginning with *taṇhā* (SN, Nidānasaṃyutta No. 52: *Upādāna*), where the succession of mental activities, *taṇhā* and *upādāna*, is said to be caused by *upādāniya dhammas* and results in *bhava*, and in sequence, in the origination of sufferings, and where its process is again analogized with the burning of fire by supplying fuel. Here we may observe a triple relationship between *upādāniya* (= *upādāna* as *karman*), *upādāna* (as *kriyā*, attachment), and *upādātṛ* (hidden behind *upādāna-kriyā* as the possessor of it).

It was the Yogācāra who gave answer to these problems by taking this triple relationship in the chain of causation into consideration. They gave the name *ālayavijñāna* to the *upādātṛ*, the agent of transmigration, which is said to be originated on the basis (*pratītyasamutpanna*) of the two kinds of *upādāna*[27], one being *rūpîndriya*, i.e. body with its faculties, equivalent to *nāmarūpa* or *pañcaskandhāḥ*, and the other being *vāsanā* (biotic force), equivalent to *saṃskāra*, which is the result of its own actions (i.e. *upādāna*) of previous time and lives and which is characterized as conceptualization and discrimination (*vyavahāra* and *vikalpa*). This function, i.e., taking (*upādā-*) these two *upādānas* is also called '*vijñapti*'. As long as *ālayavijñāna* continues to take *upādānas*, *bhava* or *saṃsāra* continues to exist. Also the Yogācāra maintains that any assumption (*upacāra* = *prajñapti*) of Ātman or *dharmas* appears as the changing process (i.e. continuation) of this *ālayavijñāna* (*vijñānapariṇāma*)[28], and thus all the phenomena as the world of *prajñapti* are reduced solely to the *ālayavijñāna* in term of '*vijñaptimātratā*'. In this new scheme, all *dharmas* and *ātman* are regarded as '*upādāyaprajñapti*' as explained by the Mādhyamika, while the *ālayavijñāna* recovered the character as representing '*pratītyasamutpāda*' being the *upādāna* (basis as well as attachment) of *prajñapti*.

[27] *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*, I. jñeyāśraya, 5. definition of *ādāna-vijñāna*. (Taisho No. 1594, Vol. 31, 133b–c; Nagao Gajin *Shodaijoron, Wayaku to Chukai* (Japanese translation of the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* with notes), vol. 1, Tokyo: Kodansha, 1982, pp. 85–89).

Because of this function (taking two *upādānas*), *ālayavijñāna* is called *ādāna-vijñāna* (*ādāna* = *upādāna*).

[28] *Triṃśikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, v. 1.

GÉZA URAY

Ñag.ñi̥.dags.po
A NOTE ON THE HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF ANCIENT TIBET

1. A relatively oft–discussed passage of the *Old Tibetan Chronicle* found in Tun–huang is a list of those tribal formations and/or states that, taking advantage of the infancy of Sroṅ–brcan sgam–po who had mounted the throne upon the death of the founder of the empire, Gnam–ri Slon–mchan, turned against the Tibetan empire. The enumeration goes like this: *gñen.žaṅ.žuṅ|mjo.sum.pa* | |*ñag.ñi̥.dags.po* | |*rkoṅ.po* |*myaṅ.po* [1]. It is not a point of debate that *Žaṅ–žuṅ*, *Sum–pa*, *Dags–po*, *Rkoṅ–po* and *Myaṅ–po* are ethnic and/or place–names, even if opinions do differ on some as to the exact location of the tribes and regions they designate. It is likewise agreed upon that the *gñen* prior to the name *Žaṅ–žuṅ* is identical with the generic word meaning " a relative, allied by marriage ", and that it referred to the matrimonial contacts between the *Žaṅ–žuṅ* and the Tibetan dynasties [2]. Recently, it seems, the view is being accepted that the *mjo* before the name *Sum–pa* is the common noun meaning " a mongrel breed of the yak–bull and common cow ", yet it is still to be settled whether the epithet *mjo* bears relation to the Sum–pas as breeders of mongrel–cow [3] or to a mythic animal ancestor [4].

In my view the interpretation of *ñag.ñi̥.*– and its syntagmatic relation

[1] MS Pelliot tibétain 1287 (earlier No. 250), L. 300; ed.: Bacot *et alii*, 1940/1946, p. 111, Ll. 3–4; facs.: Spanien and Imaeda 1979: pl. 1568.

[2] Bacot *et alii*, 1940/1946: p. 147: "le žaṅ Ñuṅ [sic!] allié"; Macdonald, 1971 p. 248, n. 230: "pays des parents par alliance"; Satō 1978, p. 406: "shinseki (親 戚) no shanshun"; Yamaguchi, 1983, pp. 338–340: "inseki (姻 戚) no shanshun", cf. *ibid.* p. 361, n. 1.

[3] Macdonald, 1971, p. 248, n. 230: " pays d[e]s vaches métisses ". In addition, cf. that Tibetan popular tradition which " claims that yak and bulls were first introduced into Tibet from *Sum pa* ", see Nebesky–Wojkowitz, 1956, p. 358.

[4] Yamaguchi 1983, pp. 338, 340.

to the subsequent *Dags–po* and other region–names are fully open to debate. The present paper is an attempt to solve this issue.

2. Let me start my argumentation with some remarks upon *Dags–po*. The name of the region is known from pre–eleventh century literature and documents in the forms of *Dags*, *Dags–yul*, *Dags–šul* and mainly of *Dags–po* [5]. In later literature this form *Dags–po* seems to have been the prevalent one well into the 16th–18th centuries, when it was supplanted by the spelling *Dvags–po* [6].

The region Dags–po/Dvags–po is situated along the Gcaṅ–po ca. between 92° 50' and 94° 20' E. Long. Generally, the maps locate it on the southern bank of the river, and this localization was taken up by Tibetology as well [7]. As far as I know, Yamaguchi is the only scholar to have expressed a view that Dags–po extends over both banks of the river [8]. Unfortunately, he gives no detailed justification for his concept, its validity may none less be easily demonstrated by the sparse data at our disposal.

Mkhyen–brce'i dbaṅ–po's *Guide*, when describing the territories of the

[5] The so–called *Genealogy of Tun–huang*, MS Pelliot tibétain 1286 (earlier No. 249), Ll. 2, 18; facs.: Spanien and Imaeda 1979, pl. 554; eds.: Lalou 1959, p. 161, Macdonald 1971, p. 195, and Bacot *et alii* 1940/1946, p. 80, L. 22. – *The Old Tibetan Chronicle*, Ll. 203, 204, 213, 214, 216, 218; facs.: Spanien and Imaeda 1979, pls. 564–565; ed. Bacot *et alii* 1940/1946, p. 106, Ll. 28, 30; 107, Ll. 7, 9, 13, 15. – *The Royal Annals of Tibet*, MSS Pelliot tibétain 1288 (earlier No. 252) + India Office 750 (Ch. 79 viii 7), Ll. 101, 208; ed. Bacot *et alii* 1940/1946, p. 17, Ll. 3–4; 22, L. 3; facs.: Spanien and Imaeda 1979: pl. 582, L. 50; pl. 587, L. 157. – The Healing Ritual India Office 734 (vol. 69, fols. 76–83), L. 333 (quoted from a microfilm by the courtesy of the India Office Library and Archives); ed.: Thomas 1957: 76. – The Healing Ritual Pelliot tibétain 1285, Ro., Ll. 23, 91, 178; ed. and facs. Lalou 1959: 165, 168, 173, pls. I, III, VI. – The wooden document M. Tāgh 0332; facs.: Stein 1928: pl. CXXX; ed.: Thomas 1951, p. 456. – Cf. also Lalou 1959, p. 190; 1965, p. 193.

[6] If Roerich's translation is to be trusted, the spelling *Dvags–po* has merely a single occurrence in the Kun–bde–gliṅ edition of 'Gos lo–cā–ba Gžon–nu–dpal's *Deb–ther sṅon–po*, to which the printing blocks of the 1481 original edition was employed; see Roerich 1953, p. 824, L. 12. Moreover, it is always the *Dags–po* form to appear as a self contained region–name, just as a part of place–names and personal names; cf. the passages referred to in Wylie 1957, p. 22 as well as the index of Tibetan personal names in Roerich 1953: 1186. As opposed to this, only *Dvags–po* may be found already in the *'Jam–gliṅ–rgyas–bšad* written in 1820 by Smin–grol no–mon–han and in the *Dbus–Gcaṅ–gi gnas rten* ... written in 1892 by Mkhyen–brce'i dbaṅ–po; cf. Wylie 1962: 256 and Ferrari 1958, p. 179. In the new spelling the *–v–* serves to distinguish graphically *dags* from *dgas*.

[7] Kjuner 1907–1908, vol. I, 2, p. 89 and vol. II, 2, p. 115; Tucci 1956, p. 82; Thomas 1957, p. 9; Ferrari 1958, p. 121, n. 203; Satō 1978, pp. 369–370.

[8] Yamaguchi 1983, p. 285.

northern bank of the Gcaṅ-po, mentions the Dvags-po region subsequent to Zaṅs-ri Mkhar-dmar, 'Ol-kha-Stag-rce and other places of the 'Ol-kha, as a region where there are places of distinction like Dvags-la Sgam-po, Khra-mo-brag and so forth. He separately recounts the places of the Rgyal-me-tog-thaṅ valley on the border between 'Ol[-kha and] Dvags[-po], then briefly touches on the regions beyond the Dvags-po [to the north and east], such as Ñaṅ[-po,] Loṅ[-po,] Koṅ[-po,] Spo-bo and so on. Finally the guide leaps back to the Zaṅs-ri Mkhar-dmar and setting out from there it describes the territory on the southern bank of the river [9]. Here primarily the places of Yar-kluṅ are discussed, and the regions lying to the east from there are actually given only a rough enumeration: ʔE-yul, Gñal, Lo-ro, Gro-šul, Byar, Ca-ri, Koṅ-po [10]. This enumeration steers clear of the part of the Dvags-po lying south of the Gcaṅ-po, and data on this area may primarily be gleaned from the maps and itineraries of Indian cartographers [11].

The most tangible rendering of the Dags-po's expansion along both banks is to be found in a passage from the *Deb-ther sṅon-po.* We learn from this passage that toward the end of the winter of 1315/16 Duṅ-cho ras-pa, one of the 108 famous *gter-ston,* was heading from Ba-yul lying near the mountain Yar-lha Šam-po [12] to Sgam-po. " He could not proceed through gYe [alias ʔE] because of heavy snows. Then having tied a rope to a tree, he slid down the precipice to Dags-po. He then crossed the gTsaṅ-po in a fisherman's boat and reached sGam-po " [13]. The Sgam-po mentioned here is a monastery of the Bka'-brgyud-pa well-known from ecclesiastical history. It is the same as the Dvags-la Sgam-po mentioned by Mkhyen-brce'i dbaṅ-po and the " Dakpu Dala Kambu " and the " Talha Kampo " of the maps. This monastery is situated on the western bank of the " Talha chu " (= **Dags-lha-čhu*), a small northern tributary of the Gcaṅ-po, vis-à-vis to the mountain Dvags-lha Sgam-po, the " Da-lakampa " and " Tala-rhi " of the maps [14].

The mountain is an ancient cult-center of Dags-po. A healing ritual

[9] Ed. and tr.: Ferrari, 1958 pp. 9–10, 47–48.

[10] Ed. and tr.: Ferrari, 1958 pp. 12, 50–51.

[11] Filibeck, 1976, p. 513 *s.v.* Lha-gsol, sNang, sKu-rnam.

[12] On Ba-yul's geographical position, see the story of Thod-smyon Bsam-grub in the *Deb-ther sṅon-po,* tr. Roerich 1953 p. 986.

[13] Tr.: Roerich 1953 p. 718.

[14] Petech's note in Ferrari, 1958, p. 121, n. 204; Wylie, 1962 p. 175, n. 559. – The *'Jam-gliṅ-rgyas-bšad* claims that the Dvags-la Sgam-po monastery lies on the southern side of the Gcaṅ-čhu (i.e. Gcaṅ-po), but the passages on the Dvags-po in this work are on he whole muddled; cf. Wylie, 1962, pp. 34–36, 92, 94, and especially 175, n. 557 and 559.

of Tun-huang refers to Dags-lha Sgam-po as the god of Dags-šul [15]. The *Deb-ther sṅon-po* relates that at the turns of the years 1315/16 and 1316/17 Duṅ-cho ras-pa, before setting about uncovering the *gter-ma* hidden in the lake Maṇḍal nag-po near Sgam-po, offered a sacrifice to Dags-lha Sgam-po and a *bcan* spirit [16]. And finally the various *lha-bsaṅs* texts register the mountain with the name *Sgam-po Dpal-ri, Sgam-po gaṅs* and *Dag-lha Sgam-bu* as " the lord of the soil (*gži-bdag*) of Dvags-po " (or incorrectly as " *Dge-yul* " [17]) and as " the chief of all the lords of the ground (*sa-bdag*) of Dvags-po-yul " [18].

The region Dags-po/Dvags-po, then, at the last from the 14th century on, covered the territories lying on both sides of the Gcaṅ-po. Prior to that period, data to have emerged so far show only its expansion over the northern side.

3. Now as far as the *ñag.ñi̥.* is concerned, its interpretations have depended upon the problems and peculiarities of punctuation in the list of tribes turning against the Tibetan empire, viz., that there is no *šad* between *ñag.ñi̥.* and *dags.po,* and that, was there ever written, and if so where, a *cheg* within the sequence *ñgñi̥.* and how this sequence is to be segmented?

Mme Macdonald assumes that *ñag-ñi* is an epithet of *Dvags-po* [sic!], just as *gñen* is of *Žaṅ-žuṅ* and *mjo* is of *Sum-pa.* She cites the *ña-gñi* reading given by Dge-'dun-čhos-'phel in the *Deb-ther dkar-po,* and goes on as follows: " c'est peut-être la bonne forme car il n'y a pas de point intersyllabique entre le *na* [recte: *ña*!] et le *ga,* et les gens de Dvags-po passent pour être mangeurs de grenouilles (...) et de poissons » [19]. Yamaguchi rightly rejects this explanation, since *ña-gñi* could hardly be interpreted as " fish-eater " [20].

Incidentally, Yamaguchi himself regards *ñag-ñi* as an epithet. He maintains that it is not determinable whether there is a *cheg* in the *ñagñi* of the *Chronicle,* but alludes to the un-ambiguous segmentation *ñag-ñi* in the List of the Thousand-districts of Dpa'bo Gcug-lag-'phreṅ-ba's *Mkhas-pa'i dga'-ston.* This list mentions *ñag-ñi* with *Dags-po* among the names of the thousand-districts of the Left Horn (*G-yo-ru*), *whereas Ñaṅ-po* (i.e,

[15] MS Pelliot tibétain 1285, Ro., Ll. 178-179; ed. and facs.: Lalou, 1959 p. 173 and pl. VI. Cf. also Lalou, 1965, p. 193.

[16] Tr.: Roerich 1953 p. 719.

[17] *Dge* is derived from an original form **dags* mistakenly read as **dgas.*

[18] Nebesky-Wojkowitz 1956, pp. 221-223, 227, 229.

[19] Macdonald 1971, p. 248, n. 230.

[20] Yamaguchi 1983, p. 363, n. 15.

Myaṅ-po) stands beside *Dags-po* in the list of the thousand-districts of the Left Horn in the *Blon-po bka'i thaṅ-yig*'s Army Catalogue. From this it should follow, Yamaguchi contends, that *ñag-ñi* is the common epithet of *Dags-po*, *Rkoṅ-po*, and *Myaṅ-po*. The first syllable of *ñag-ñį* he takes to be identical in meaning with the words *ñag-re* " single ", *ñag-čig* " id. " and *ñag-mo* " female relative ", the second syllable as the vulgar variant of the word *ñid* " self, same, only ", hence he interprets *ñag-ñi* as " of the same kin (同一氏族 dōitsu shizoku) " [21].

In our view it is indisputable that in the *Old Tibetan Chronicle*, in the list of tribes turning against the Tibetan empire we find *ñag.ñį*. It is clearly perceivable in the facsimile that the *cheg* is put after the letter *ga*, and the pen, without having been picked up from the paper, was drawn downwards to the right up to the initial point of the second *ña* letter. Thus the *cheg* is included in a tiny hook at the start of the second *ña*. This circumstance creates the false impression as if the *cheg* were actually missing, and as if the *ga* were farther from the first *ña* than from the second, that is, as if **ña gñį.* were indeed written [22].

When evaluating the data from the lists of state organization of the *Blon-po bka'i thaṅ-yig* and the *Mkhas-pa'i dga'i-ston*, we should first of all pay heed to the textual history of the lists. Even a cursory comparison reveals that the *Mkhas-pa'i dga'-ston*'s List of the Thousand-districts and Army Catalogue [23] on the one hand, and the *Blon-po bka'i thaṅ-yig*'s Army Catalogue [24] on the other, ultimately go back to common sources. These common sources probably registered Tibet's state organization in the second half of the 8th century A.D. One of these is a List of the Thousand-districts which registered the thousand-districts and the clans possessing a hereditary right to the ranks of heads of the thousand-districts in the Four Hourns (*Ru Bži*) of Tibet, in Upper and Lower Žaṅ-žuṅ and in the Horn of the Sum-pa (*Sum-pa'i ru*). The other common source is an Army Catalogue which gives a list of the military chiefs, the color of the horses, the color and the emblems of the banners etc., of the upper and lower parts of each of the Four Horns. In the line of tradition represented by

21 Yamaguchi, 1983, pp. 340–341; 363, n. 15–18; cf. also pp. 283–284, 845–846.

22 See Spanien and Imaeda, 1979: pl. 568, L. 300.

23 Lho-brag Gnas-kyi gžis-kha ed., copy of the Gandan Tégčinlén Monastery in Ulan Bator (quoted from a microfilm by the courtesy of the State Library of the Academy of Sciences of the Mongolian People's Republic), chap. JA: 19 b 6–20 b 1; facs.: Chandra, 1962 p. 10. Cf. also Tucci, 1956 pp. 81–86.

24 Dga'-ldan Phun-chogs-gliṅ ed. (quoted from a microfilm by the courtesy of the India Office Library and Archives): 8 a 5–9 b 4; tr. and comm.: Thomas 1935, pp. 276–286.

the *Mkhas-pa'i dga'-ston*'s lists the two kinds of list have preserved their separate stance, but here the names of clans were left out from the List of the Thousand-districts, and the data were rearranged to a considerable extent in the Army Catalogue. In the other line of tradition represented by the *Blon-po bka'i thaṅ-yig*'s Army Catalogue the two kinds of list have been amalgamated, so that they jointly present the tousand-districts and military data of every horn of Tibet, but not a single word is devoted to Upper and Lower Žaṅ-žuṅ and the Horn of the Sum-pa.

Obviously, of the *ñag.ñi̥.* [25] preserved in the *Mkhas-pa'i dga'-ston* and the *ñaṅ.po.* [26] surviving in the *Blon-po bka'i thaṅ-yig* only one could have been present in the original List of the Thousand-districts. It is scarcely feasible that the well-known region-name *Myaṅ-po/Ñaṅ-po,* which frequently occurs together with the name *Dags-po/Dvags-po* in religious epics and in the *lha-bsaṅs* texts, should have been changed for the less-known *ñag.ñi̥.* A mistaken correction to the opposite direction, however, could, indeed, come to pass, especially since the spelling *Myaṅ-po* was mostly replaced with the spelling *Ñaṅ-po* [27]. We are inclined to conclude, then, that in the original List of the Thousand-districts there figured beside the thousand-district of Dags-po one of Ñag-ñi̥.

This conclusion is substantiated by a list preserved in Ne'u (alias Nel-pa) paṇḍita's *Me-tog phreṅ-ba* written in 1283. This list was presented to the scholars by Miss Helga Uebach at the Seminar on Tibetan Studies held at Columbia University in 1982. Thanks to her favor we were allowed to study the text of her lecture even before publication. Ne'u paṇḍita's list enumerates the thousand-districts of the Four Horns of Tibet and the Land of the Sum-pa (*Sum-pa'i yul*). This list represents a tradition distinctly independent from the lists of the *Mkhas-pa'i dga'-ston* and the *Blon-po bka'i thaṅ-yig* and depicts a state organization from another epoch – in Miss Uebach's opinion from an earlier one – than the other two. Now in Ne'u paṇḍita's lists, too, a thousand-district of Ñag-ñi is mentioned before that of Dags-po, and nothing is said whatever of a thousand-district of Ñaṅ-po. [28]

Finally I would like to cite another piece of data that clarifies the

[25] Lho-brag Gnas-kyi gžis-kha ed., chap. J̌A: 19 b 7;c f. Tucci, 1956, p. 82 and n. 1.

[26] Dga'-ldan Phun-chogs-gliṅ ed.: 9 a 6; tr.: Thomas, 1935 p. 280.

[27] Regretfully, our knowledge has not yet been able to establish when and how the form with *ñ* came to replace the form with *my* in the region-names *Myaṅ-po/Myaṅ-yul* and *Myaṅ-ro* as well as in the clan-name *Myaṅ*. Inferring from the sparse data we have, it is assumed that various trends of spelling have mingled in the process.

[28] Uebach, 1982.

problematics of *ñag.ñi̥.* from a new angle. In the PA chapter, on the story of the Karma–pa order, in Dpa'–bo Gcug–lag–'phreṅ–ba's *Mkhas–pa'i dga'–ston*, one short biography starts with this sentence: *rje.dvags.po.rab.'byams.pa.mkhas.grub.čhos.rgyal.bstan.pa.ni.sgam.po'i.mdun.ñag.ñi.kluṅ.du.sa.sb[r]ul.la.sku.bltams|* "The Lord Mkhas–grub–čhos–rgyal–bstan–pa, Doctor of Dags–po, was born in the Ñag–ñi valley near Sgam–po in the Earth–Snake [year] (1449/50 A.D.)" [29].

Consequently, *Ñag–ñi̥* is a place–name which was in use at least up to the middle of the 15th century as the name of a valley region in the vicinity of the Dvags–la Sgam–po monastery.

4. In the last analysis there is nothing in the list of tribes turned against the Tibetan empire, in the *Old Tibetan Chronicle*, to account for the interpretation of *ñag.ñi̥.* as an epithet. In the 15th century *Ñag–ñi* unambiguously appears as the name of a valley near Dags–po. This nicely tallies with the fact derivable from two independent sources that during the era of the Tibetan empire there was a thousand–district of Ñag–ñi beside that of Dags–po in the Left Horn, as place–names were generally employed to designate the thousand–districts. Finally, the *Ñag–ñi* interpreted as a region–name fits in well with the tribal and region–names of the list recounting the tribes opposing the Tibetan empire.

The only question to be settled is, what importance should be attributed to the fact that no *šad* is put between *ñag.ñi̥.* and *dags.po* in the enumeration of tribes and countries facing the empire? It is not entirely improbable that the absence of the *šad* was meant to express that Ñag–ñi̥ and Dags–po had a close connection, they constituted a unity. Yet in our opinion the Tibetan texts indeed use the *šad* more or less inconsistently, and its absence does not warrant farreaching conclusions.

Therefore, I submit, the Tibetan tradition recorded, in addition to the principalities of Dags–po, Rkoṅ–po, and Myaṅ–po. a principality of Ñag–ñi from the age of the formation of the empire.

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THE DHARMA-CONCH OF SA-SKYA

A recent edition of the Chinese travel magazine *Chung-kuo-lü-yu* contains an illustrated article about Sa-skya [1], the monastic village on the banks of the Grum river in the Gtsang province of Tibet visited in 1939 by Giuseppe Tucci [2]. One of the illustrations in that article is a color photograph of a conch shell with the following caption: "Tradition says it is the Dharma-conch used by Śākyamuni" [3]. The text of the article states that this seven-inch conch was given by Khubilai Khaghan to his Tibetan religious teacher, 'Phags-pa Lama of Sa-skya [4]. A general history of the religious-political relationship between Khubilai Khaghan (1215-1294) and 'Phags-pa Lama (1235-1280) can be found in various publications [5]. For the purposes of this brief paper, it is sufficient to note that the Mongols, who had taken 'Phags-pa from Sa-skya when he was nine years old, delivered him to the camp of Prince Khubilai in 1253. Khubilai was elected Khaghan in 1260 and ten years later he elevated 'Phags-pa, a fully-ordained Buddhist monk, to the unique position of *Ti-shih*, 'Imperial Teacher'. Although there were other Buddhists in the Mongol court, as well as Taoists, Muslims, and Nestorian

[1] *Chung-kuo-lü-yu* [hereafter cited as *Chung-kuo*], No. 29, Hong Kong, 1983, pp. 48-51.

[2] For details of his visit, see G. Tucci, «Un principato indipendente nel cuore del Tibet: Sachia», *Asiatica* 6, 1940, pp. 353-60.

[3] *Chung-kuo*, p. 49.

[4] It also states that the guide at Sa-skya said the Dharma-conch was sent by the King of India to Khubilai, Emperor of the Yüan Dynasty of China (*Chung-kuo*, p. 50). A Sa-skya text would place this event in the T'ang Dynasty (see note no. 14 of this paper).

[5] See, *inter alia*, Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, *Tibet: A Political History*, New Haven, 1967, pp. 61-72; G. Tucci, *Tibetan Painted Scrolls* [here-after cited as *TPS*] 3 vols., Rome, 1949, I pp. 8-17, II pp. 626-69; Turrell V. Wylie, «The First Mongol Conquest of Tibet Reinterpreted» [hereafter cited as *Wylie*], *HJAS*, 37, 1977, pp. 103-33.

Christians, the *Ti-shih* 'Phags-pa Lama became the paramount presti of Khubilai Khaghan [6].

'Phags-pa Lama conferred the empowerment of the *Hevajra-tantra* upon Khubilai three times. This *tantra* is central to the Sa-skya religious tradition and Hevajra is a principal tutelary deity (*yi-dam*) of the Sa-skya school [7]. Following custom, Khubilai presented offering gifts to 'Phags-pa for each of the three initiations. As one of the gifts for the second enpowerment, Khubilai gave him a conch named *Chos dung dkar po rgyang grags*, meaning 'The far-sounding, white Dharma-conch' [8]. In Sa-skya tradition, this conch is believed to be the authentic Dharma-conch used at the time the Buddha Śākyamuni expounded his teachings [9]. It is said to possess innumerable great

[6] The Sa-skya genealogical text compiled by 'Jam-mgon A-myes-zhabs Ngag-dbang kun-dga' bsod-nams, published under the abbreviated title, *Sa-skya Gdung-rabs Chen-mo* [hereafter cited as *Gdung-rabs*] (Dolanji: Tibetan Bonpo Monastic Centre, 1975), states that 'Phags-pa was appointed *Ti-shih* in the Water-female-Ox year (= 1253) when he was 19 years old (*Gdung-rabs*, p. 186). The Fifth Dalai Lama's Chronicles also say he was 19 years old when he was made *Ti-shih* (*TPS*, p. 626). That date and that age are incorrect by virtue of the meaning of the title *Ti-shih*, 'Imperial Teacher', i.e., the spiritual teacher of the emperor. Since Khubilai did not become the Emperor, or Khaghan, until 1260, the year 1253 is not the year he appointed 'Phags-pa Lama as his *Ti-shih*. The correct year of this appointment was 1270 (*Wylie*, p. 127). According to the *Deb-ther dmar-po*, "After Se-chen (= Khubilai) came to the throne, ('Phags-pa) obtained successively (the titles) *Kuo-shih* ('State Teacher') and *Ti-shih* ('Imperial Teacher')" / se chen rgyal sar byon phyin chad / gu shrī ti shrī rim par blangs / (*The Red Annals*, Part One [Gangtok: Namgyal Institute of Tibetology, 1961], p. 43. (For the significance of the year 1253 see note no. 7 of this paper).

[7] "... lan gsum gyi bar du sa skya pa'i khyad chos dpal kye rdo rje'i dbang yongs su rdzogs par bskur ba ..." (*Gdung-rabs*, p. 179). In the year 1253, 'Phags-pa was taken to the camp of Khubilai. Herbert Franke, in his "Tibetans in Yüan China", *China under Mongol Rule*, edited by John D. Langlois, Jr., (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), states: "All known sources, Chinese, Mongol, and Tibetan, agree that Khubilai was given a consecration (*abhiṣeka*) in 1253. It was an initiation to the rites of dGes-pa rdo-rje (Sans. Hevajra), a tutelary deity specially worshipped in the Sa-skya monasteries and whose cult is closely linked with that of Mahākāla, a protector and defender of the faith who is, like Hevajra, represented in a terrifying aspect. It seems that rites connected with Hevajra and Mahākāla became customary for every enthronement of a Yüan emperor, a fact which is also mentioned in Chinese sources" (p. 308). For the bilingual Sanskrit-Tibetan texts and translation of this *tantra*, see David L. Snellgrove, *The Hevajra Tantra: A Critical Study*, London, 1959, 2 vols.

[8] *Gdung-rabs*, p. 179; *TPS*, p. 14. Although it is widely accepted that Khubilai gave 'Phags-pa this Dharma-conch, it should be noted there is another tradition that it was presented to Sa-skya Paṇḍita (1182-1251), uncle of 'Phags-pa, by the Mongol prince, Köden, and that Sa-skya Paṇḍita then handed it on to 'Phags-pa (*Gdung-rabs* p. 182; Wylie, pp. 106, 115-6).

[9] *Gdung-rabs*, p. 180.

qualities, one of which is that just by hearing its sound, one's defilements accumulated over measureless tens of millions of kalpas, are washed away; the door to one's rebirth in the lower realms is blocked shut; and one is established in paradise and the bliss of liberation [10]. 'Phags-pa Lama brought the Dharma-conch from China when he returned to Sa-skya [11], and it became one of the most venerated relics preserved by the successive hierarchs of Sa-skya, who belonged to the 'Khon lineage [12].

The *Sa-skya Gdung-rabs Chen-mo*, a genealogical account of the 'Khon lineage [13], contains an account of how this Dharma-conch came to China from India. In brief, during the reign of the Indian king, Dharmapāla [14], heretics destroyed the monastic university of Nālandā [15], and suppressed Buddhist teachings. Dharmapāla requested assistance from the Emperor of China, and military and economic help was sent twice. Dharmapāla was thus able to defeat the armies of the heretics [16]. Out of grati-

[10] *Gdung-rabs*, p. 183.

[11] *Gdung-rabs*, p. 182. This text does not specify whether 'Phags-pa brought the Dharma-conch to Sa-skya when he returned there in 1265 (*Wylie*, p. 121) or in 1276 (*Wylie*, p. 127).

[12] On the origin of the name 'Khon, see *TPS*, p. 625. 'Khon was the family name of the lama who founded the Sa-skya monastery in 1073, and his descendants have been the hierarchs of the Sa-skya school of Tibetan Buddhism down to the present day. For an up-to-date, comprehensive study of the 'Khon lineage, see Jeffrey D. Schoening, *The Sa-skya Throne Holder Lineage* (unpublished M.A. thesis), University of Washington, 1983, 392 pages.

[13] See notes no. 6 and 12 of this paper.

[14] Dharmapāla was the grandson of Gopāla who founded the Pāla dynasty in India; for their story, see *Chos-rgyal Srong-btsan-sgam-po'i Bka'-chems bka'-khol-ma*, commonly known by the shorter title *Bka-chems ka-khol-ma* [hereafter cited as *Bka'-chems*], published in *Smanrtsis Shesrig Spendzod* 33 (Leh: S. W. Tashigangpa, 1973), pp. 642–3. (For additional notes on this text, see note no. 22 of this paper). Gopāla reigned circa 750–770, and Dharmapāla reigned circa 770–810; cf. *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1974) vol. 9, p. 361.

[15] Nālandā, a Buddhist monastic center, flourished during the Pāla dynasty, but was "... sacked during Muslim raids in Bihār (*c.* 1200) and never recovered" (*Encyclopaedia Britannica*, vol. VII, p. 174). For 'heretics' the usual Tibetan term *mu-stegs-pa* is used in both *Gdung-rabs* and *Bka'-chems*, but the later text also calls them *Tu-ru-ka* (*Bka'-chems*, p. 644); i.e., "... the Turks, sometimes used historically as a general term for Mahomedans". (Sarat C. Das, *A Tibetan-English Dictionary* [Calcutta: Bengal Secretariat Book Depot, 1902], p. 517). See note no. 16 for more discussion on this story.

[16] According to the *Bka'-chems*, half of the wealth sent by the Emperor of China to Dharmapāla was used to defeat the heretics, and the other half was used to restore temples, recopy manuscripts, and invite paṇḍitas to revive Buddhist teachings (*Bka'-chems*, pp. 643–4). This restoration of the monastic complex at Nālandā would indicate that the story does not refer to its destruction by the Muslims since it never recovered from those attacks circa 1200. The story of Dharmapāla and the destruc-

tude, he offered to send the Emperor of China whatever he desired in return. The Emperor requested specific things and they were sent.

Since the list of the things sent to China is the basis of this paper, that list, as found in the *Sa-skya Gdung-rabs Chen-mo*, is given here:

1. (a statue of) the Buddha, the size of an eight-year-old,
2. The Dharma-conch of the Buddha,
3. (the *sūtra*) *Chu klung gi mdo*,
4. (the *sūtra*) *Rgyan stug po bkod pa'i mdo*,
5. (the *sūtra*) *'Dul ba ko sha*,
6. (the *sūtra*) *Za ma tog bkod pa'i mdo*, and
7. a community of four monks, steadfast in their vows [17].

A-myes-zhabs, who compiled the *Sa-skya Gdung-rabs Chen-mo* circa 1629, did not name any source, textual or verbal, for the account he gave about how the Dharma-conch of the Buddha came to China from India. The same story, however, is found in the *Rgya Bod Yig-tshang*, which predates the *Sa-skya Gdung-rabs Chen-mo* by almost two centuries [18]. A comparison of these two texts shows that the story in the *Sa-skya Gdung-rabs Chen-mo* is close to being a verbatim copy of the story in the *Rgya Bod Yig-tshang*. In spite of their close similarity, there is one major difference

tion of Nālandā by the 'Turks' may be little more than a confused mythical tradition. (Compare note no. 24 of this paper). When recounting this story, Professor Tucci asked, 'Is it possible that this tale preserves some memory of Wang Hiuen tse's expedition'? (*TPS*, p. 682).

[17] The list in Tibetan: "... sangs rgyas dgung lo brgyad pa'i sku tshad dang / sangs rgyas kyi chos dung / chu klung gi mdo / rgyan stug po bkod pa'i mdo / 'dul ba ko sha dang / za ma tog bkod pa'i mdo dang bzhi / dge slong sdom brtson ldan pa bzhi sde dang bcas pa..." (*Gdung-rabs*, pp. 181–2). As for the 4 texts: *Chu-klung-gi mdo* was not found in *A Comparative Analytical Catalogue of the Kanjur Division of the Tibetan Tripitaka* [hereafter cited as *Otani*], Kyoto, 1930–32. Is it the same *sūtra* as the *Chu-klung-mngon-par-rol-pa'i mdo* mentioned in the *Deb-ther Sngon-po*, as translated by George N. Roerich under the title, *The Blue Annals* [hereafter cited as *BA*], Delhi, 1976), p. 978 *Rgyan stug-po bkod-pa'i mdo* is the *Ghanavyūha-sūtra* (*Otani*, p. 280, no. 778). *'Dul ba ko sha* was not found in *Otani*. Is it the same as *'Dul-ba'i mdo*, the *Vinayasūtra* by Guṇaprabha (*BA*, p. 654)? *Za-ma-tog bkod-pa'i mdo* is the *Karaṇḍavyūha-sūtra* (*Otani*, p. 285, no. 784). To use the term *sde* for a community of monks, that community must consist of at least four members; *cf.* H. A. Jäschke, *A Tibetan-English Dictionary*, London, 1949, p. 295.

[18] For a study of this important work compiled by Śrībhūtibhadra circa 1434, see Ariane Macdonald, « Préambule à la lecture d'un Rgya-Bod Yig-Chañ », *JA*, 1963, pp. 53–159. The version of the *Rgya Bod Yig-tshang* thereafter cited as *RBwT*] used in this paper is the 357-folio manuscript acquired by the East Asia Library (University of Washington) from the collection of Joseph R. Rock (1884–1962).

between the two, and it was that factor which prompted the writing of this preliminary paper.

The list of things sent from India to China given in the *Sa-skya Gdung-rabs Chen-mo* is identical with the list in the *Rgya Bod Yig-tshang*, except that there is no mention whatsoever of the Dharma-conch of the Buddha in the *Rgya Bod Yig-tshang* list or elsewhere in the story itself[19]. Also, the expanded passage in the *Sa-skya Gdung-rabs Chen-mo*, which says, «... such things as the Jo-bo (Śākyamuni image) and this very Dharma-conch were escorted to China... "[20] is found in the *Rgya Bod Yig-tshang* to say only, "... the Jo-bo (Śākyamuni image) was escorted to China "[21].

If these two versions of the story were the only ones available for comparison, it would be impossible to guess which one should be regarded as the valid original, even though the *Rgya Bod Yig-tshang* is almost two hundred years earlier than the *Sa-skya Gdung-rabs Chen-mo*. Fortunately, the author of the *Rgya Bod Yig-tshang* states clearly that the textual source of his story was the *Bka'-chems ka-khol-ma*[22]. The list given in the *Bka'-chems ka-khol-ma* is basically the same as that in the *Rgya Bod Yig-tshang*[23]. In other words there is no mention of the Dharma-conch of the Buddha in the *Bka'-chems ka-khol-ma* story either.

Given this textual evidence it appears that, in the original story (whether fact or fiction is immaterial here), the list of things sent by Dharmapāla to China included an image of the Buddha, four Buddhist texts, and a community of four Buddhist monks. It seems clear as well that

[19] *RBYT*, folios 62-a & 62-b.

[20] In Tibetan: "... jo bo dang chos dung 'di nyid sogs rgya nag tu spyan drangs pa yin..." (*Gdung-rabs*, p. 182, line 2).

[21] In Tibetan: "jo bo rgya nag du gdan drangs par byed do/ " (*RBYT*, folio 62-b, line 6).

[22] *RBYT*, folio 62-a, line 1. *Bka'-chems ka-khol-ma* is the name of a work purported to be one of the so-called " wills " of the 7th-century monarch, Srong-btsan-sgam-po. It is said to have been discovered by Atiśa (982-1054) in the Jo-khang temple in Lhasa. For details on this " will ", see A. I. Vostrikov, *Tibetan Historical Literature*, translated by Harish Chandra Gupta, Calcutta, 1970, pp. 28-32.

[23] There are slight differences in the names of two of the Buddhist texts listed. The *Chu-klung-gi mdo* and the *'Dul-ba ko-sha* of *Gdung-rabs* and *RBYT* are listed as *Chu-klung-ba tsha-can-gyi mdo* and *'Dul-ba bkod-pa sha* in *Bka'-chems* (p. 644). There is, however, an important difference regarding the size of the image of the Buddha. In both *Gdung-rabs* and *RBYT*, the image is said to be the size of an eight-year-old, with no mention of what substance the image was made. According to the *Deb-ther Sngon-po*, it was made of sandalwood (*BA*, p. 48). The *Bka'-chems*, on the contrary, says the image was the size of a twelve-year-old and that it was made out of gold (p. 644). Since *RBYT* cites the *Bka'-chems* as its source for the Dharmapāla story and list, it is unexplainable at this point why there is a discrepancy about the image of the Buddha in these two texts.

the purpose of the original story was to explain how the image of the Buddha came to China. The Dharmapāla story occurs in the *Rgya Bod Yig-tshang* after the text states chronologically that the Jo-bo Śākyamuni (image), the size of an eight-year-old, came to China in the time of the Gwa'i-tsing [sic!] kings [24]. The *Deb-ther Sngon-po* states, "In the time of the bSi-Tsiṅ (Hsi-Chin) dynasty, (an embassy) was sent to bring the sandal image of the Buddha (tsan-dan J̌o-bo)" [25]. The *Deb-ther Sngon-po* gives some more details about the image after the fall of the Hsi-Chin (Western Chin) dynasty, but there is no Dharmapāla story and no list of things sent to China. The absence of these shows that emphasis was placed in the *Deb-ther Sngon-po* on the image of the Buddha alone.

The emphasis of the story in the *Sa-skya Gdung-rabs Chen-mo*, on the contrary, is on the Dharma-conch of the Buddha. The story does not end with the sending of the things to China (as it does in the *Rgya Bod Yig-tshang*), but goes on to eulogize the virtues of the Dharma-conch, even relating how it performed miracles when enemies seized the Lha-khang chen-mo [26] in the 16th century and took it away [27].

This emphasis on the Dharma-conch overtly enhances the prestige of the Sa-skya hierarchs, and covertly may provide a reason why the Sa-skya story includes a Dharma-conch of the Buddha, when no such conch is mentioned in either the *Rgya Bod Yig-tshang* or *Bka'-chems ka-khol-ma*. (Whether or not the Dharma-conch is actually the Dharma-conch of the Buddha, as believed in the Sa-skya tradition, is not at issue here). What is suggested in this paper is that in time an oral tradition evolved saying,

[24] *RBYT*, folio 61-b. Thanks to an analogous passage in the *Deb-ther Sngon-po*, where the Gwa'i-tsing of *RBYT* is spelled bSi-Tsiṅ and identified by Roerich as Hsi-Chin (*BA*, p. 48), it is possible to set-up the following equation: Gwa'i-tsing = bSi-Tsiṅ = Hsi-Chin = the Western Chin dynasty of China, dated A.D. 265–317 (*Encyclopaedia Britannica*, vol. 4, 316). It is impossible to regard a story in which Dharmapāḷa (r. 770–810) sends a Buddha image to China after 'heretics' (= Muslims) destroyed Nālandā (circa 1200), and the image arrives in China during the Western Chin dynasty, as anything but confused mythology (see note no. 16).

[25] *BA*, p. 48.

[26] The Lha-khang chen-mo, literally 'Great Temple', is the fortress-like monastic building constructed on the left bank of the Grum river in the 13th century as the headquarters of the Sa-skya hierarchs (*TPS*, p. 626; *Wylie*, p. 126).

[27] This attack on Sa-skya took place during the time of the Sa-skya Throne-holder, Sngags-'chang Ngag-dbang kun-dga' rin-chen (1517–1584) (*Gdung-rabs*, pp. 183–4, 522; Jeffrey D. Schoening, *op. cit.*, p. 146). It is said that when in the hands of Sa-skya's evil enemies, this miraculous Dharma-conch, which had become filled with worms, was left on the altar of offerings. Without anyone to blow it, it sounded forth its own voice as an inauspicious omen. Relying on this and other unwholesome signs it displayed, the Dharma-conch was immediately offered back to Sa-skya with apologies (*Gdung-rabs*, p. 183).

since this conch is the authentic Dharma-conch of the Buddha himself, then surely it must have come to China along with the other things sent by Dharmapāla, and so a Dharma-conch of the Buddha was simply added to the list given in the original story. Whether someone else put this Dharma-conch tradition down in writing as part of the Dharmapāla story before 'Jam-mgon A-myes-zhabs compiled the *Sa-skya Gdung-rabs Chen-mo* in the 17th century remains to be seen.